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Traditionally the laws of war, or widely known as international humanitarian law today,
in principle did not cover civil wars but only wars between States. The Geneva
Conventions were adopted in 1949 to increase the protection of victims in armed
conflicts, but the protection of the victims in internal conflict by the Conventions was
limited. Thus, Protocol II additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 was
introduced in 1977 to be specifically applicable to non-international armed conflicts in
order to ameliorate the conditions of those who suffer in such conflict.
A State confronting a conflict in its own territory is almost always unwilling to apply
an international treaty to the situation, and therefore the pace of the ratification of
Protocol II has been slow. The State is not bound by the treaty unless she ratifies it,
and an internal war tends to become severe and cruel with few regulations. Despite
such inadequate protection, however, customary international law based on State
practice and opinio furls applies to such circumstances. The purpose of this thesis is
therefore to ascertain the customary status of Protocol II.
This thesis first examines whether customary rules had existed before the introduction
of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and proceeds to study what is customary
international law applicable to non-international armed conflict. Then this author
determines whether each article of Protocol II has become customary by investigating
into State practice and opinio juris, and he finds through the investigation that only a
little part of the Protocol has become customary. Notwithstanding such insufficient
protection for the victims in civil conflict, however, the general principles of the laws
of war are always applicable to internal conflict. In addition this writer emphasises
,
the importance of the domestic "implementation" of the humanitarian rules and
recommends the introduction of a unified and simplified treaty in the future revision of
the Geneva Conventions and their Protocols.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1. INTRODUCTION
"We must do something!" This is an outcry which was heard all over the world during
the last decade of the twentieth century, when so many calamities were observed in
civil wars. The most successful instance of this exclamation was anti-personnel
landmines campaigns. Indeed, the result was more than "something": a treaty was
concluded which would totally ban anti-personnel landmines in all armed conflicts.'
International lawyers, too, argued that "something must be done" in legal terms, and
the establishment of the Rome Statute, which would eventually lead to the creation of
the International Criminal Court, 2 was indeed more than something: something which
had been considered for as long as fifty years.'
"Something must be done", and indeed something was usually done to certain
conflicts and certain war criminals. The war in the former Yugoslavia probably
attained much attention during the last decade, and something was done to prosecute
war criminals. In contrast, international forces led by the United States directly
intervened in Somalia, but they left without solving its civil war. Worst of all, the
international community paid close attention to Somalia only when "something was
being done". After the withdrawal of the multinational forces, less focus has been
1 Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel
Mines and on Their Destruction, reprinted in 36 IL/v.! 1507 (1997).
2 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.18319 (17 Jul. 1998), reprinted
in 33 IL/v.! 999 (1998). According to Article 126 of the Statute, sixty ratifications are required for the
formal establishment of the International Criminal Court. Throughout this thesis, this Statute is referred
to as "the Rome Statute".
3 For instance, an international criminal court was envisaged in Art. 6 of the Genocide Convention.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the General
Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948, 78 UNTS 277 (1951).
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placed on this continuing conflict. On the other hand, nothing or very little has been
done about many other internal strifes. The Secretary-General in his report avowed:
In conclusion, the Special Envoy pointed out that since Liberia is a small country,
'
with a small population, the world does not seem to pay much attention to the
suffering of itspeople.4
Similarly, the ICRC' s Annual Report stated:
The Afghan conflict continued to take its deadly toll, largely ignored by the rest
of the world.5
To sum up, it appears that there are now two opposing phenomena. On the one hand,
attention is concentrated on certain internal conflicts, and international legal
instruments are devised to cope with the problems which occurred in those conflicts.
On the other hand, focus is not placed upon the rest, and those who are affected in
such neglected conflicts continue to suffer. In addition, the invention of
international agreements does not necessarily assist the victims in well-known
conflicts, not to mention those in less well-known ones. As the following chapters
show, the victims in the former Yugoslavia underwent the sufferings which were not
moderated by the accords by the parties to the internal strife to "internationalise" the
conflict.°
4 Security Council, Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, para. 6, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1167 (14 Oct. 1994).
5 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 103.
6 See infra. Chs. 5-8, in particular Ch.5.
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1.2. THE PURPOSE OF THIS THESIS
International humanitarian law7 is a branch of public international law which applies to
situation of armed conflicts. In international war where States fight with each other,
the number of international treaties has been extensively codified since the mid-
nineteenth century, while in civil war where fighting takes place within a boundary of
a State, 8 there had been only a fragment of customary law regulating the conduct of
warfare before the end of the Second World War. It was only with the adoption of
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions in 1949 9 that the first written provision
applicable to civil conflicts was created. However, this concise article was not
adequate in the post-Second World War period when many of the armed conflicts were
not international but non-international, and thus it was necessary to establish a set of
rules in this area. In 1977 therefore Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva
7 The terms "the laws of war", "the law of armed conflict" and "international humanitarian law" are used
interchangeably. However, when this author deals with historical aspects, particularly before the end of
the Second World War, the term "the laws of war" is exclusively used. Regarding the term
"international humanitarian law", see Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, 24 May - 12
June 1971), I, Introduction, at 25-26 CE/lb (1971). As to the term "the laws of war", see, The Laws of
War, at 1, 2 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed. with revisions and additions, 2000).
8 The terms "non-international armed conflict", "civil war", "civil conflict", "internal war", "internal
conflict", "civil strife" and "internal strife" are used interchangeably. As to internal strife or civil strife,
see A.J. Thomas, Jr., in "Panel: International Law and Civil Wars - I", 61 Proceedings of the ASIL 1, 23
(1967).
9 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces
in the Field of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 31-83 (1950).
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea of August 12, 1949,75 UNTS 85-133 (1950).
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 75 UNTS 135-
285 (1950).
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1945,
75 UNTS 287-417 (1950).
Throughout this thesis, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 are respectively referred to as "Geneva
Convention r, "Geneva Convention Ir', "Geneva Convention III" and "Geneva Convention IV".
Throughout this thesis, Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions is referred to as "Common
Article 3".
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Convention i° was introduced as the first international treaty which is solely applicable
to non-international armed conflict.
In 2001, more than 140 States are parties to Protocol II, 11 and these States are hence
bound by the treaty. However, with careful examination, one can easily notice that a
State which faces conflict in its territory tends to avoid the ratification of the
Protoco1, 12 and the only international instruments that bind such a State are Common
Article 3 and customary international law. Accordingly, the study of the contents of
custom becomes important in order to assist victims in internal strife where the State
involved is not a party to the Protocol, and the purpose of this thesis is therefore to
ascertain the customary status of Protocol II additional to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions.
The ascertainment of custom in non-international armed conflicts would also
contribute to the theoretical development and actual application of international law.
Regarding the former aspect, there are virtually no scholars who sought to establish the
customary status of Protocol II, and this thesis therefore would contribute to
international humanitarian law by demonstrating customary rules in Protocol II. For
instance, textbooks on international humanitarian law usually refer to treaties and
custom as two important tools, but they seldom show what custom is in international
war not to mention non-international armed conflicts. Accordingly, this thesis would
10 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of
Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 1125 UNTS 609-699 (1979). Throughout
this thesis, this Protocol is referred to as "Protocol II".
I See "Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: ratifications,
accessions and successions" (29 August 2000), which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at
www.icrc.org .
12 States, such as Afghanistan, Papua New Guinea, Somalia, Sudan and Sri Lanka are not parties to
Protocol II, even though there is no evidence to suggest that these States have avoided the ratification of
the treaty because they have been confronted by internal conflicts.
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be a guiding tool to demonstrate the existence of custom in civil conflicts by showing
how it has been formed.
Concerning the application of international humanitarian law, international and
domestic courts could consult with the outcome of the investigation of this thesis. 13
Article 8 of the Rome Statute provides Common Article 3 and a detailed list of "other
serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an
international character", and all of the rules which this author finds customary in this
thesis are included in this provision. Nevertheless, the International Criminal Court
may use the methods this thesis applies, namely investigation into opinio juris and
State practice, and ascertain customary rules which are created after its entry into force.
As regards ad hoc international tribunals and domestic courts, they need to rely on
customary rules if the State concerned is not a party to Protocol II, and here the result
of this thesis could be referred to.
Lastly, the ICRC is conducting research into customary rules of international
humanitarian law, which was endorsed by the 26 th International Conference of the Red
Cross and Red Crescent. 14 This project was originally intended to study customary
rules governing non-international armed conflicts, since there are only a limited
number of treaty provisions and custom was therefore thought to be a useful tool since
it binds all States. 15 The study turned into a research into both international and non-
international armed conflicts, but the original idea of the study indicates the
importance of analysis into custom in non-international armed conflicts.
13 See Jean-Marie Henckaerts, 'Study on customary rules of international humanitarian law: Purpose,
coverage and methodology', IRRC, Sept. 1999, at 660, 661-662.	 .
14 m.
5
1.3. THE APPROACH OF THIS THESIS
Among the limited number of authorities on the customary status of international
humanitarian law, Abi-Saab relies on general international law instead of custom, and
considered it unnecessary to prove the existence of opinio juris and State practice.16
Cassese conducts extensive investigation into the relationship between treaties and
customary international law before examining each provision of both Protocols. 17
Kalshoven argues that the same "standards of civilization" are applicable to both
international and non-international armed conflicts, as discussions and resolutions after
1945, he claims, indicate. 18 Meron focuses on case law, particularly the Nicaragua
Judgment in his publication. 19
The approach of this author towards research into this area of law is quite different
from such scholars. First he applies the theory of customary law to various civil wars;
in other words, he attempts to observe if there are practices and opinio juris that are
necessary for the formation of custom. This method of ascertaining customary law is
so fundamental, yet virtually no scholar has tried to apply the theory into practice, and
many of them focus upon only one element, opinio juris or other sources, such as
resolutions. Second, in this thesis this writer undertakes to bring more light to civil
wars other than well-known conflicts, such as the one in the former Yugoslavia. As
has been already mentioned, there have been numerous writings as well as judgments
15 Id., at 660-661.
16 Georges Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary
Reflections", in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead, 115, 121-122 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen & Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
17 Antonio Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and
Customary International Law", 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55 (1984).
18 Frits Kalshoven, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-International Armed
Conflict", in Current Problems ofinternational Law 267, 280 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975).
19 Theodore Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Customary Law, Ch. 1(1989).
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on the conflict occurred in the former Yugoslavia, 20 and therefore authorities tend to
focus on this particular case. However it should be emphasised that the war is one of
the many internal conflicts that have taken place recently, and paying disproportionate
attention to it would be even harmful to the customary regulations in times of civil war,
which should be equally applicable to all internal conflicts. The study on customary
rules by the ICRC has not been published yet, but it appears that the research covers a
wide range of State practice and opinio furls, which might be relevant to this author's
methods. 21
1.4. THE CHAPTERS IN THIS THESIS
Now, this author turns his focus on each chapter of this thesis. In the following chapter,
he first discusses the recognition of belligerency. Conventional belief held by
international lawyers about the laws of war in civil conflicts before 1945 is that these
laws were applicable only when the belligerency of a rebel group was recognised, but
the present writer will demonstrate in Chapter 2 that, unlike such conventional belief,
the recognition of belligerency was more concerned with the law of neutrality than
with the rules of conduct of hostilities, and that virtually no customary law applicable
to civil wars had existed before the end of the Second World War. Having said so, he
then argues that the general principles of the laws of war have always covered both
internal and international wars and that these principles still play a significant role
today because of a modicum of existing customary humanitarian law in civil conflicts,
20 See e.g. Christopher Greenwood, "International Humanitarian Law and the Tadic Case", 7 EJIL 265
(1996).
21 Henckaerts, supra. note 13, at 664-666. But id., at 668 (the study appears to have found that "there
are more rules of customary international law relating to non-international armed conflict than originally
expected", and this is contrary to the finding of this thesis.)
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After clarifying the state of the law until the mid-twentieth century, this author
examines the Japanese Civil War in the light of the laws of war in Chapter 3. Research
into this Civil War would support the proposition that the recognition of belligerency
was of limited significance in terms of the conduct of hostilities. There are three
reasons why this civil war is examined in this thesis. First, few readers outside Japan
have knowledge about the Civil War, and its analysis would be of academic
consequence. Second, the Civil War observed features common to many of today's
internal conflict, e.g. the severe treatment of captured samurai and reconciliation after
the end of hostilities. Third, the war was a pertinent example of the explicit
recognition of belligerency, which has rarely occurred in practice.
In Chapter 4, the theory of customary international law is construed in the light of the
law of armed conflict applicable to civil war. Only when the relationship between
these two branches of law is clarified, can one proceed to the detailed discussion of the
customary status of Protocol II. The centre of this chapter is practice and opinio furls,
the two fundamental elements of custom. Even though most scholars as well as
judicial judgments agree that the two components are indispensable, they do not
necessarily show of what they actually consist. Therefore this author elucidates what
constitutes State practice and opinio juris in international humanitarian law in time of
internal conflict.
Then, Chapters 5 to 8 discuss each article of Protocol II. The method of discussion is
historical. First, the laws of war before 1949 is briefly referred to, and then the state of
law from 1949 to 1970 is focused. Two instruments, namely Common Article 3 and a
series of General Assembly resolutions of 1970 concerning humanitarian law are
particularly investigated. The latter is important because the twenty-fifth session of the
UN General Assembly was the only occasion when the UN considered humanitarian
8
law at length. Third, debate in the Diplomatic Conference is examined to show
whether the customary status of each provision of Protocol II was confirmed as
customary by a majority of the States participating in the Conference. Fourth, recent
practice and opinio juris are analysed. There have been so many civil wars in recent
history, and discussing all of them is just not plausible. Thus, this author limits the
scope to the conflicts in Afghanistan, Bougainville (Papua New Guinea), Chechnya
(Russia), El Salvador, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sri Lanka and the former Yugoslavia.
Such limitation does not, however, prevent the use of materials of other civil conflicts,
international wars and internal disturbances whenever necessary and relevant.
Chapter 5 examines the customary status of each provision in Part I of Protocol II;
Chapter 6 in Part II; Chapter 7 in Part III; and Chapter 8 in Part IV. In Chapter 9,
"implementation" of international humanitarian law is discussed." However, as a
matter of convenience, Article 2 of Protocol II providing personal field of application
is discussed in Chapter 6; Article 4(2)(d) regarding terrorism in Chapter 8; and Article
6(5) concerning amnesty in Chapter 9. In Chapter 10, this thesis will be summarised
and concluded.
1.5. THE LIMITATIONS OF THIS THESIS
It is essential to list the topics which are not discussed in this thesis. First the theory of
customary international law itself is an extremely vast, controversial area of law, and
the space in Chapter 4 does not allow minute discussion of the general theory of
custom to be undertaken. Consequently, discussion in this chapter centres on
customary international law in humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict.
22 In this chapter, to avoid confusion, the word "implementation" with quotation marks includes
implementation, enforcement and reconciliation while implementation without quotation marks signifies
implementation only.
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The general argument of custom is mentioned briefly for guidance at the beginning of
each section, but the rest devotes to discussion of customary international law in the
context of the laws of war on non-international armed conflict. 23 Jus cogens and the
law of armed conflict are a controversial issue, but this topic is not considered in this
thesis either because of the nature of jus cogens as treaty law.24
Second, even though Protocol II picks up only one form of non-international armed
conflicts and does not make a comprehensive definition of such conflict," this author
does not attempt to define or categorise non-international armed conflicts, 26
 because
the purpose of this thesis is to discuss the customary status of Protocol II. Having said
so, Chapter 5 will address what constitutes "armed conflict not of an international
character" in Common Article 3, since Protocol II "develops and supplements
[Common] Article 3 27 and discussion on the material field of application of Common
Article 3 is necessary in order to clarify the material field of application of Protocol II.
Third, the problems of genocide and crimes against humanity are not within its
scope,28
 while it is worth pointing out that the differentiation of the three categories
would be essential because of the increasingly confused use of the terms.
Finally this thesis does not discuss human rights law. There has been debate among
scholars about the relationship between human rights law and humanitarian law, 29 and
23 Discussion about custom in international armed conflict is, however, undertaken wherever relevant.
24 As to jus cogens and humanitarian law, see e.g. H.H.G. Post, "Some Curiosities in the Sources of the
Law of Armed Conflict Conceived in a General International Legal Perspective", 25 IVY/L 83, 114-115
(1994). As to general discussion of jus cogens, see e.g. Danilenko, "International Jus Cogens: Issues of
Law-Making", 2 EJIL 42 (1991).
25 See Georges Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International Dimensions
of Humanitarian Law 217, 237 (1988).
26 Regarding the categorisation of non-international armed conflicts, see Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel
D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, at 19-22 (1995).
27 Protocol II, Article 1(1).
28 As to genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, see David Turns, "War Crimes without
War? - The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Atrocities in Non-International Armed
Conflict", 7 RADIC 804 (1995).
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it is true that Common Article 3 and Part II of Protocol II were greatly influenced by
the development of human rights. 30 The present author, however, is of opinion that the
customary human rights law, however fundamental it may be, does not necessarily
guarantee the same, status in humanitarian law. 31 The laws of war is applied to
situations of extreme severity, and under certain circumstances it is not prohibited for
States and rebels by the laws to deprive persons of their most important right, the right
to life. Therefore international humanitarian law remains to be distinct from human
rights law, even though admittedly there is influence, particularly from the latter on the
former.
29 See e.g. Louise Doswald-Beck and Sylvain Vite, "International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights
Law", IRRC, Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 94; Francoise Hampson, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
Internal Conflicts", inArined Conflict and the New Law 55 (Michael A. Meyer ed., 1989).
3° Doswald-Beck & Vite, id., at 112-113.
31 The customary prohibition of slavery and recruitment of child soldiers in civil war situation are,
therefore, two exceptions, which is discussed in infra. Ch. 6.
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CHAPTER 2
THE RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY AND THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR
2.1. INTRODUCTION
Were the laws of war applied to civil war before 1945? This simple question is not
only of historical, but also of contemporary significance. Considering the historical
implication, today it is generally assumed that the recognition of belligerency was
necessary for the application of the laws of war to civil war in the pre-Second World
War period.' However, in practice, such recognition, particularly de jure one, rarely
took place, and the legal importance of the recognition of belligerency needs
investigation. Besides, there were humanitarian activities in civil conflicts, i.e. the
Spanish Civil War, even in absence of the formal recognition of belligerency, and the
prerequisite that the belligerency of rebels should be recognised before the application
of humanitarian rules may not be self-evident.
As for the contemporary meaning of the question, had there been laws of war
applicable to civil wars before the end of the Second World War, they should have
taken the form of customary law, since there had been no written international treaty
specifically to regulate such wars until the emergence of Common Article 3. 2
 If so, the
following questions should be asked. What were the contents of the custom? Was the
custom the same as the custom on international wars? Have the customary rules
continued to govern non-international armed conflict until today?
I See James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 49 (1974).
2 See id., at 33-34.
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2.2. RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY
2.2.1. OPINIONS OF EARLY WRITERS
Early writers did not mention the recognition of belligerency at all, and asserted that
the general principles of the laws of war regulated a civil war. 3
 For instance, de Vattel
was one of the first scholars who thoroughly explained the conduct of warfare of the
time.4
 He made the following remark in 1758, which may sound quixotic today:
... it is perfectly clear that the established laws of war, those principles of
humanity, forbearance, truthfulness, and honor, which we have earlier laid down,
should be observed on both sides in a civil war.5
About one hundred years later, Wheaton considered "all the rights of war as against
each other, and even as respects neutral nations" to be applicable to both parties to civil
war according to "the general usage of nations". 6 Similarly Woolsey wrote:
With civil wars international jus has nothing to do. But the same rules of natural
justice and humanity, which are applied to the question of the justice of ordinary
wars, and to the mode of conducting them, apply here also. In no kind of wars is
retaliation more sure, and none are generally so cruel and uncivilizing, so that
strict rules of war are here more necessary than any where else.7
3 As to general discussion on early writings, see e.g. L.C. Green, "What Is - Why Is There - The Laws of
War?", 5 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 99, 119-124 (1994).
4 See Green, id., at 123.
5 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Vol. III, Translation of the Edition of 1758 By Charles G.
Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, Book III, §294 (Michel E. Slatkine and Jiri
Toman reprint eds., 1983) (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758).
6 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, § 296 (James Brown Scott ed., 1936) (Edition of
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ed. by George Grafton Wilson, 1866). Dana's edition having been published
in 1866, the main text was idential to an edition published in 1846. See id., at 17a.
7 Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching,
and in Historical Studies, §136 (1860).
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2.2.2. THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
The American Civil War observed the recognition of belligerency of the Confederacy.
In April 1861 Lincoln declared blockade of ports, 8 which has been regarded by many
authors as recognition of belligerency of the Confederates by the lawful Government.9
The British deClaration of neutrality followed the proclamation of the President,
recognising the existence of hostilities "between the Government of the United States
of America and certain States styling themselves the Confederate States of America".10
Other States, such as France, 11
 also recognised the belligerency of the Southern
States. 12
State practice during the American Civil War influenced scholars of international law,
but it is questionable whether the recognition of belligerency became a firmly
established rule during or soon after the Civil War. It seems that Twiss was one of the
earliest writers who mentioned the recognition of belligerency. 13 In 1863 he wrote:
Further, where there is a State of War de facto between parties, which cannot be
preceded by a Declaration, as for instance in the extreme case of a Civil War,
where part of a Nation has erected a distinct and separate government, the
existence of a State of War, under such circumstances, is of necessity recognised
by foreign Powers... . 14
8 Reprinted in Williams Edward Hall, A Treatise of International Law, at 41 (Higgins ed., 8th ed., 1924).
9 E.g. Erik Castren, Civil War, at 46 (1966).
10 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1862 [2902] Vol. LXII. 1, mf 67.514, Correspondence
relating to the Civil War in the United States of America, No. 35, Incl. Proclamation by the Queen.
(Emphasis added).
11 See 3 Alexander-Charles Kiss, Repertoir de la Pratique Fran caise en Matiere de Droit International
Public, Doc. No. 128 (1965).
12 Castren, supra. note 9, at 45 and n.4.
13 Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the Rights
and Duties of Nations in Time of War, §§38, 239 (1863).
14 Id., §38, (1863). The recognition of belligerency by a lawful government appears to have been closely
related to the declaration of war, because the legitimate authorities could not declare war on a group
14
Notwithstanding this explicit statement, in the following part of his publication, he
elucidated the recognition of belligerency only in reference to neutrality and did not
explain whether such recognition would influence the conduct of hostilities. 15 In
addition, while Lieber's Code of 1863 was silent on the recognition of belligerency, it
declared the applicability of the general principles and the laws of war to civil war.16
_
Opinions opposing the application of the laws of war or their principles to civil war
appeared after the American Civil War. One of such views was an Editorial Comment
of the American Journal of International Law:
[I]t would seem that there should be no insuperable difficulty of adapting the
principles of the 1906 Geneva Conventions] to a state of war existing within a
state if as an essential precedent action the belligerency of the insurgents and of
their establishment of a provisional government be recognized.17
According to this article, insurgents should receive the recognition of belligerency,
pronounce their willingness to observe the laws of war, and request the Red Cross for
assistance, before the Red Cross began to undertake its operations. 18 This opinion
seems to be in accordance with the fact that it was only in the International Conference
existing in its own territory. As to the declaration of war, see Christopher Greenwood, "The Concept of
War in Modern International Law", 36 ICLQ 283 (1987).
15 Twiss, id., §239, (1863).
16 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, Section X, reprinted in
The Laws of Armed Conflicts, No. 1, (Deitrich Schindler and Jiri Toman eds., 3rd. rev, and completed
ed., 1988). Throughout this thesis, these Instructions are referred to as "Lieber's Code".
17 "The Red Cross in Civil Wars", 5 AJIL 438, 440 (1911) (the article also stated that the satisfaction of
these strict requirements would be necessary for safe operations conducted by the Red Cross). As to
ICRC activities in civil conflicts since its foundation in 1863, see generally Michael Veuthey,
"Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International
Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross", 33 AULR 83, 84-89
(1983).
18 "The Red Cross in Civil Wars", id., at 440.
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of the Red Cross in 1921 when the Red Cross, particularly National Societies,
considered assistance to victims of civil war their duty.19
In spite of such reluctance to regulate conduct of hostilities in civil war, many scholars,
_
in fact, referred to the recognition of belligerency in relation to either declaration of
war or neutrality rather than to the conduct of hostilities. 20 Dana only argued the
recognition of belligerency by third States and its consequences. 21 Twiss did not
modernise his argument about the recognition of belligerency in the second edition of
The Law of Nations.22 Woolsey, in the sixth edition of his Introcution, expounded the
section concerning civil war, part of which was quoted above, in a more elaborate way
than in the first edition. 23 He wrote:
With internal wars international law comes into contact so far as the laws of war,
that is, of humanity and natural justice, are concerned, and also in the bearings of
the war upon the interests and rights of foreign states... .
The same rules of war are required in such a war as in any other - the same ways
of fighting, the same treatment of prisoners, of combatants, of non-combatants,
and of private property by the army where it passes; so also natural justice
19 See International Committee of the Red Cross / International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, at 784-786
(13th ed., 1994) [hereinafter Red Cross Handbook]. As to this Conference, see Georges Abi-Saab,
"Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, Internatioinal Dimensions of Humanitarian Law
217, at 219 (1988). In the International Conference held in 1912 discussion of the problem of civil wars
was refused. See Jean S. Pictet, Red Cross Principles, at 34 (1956).
213 Sir Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the
Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War, §239 (2nd ed. rev., 1875). This section is identical to the
same numbered section in Twiss' first edition. See Twiss, supra. note 13, §239 (1863).
21 Wheaton, supra. note 6, at 29, n.15 and 314, n.153.
22 Twiss, supra. note 20, §§38, 239 (1875). These sections are identical to the corresponding sections of
the first edition.
23 Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in
Teaching, and in Historical Studies, §143 (6th ed. rev. en!., 1888).
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demands the same veracity and faithfulness which are binding in the intercourse
of all moral beings.24
In this sixth edition, Woolsey inserted new sections regarding the recognition of
belligerency, but it was discussed in the context of neutrality. 25 For instance he
explained both the British proclamation of neutrality and President Lincoln's
declaration of blockade, but his argument was limited to rules, such as blockade and
captures of vessels, and did not extend to the actual conduct of warfare.26
Apart from discussion about the recognition of belligerency, it seems that the
codification of the laws of war, which started around the American Civil War,
influenced the exclusion of their application to civil wars. The laws of war having
developed as a branch of public international law, the humanitarian treaties have been
codified by States and consequently they have been applicable to war between the
ratifying States. 27 For instance, it was unthinkable that rebel groups, such as the
Confederates, were allowed to partake of treaty-making procedures. The 1864 Geneva
Convention implicitly referred to the problem of applicability; the treaty did not
explicitly provide the scope of application, but usages of language, such as "Generals
of the belligerent Powers", indicated the applicability of the convention to international
war.28 However, such vaguely worded ambits of application might have left room for
interpretation, as Gustav Moynier, a founding member of the Institute of International
Law, claimed that the 1864 Geneva Convention should be obeyed "in all
24 Id.
25 1d., §§179-181.
26 1d., §180.
27 See Frits Kalshoven in "Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorism", 79 Proceedings of ASIL 109,
115 (1985).
28 Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field, reprinted in
supra. note 16, No. 36, Article 5. Throughout this thesis, this Convention is referred to as "the 1864
Geneva Convention".
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circumstances" because it was "a sort of declaration of humanitarian faith, a moral
code".29
Then, the St. Petersburg Declaration proclaimed that the treaty would be invoked "in
time of war between civilized nations".30 After that Declaration no multilateral treaty
had referred to civil war, 31 until 1949 when Common Article 3 was successfully
inserted in the Geneva Conventions. Today certain conventions specialising in
particular areas, such as the banning of landmines, cover both international and non-
international armed conflicts, but disparity in the degree of protection continues to
exist between the conventions applicable to international wars and the only multilateral
treaty applicable to civil wars, namely Protocol II.
2.2.3. THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH
There was intense debate about the applicability of the laws of war to the Spanish Civil
War in absence of the recognition of belligerency of the Nationalists. 32 The fact is that
neither the Spanish Government nor third parties to the war recognised the
belligerency of the insurgents, 33 and discussion centred upon two points, i.e. maritime
rights of the belligerents34 and the policy of non-intervention. 35 What was lacking was
29 Statement by Gustave Moynier, reprinted in AndrO Durand, "The role of Gustave Moynier in the
founding of the Institute of International Law (1873)", IRRC, Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 543, 558. (The original
text in italic). The source of the statement is not given in the article.
30 Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles under 400 Grammes
Weight, reprinted in The Laws of Armed Conflicts, supra. note 16, No. 9.
31 Woolsey criticised the exclusion of civil war from the range of 1874 Brussel Declaration because such
omission would "[leave] the parties in a civil war wholly unprotected". Woolsey, supra. note 23, §142
(1888).
32 The following are major works about the legal aspects of the Spanish Civil War published during or
just after the strife. Norman J. Padelford, International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife
(1939); George A. Finch, "The United States and the Spanish Civil War", 31 AJIL 74 (1937); James W.
Garner, "Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War", 31 AJIL 66 (1937); Vernon A.
O'Rourke, "Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War", 31 AJIL 398 (1937); James W. Garner,
"Recognition of Belligerency", 32 AJIL 106 (1938); C.G. Fenwick, "Can Civil Wars Be Brought under
the Control of International Law?", 32 AJIL 538 (1938).
33 See e.g. Garner, "Questions of International Law", id., at 66.
34 See id., at 71-73; O'Rourke, supra. note 32, at 402-8.
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deliberation about rules concerning conduct of hostilities. Indeed the Spanish
Goverment and the junta of Burgos formally accepted ICRC delegates. 36 The former
described the ICRC mission as "that of protecting and gaining respect for the Red
Cross emblem by the two parties and of facilitating the humanitarian work of the said
institution".37 The latter was more explicit, as "It states its readiness to observe and
respect, as it has always done and as it still does at every moment, the [1929] Geneva
Convention relating to the wounded, sick and prisoners". 38 As Cassese points out,
there was foreign pressure on both parties to observe certain rules of warfare, but such
a demand was made outside the framework of recognition of belligerency. 39 In
practice, the ICRC reported difficulties in conducting their activities, e.g. visits to
prisoners of war, but its delegates were still able to visit prisoners, which was followed
by improvements in conditions of captives.° It appears to the present author that the
recognition of belligerency was understood by authorities of the time to be more
related to the law of neutrality than of conduct of hostilities.
In 1947 Lauterpacht published Recognition in International Law in which he fully
explained the recognition of belligerency. 41 In this publication, he dismissed the
contention that the recognition of belligerency by a foreign State would contribute to
ensuring the application of the laws of war in civil war because "experience shows", he
argued, "after an initial stage of severity ..., the parties to the civil struggle tacitly
35 See Garner, id., at 66-71; O'Rourke, id., at 408-11; Fenwick, supra. note 32.
36 General Report of the International Red Cross Committee on its activities from August, 1934 to
March, 1938, Doc. No. 12a., at 126-128, (1938) [hereinafter General Report]. This document in the
French text is referred to by Antonio Cassese, "The Spanish Civil War and the Development of
Customary Law Concerning Internal Armed Conflicst", Current Problems of International Law 287, at
294 and n.8 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975).
37 General Report, id., at 127.
38 Id., at 128.
39 Cassese, supra. note 36, at 293-294.
40 General Report, supra. note 36, at 113-115, (1938).
41 Hersh Lauterpacht, Recognition in International Law (1947).
19
accept and act upon most of the rules of war which have secured consent". 42 With
adoption of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Common Article 3 came into being, whose
application is subject to only the existence of "armed conflict of not international
character".
..
2.2.4. WERE THE LAWS OF WAR APPLICABLE TO CIVIL WAR?
It has been demonstrated that the recognition of belligerency was more concerned with
the law of neutrality and maritime rights than the law regarding the conduct of
hostilities. Dana concentrated on third parties' recognition of insurgents as
belligerents, 43 and Twiss44 and Woolsey45 took similar views. With the arrival of the
twentieth century, Oppenheim mentioned the recognition of belligerency of an
insurgent group granted by both licit authorities and foreign States, 46 but he explained
the consequence of such neutrality only in the context of neutrality. 47 Finally,
Lauterpacht even regarded the "humanitarian argument" that humanitarian activities
would follow the recognition of belligerency by third parties as "deceptive". 48 Among
today's scholars who mention the recognition of belligerency, Abi-Saab points out that
the recognition of belligerency of a rebel group by a rightful government conferred all
the belligerent rights to the group, while such recognition by a third party gave it the
status as a neutra1. 49
 Moir argues that, while the law of neutrality became applicable
42 Id., §63.
43 Dana's notes in Wheaton, supra. note 6, at 29 n.15 and 314 n.153.
44 Twiss, supra. note 20, §239 (1875).
45 Woolsey, supra. note 23, §§179-181 (1888).
46 L. Oppenheim, 2 International Law, §59 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 1935).
47 Id, §298.
48 Lauterpacht, supra. note 41, §63.
49 Abl-Saab, supra. note 19, at 218. See also Frits Kalshoven in "Should the Laws of War Apply to
Terrorism", supra. note 27, at 115 (stating that "recognition of belligerency by the incumbent
government continued to be regarded as a precondition for application of the laws of war...").
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when third States recognise the belligerency of insurgents, 50 "recognition of
belligerency tended to encourage the observance of the humanitarian rules of warfare,
whereas an absence of recognition did the opposite".5I
/
It would be reasonable to conclude that the recognition of belligerency either by a
legitimate or foreign government did play a little part in the conduct of hostilities
between the warring parties, while the laws of war were to a certain extent applied and
humanitarian activities took place in civil conflict when the magnitude of the conflict
became severe, as the ICRC conducted its activities during the Spanish Civil War.
Therefore, the laws of war, particularly the "Geneva" law, became applicable to
internal war only after Comman Article 3 was established, and the undertaking to
ascertain customary law in this area should date back to 1949.
2.3. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR
2.3.1. SOURCES OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR
There are three sources of the general principles of the laws of war. Part of the general
principles of the laws of war originated from natural law and therefore they are ethical
expectations. 52 Positivism prevailed in the nineteenth century, 53 but the general
principles as moral expectations remained continuously applicable to civil wars. De
Vattel is regarded as an early positivist, 54 but he argued: "A lawful end confers a right
only to those means which are necessary to attain that end. Whatever is done in excess
50 Lindsay Moir, "The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts to 1949", 47 ICLQ 337, 341 (1998).
51 Id., at 346 (footnote omitted).
52 The theoretical problems of naturalism and positivism are out of the scope of this thesis. See
International Rules (Robert J. Beck et al ed., 1996); Hilare McCoubrey, "Natural Law, Religion and the
Development of International Law", in Religion and International Law 177 (Mark W. Janis and Carolyn
Evans eds., 1999).
53 See Abi-Saab, supra. note 19, at 218.
54 International Rules, supra. note 52, at 56.
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of such measures is contrary to the natural law, and must be condemned as evil before
the tribunal of conscience".55
Another part emanated from principles, which were incorporated in domestic
instruments, e.g. military manuals. The most pertinent example would be Lieber's
Code, which included such principles as military necessity, 56 proportionality, 57
humanity 58 and distinction. 59 The British military manual refers to the principles that
the use of force is justified "to the extent necessary for the realisation of the purpose of
war", and the principles of humanity and of chivalry. 60 The new German military
manual alludes to military necessity and humanity as two major principles, and also to
others, such as the principle of military objectives and the prohibition of unnecessary
sufferings.61
The third category of the general principles is the principles developed by the Red
Cross Movement. 62 Pictet referred to the following as the Fundament Principles of the
Red Cross: Humanity, Equality, Due Proportion, Impartiality, Neutrality,
Independence, and Universality. 63
 The Preamble of the Statutes of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted in 1986 provides the Fundamental
Principles of Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Services,
55 See de Vattel, supra. note 5, Book III, §137. McCoubrey found "The combination of naturalist and
positivist elements" in de Vattel's work. McCoubrey, supra. note 50, at 185.
56 Lieber's Code, Articles. 14-16.
57 Lieber's Code, Articles 27-28 (providing retaliation, though the principle of proportionality can be
read, particularly from Article 28).
58 Id., Article 152.
59 Id., Articles 22, 155.
60 The War Office, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, para. 3
(1958).
61 The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, §§130-132 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
62 As to the concise history of the Red Cross principles, see Jean-Luc Blonde], "The Fundamental
Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Their origin and development", IRRC, Jul.-Aug. 1991, at
349.
63 Jean S. Pictet, Red Cross Principles, at 11-91(1956).
22
Unity and Universality. 64 The Red Cross' fundamental principles are construed in the
context of Red Cross activities. For instance, Pictet held that "the general principle of
humanity" assumed broader implication than "the principle of humanity", discussed in
his work.6s The principle of proportionality, which he suggested, was interpreted in
such a way as to apportion help "according to the relative importance of individual
needs and in their order of urgency".66
Attempts to combine the three types of the general principles would be not only
extremely difficult but also damaging to the uniqueness of each principle. However,
the common feature of the three categories would be moral expectations 67 to be
observed by States, rebels and the Red Cross. As discussed, natural law tradition is
based upon morality, while the Red Cross principles also assume the ethical
responsibility of the organisation, as well as the legal one as incorporated in its Statute.
Domestic instruments embodying principles may be of legal significance, but they
often cannot disassociate themselves from morality, as Lieber's Code indicates.
2.3.2. THE CUSTOMARY STATUS OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF
WAR
In the light of international war, the accumulation of State practice and opinio juris
transformed the general principles of the laws of war into customary. 68
 In terms of
64 Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, Preamble, reprinted in Red
Cross Handbook, supra. note 19, at 417-418.
65 Pictet, supra. note 63, at 21 n. 1.
66 1d., at 41.
67 See Rosemary Abi-Saab, 'The "General Principles" of humanitarian law according to the International
Court of Justice', IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 367, 370-371 ("Considerations of humanity" would thus
represent general principles, or an ethical or moral basis, applying in all circumstances, in times of peace
as well as in times of armed conflict. The more specific "principles of humanitarian law" would be
those implementing the principles of humanity in circumstances of actual or potential armed conflict.').
68See EsjOrn Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, at 11 (1979) ("Some major
principles of international humanitarian law have been recognized in customary and treaty law as well as
in codification efforts").
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civil war, however, only part of the general principles has become customary
international law because of a lack of State practice and opinio juris, as well as treaty
provisions. This view partly agrees with Kalshoven who argues that the same
"standards of civilizations", or in other words "certain basic precepts of international
humanitarian law", ought to be applied to both international and internal conflicts.69
According to him, those precepts include the principles of the protection of civilians
and of the prohibition of unnecessary sufferings." However the opinion of the present
author differs from that of Kalshoven in that the latter considers the precepts to be
customary law without questioning their origin as law. 71 An article of Protocol II can
be an interpretation of a general principle of the laws of war, 72 but the general
principles of the laws of war have not amounted to law in the area of non-international
armed conflict because of want of practice and opinio furls.
2.3.3. WHAT ARE THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR?
What constitute the general principles of the laws of war vary among writers and
relevant institutions. 73 Rogers refers to military necessity, humanity, distinction and
proportionality, while Roberts and Guelff to limited means of injuring the enemy,
proportionality and discrimination. 74 The British military manual refers to "the
principles that a belligerent is justified in applying compulsion and force of any kind",
humanity and chivalry. 75 Indeed, the general principles of the laws of war are inter-
69 Frits Kalshoven, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-International Armed
Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 267, at 272, 280 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975).
7° Id., at 281-283.
71 Id.
72 Georges Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary
Reflections", in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits
Kalshoven 115, 120 (Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
73 See e.g. A.P.V. Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, at 1-26 (1996); Documents on the Laws of War, at 9-
10 (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff ed., 3rd ed., 2000).
74 Rogers, id.; Documents on the Laws of War, id.
75 The War Office, supra. note 60, para. 3.
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related and whether one categorises them into three or four or more does not make a
difference. The present writer, however, uses Rogers' categorisation, for his list of the
principles of the laws of war appears to be in accordance with the historical
development of those principles.
2.3.3.1. HUMANITY76
Among early scholars, de Vattel and Woolsey referred to the principle of humanity,
and such well-known domestic instruments as Lieber's Code, British and German
Military Manuals all allude to this principle. 77 In addition, "If the Red Cross were to
have only one principle", Pictet argued, "this [the principle of humanity] would be
it". 78 Rogers concisely interprets this principle as "a guiding principle which puts a
brake on undertakings which might otherwise be justified by the principle of military
necessity". 79 Without humanity, it might be militarily necessary to kill the prisoners of
war so that enemy population could be reduced in number, but the principle of
humanity could prevent such atrocity. 8° One principle which originates from this
general principle of humanity is the prohibition of rendering unnecessary sufferings, 81
which was embodied in the St. Petersbourg Declaration.
2.3.3.2. MILITARY NECESSITY82
As the "General principle of the rights of a sovereign against his enemy in a just war",
de Vattel referred to the principle of military necessity, since a State was, he argued,
76 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 6-7.
77 See de Vattel, supra. note 5, Book III, §294; Woolsey, supra. note 7, §136 (1860); the War Office,
supra. note 60, para. 3; The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, supra. note 61, §131.
78 Pictet, supra. note 63, at 14.
79 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 7.
80 Id., at 7.
81 Pictet, supra. note 63, at 17-18.
82 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 3-6.
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entitled "to make use of all the means necessary to attain it" to pursue the purpose of a
just war. 83
 As only instruments necessary to weaken an enemy can be taken, this
principle incorporates another principle that the means and methods to injure the
enemy is limited.84
Balance must be struck between military necessity and humanity; international
humanitarian law is premised on the existence of armed conflict, and disregarding
military necessity would be against the premise of the law. 85
 However international
humanitarian law does not always give the military a free hand to decide what is
militarily necessary. 86
 For instance, Article 14 of Protocol II, which prohibits the
starvation of civilian populations, leaves no room for military necessity. 87 Moreover,
as this thesis presents, States and rebels tend to deny the existence of or their
involvement in atrocities, and it is indeed rare to resort to this principle by claiming
that it was militarily necessary to kill, for instance, detainees.
2.3.3.3. DisTiNcrioN88
War having been waged between regular troops, de Vattel contended, those who did
not participate in hostilities "have nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy".89
Woolsey explained the same principle in different words; he argued "That war is
waged between governments by persons whom they authorize, and is not waged
83 De Vattel, supra. note 5, Book III, §136. Wheaton and Woolsey also referred to this principle.
Wheaton, supra. note 6, §§343, 345; Woolsey, supra. note 7, §125 (1860).
84 De Vattel, id., §§139-140. Roberts and Guelff regard this principle that "means of injuring the enemy
is not unlimited" as one of "the most fundamental customary principle". Documents on the Laws of War,
supra. note 73, at 9.
85 See Rogers, supra. note 73, at 7.
86
	 id.
87 This Article is not customary, as discussed in infra. Ch. 8.
88 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 7-14.
89 De Vane', supra. note 3, Book III, §147.
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against the passive inhabitants of a country". 9° This principle was codified in the St.
Petersburg Declaration, and it has been particularly the case with distinction between
military and civilian objects. 9I
 Even though Protocol II does not use the term "the
principle of.distinction" as such, this principle is incorporated in Part IV of Protocol
11, 92 in particular Article 13.
2.3.3.4. PROPORTIONALITY93
The principle of proportionality developed with close relation to reprisals94 and the
prohibition of causing unnecessary damages, particularly, to civilians. According to
earlier writers, the obligations of the laws of war were reciprocal, and the disobedience
of the laws brought retaliation. 95 De Vattel considered it permissible to kill, in
retaliation to the killing of prisoners by an enemy general, the same number of enemy
prisoners whose rank is the same as those who were killed by the genera1. 96 As a more
recent example, the German Military Manual states:
Reprisals shall not be excessive in relation to the offence committed by the
adversary and shall be preceded by a warning. They must be the last resort,
when all other means to stop the illegal behaviour have failed and the warning
has not been heeded.97
9° Woolsey, supra. note 7, §125 (1860). Wheaton also referred to this principle, even though he argued
in the context of military necessity. Wheaton, supra. note 6, §345.
91 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 7.
92 According to Rosenblad, Articles 7 and 14 to 18 of Protocol II contain this principle. See Rosenblad,
supra. note 68, at 101 and n.266.
93 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 14-19.
94 Belligerent reprisals is discussed in infra. Ch. 9.
95 Woolsey, supra. note 7, §§125-126 (1860); de Vattel, Book III, supra. note 5, §§137, 142.
96 De Vattel, id., §142. Woolsey took a more cautious approach, but he made a few small, but
interesting changes in his text. Compare Woolsey, supra. note 7, §126 (1860) with Woolsey, supra.
note 23, §132 (1888).
97 The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, supra. note 61, §478. It, however, prohibits
reprisals against certain categorised persons. Id, §479.
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It also provides:
Attacks on military objects must not cause loss of civilian life which is excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.98
This principle may be abused to execuse a brutal act which can take form as an act of
reprisal, but it is true that without the principle there would be more plight of victims,
as civilians are protected from excessive damages by the proportionality principle.99
Thus, this principle is valid to make a balance between the principles of humanity and
military necessity. 100
2.3.4. THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAWS OF WAR TODAY: How EFFECTIVE?
The Martens clause, which originally appeared in Hague Convention IV of 1907, is
also incorporated into Protocol II. 1 °I The Preamble of Protocol II provides:
... in cases not covered by the law in force, the human person remains under the
protection of the principles of humanity and the dictates of the public
conscience...
In the Diplomatic Conference, there were objections to the insertion of the Martens
clause in Protocol II, which enjoyed considerable support. 102
 A proposal to delete the
98 1d., §509.
99 See Antonio Cassese, "Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law", in The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 161, 165 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
100 Rogers, supra. note 73, at 14.
191 As to this clause, see e.g. The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict, supra. note 61,
§129 and its commentary; Rogers, supra. note 73, at 6-7.
192 The Nigerian proposal to delete a preamble was rejected (32/19/27). 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.76, para. 18,
at 476. Throughout this thesis, the Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation
and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Geneva (1974-
1977) are abbreviated as "OR". The above figures (32/19/27) represent the voting result, as 32 States in
favour, 19 against with 27 abstentions. Throughout this thesis, voting results in the Diplomatic
Conference are referred to in this way.
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phrase "the dictates of the public conscience" also received substantial backing.1°3
According to Indonesia, this phrase "is not completely clear and is confusing from the
legal point of view „ . 104 The adoption of the Preamble was made by consensus, 105 but
strong opposition to the inclusion of the Martens clause in Protocol II reveals that it
was not customary at the time of the Diplomatic Conference.
Indeed, doubt should be cast to the proposition that the Martens clause ought to be
customary only because the Martens clause has been inserted into humanitarian law
over and -over, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions. 106 The Martens clause in
Protocol 1 107 refers to "the protection and authority of the principles of international
law derived from established custom” while the Preamble of Protocol II omits this
phrase. 108 The ICRC's Commentary explains that this Preamble does not deny the
existence of "established custom", 109 and that "the principles of international law
apply in all armed conflicts" according to the Martens clause. 11 ° However, whether or
not there is the Martens clause in a humanitarian treaty, custom is applicable to all
it 1States.	 Besides, the general principles of the laws of war are more moral
expectations than law, and whether they are inserted in the Martens clause or not, they
are ethically expected to be conformed to by both States and rebels. In practice, the
Martens clause has not been invoked in non-international armed conflict, and its
usefulness seems to be limited.
103 The proposal was rejected (35/21/21). 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.76, para. 28, at 477-478.
104 Indonesia, 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.77, ANNEX, at 500.
105 7 OR, CDDH/SR.54, para. 43, at 170
106 Articles 63(1)/62(I1)/142(110/158(1V).
107 Article 1(2), Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 1125 UNTS 3 (1979). Throughout
this thesis, this Protocol is referred to as "Protocol I".
108 See Green, supra. note 3, at 140.
109 Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, para. 4435 (Yves Sandoz, Christophe Swinarski, and Bruno Zimmermann, eds., 1987).
Throughout this thesis, this Commentary is referred to as "the ICRC's Commentary".
no , 7.3la para. 56. (Footnotes omitted).
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Notwithstanding the contention that the Martens clause is not customary and does not
have to be customary, the general principles of the laws of war can play an important
part in ameliorating victims of internal strifes. The significance of these principles is
that they can be morally applicable to areas which are not regulated by specific rules
based on convention and/or custom. I 12 For instance, the principle of the protection of
civilians I13 is codified in Article 13 of Protocol jjll4 and this general provision can
cover large areas which are not explicitly regulated by international humanitarian law.
In Chapter 8, it is argued that this provision is not customary, primarily because of a
lack of practice, but even in an internal conflict not covered by Protocol II, it is
expected that legitimate authorities and a dissident group observe the general
principles of the laws of war. Although the Martens clause has not been resorted to
either by States or rebels in civil war, "principles" have been invoked on various
occasions. For instance, in its judgments, the ICJ resorted to "elementary
considerations of humanity" 115 and "the principles of humanitarian law". 116 In
conclusion, it would be necessary to pay more attention to the general principles of the
laws of war, since the customary rules on internal war are, as the following chapters
demonstrate, still limited today.
111 Documents on the Laws of War, supra. note 73, at 7.
112 But see Cassese, supra. note 99, at 165-6 (arguing that the general principles are vaguley worded and
being sceptical of their implementation).
113 This principle originates from all four general principles of the laws of war.
114 The ICRC 's Commentary, §4761. However, the present author considers that Article is not
customary because of a lack of practice. See infra. Ch. 8.
115 Corfu Channel case, Judgment of April 9th, 1949, 1C'.1 Report 1949, P. 4, at 22.
116 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 215. See analysis on the
general principles made by Rosemary Abi-Saab, supra. note 67.
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CHAPTER 3
THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR'
3.1. INTRODUCTION2
On January 28, 1868 war broke out between the Imperial and Shogun Forces near
Kyoto, the then capital of Japan. The war spread northwards and continued until the
last remainder of the Shogun Forces was defeated on Hokkaido on May 18, 1869. The
political "consequences of the Civil War are noteworthy: after the war the new Imperial
regime was firmly established and modern Japan began to emerge.
The Civil War is also significant from the perspective of the laws of war. First, the
Civil War is one of the rare examples in which third parties to the conflict explicitly
recognised the belligerency of both the Government and rebel forces. Furthermore, the
war was waged in accordance with the laws of war, to a certain degree. For instance,
'For this chapter, the author often relies on diplomatic documents of Great Britain, France and the USA
as well as those of Japan.
Concerning Japanese documents, he uses Gaimusho Chosabu [Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Research
Department] (ed.), Dai Nippon Gaiko Monjo [Japanese Diplomatic Documents] [hereinafter J.D.D.].
Regarding British documents, he uses General Correspondence, Japan, F.O. 46, which is held on
microfilm by the Library of the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo. The description of
each document is in accordance with Historical Documents Relating to Japan in Foreign Countries, Vols.
VI, The United Kingdom, Part 1(1966); Vol. VII, The United Kingdom, Part 11 (1967).
Regarding American documents, he uses General Records of the Department of State (R.G. 59),
Diplomatic Correspondence, Despatches from United States Minister to Japan, which is held on
microfilm by the Library of the Historiographical Institute of the University of Tokyo. The description of
each document is in accordance with Historical Documents Relating to Japan in Foreign Countries, Vol.
IX, The United States of America, Part 1 (1968).
Regarding French documents, he uses Correspondence Politique Japon [hereinafter C.P.J.], 1854-1871,
part of which is reproduced in a typewritten form as Documents sur la Relation diplomatique Franco-
Japonais, 1854-1871, quie etaient choisis des Correspondences du Ministere des Affaires Etrangeres de
la France par M Takematsu OTSUKA, en 1929 and which is held by the Library of the Historiographical
Institute of the University of Tokyo. The description of each document is in accordance with Historical
Documents Relating to Japan in Foreign Countries, Vol. XIII, France (1965).
2 In this thesis, the present author follows the Japanese system of order of names in which surnames come
first, given names second. He also uses the most well-known given names because it was not uncommon
for the Japanese to change their given names at that time. With respect to the calendar, Japan was using
the lunar calendar during the Civil War but in this account the writer uses the Gregorian calendar unless
otherwise indicated. Regarding the Japanese titles of publications and Japanese names of institutional
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Japanese and English doctors cared for the wounded and sick on the battlefield. In
naval battles, the tactics of using false flags were employed. Such facts being of great
historical significance, the purpose of this work is to elaborate how the laws of war of
that time were applied in the Japanese Civil War.
3.2. BACKGROUND
In 1600 Tokugawa Ieyasu established a new Shogun regime (Shogunate or bakufu)
which was dominated by the Tokugawa clan and continued for 260 years. 3 During the
Edo period, as this Tokugawa era is called, 4 Japan maintained a strict isolationist policy.
All trade was banned except with the Netherlands and China. 5 Domestically, in spite of
the supremacy of the Tokugawa family, Japan was divided into about 200 domains or
han ruled by feudal lords or daimyo, each of which was virtually independent. A rigid
class system was established in which the samurai ruled over the farmers, craftsmen and
merchants. Japan was generally peaceful, both domestically and internationally, during
most of the Edo period. However, a new era began when Commodore Perry of the
United States of America arrived in Japan in 1853 and forced the Shogun Government
to sign a treaty that established trade with the United States. 6 The Shogun regime
reluctantly signed treaties with the USA and later with Great Britain, France, Russia and
editors, the author translates them into English and places the translation in square brackets after the
original Japanese titles or names.
3 Shogun was usually referred to as "Tycoon" in diplomatic documents and treaties.
4 Edo was renamed Tokyo and the city became the capital of Japan in 1868. Edo was referred to as Yedo
or Yeddo in diplomatic documents and treaties.
5 Although the Shogunate feared invasion by European States, it allowed trade with the Netherlands
because it considered Protestantism less ambitious than Catholicism.
6 Treaty of Peace and Amity Between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan, (signed in
1854, ratifications exchanged in 1855) [hereinafter 1854 US-Japan Treaty], Gaimusho Joyakukyoku [The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Treaties Bureau], Kyujoyaku Isan [Recueil des traites et conventions entre le
Japon et les puissances entrangeres], Vol 1-1, at 1(1930). See also Convention Between Great Britain
and Japan, (signed in 1854, ratifications exchanged in 1855) [hereinafter 1854 Anglo-Japan Treaty], id,
Vol. 1-2, at 1(1934). The title of the above treaty series is given both in Japanese and French.
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the Netherlands in 1858. 7 But many of the samurai were infuriated by these forced
treaties, which led to movements against the Tokugawa Government. The Satsuma and
Choshu han played the most important role in these movements. 8 Earlier, both the
Satsuma and Choshu had taken extreme anti-foreign attitudes, which resulted in wars
with foreign Powers, 9 but after the wars the two daimyo began to establish friendly
relationships with them, particularly with Great Britain because they realised the
economic, military and naval superiority of European Powers. The domestic conflict
worsened and Tokugawa Yoshinobu, the last Shogun, returned power to Emperor Meiji
on November 9, 1867 10 and the restoration of Imperial rule was declared on January 3,
1868. 11 Nevertheless, tension between the Imperial and Shogun sides continued to exist
and on January 27, 1868 war broke out.
In spite of the general hatred of foreigners which existed in Japan during this
tumultuous time, the influence that Britain and France had on Japanese politics is
significant. 12 Britain had commercial interests in Japan and strong ties with the
7 See Treaty of Amity and Commerce Between the United States of America and the Empire of Japan,
(signed in 1858, ratifications exchanged in 1860), id., Vol. 1-1, at 13; Treaty of Peace, Amity and
Commerce Between Great Britain and Japan, (signed in 1858, ratifications exchanged in 1859)
[hereinafter 1858 Anglo-Japan Treaty], id., Vol. 1-2, at 8; and Traité de paix, d'amitie et de commerce
entre le Japon et la France, (signed in 1858, ratifications exchanged in 1859), id., Vol. 1-1, at 813.
Hereinafter, the USA and major European Powers that signed treaties with Japan are referred to as
"Treaty Powers" and their representatives in Japan as "Foreign Representatives".
8 The Satsuma han is today's Kagoshima prefecture that is located in the southern part of Kyushu, while
the Choshu han is today's Yamaguchi prefecture in the southern part of Honshu. Choshu was also
referred to as Choshiu in diplomatic documents and treaties.
9 In retaliation to the killing of a British subject by Satsuma's samurai, British men-of-war attacked the
city of Kagoshima, Satsuma, in 1863 and this resulted in the burning of a large area of the city. In the
same year, Choshu bombed foreign vessels and in return American, British, Dutch and French ships
attacked the cannons in Choshu and occupied the surrounding areas. See Sir Ernest Satow, A Diplomat in
Japan, 84-133 (Charles E. Tuttle 1983) (1921). Satow began his career as interpreter for the British
Legation in Japan in 1862 and returned to Britain as Secretary in 1869. He worked as a diplomat three
times in Japan and was Resident Minister in Tokyo between 1895 and 1900.
I ° J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, Doc. No. 1, Nov. 9, 1867. Emperor was usually referred to as Mikado in diplomatic
documents and treaties.
" F.O. 46-91, No. 9, Encl. 5: Imperial decree abolishing the Taikunate & other offices.
12 See Ikei Masaru, Zoho Nihon Gaikoshi Gaisetsu [The History of Japanese Diplomacy, revised and
enlarged], at 24-31 (1989).
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Imperial side, especially with the Satsuma and Choshu. 13 Sir Harry S. Parkes, the
British Minister, was the first foreign minister who submitted his credence to the
Emperor 14 and he also persuaded his colleagues to withdraw neutrality that worked
against the Imperial Government. I5 France, on the other hand, supported the bakuful6
and for example she assisted it to build an arsenal in Yokosuka and sent military
instructors who trained samurai of the Shogunate. 17 Leon Roches, the French Minister,
was a vigorous supporter of the Shogun and stated, even after Tokugawa Yoshinobu
returned his power to the Emperor and the war broke out, that "Nile Tycoon has neither
renounced to govern nor execute the Treaties. Far from this, one could rather believe
that he would be ready to extend them, and to put himself at the head of the foreign
party." 18 Roches was, however, replaced by Max Outrey in May 1868 because a new
French Foreign Minister was less enthusiastic about a relationship with Japan, and
Roches' policy towards the Shogun Government came to an end. 19 Regarding the
American policy towards Japan, despite the fact that it was the USA that had opened up
the country, her diplomatic influence was limited due to her preoccupation with her own
civil war.2° Nevertheless, Robert B. Van Valkenburgh, the American Minister and a
veteran of that war, reported the progress of the Japanese Civil War in considerable
detail in his despatch to Seward, Secretary of State. Furthermore, his amicable attitude
towards the northern daimyo and the exiled retainers is quite different from that of his
British and French counterparts.
13 One of the best works that illustrate the British policy on Japan would be Satow, supra note 9. See also
Ikei, id. at 28-31.
14 See infra. 3.4.1. The Sovereignty of Japan and the Legitimacy of Government.
15 See infra. 3.4.6. The End of the War in the North and the Cessation of Neutrality.
16 See Ikei, supra note 12, at 28.
17 See Takahashi Kunitaro, Oyatoi Gaikokujin 6 Gunji [Foreigners Employed by the Imperial
Government, Vol. 6, Military] , at 72-170 and 171-208 (1969).
18 R.G. 59, R. 9, No. 11, Encl. 1: Memorandum addressed to his colleagues by Mr. Leon Roches. Kobe,
Feb. 6, 1868. [Translator unknown.]
19 Ikei, supra note 12, at 30-31.
20 1d., at 24.
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3.3. THE PROGRESS OF THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR
The purpose of this research is to examine the extent to which the laws of war were
applied during the Japanese Civil War and a detailed account of the engagements should
be found elsewhere. 2I However, it is necessary here to explain the progress of the Civil
War briefly in order to examine its legal aspects. The Japanese Civil War can be
divided into four main stages: operations in Toba-Fushimi, Edo, the north and
Hakodate. The battle at Toba-Fushimi near Kyoto was won by the Imperial Forces
mainly because the Satsuma and Choshu had better arms and their morale was high. 22
The battle was heavily fought with weapons of the latest models, as evidenced by the
Shogun Government's statement that "there were a good many killed and wounded"
and that artillery, cannon and musketry were used. 23 Similarly, the US legation reported
that "the losses on both sides were very large principally in officers" and that the latest
breechloading rifles and rifled artillery were used. 24 The battle at Toba-Fushimi was
virtually the only significant battle at the early stage of the Civil War, followed by small
and relatively insignificant skirmishes that continued until the Imperial Forces arrived in
Edo.
Tokugawa Yoshinobu having submitted to the Emperor, Katsu Kaishu and Saigo
Takamori, representing the Shogun and Imperial Governments respectively, came to an
agreement that the Edo castle, the residence of the Tokugawas, would be peacefully
21 See, for instance, Oyama Kashiwa, Boshin Sensoshi, Joge [Histog of the Japanese Civil War, Vols.
1&2] (1968).
22 Ishii Takashi, Boshin Senso Ron, [The Japanese Civil War], at 104-105 (1986). Griffis wrote
apparently in favour of the Imperial Government: "Two thousand riflemen and artillerists, with arms and
tactics in modern style directed by Saigo opposed ten thousand men cased in helmets and armor and
equipped, for the most part, with arrow, sword, and spear." William Elliot Griffis, The Mikado, at 127
(1915).
23 See F.O. 46-91, No. 13, Encl. 9: Japanese Government account of engagement at Fushimi and Yodo.
[translated by Satow.] The original in J.D.P., Vol. 1-1, Doc. No. 82, Jan. 28, 1868. No date was shown
in the British document but according to the Japanese document it was produced on Jan. 28, 1868.
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transferred to the Imperial Forces. The peaceful hand-over of the castle was achieved,
but there were a small number of retainers of the bakufu who were not satisfied with
this transfer and on July 4, 1868 they fought against the Imperial Forces at Ueno, only a
few kilometres north of the castle. The retainers were, however, overwhelmed by both
the number and weaponry of the Imperial Forces and the battle resulted in the latter's
complete victory in one day.25
Many feudal lords in the northern part of Honshu, headed by the Aizu han, 26 were
discontented with the new Imperial Government and they formed an alliance, even
though their confederation had neither firm political principles nor unified military
organisation, a situation which resulted in the defection of some daimyo from the
alliance. 27 On the Echigo front, the Imperial Forces had to fight during the entire
summer of 1868 in order to defeat the Nagaoka clan, who resisted fiercely. After the
victory, however, the Imperial Forces were able to concentrate their power on the last
stronghold of the northern daimyo, Aizu, which had been the main enemy of the
Imperial Forces since the battle at Toba-Fushimi, and the Aizu han surrendered on
November 6, 1868.
After the triumph of the Imperial Forces at Edo, a group of discontented retainers of the
Shogun, headed by Enomoto Takeaki, seized eight vessels of war that had belonged to
the bakufu. 28 These retainers, who regarded themselves as exiled kerais (retainers),
sailed to the north on October 4, 1868 and attacked and occupied Hakodate on
24 See R.G.59, R. 9, Portman to W.H. Seward. Yokohama, Feb. 15, 1868. This document is not
numbered.
25 See F.O. 46-95, No. 169, Encl. 3: Statement and list of hostilities in Yedo [n.d.].
26 Aizu was referred to as Aidzu in diplomatic documents
27 Regarding this alliance, see Hoshi Ryoichi, Ouetsu Reppan Dome! [The Alliance of Northern Han]
(1995).
28 See F.O. 46-97, No. 260, Encl. 2: Statement by [Higashi Kuze Chiujo]. Oct. 10, 1868.
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December 8, 1868.29 The Imperial Forces were unable to react quickly because of the
severe winter of Hokkaido and it was only in May 1869 that they began to undertake
operations against the insurgents both on land and at sea, among which operations the
Battles of the- Miyako and Hakodate Bays are well-known. 30 There were foreign
residents in Hakodate because it was an open port3I and therefore the Treaty Powers
paid great attention to the conflict there. The Imperial Forces successfully advanced
both from land and sea and Enomoto surrendered on June 27, 1869.
3.4. THE RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENCY BY MAJOR POWERS AND ITS EFFECT
3.4.1. THE SOVEREIGNTY OF JAPAN AND THE LEGITIMACY OF GOVERNMENT
What is peculiar about the recognition of belligerency in the Japanese Civil War is that
the sovereignty of Japan was not well-defined and the Foreign Representatives did not
necessarily agree about which Government was legitimate, the Imperial or the Shogun
Government. 32 The early treaties were signed between the Shogun and Great Powers
and therefore the Shogun was considered to be the sovereign of Japan. 33 For example,
in the treaty of 1858 between Japan and Great Britain, the term "His Majesty the
Tycoon of Japan" was used to equal "Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Ireland." 34 Furthermore, Article 2 of the British Order in Council of
29 The exiled kerais issued a proclamation explaining their intention to the foreign representatives. See
"Document Circulated among all the Foreign Consuls at Hakodate on 6 th Dec. Translation. The Exiled
Tokugawa Kerai to the Representatives of European Powers", The Japan Times' Overland Mail
(Yokohama), Dec. 30, 1868, Vol. 5., No. 82, at 316, reprinted in Nihon Shoki Shimbun Zenshu [Early
Newspapers in Japan] [hereinafter Early Newspapers], Vol. 20 (Kitane Yutaka ed., 1989), at 10.
39 See e.g. "Naval Engagement in Miaco Bay", The Japan Times' Overland Mail (Yokohama), May 14,
1869, Vol. 7, No. 92, at 117, reprinted in Early Newspapers, id., Vol. 22 (1990), at 197: and "The Fall of
Hakodate", The Japan Times' Overland Mail (Yokohama), Jul. 12, 1869, Vol. 7, No. 96, reprinted in id.,
Vol. 23 (1990), at 277.
31 See e.g., 1854 US-Japan Treaty, Article II and 1854 Anglo-Japan Convention, Article I.
32 See Osatake Takeshi, Kokusaihoyori Mitaru Bakumatsu Gaikoshi [Diplomacy of the later Period of the
Shogunate, in the light of International Law], at 26 (1930).
33 See id. at 32.
34 1858 Anglo-Japanese Treaty, Preamble. Emphasis added. The Tycoon means the Shogun.
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March 9, 1865 stipulated that [t]he term "Japan" means the dominions of the Tycoon of
Japan.' 35 In contrast, the Court in Kyoto had been fiercely opposed to establishing
relationships with foreign States, but in 1865 Emperor Komei 36 issued a promulgation
which stated that "[the] Imperial consent is given to the Treaties."37 Now, the British
Minister stated that the Emperor "established his supremacy from a foreign point of
view" by confirming those early treaties. 38 The American Minister also wrote that his
Goverment recognised the supreme authority of the Emperor and "held the Tycoon
only as subordinate" when the Emperor ratified the treaties in 1865. 39 In fact,
administration continued to be conducted by the Shogun since the Emperor did not form
his own Government. However, soon after the Imperial restoration and the fighting in
Toba-Fushimi, Emperor Meiji declared:
Henceforward we shall exercise supreme authority both in the internal and
external affairs of the country. Consequently the title of Emperor should be
substituted for that of Tycoon which has been hitherto employed in the Treaties.
... It is desirable that the Representatives of all the Treaty Powers should
recognize this announcement.°
35 Order in Council for the Exercise of Jurisdiction in China and Japan 9th March 1865, Art. 2. House of
Commons Parliamentary Papers 1865 Vol. LVII [3497] 403, mf 71.441, at 3. (Emphasis added). Parkes
informed the Japanese Government that the Order substituted the term "Mikado" for "Tycoon," which
was received with "satisfaction" by the Government. See F.O. 46-111, No. 158, Aug. 9, 1869, and Encl.
1: Parkes to Date Chiunagon. Yedo, Jul. 29, 1869.
36 Emperor Komei was the father of Emperor Meiji.
37 House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1866 [3615] Vol. LXXVI 427, mf. 72.593 or 594,
Correspondence respecting Affairs in Japan: 1865-66. No. 79, Incl. 3, Mikado's Sanction of the Treaties,
and Gorojio's Engagement for its Promulgation, Nov. 24, 1865.
38 F.O. 46-92, No. 62. Osaka, March 19, 1868. (confidential)
39 R.G.59, R. 9, No. 11. Hiogo, Feb. 18, 1868.
49 F.O. 46-91, No. 23, Encl. 2, Proclamation by the Mikado, Feb. 3, 1868. (Translation)
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This declaration brought controversy among the Foreign Representatives because they
understood that the Imperial Government demanded recognition. 41 The French, Italian
and Prussian representatives were opposed to such recognition even though the British
representative was in favour. 42 Britain became the first State that formally recognised
the Imperial Government when Parkes submitted his credence to Emperor Meiji on May
22, 1868. 43 The effect of this formal recognition can be observed in the difference of
wording between the British neutrality notification of February, and the May Order of
the Queen in Counci1.44
 In the former, the contending parties were referred to as "His
Majesty the Mikado and the Tycoon" 45 but in the latter as "the Mikado and other
belligerents within the Japanese dominions". 46 This usage of these terms clearly
indicates that in the above Order the British Government regarded the Imperial
Government as legitimate. Furthermore, the Order used the words, "whereas Her
Majesty is at peace with the Government of Japan."47 Even though the Order did not
specify which party to the Civil War was "the Government of Japan", it is obvious that
the Imperial Government was such Government because the Shogunate was merely
"other belligerents". The Dutch, French and Italian Representatives submitted their
41 Kajima Morinosuke, Nihon Gaikoshi, Dai I kan, Bakumatsu Gaiko [The History of Japanese
Diplomacy, Vol. I, Diplomacy at the end of the Edo Period], at 251 (Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo [Kajima
Peace Institute] ed., 1970).
42 Id.
43 J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, Doc. No. 279, May 22, 1868; Kajima, id., at 275. A letter of credence was to be
addressed "to the sovereign ... or State to whom the minister is delegated." See Henry Wheaton,
Elements of International Law, § 217 (James Brown Scott ed., 1936) (Edition of Richard Henry Dana, Jr.,
ed. by George Grafton Wilson, 1866).
44 The notification and Order will be discussed later. Regarding the Order, it was issued on May 14, 1868
but this was before Parkes submitted his credentials to Emperor Meiji on May 22. However, note that the
letter of credence was issued on February 14 at Osborne by Queen Victoria and the delivery of the
credence to Japan took a considerable time. Therefore the Order would have been passed with the
knowledge of the credentials.
45 "Official Notification", Supplement to the Hiogo and Osaka Herald (Hiogo), Feb. 22, 1868, Vol. I, No.
8, (no page number given), reprinted in Early Newspapers, supra note 29, Vol. 13 (1988), at 34.
46 J.-u u , Vol. 1-1, Doc. No. 376, Jul. 13, 1868. Emphasis added.
" Id.
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respective letters of credence to Emperor Meiji on January 4, 1869. 48 The American
and German Representatives had the audience of the Emperor next day even though
they did not submit any letters of credence. 49 However, the American Minister regarded
the Imperial Government as "the Government [of the Empire of Japan]", 5° while in his
address to the Emperor, the German Minister stated that he "would like to be trusted by
Your Majesty [the Emperor of Japan]" 51 Judging from the wording, the above
addresses could mean that Germany and the USA recognised the Imperial Government.
3.4.2. THE COLLECTIVE DECLARATION OF NEUTRALITY OF 18 FEBRUARY 1868
On February 8, 1868 the Emperor proclaimed:
It is thus plain that hostilities were begun by him, and therefore that Yoshinobu is
in open rebellion. This and the continual deception practised on the Imperial
Court, are traitorous and unprincipled acts, and the patience of the Imperial Court
being entirely exhausted, it is unavoidably necessary to decree his punishment.52
This proclamation announced the commencement of war to the Japanese people, and on
February 14 the Imperial Government notified the Treaty Powers that "Nil consequence
of the revolt of Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Ninwaji no Miya, a Prince of the Blood ... has
been appointed Commander in Chief of the army of execution" and requested the
48 j:-.:-..
li 1J , Vol. 1-2, Doc. No. 691, Jan. 4, 1869.
49 J.D.D., Vol. 1-2, Doc. No. 698, Jan. 5, 1869.
5° J.D.D., Vol. 1-2, Doc. No. 693, Jan. 4, 1869. Van Valkenburgh had already submitted his letter of
credence to the Shogun on May 4, 1867 when the latter was still in charge of the Japanese Government.
See J.D.D., Vol. 1-2, Appendix 3, at 1.
51 See J.D.D., Vol. 1-2, No. 698, Jan. 5, 1869. Translated from Japanese by the author. It seems that Von
Brandt did not submit a letter of credence either to the Imperial or Shogun Government. See id.,
Appendix 3, at 40-41.
52 
"Proclamations by the Mikado. Translation.", The Japan Herald Market Report & Mail Summary, No.
51, Mar. 26, 1868, reprinted in Early Nespapers, supra note 29, Vol. 13, at 5. It appears that this
proclamation was originally issued on January 31, but it was publicly announced on February 8. See its
original in J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, No. 85, Jan. 31, 1868.
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Powers to "take measures in order to the [sic] preservation of strict neutrality". 53 On the
other side, as soon as the battle at Toba-Fushimi began, the Shogunate sent the
following letter to the British Minister:
,
We beg you therefore to notify your countrymen that they strictly observe those
provisions of the Treaty for the regulation of Trade which provide against the sale
of arms and vessels of war to any persons but the Japanese Government ... . In
time of peace these stipulations are not of much weight, but when civil war has
arisen, they are of the highest importance.54
The Treaty Powers were reluctant to interfere with Japanese domestic affairs because
they feared the disruption of trade with Japan. 55 The recognition of belligerency was
especially relevant to a case where a State and a rebel group in a civil conflict were
maritime because the commercial interests of foreign States could be damaged by the
conflict. 56 After Japan had abandoned her isolationist policy by signing treaties with
Great Powers, their commercial activities with Japan became frequent, and the
Shogunate and several daimyo began to purchase or even make men-of-war. 57 Thus,
having received the above requests by both parties to the conflict, France, Great Britain,
53 F.O. 46-91, No. 29, Encl.: Higashi Kuze no ShOshO to Parkes. Feb. 14, 1868. According to a note
attached to the original Japanese document, whether the letter had been sent to each of the six Foreign
Representative was not certain and it was concluded that this request for neutrality was probably made at
a gathering of the Foreign Representatives. See the original document in J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, No. 115, Feb.
14, 1868.
54 F.O. 46-91, No. 13, Encl. 6: Matsudaira Buzen no Kami, Itakura Iga no Kami and Sakai Uta no Kami
to Parkes. Jan. 27, 1868. Emphases added.
55 Kajima, supra note 41, at 259. See also Gordon Daniels, "The Japanese Civil War (1868) - A British
View", 1 Modern Asian Studies 241, at 241 (1967).
56 Wheaton, supra. note 43, Dana's note 15, at 30-31. See also Sir Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations
Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War,
§239 (2d ed. rev., 1875).
57 Satsuma started to build the first Japanese man-of-war in 1853. See Koshaku Shimazuke Hensanjo
[Institute of the Family of Prince Shimazu] (ed.), Sappan Kaigunshi [History of the Navy of the Satsuma
Han], Vol. 1, at 787 (1968).
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Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia and the USA issued the "Official Notification" [of
neutrality] on 18 February 1868. 58 The British declaration was as follows:
WHEREAS the Undersigned [Sir Hany S. Parkes] has been officially informed that
,
hostilities have commenced in this country between His Majesty the Mikado and
,
the Tycoon, and whereas a strict and impartial neutrality should be observed by all
British subjects in the contest between the said contending parties, the
Undersigned, Her Britannic Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary in Japan, hereby calls upon all Subjects of Her Majesty to abstain
from taking part in any operations of war against either of the contending parties,
or in aiding or abetting any person in carrying on war for or against either of the
said parties, and to avoid the infringement of any British Law or Statute made and
provided for the purpose of maintaining neutrality in foreign or civil contests or of
the Law of Nations relating thereto.59
As regards this collective declaration of neutrality, the following points need further
analysis. First, the notification acknowledged the existence of war between the
Emperor and the Shogun. However, documents reveal that the Shogun himself
submitted to the Emperor at an early stage of the Civil War and sought to avoid any
confrontation with the Imperial Government, while the bakufu asked for the observance
of neutrality by the Treaty Powers. The Shogun's Minister for Foreign Affairs told
Sidney Locock, Secretary of the British Legation, that "[the Shogun] did not consider
88 The American notification was published in The Japan Times' Overland Mail (Yokohama), Feb. 27,
1868, Vol. V., No. 60, at 57, reprinted in Early Nespapers, supra note 29, Vol. 13, at 49. The other
notifications were published in Supplement to The Hiogo and Osaka Herald (Hiogo), Feb. 22, 1868, Vol.
I, No. 8, (no page number given), reprinted in id. at 34-36. Cf. The Dutch notification alone was issued
on 19 February.
89 Official Notification, Supplement to the Hiogo and Osaka Herald (Hiogo), Feb. 22, 1868, Vol. I, No. 8,
(no page number given), reprinted in id, at 34. The Foreign Enlistment Act was attached to this
notification and this will be discussed later.
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himself at war with the Mikado: consequently he had no intention of availing himself on
[sic] any of the rights of a belligerent power." 6° The Minister further stated that the
Shogun had been retired from public affairs, 6I which was a form of punishment in Japan.
Moreover, the Shogun regime claimed that it was at war with the Satsuma han. Soon
after the battle of Toba-Fushimi, the American Legation sent a letter to the bakufu,
asking, "With whom is the Japanese Government now engaged in war" and whether
Satsuma was the only actor fighting with the Shogunate. 62
 The bakufu replied that
Satsuma alone was fighting at that moment, 63
 even though the fact was that the battle of
Toba-Fushimi was being fought by others as well as mainly Satsuma and Choshu on the
Imperial side. 64
 Both parties to the war relied on daimyo who offered their forces to
whichever supported.65
It can be argued that the Treaty Powers considered that the war was being fought
between the Imperial and Shogun Governments, while at the same time they knew that
it was mainly the samurai of various daimyo who were fighting on both sides.
Recognising all the daimyo who participated in the war as belligerents was simply
impossible, and considering the war to be a struggle between the old and new
Governments would have been the most realistic approach. Earlier in 1864, after the
F.O. 46-92, No. 53, Encl. 2: Sidney Locock to Parkes. Yokohama, March 6, 1868. However, Parkes
was doubtful about the Shogun's intention and he wrote that "It is not improbable that the Taikun is in a
very uncertain frame of mind." F.O. 46-92, No. 54. Hiogo, March 11, 1868.
61 F.O. 46-92, No. 53, Encl. 2: Sidney Locock to Parkes. Yokohama, March 6, 1868.
62 See J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, No.79, Jan. 28, 1868. Note that this letter was addressed to the Shogunate, not to
the Imperial Government.
63 See R.G.59, R. 9, No. 7, Encl. 3: Itakura and Sakai to Van Valkenburgh, Jan. 28, 1868.
64 An official account of the battle refers to the Satsuma, Aki and Choshu han on the Imperial side and to
the Matsuyama, Aizu, Kuwana, Ogaki, Oshi, Shimizu, and Yoshida han on the Shogun side. See R.G.59,
R. 9, Portman to W.H. Seward. Yokohama, March 2, 1868. Encl. 1: Official account of the recent action
between Kioto and Osacca by Okubo Sazen no Sho.
65 It was after the Civil War that the Imperial Government obtained its own armed forces. With respect to
the Shogunate, it had its own forces, Hatamoto and Gokenin, but the role they played in the Civil War
was small and the Shogunate too relied on han, especially Aizu and other northern han.
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war between the Choshu han and the four Powers, 66 Sir Rutherford Alcock, the then
British Minister, sent a memorandum to Choshu in which he stated that "There cannot
be 20 or 100 petty Sovereigns and Princes in a country, with all of whom separate
Treaties must be made, each to be valid only within the narrow limits of their own
territories. This could only lead to confusion." 67 The Shogunate took the responsibility
of Choshu's conduct and paid indemnity to Britain, France, the Netherlands and the
USA. 68 This document demonstrates that the Treaty Powers did not consider each
daimyo the sovereign of his territory.
To what extent the two conflicting parties had knowledge of international law is another
point to discuss. The bakufu damaged its status as the legitimate Government of Japan
by confirming the existence of war and requesting the declaration of neutrality from the
Treaty Powers. 69 This damaging effect to the Shogun Government was beneficial to the
Imperial Government because the status of the Government was still at most de facto in
international law. 7° However, the Imperial Government lacked proper information on
international law, either; for instance, at the outset of the Civil War the representatives
of the Imperial Government had to enquire of the British and Prussian Representatives
how to prevent foreign vessels from carrying the troops of the Shogunate, and also
asked them to withdraw the foreign military instructors from the bakufu. 71 For both
66 See supra. note 9.
67 Memorandum, Delivered by the British Minister in Japan, to the Prince of Choshiu's Officers, Relative
to the Maintenance by Force by the Treaty Powers of Foreign Trade with Japan, (V. State Papers, Vol.
LXIII, p. 867), reprinted in Gaimusho Joyakukyoku, supra note 6, Vol. 1-1, at 229.
68 See Shimonoseki Convention, (signed and ratified by the Bakufu in 1864), reprinted in id at 222.
69 See F.O. 46-91, No. 13, Encl. 6: Matsudaira Bugen no Kami, Itakura Iga no Kami and Sakai Uta no
Kami to Parkes. Jan. 27, 1868. Regarding the beneficial effect of the recognition of belligerency on the
side of the insurgents, see Lindsay Moir, "The Historical Development of the Application of
Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts to 1949", 47 ICLQ 337 (1998).
79 Kajima, supra note 41, at 257.
71 R.G. 59, R. 9, No. 10, Encl. 8: Memo of interview between Parkes and Von Brandt with the envoy of
the Mikado. Feb. 11, 1868. In the same meeting, the representatives answered that the declaration of war
and notification of existence of war would be necessary.
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parties, the neutrality of third States signified the end of outside assistance. 72 Osatake
rightly argued that the request for neutrality by both parties had been partly because
both welcomed foreign assistance to their respective sides but feared assistance to their
respective enemies, 73 and they would have considered only the latter consequence. The
acquisition of up-to-date arms from the Treaty Powers was essential in order to win the
Civil War and thus the decision of both governments to ask for the observance of strict
neutrality was not sophisticated. The USA refused to hand over the Stonewall, an iron
steamer which was originally purchased by the Shogun regime, to either contending
side because of her neutrality policy. 74
 The above evidence suggests that the warring
Governments were not knowledgeable on international law. Both belligerents'
requesting foreign States to declare neutrality was probably a rare case in the
international law of that time. However, one should bear in mind the fact that it was
only about fifteen years since Japan had begun her diplomacy in a modern sense.
The third point is the question of which authorities issued the notifications of February
1868. Some Japanese authors have argued that normally it would have needed the
foreign governments to recognise belligerency because such recognition would be of
political importance, but that in the Japanese Civil War it was the Foreign
Representatives stationed in Japan who declared neutrality. 75
 The reason for this
irregularity is that Japan is far from Europe and waiting for instructions would have
missed the appropriate time for the Treaty Powers to declare neutrality. 76 For instance,
the French Minister admitted in his despatch to the Foreign Minister that because of the
72 For the inadequate knowledge of international law on the Imperial side, see Kajima, supra note 41, at
252, 253.
73 Osatake, supra note 32, at 278.
74 Kajima, supra note 41, at 259.
75 Tachi Sakutaro, "Book Reviews. Osatake: Diplomacy of the later Period of the Shogunate, in the light
of International Law", 26 The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 189, 193 (1927); and Kajima,
Id. at 256-257.
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distance from Europe the Foreign Representatives had to declare and withdraw their
neutrality under their responsibility. 77 Britain, on the other hand, published the Order of
the Queen in Council of 14 May 1868 regarding the observance of neutrality in the
Japanese Civil War with the effect that the Order replaced the neutrality notification of
February with notification to come into force from July 13, 1868. 78 The Japanese
Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked Ernest Satow, after the Civil War, why it took a
considerable time to issue the formal declaration of neutrality, and he answered that it
was necessary to have the Queen's recognition of neutrality which was proclaimed by
the British Minister on his own responsibility. 79 In conclusion, it can be maintained that
the legitimacy of the collective notification of February 1868, however irregular it was,
was not overturned. Apart from the official British Order of May, a lack of evidence
could mean that other Treaty Powers did not issue official notification similar to the
British Order. However, such absence of official declaration did not nullify the original
notification and the Governments of the Treaty Powers did not raise questions of the
legitimacy of the notification later.
3.4.3. THE INVOLVEMENT OF FOREIGN SHIPS
Soon after the outbreak of the Civil War, two men-of-war belonging to the Shogunate
were approached by two British military steamers that, having already "moved as if the
situation were to lead to war [between the Japanese and British ships]," "weighed
anchors again, revolved around the Kaiyomaru a few times, began to undertake
76	 • •Kajima, supra note 41, at 257.
77 C.P.J., Tome 18, [7] M. Outrey au marquis de la Valette, Ministres des Affaires ttrangeres. Yokohama,
10 fey. 1869 (Direction politique No. 6).
78 J.D.D., No. 376, Vol. 1-1, Jul. 13, 1868.
79 Meiji Boshin Kyokugai Churitszt Tenmatsu [Neutrality in the Japanese Civil War], at 7 (Otsuka
Takematsu ed., 1932).
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exercises, shoot several bullets, and was just going to bomb [the Japanese ships]."8°
Sawa Tarozaemon was asked about response to a possible attack by the British ships
and answered that "probably Satsuma and Choshu asked the British ships to act ... .
However, it is prohibited in public international law to attack a ship of a friendly nation
without reason ... . Therefore be assured that nothing will happen." 81 There is no
evidence to suggest that there was a direct engagement between a military ship of a
Treaty Power and either of the contending parties, and the above case was, while it was
an indirect involvement, probably exceptional. Regarding foreign vessels other than
men-of-war, the American Minister reported that he had told his British counterpart that
British steamers were involved in carrying troops of southern daimyo but that the
British Minister had taken no action. 82 In the same letter, however, he admitted that
there was a violation of neutrality by an American steamer which was detained by the
Iroquois, an American man-of-war. 83 Another occasion to mention is that the Helen
Black, British ship, was reported to have left Yokohama with arms for Hakodate, and
the authorities at Kanagawa asked their counterparts at Hakodate not to allow the arms
to land." The Imperial Government demanded that the British Minister deal with the
ship because the Helen Black carried arms and had also tried to load rice at an unopened
port in the north for the Hakodate rebels. 85 Parkes later notified Date, the Principal
Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, that this important case would be heard by the
Judge of the Supreme Court of China and Japan. 86 The Judge found the captain of the
813 Sappan Kaigunshi, supra note 57, Vol. 3, at 139-149. Translated from Japanese by the author.
81 Id. at 140. Translated from Japanese by the author. The British ships did not attack the Japanese ships.
82 R.G. 59, R. 10, No. 59. Yokohama, Jun. 14, 1868.
83 Id.
84 J.D.D., Vol. 2-1, No. 140, May 5, 1869. According to the Japanese document, the captain of the ship
lied that she was sailing to Hyogo.
85 J.D.D., Vol. 2-1, No. 247, Jul. 2, 1869.
86 J.D.D.,
 Vol. 2-1, No. 287, Jul. 29, 1869.
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ship guilty of "smuggling or trading in non-opened Ports, in contravention of the [1858
Anglo-Japanese] Treaty" and fined him one thousand dollars.87
3.4.4. THE STONEWALL
Having declared the observance of strict neutrality, the Foreign Representatives issued a
memorandum to the effect that the delivery of a vessel of war to a belligerent party in
the Japanese Civil War would be contrary to their neutrality. 88 It became therefore
explicit that the Stonewall could not be handed over to the contending parties in the war.
The Imperial Government, having realised the value of the iron steamer, was irritated by
the American policy not to hand over the Stonewall to the newly established
Government. During the conflict in the north, Higashikuze, the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, asked the American Minister "whether [the Minister] could now deliver the
Stonewall to the Mikado's Government", and the Minister answered in the negative.89
However, when he issued a notification of withdrawal of neutrality on February 9,
1869, 9° he showed his readiness to make arrangements to deliver the ship to the
Imperial Government in his letter of the same date to Higashikuze.91
3.4.5. THE WITHDRAWAL OF MILITARY ADVISERS
Before the Civil War, the bakufu was employing naval instructors from Britain and
military instructors from France to strengthen its forces, which required
87 J.D.D., Vol. 2-2, No. 408, Sept. 30, 1869.
88 R.G. 59, R. 9, No. 13, Encl. 1: Memorandum by Parkes and other Representatives of Foreign Powers.
Hiogo, Feb. 28, 1868.
89 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 97. Sept. 18, 1868.
90 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 12, Encl. 3: Notification of the cessation of the state of war in Japan issued by Van
Valkenburgh. U.S. Legation, Yokohama, Feb. 9, 1869.
91 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 12, Encl. [4]: Van Valkenburgh to Higashi Kuze. U.S. Legation, Yokohama, Feb. 9,
1869. The date of actual delivery is not certain but in his letter of March 81869, he wrote that the ship
had been delivered. See R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 19. March 8, 1869.
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modernisation. 92
 After the outbreak of the Civil War, whether those instructors should
be recalled to their respective States became a diplomatic problem between the Imperial
Government, and Britain and France. In the British official notification of neutrality it
was explicitly prohibited for British subjects to be involved in the Civil War, and
extracts from the Foreign Enlistment Act were attached to the notification for the above
purpose. 93 Therefore Parkes decided to withdraw British instructors from the Shogun
Government because their use would be against the British policy of neutrality. 94
Parkes wrote that the naval instructors to the Imperial Government would return to
England on October 7, 1868 because the war still continued and neutrality needed to be
observed.95
At first Roches was opposed to the withdrawal of the French military instructors who
were employed by the Shogunate because of his policy favouring the regime. 96 His
successor, Outrey, received a letter from Higashikuze in which the Imperial
Government which had taken over the armed forces of the Tokugawas requested him to
withdraw the French instructors in Japan because of "the unusual crisis that we are
going tlirough". 97 Outrey decided that the withdrawal of the instructors should take
place on September 13, 1868 although he disagreed with the conditions that the
92 Both Imperial and Shogun Governments employed foreign instructors from Treaty Powers. See
generally Takahashi, supra note 17.
93 J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, Doc. No. 151, Mar. 8, 1868.
94 F.O. 46-92, No. 53, Encl. 1: H. Parkes to Capt. Tracy. Hiogo, Feb. 29. 1868. Parkes wrote to the effect
that Captain Tracy and other instructors should move from Edo to Yokohama. In this letter, Parkes
referred to the Shogunate as "the Government of Japan".
95 F.O. 46-97, No. 233. Parkes to Stanley. Yokohama, Oct. 7, 1868.
96 C.P.J., Tome 16, [21] L. Roches au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 25 mai 1868. (Direction politique
No. 113)
97 C.P.J., Tome 17, [12] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 12 sept. 1868. (Direction
politique No. 16), Annexe I: Higashi Kouze A M. Outrey. [Yokohama], 11 sept. 1868. Traduction. The
original French wording is "la crise particuliêre que nous traversons". Higashikuze later made it clear
that the reasons for their asking the withdrawal of the military instructors were the existence of war and
the neutrality policy of the Treaty Powers. See C.P.J., Tome 17, [9] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier.
Yokohama, 18 sept. 1868. (Direction politique No. 18), Annexe II: Higashi Kouze Djiu-Dji6 A M. Outrey.
[Yokohama], 28j. 7m. (14 sept.) 1868. Traduction.
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Imperial Government offered for breaking of the contracts concerning the instructors.98
Some French officers, on the other hand, remained with the Shogun side. Brunet,
captain of artillery, resigned himself to joining the forces of the northern daimyo, 99 a
decision which was regarded by Outrey as an embarrassment to French diplomacy.ioo
Before the exiled retainers surrendered to the Imperial Government, Brunet and several
French officers had surrendered and were collected and taken to Yokohama by a French
man-of-war. 1 ° 1 Outrey informed the Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs that the French
officers who fought with Enomoto had left Yokohama for Saigon except for the two
wounded who were being treated in Yokohama.102
3.4.6. THE END OF THE WAR IN THE NORTH AND THE CESSATION OF NEUTRALITY
The Imperial Government seized all of Edo, the "capital" of the Shogunate, when the
battle at Ueno resulted in its complete victory. Following this, the Imperial Government
constantly requested the Treaty Powers to withdraw the neutrality they were observing.
For instance, Higashikuze in his meeting with the American Minister in September
1868 consistently solicited the latter for the retraction of the declaration of neutrality in
the hope of the possible handover of the Stonewall, even though Higashikuze
acknowledged that war existed between "the Mikado's Government on the one side and
Aidzu and other Northern Daimios [sic] on the other." 103 Van Valkenburgh, however,
was strongly against withdrawing its neutral policy "as long as war continues in
98 C.P.J.,
 Tome. 17, [9] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 18 sept. 1868. (Direction
Folitique No. 18), Annexe I: M. Outrey au Ministre [Higashi Kouze?]. Yokohama, 13 sept. 1868. Copie.
9 C.P.J., Tome. 17, [29] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 11 nov. 1868. (Direction
politique No. 31), Annexe I: Brunet a Chanoine. Yokohama, 4 oct. 1868. Copie.100
 c:-..,-.2r J Tome 17, M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 16 dec. 1868. (Direction politique No.
39).
101 c:-. ,.r. ,J Tome 18, M. Outrey au marquis de Lavalette. Yokohama, 1 juillet 1869. (Direction politique
No. 19).
102 See J.D.D., Vol. 2-1, Doc. No. 219, Jun. 20, 1869.
183 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 97. Sept. 18, 1868.
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japan.,,104 Moreover, the leading daimyo of the northern alliance explained to Van
Valkenburgh that they could not submit to the new Government because Imperial orders
were not trusted, as they explained: "[t]he Mikado is young and his government
inchoate and imperfect and very unscrupulous subjects taking advantage of this widely
seized the governmental power and friely [sic] use it as they please." 105 Van
Valkenburgh replied to this letter that the United States would continuously observe
strict neutrality. 106 Other Treaty Powers also continued to maintain their neutrality
policy.
The Imperial Government sent a statement to the Foreign Representatives on December
8, 1868, proclaiming that "[o]ur country is therefore entirely tranquillized and the mind
of our Emperor is at ease." 1 °7 On January 15, 1869, an interview was held between the
Foreign Representatives and Iwakura Tomomi, 108 in which the latter entreated the
former to withdraw the neutrality proclamation, since peace was restored on Honshu
and those who were occupying Hakodate were "only a small band of outlaws." 1 °9 A
series of discussions was held by the Foreign Representatives in which the British
representative was in favour of the withdrawal of the neutrality while his American,
Prussian and Italian counterparts were opposed to such withdrawal because of the
10existence of conflict in Hakodate. 1 Nevertheless, the Ministers became more
104 R.G.
DV R. 11, No. 138. Dec. 24, 1868.
105 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 93, Encl. 1: Ashina Yukie Morikauge, Sendai, Irobe Nagato Hisanaga, Yonesawa,
Kadgjiwara Heima Kagemasa, Aidzu, Ishiwara Soyemon Thiunagon, Shonai and Kawai Keinoskë
Akiyoshi, Nagaoka, to [Van Vallcenburgh].[n.d.]
106 R.G. DY R. II, No. 93, Encl. 2: Van Valkenburgh to Ashina, Irobe, Kadgjiwara, Ishiwara and Kawai.
U.S. Legation, Yokohama, Sept. 10, 1868. Judging from the above three documents, it was likely that the
American minister was in favour of the northern daimyo.
107 F.O. 46-99, No. 318, Encl.: Date Chiunagon and Higashi Kuze Chiujo to H. Parkes, 10th month.
108 His position was equivalent to today's Prime Minister.
109 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 9, Encl. [7]: Memorandum on the interview between the Representatives of
England, France, Holland, Italy, Prussia, and the U.S.A. and Iwakura Uhi6ye no Kami, Minister for
Foreign Affairs, held at the British Legation, Yokohama on Jan. 15, 1869.
II ° C.P.J., Tome 18, [7] M. Outrey au marquis de la Valette, Ministres des Affaires Etrangêres. Yokohama,
10 fey. 1869. (Direction politique No.6)
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harmonious on this issue and decided that they would come to a decision on February 9,
after they had examined a report from Hakodate which they expected to arrive on
February 6 or 7. 111 The Foreign Representatives having studied the new information
which arrived in Yokohama on February 7, they decided to withdraw the neutrality,112
and finally they issued notifications on February 9, 1869 to the effect that the hostilities
in Japan had ceased to exist and hence the notifications concerning neutrality were
withdrawn.113
3.4.7. THE POSITION OF THE ARMED GROUP IN HAKODATE: INSURGENTS OR
PIRATES?
The definition of piracy is controversial today, 114 and so was it in the mid-nineteenth
century. 115 Wheaton wrote that "[p]iracy is defined by the text-writers to be the offence
of depredating on the seas without being authorized by any sovereign State, or with
commissions from different sovereigns at war with each other." 116 Dana stated that
piracy jure gentium was an act "committed on the high seas" by those who were "free
from lawful authority. 117 Twiss argued that "A violation of the peace of the High Seas
is either an act of Piracy or an act of War, according as such an act is done with the
design of robbery, or with the object of prosecuting a Right."118
The exiled kerai sent the Foreign Representatives a notification, stating that some
southern daimyo were conducting brutality against people "asserting their pretention as
the order of Mikado" and that therefore the exiled retainers would resort to force in
"Id.
1121d.
113 The American, British, Dutch, French, Italian and Prussian notifications are reprinted in J.D.D., Vol.
1-2, No. 753, Feb. 9, 1869.
114 See D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, at 432-433 (5th ed., 1998).
115 Wheaton, supra. note 43, Dana's note 83, at 162-163.
116 Id. §§122-124 (footnote omitted).
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order to assist northern daimy0. 119 Higashikuze, as a response to the action of the exiled
retainers, issued a statement in which "their having decamped regardless of the will of
their master [Tokugawa Yoshinobu] and without any reason" was regarded as "acts of
p iracy.,,120 The Japan Times' Overland Mail was a strong supporter of the contention
that Enomoto and his followers were pirates. The newspaper had stated that they acted
contrary to the will of Tokugawa Yoshinobu, their former master, and therefore they
should have been punished as pirates. 121 Later, however, it argued that the exiled
retainers were a de facto authority as long as they remained in Hakodate and therefore
only pirates lege fori: once they left Hakodate however, as in the case of the battle of the
Miyako Bay, they should be considered to be pirates jure gentium.122
There was a conference among the Foreign Representatives about their positions
regarding the exiled retainers, but a collective memorandum was not drafted because of
disagreement. 123 Such disagreement was, for instance, reflected in the following
incident: the exiled retainers' ship saluted foreign ships and the salute was not returned
by the British and French ships but was accepted by the American, Prussian and
Russian consular authorities. 124 The British and French ministers alone issued a
memorandum on the question of the exiled retainers, among which comments they
referred to the retainers' status as follows:
117 Id., Dana's note 83, at 163.
118 Twiss, supra note 56, §239.
119 F.O. 46-97, No. 244, Encl. 1: Northern Officers to Foreign Ministers. Yedo, Oct. 4, 1868.
120 F.O. 46-97, No. 260, Encl. 2: Statement by [Higashi Kuze Chiujo]. Oct. 10, 1868. Parkes considered
the purpose of that statement "to declare Enomoto an outlaw". F.O. 46-97, No. 260. Yokohama, Oct. 15,
1868.
121 "The Descent on Yezo", The Japan Times' Overland Mail (Yokohama), Dec. 30, 1868, at 314,
reprinted in Early Newspapers, supra note 29, Vol. 20, at 9
122 "What is a Pirate?", The Japan Times' Overland Mail (Yokohama), May 28, 1869, at 128, reprinted in
Early Newspapers, supra note 29, Vol. 22, at 261.
123 cy
.J Tome 17, [38] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 16 dec. 1868. (Direction
politique No. 39) In this document it was emphasised that the American, Italian and Prussian
Representatives were not in favour of the Imperial Government, in contrast to the British representative.
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1. Les soussignes [Ministres plenipotentiaires de France et d'Angleterre] sont
d'opinion que la situation des Kerais exiles et des huit batiments qui se sont
presentes dans Vulcano-bay, ne constitue pas, d'apres donnees parvenues jusqu'A
ce jour, les conditions necessaires pour leur accorder les droits de belligerents
proprement dits. .. . 125
-
The captain of H.M.S. Satellite wrote that the exiled retainers would be recognised as
"authorities de facto" by him and the British Consul, 126 while the American Minister
suggested to the Consul in Hakodate that, should a conflict occur at or near the city,
"[he] will observe a strict neutrality, transacting all necessary business with the
government de facto, .. . '1127 The American Consul therefore issued the following
notification to captains and agents of American ships on December 11, 1868:
You are hereby warned and forbid [sic] to transport soldiers, munitions of war, or
other articles contraband of war, to or from this Port [of Hakodate]. You are also
to maintain strict neutrality between the present contending parties, under the
severest penalties in such cases made and provided.128
The American Minister seemed to have favoured the cause of the exiled kerai as he
stated that they "form[ed] a strong political organization, commit[ted] no depredation,
124 F.O. 46-106, No. 11, Encl. 1: Memorandum by F.O. Adams on observations with reference to his late
visit to Hakodate. [n.d.].
125 C.P.J., Tome 17, [38] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 16 dec. 1868. (Direction
politique No. 39), Annexe IV: Memorandum de M. Outrey et H. Parkes. [s.d.] According to a British
document, the reason why only Britain and France made this statement is that other Powers did not have
any vessel to send to protect the foreigners residing in Hakodate. See F.O. 46-99, No. 316. Yokohama,
Dec. 16, 1868. However, according to a French document, there was a disagreement in the conference.
See C.P.J., Tome 17, [38] M. Outrey au marquis de Moustier. Yokohama, 16 dec. 1868. (Direction
politique No. 39)
126 F.O. 46-99, No. 329, Encl. 4: Ed. White. Captain of H.M.S. Satellite, to the Military Commanders of
the exiled Kerais of Tokugawa. Hakodate, Dec. 23, 1868.
127 F.O. 46-99, No. 316, Encl. 10: Van Valkenburgh to E. Rice, Legation of United States. Yokohama,
Dec. 12, 1868. Emphasis added.
128 F.O. 46-99, No. 330, Encl. 3: Notification by E.E. Rice. United States Consul. Dec. 11, 1868.
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and [met] with the cordial support of the people, particularly of their clan." 129 In
practice, on May 12, 1869, when Imperial troops on board an American steamer were
going to land, an American battleship approached. 13 ° The captain of the battleship
demanded that no soldier land because the American Minister had ordered that a ship
hoisting an American flag not be engaged in activities within three miles of a battlefield,
according to international law. 131
 In addition, the captain stated that the American
Government was maintaining neutrality in the Japanese Civil War. 132
 As has been
noted, the American Minister had already withdrawn his country's commitment to the
neutrality notification, but it appears that he considered the situation to be as if the war
and neutrality continued to exist.
The Japanese Government in a letter of December 22, 1868 admitted that Government
officials were not present in Hakodate and made a request to British merchants to
"abstain from visiting [Hakodate] until it returns to its allegiance." 133 The British
Minister issued the following notification on January 15, 1869:
So long as the disturbances above-named [in Hakodate] shall remain unsettled, or
until such order time as may hereafter be publicly notified by the Undersigned
[Parkes], no British subject may land or embark, or attempt to land or embark, at
Hakodate, troops, arms or munitions of war, or may convey in any British ship or
vessel to or from the said port, or land or embark, or attempt to land or embark at
129 R.G. 59, R. 11, No. 134. Dec. 18, 1868.
130 Soga Junzo, Hakodate Datsuzoku Tsuito Shuki [Memorandum on Suppressing the Exiled Rebels in
Hakodate], reprinted in Sappan Kaigunshi, supra. note 57, Vol. 3, Appendix, at 522.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 F.O. 46-99, No. 337, Encl. 1: Higashi Kuze Chijo to H. Parkes. Dec. 22, 1868. See also R.G. 59, R. 11,
No. 138, Encl. [I]: Higashi Kuze to Van Valkenburgh. Dec. 22, 1868.
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the same port, Japanese passengers in any greater number than one man to every
ten tons of register tonnage of such ship or vesse1.134
One could hold that the exiled retainers were short of being belligerents even though the
generalisation of their status would be difficult because of disagreement that existed
among the Foreign Representatives. The British and French Ministers did not recognise
the belligerency of the armed group led by Enomoto, but they did not treat them as
pirates either. Indeed, there is no case in which a British or French battleship dealt with
a man-of-war of Enomoto as a pirate. The American Minister and Consul, on the other
hand, appeared to be more supportive of the rebels and the above evidence could
suggest that they regarded the exiled retainers as belligerents. However, the Americans
did not, in fact, recognise the belligerency probably because they needed to accord with
the British and French. Lastly, concerning the Imperial Government's attitude towards
the exiled kerai, notwithstanding Higashikuze's opinion that the rebels were piratical, it
is doubtful that there existed domestic law that could regulate piracy either jure gentium
or lege fori. It is certain that the insurgents in Hakodate were criminals in the eyes of
the Imperial Government but that they could have been regarded as pirates in Japanese
law would be difficult to sustain.
3.5. THE CONDUCT OF WARFARE IN THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR
3.5.1. THE USE OF A FALSE FLAG
It is generally agreed that the use of a false flag is a legitimate ruse of maritime warfare
according to customary law. I35 Woolsey claimed that the use of means to deceive an
134 Official Notification of January 15, 1869, issued by Harry S. Parkes. Originally published in the
Japan Herald that no longer exists and appeared in The Hiogo and Osaka Herald (Hiogo), Jan. 30, 1869,
at 28, reproduced in Early News apers, supra note 29, Vol. 20, at 230. Parkes withdrew this notification
56
enemy regarding a combatant's own movement is not prohibited, even though this
writer did not mention the use of a false flag. I36
 Although there were several instances
of the use of false flags in the Japanese Civil War, the most well-known case took place
in the naval battle at Miyako Bay. 137
 On the morning of May 6, 1869, when eight
Imperial vessels gathered in Miyako Bay, the Kaiten, a man-of-war belonging to the
exiled kerai, approached the Imperial Fleet alone with the American flag flying. I38 The
Kaiten came closer to the Stonewall, suddenly lowered the American flag and hoisted
the Japanese one, and began to attack the ship. 139 Ando clearly explained why the
Kaiten hoisted the American flag:
According to the maritime law, even if a battleship hoists a foreign flag, it is not
prohibited to [attack an enemy ship] should the battleship replace the flag by its
own flag before opening fire. Therefore we deceived the enemy by flying the
American flag. 140
3.5.2. VISIT AND SEARCH
It was generally agreed that a belligerent had the right to visit and search neutral ships at
sea and to capture those ships which carried goods to the belligerent's enemy. 141 The
question of visit and search became a matter of controversy between the exiled retainers
on July 9, 1869. See F.O. 46-110, No. 141, Encl. 5: Notification of Parkes to revoke notifcation of Jan.
15, 1869. Yokohama, July 9, 1869. [p.m.] Extract from newspaper whose name is not specified.
135 See The Law of Naval Warfare, at 46 (N. Ronzitti ed., 1988); L. Oppenheim, International Law: A
Treatise, Vol. II, § 211 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 7th ed., 1952).
136 Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, § 127 (1860).
137 Another example was a man-of-war of the Imperial Forces hoisting what appeared to be a Russian flag,
which resulted in the protest of the Russian Consul in Hakodate. See F.O. 46-98, No. 295. Yokohama,
Dec. 2, 1868 (confidential) and Encl.: R. Eusden to H. Parkes, Hakodate, Oct. 28, 1868 (confidential).
138 Arai Ikunosuke Miyakoko Kaisenki [The Records of Maritime Warfare in the Port of Miyako by Arai
Ikunosztke] and Ando Taro Miyakoko Kaisenki [The Records of Maritime Warfare in the Port of Miyako
by Ando Taro], reprinted in Sappan Kaigunshi, supra note 57, Vol. 3, at 413 and 421 respectively,
especially at 417 and 424. The two were on board the Kaiten.
1391d.
140 Id. at 424. Translated from Japanese by the author.
141 See Wheaton, supra note 43, §524.
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and Treaty Powers during the conflict in Hakodate. 142 The retainers argued that in the
port of Halcodate they could visit British ships on their arrival should there be no
H.B.M.'s steamers in the port and that they could detain British ships should those ships
violate neutrality. 143 In other ports which were not open to foreigners, they maintained,
they could visit any British vessels and could arrest the vessels should there be proof
that those vessels carried "troops, munitions of war and generally whatever may be
included in the term contraband of war." 144 On the high seas, they stated furthermore,
the same right as in unopen ports would be "carefully" used when there was a suspicion
on British vessels. 145 The British and French ministers responded to these claims by
stating that visit and search on a British or French ship was not allowed in the port of
Hakodate and on high seas because the exiled retainers did not have belligerent rights,
and that such ships could be dealt with by the retainers only in accordance with the
Regulations attached to the French and English treaties.146
The problem of visit and search by the exiled kerai was rather theoretical because there
is a lack of evidence of the real enforcement of these rights but there were a few cases in
which the Imperial Forces detained neutral ships. One instance was the seizure of the
Peiho, an American steamer, by the Imperial officers who replaced its American flag
-
142 The question of visit and search was not a great issue in the war until the northerners surrendered
because as Parkes stated to Prime Minister Iwakura, "Both [Imperial and Shogun governments] were
belli aerents, and had rights accordingly, such as those of blockade, searching ships etc. ..." F.O. 46-106,
No. 5, Encl.: Minute of interview between the HoshO (Prime Minister) lwakura and Parkes at Yedo, Jan.
9, 1869.
143 F.O. 46-99, No. 331, Encl. 3: Enomoto Kamajiro, Admiral of the Navy of Tokugawa, and Otori
Keiske, Major General, to the Captain of H.B.M.'s Ship Satellite. Hakodate, 11th month 17 day, 1 at year
Meiji.
144 Id.
145 1d.
1" F.O. 46-106, No. 6, Encl. 1: Memorandum on Tokugawa kerais by Parkes and Max Outrey.
Yokohama, Jan. 1, 1869. The relevant stipulations of the British and French treaties were reprinted in the
same document: the article of the British treaty reads that 'If any British ships shall smuggle, or attempt to
smuggle, goods in any of the new opened harbour of Japan, all such goods shall be forfeited to the
Japanese Government, and the ship shall pay a fine of one thousand dollars for each offence.' See id.
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with the Japanese one on May 28, 1869 at Aomori Bay. 147 Van Valkenburgh, the
American Minister, strongly protested at the seizure of the ship and even described "the
seizure of this American steamer and her detention under the circumstances as they
occurred is a hostile proceeding almost equivalent to a declaration of war". I48 De Long,
_
the successor to Van Valkenburgh, informed the Imperial Government that the captain
of the Peiho claimed about fifty thousand dollars for the detention. I49 In the same letter,
he also demanded that redress be made against the hauling down of the American
flag. 15° The Imperial Government justified its position by maintaining that the captain
of the steamer, in conspiracy with Enomoto, had helped the rebels in Hakodate, 151 an
allegation which was denied by De Long. 152 The Peiho case was protracted and was
finally solved in 1881 by the Japanese Government's decision that the case would be
settled amicably and the sum of twenty-five thousand yen would be paid to the
captain.153
3.5.3. THE PROTECTION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK AND SHIPWRECKED
How the wounded and sick on the battlefield are to be protected - which is today one of
the important forum on the laws of war - this subject was not specifically discussed in
Woolsey's textbook. Wheaton supported the principle of military necessity and argued
that "the inhabitants of the enemy's country ... who, being in arms, submit and
surrender themselves, may not be slain"; but he did not mention the protection of the
wounded, sick and shipwrecked. 154 Moreover, in spite of its limited interpretation of
147 See J.D.D., Vol. 2-2, Doc. No. 262, Jul. 13, 1869.
148 J.D.D., Vol. 2-2, Doc. No. 375, Sept. 20, 1869.
149 J.D.D., Vol. 4-1 (1939), Doc. No. 293, Feb. 22, 1871.
I" Id.
151 J.D.D., Vol. 5 (1939), Doc. No. 284, Sept. 19, 1872.
152 J.D.D., Vol. 5, Doc. No. 285, Sept. 26, 1872.
153 Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs] ed., Nippon Gaiko Monjo, Vol. 13 (1950), Doc. No. 234, May
31, 1881; Doc. No. 235, Oct. 14, 1881.
154 Wheaton, supra note 43, § 343.
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military necessity, Lieber's Code did not indicate the protection of the wounded and
sick either. 155 The 1 864 Geneva Convention should have been the only detailed
instrument which provided the protection of the wounded and sick, but no obtainable
evidence suggests that officials of both the Imperial and Shogun Governments had
knowledge of this treaty.
Soon after the first battle at Toba-Fushimi, the Imperial Government requested Parkes
to despatch a British doctor to assist the wounded and sick, and Parkes therefore sent Dr.
William Willis near the battlefield in Kyoto. 156 In spite of the general hatred of
foreigners in Japan at that time, the invitation to Willis was necessary because there
were many wounded soldiers who could not have been saved by traditional Chinese
medicine. 157 Willis also assisted some wounded soldiers on the side of the Shogun
Government. 158 Then he attended those who were wounded at Ueno, Edo and in the
north and were sent to Yokohama. 159 Dr. Sidall, a British doctor, also treated patients
first in Yokohama and then in Edo, because of the large number of wounded samurai.16°
Both Willis and Sidall wrote in their reports that the injuries that they treated resulted
"almost exclusively" from firearms, not from swords and spears. 16I As battle was
155 See Lieber's Code, Article 16.
156 F.O. 46-91, No. 41. Hiogo, Feb. 25, 1868. Willis was appointed as "Vice-Consul" in Edo and
Kanagawa on January 1, 1868. See J.D.D., Vol. 1-2, Appendix 3, at 28. See also Hugh Cortazzi, Dr
Willis in Japan (1985). In Cortazzi's work, much of Willis' reports was reproduced. However, there is
difference between Cortazzi's reproduced reports and reports reproduced in the microfilm. The author
therefore relied on the microfilm even though he referred to Cortazzi's version.
157 See Koike Iichi, Zusetsu Nihon no "I" no Rekishi, Jyo, Tsushi Hen [Illustrated History of Medicine in
Japan, Vol. 1: Comprehensive Histoiy] , at 212 (1992).
158 F.O. 46-91, No. 20. Hiogo, Feb. 12, 1868; F.O. 46-91, No. 41. Hiogo, Feb. 25, 1868. It seems that
Willis did not produce any report on his assistance to these wounded men on the Shogun side. See also
Griffis, supra note 22, at 132; and Satow, supra note 9, at 315.
159 F.O. 46-95, No. 190, Encl.: Memorandum regarding wounded Japanese by W. Willis. Yokohama, July
21, 1868. [hereinafter Willis' Memorandum of July 21, 1868]
160 F.O. 46-108, No. 81, Encl. 1: Report on Japanese Military Hospital by Joseph B. Sidall. Yedo, March
30, 1869 [hereinafter Sidall's Report].
161 F.O. 46-92, No. 46, Encl.: W. Willis to H. Parkes, March 2, 1868. The same description can be found
in his report in F.O. 46-106, No. 17, Encl. 1: Memorandum by Dr. Willis on his visit to Wakamatsu and
other places to render medical assistance to wounded Japanese, Yedo, Jan. 23, 1869 [hereinafter Willis'
Memorandum of Jan. 23, 1869]; Sidall's Report; F.O. 46-98, H. Parkes to E. Hammond. Yokohama, Dec.
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exacerbated in Echigo, Higashikuze requested Parkes to allow Willis to render his
services in that region also, and Parkes accepted this request on the condition that Willis
could also attend prisoners captured by the Imperial Forces. 162 The Imperial
Government _asked further assistance of Willis in Wakamatsu 163 and he rendered
assistance to wounded and sick soldiers belonging to both the Imperial Forces and the
daimyo of Aizu.164
The British Minister's intention was two-fold, as he wrote to Lord Stanley in agreeing
to send Willis to Echigo: "it is to be hoped that by practical teaching of this nature the
better feelings of the Japanese may be touched and the horrors of their warfare mitigated
if only in a slight degree." 165 From this statement it is obvious that Parkes sent the
doctor not only because it accorded with humanity but also because it would suit the
British foreign policy of the time. 166 Willis himself wrote that his meeting with
Japanese people would, he hoped, "open the way to a more familiar intercourse with
foreigners." 167 However, as will be discussed later concerning the prisoners of war, the
humanitarian aspect of British medical relief is to be emphasised. 168 Willis consistently
complained of the non-existence of prisoners of war to the Japanese authorities.169
Besides, the fact that the two British doctors saved the lives of injured samurai is
2, 1868. (private) Encl. 1: Memorandum by W. Willis. Shibata, Nov. 18, 1868 [hereinafter Willis'
Memorandum of Nov. 18, 1868].
162 F.O. 46-97, No. 240, Encl. 1: Higashi Kuze to H. Parkes. Yedo, Oct. 2, 1868; Encl. 2: Parkes to
Higashi Kuze Chiujo. Yokohama, Oct. 3, 1868. Daniels gave three motives behind Parkes's condition,
namely "a desire to keep up an appearance of non-involvement, pure humanitarian sentiment, and a desire
to gain popularity for foreigners among Japanese by helping as many as possible." Daniels, supra note 55,
at 243.
163 F.O. 46-98, No. 301, Encl.: Saionji Chiunagon and Mibu Sayemon no Gonnoske to W. Willis. Nov. 19,
1868.
164 Willis ,
 Memorandum of Jan. 23, 1869.
165 F.O. 46-97, No. 240. Yokohama, Oct. 7, 1868. It was reported that "PARKEs had a political object in
viewing in sending them [Willis and Satow] up." See "Summary", The Japan Times' Overland Mail
(yokohama), Feb. 27, 1868, at 49, reprinted in Early Newspapers, supra. note 29, Vol. 13, at 45.
166 Daniels, supra note 55, at 243.
167 F.D. 46-98, H. Parkes to [E. Hammond]. Yokohama, Nov. 4, 1868. (private) Encl. 4: Memorandum by
W. Willis on the occasion of his visit to Kashiwasaki. [hereinafter Willis' Memorandum of Nov. 3, 1868]
168 See Daniels, supra note 55, at 244.
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significant, when considering that anti-foreign attitudes were still overwhelming in
Japan.
Willis and Sidall were not the only doctors who helped the wounded and sick on the
battlefield, and indeed there were some Japanese doctors who contributed to mitigating
the conditions of hors de combat)" In Hakodate, the role played by Takamatsu Ryoun,
a doctor who had studied medicine in France, is particularly noteworthy. He was given
by Enomoto, the leader of the exiled retainers, charge of the Hakodate Hospital and its
branch at the Koryuji Temple, 171
 where he treated wounded soldiers of both sides
equally on the basis of Red Cross principles that he had encountered while in Europe."2
He explained why he undertook such impartial treatment by stating that "Nil European
States, there is a law that provides the equal treatment of those who are hors de combat,
friend or foe." I73 On June 20, 1869, these two hospitals fell to the Imperial Forces.
The Hakodate Hospital was entered by a group of Imperial soldiers who threatened to
kill the wounded, but Takamatsu persuaded an officer of Satsuma into protecting the
wounded soldiers in the hospital.' 74 On the other hand, another group of soldiers broke
into the Koryuji branch, killed all the wounded soldiers and burnt the building.I75
The number of available documents concerning the protection of the shipwrecked is
limited, but the following example is noteworthy. When the Choyo, the Imperial man-
of-war, was destroyed by the rebels during the battle of Hakodate Bay on June 20, 1869,
the Pearl, the British man-of-war, collected twenty-four officers and sailors of the
169 See infra. 3.5.4. The Protection of Prisoners of War.
170 The Japanese doctors included Sato Shochu, Seki Kansai, Akagawa Genreki and Takamatsu Ryoun.
See Koike, supra note 157, at 213-218.
171 Takamatsu Ryoun, Toso Shimatsu [Record of Flight], reprinted in Takamatsu Ukiji, Bakusho Furuya
Sakuzaemon (am) Bakui Takamatsu Ryoun (ototo) Den [Biography of Two Brothers, Furuya Sakuzaemon
and Takamatsu Ryoun] , at 243 (1980).
172 Koike, supra note 157, at 218.
173 Takamatsu Ryoun, supra note 171, at 239. Translated from Japanese by the author.
174 Id. at 329-330.
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Choyo and gave medical treatment to them on land. 176 In gratitude, the Emperor
granted presents to the captain, doctors and officers who helped the shipwrecked with
gratitude.I77
3.5.4. THE PROTECTION OF PRISONERS OF WAR
The protection of captured soldiers in civil war is controversial, and for instance 1977
Protocol II does not use the term "prisoner of war". Article 56 of Lieber's Code
prohibits the punishment and cruel treatment of prisoners of war, while its Article 153
specifically states that "[treating captured rebels as prisoners of war ... neither proves
nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people". During his trip to help the
wounded and sick in the Japanese Civil War, Willis continuously complained of the
non-existence of prisoners of war or of wounded soldiers belonging to the Shogunate.
He wrote:
It is to be feared that a needless and cruel sacrifice of life characterizes hostile
action on both sides, each justifying its acts by the conduct of its opponents. In
the recent fight at Yedo all the wounded ronin were beheaded, and I have learnt
from a reliable source that an unhappy doctor who lent his services to the ronin
was for so doing executed and his head exposed at a place called Sanya near the
Yoshiwara in Yedo. I have observed a significant absence of wounded prisoners,
and notwithstanding assurances to the contrary from one side of the contending
parties I am inclined to believe that a wounded prisoner has little if any
compassion extended to him and is as a rule beheaded. .. . 178
175 1d. at 330-331.
176 See J.D.D., Vol. 2-2, Doc. No. 260, Jul. 13, 1869.
177 See id., Doc. No. 442, Oct. 11, 1869.
178 Willis' Memorandum of July 21, 1868.
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In almost all reports after this, Willis wrote that he had not seen any prisoner of war or
wounded soldier of the Shogun Government. 179 It was in Wakamatsu where Willis
finally found captured soldiers of the Aizu clan treated "with great clemency" by the
Imperial Army. 180 On the other hand, in his same report on Aizu, Willis gave an
account of the cruelty that the Aizu clan had shown to both Imperial soldiers and coolies
in their hands. 181 One can argue that many of the captured samurai were not treated as
prisoners of war and possibly beheaded even though the numbers of those executed
would require further in-depth research. It is likely that -establishing prisoners of war
camps according to the laws of war were unheard of during the Japanese Civil War.
3.5.5. THE PROTECTION OF FOREIGNERS
The protection of foreigners and their property became particularly relevant during the
conflict in Hakodate because it was an open port where foreign settlers resided. The
exiled retainers sent a declaration stating that their soldiers were forbidden to intrude
into residential areas inhabited by Europeans and that they requested consuls to report
any disobedience of the above order. I82 Parkes wrote to Eusden, the British Consul in
Hakodate, that the exiled retainers should give less than twenty four hours' notice of
attack in order to protect "the interests and safety of British subjects." I83 Also, before
the commencement of the conflict in Hakodate, the naval commanders of Britain and
France recommended on April 20, 1869 that "some distinctive flag be hoisted over
179 F.O. 46-98, Private letter (Nov. 4, 1868), Encl. 2. Memorandum by W. Willis of a journey from Yedo
to Takata. Takata, Oct. 25, 1868; Encl. 3, Willis to Parkes. Kashiwasaki, Nov. 3, 1868; Willis'
Memorandum of Nov. 3, 1868; F.O. 46-100, (No number), Memorandum on the occasion of Willis' visit
to Niigata to render medical assistance to wounded Japanese by W. Willis. Niigata, Nov. 13, 1868;
Willis' Memorandum of Nov. 18, 1868.
180 Willis Memorandum of Jan. 23, 1869.
181 Id.
182 "Document Circulated among all the Foreign Consuls at Hakodate on 6th Dec. Translation. The Exiled
Tokugawa Kerai to the Representatives of European Powers", The Japan Times' Overland Mail
(Yokohama), Dec. 30, 1868, at 316, reprinted in Early Newspapers, supra note 29, Vol. 20, at 10.
183 F.O. 46-99, No. 316, Encl. 6: H. Parkes to R. Eusden, Yokohama, Dec. 13, 1868.
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foreign property" for protection during hostilities. 184 In a circular issued by Eusden on
the same day, "a red ensign or a red flag" should be used by British subjects residing in
the town because of the above recommendation of the naval commanders. I85 Minami
Teisuke, in the notice of commencement of hostilities, stated that a steamship was being
sent for the protection of British subjects' moveable properties 186 and he informed the
British commander that the rebels would be attacked "in a short time". 187
 The French
Consul on the other hand requested the Imperial Government to protect French factories
and any church in Hakodate, and the authorities issued a strict order to that effect.I88
Regarding actual protection of foreign property, Eusden wrote on June 22, 1869:
There was very little looting indeed, I am told, and no wanton destruction of
property, except in one case. ... on the whole, I am inclined to the opinion that
great respect was shown to property more so than any European Army would
have done after taking a town by assault...189
However, Eusden wrote next day that he had requested the commander-in-chief of the
Imperial Forces to issue strict orders to his soldiers not to enter into the houses of
foreign residents because he had been informed of looting on the Imperial side: orders
to the above effect followed the request. 19° As regards French nationals and their
property, the French Interpreter sent a memorandum that pointed out some crimes
184 F.O. 46-109, No. 103, Encl. 7: Circular by R. Eusden and John N. Duus, H.I.F. M's Consular Agent to
the foreign Consuls. [n.d.]
185 F.O. 46-109, No. 103, Encl. 6: Circular by Consul R. Eusden. British Consulate, Hakodate, April 20,
1869.
186 F.O. 46-109, No. 122, Encl. 2: Minami Teisuke to the Captain of H.B.M.'s man of war at the Harbour
of Hakodate. 27d. 3m. The British captain replied to the letter. See F.O. 46-99, No. 122, End. 3: J.J.
Ross, Captain, to Minami Teisuke. H.M.S. Pearl, Hakodate, May 9, 1869. Minami also wrote to the
British and French consuls at Hakodate to similar effect. See F.O. 46-109, No. 122, Encl. 7: Minami
Teisuke to Consul Eusden. 5d. of 4. in Meiji 2nd (May, 1869).
187 F.O. 46-109, No. 122, Encl. 2, id.
188 J.D.D., Vol. 2-1, Doc. No. 238, Jun. 29, 1869.
189 F.O. 46-110, No. 139, Encl. 1: R. Eusden to Parkes. Hakodate, June 22, 1869.
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committed by Imperial troops, in one of which soldiers broke into the warehouse of a
French merchant and threatened him with a sword.191
3.6. THE AFTERMATH OF THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR
3.6.1. Amnesty
After northern daimyo fighters surrendered, an Imperial edict was issued and the
sentence of the rebellious daimyo was determined on January 19, 1869. 192 According to
the edict, the Government officials reported to the Emperor that "the crime of
[Matsudaira Katamori, Date Yoshikuni and the rest] is equally that of rebellion, and that
they deserve capital punishment". 193 However, no death sentence was pronounced and
punishments peculiar to Japan of the time, such as "perpetual custody", "retirement into
seclusion" and "retirement from public life" were imposed on the defeated daimyo.194
Moreover, on November 1, 1869, the Imperial Government issued another decree to the
effect that pardon was granted to Tokugawa Yoshinobu, Aizu and "all their
followers."195
During the Civil War, Tokugawa Yoshinobu retired himself and the head of the
Tokugawa family was replaced by Tokugawa Iesato, who was granted Shizuoka as the
family's new domain. 196 The real reconciliation between the Imperial Government and
190 F.O. 46-110, No. 141, Encl. 1: R. Eusden to Parkes. Hakodate, June 23, 1869.
191 J.D.D., Vol. 2-1, Doc. No. 256, [date not given] 1869.
192 F.O. 46-107, No. 41, Encl. 1: Extract from an extra number of the Yedo Official Gazette [Dajokan
Nisshi] published on [Jan.] 24, [1869]; the sentences pronouncement on all the DAIMIOS in rebellion
against the Mikado.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 R.G. 59, R. 13, No. 84, Encl.: Notification of the Mikado's decree granting unconditional pardon or
absolution to the late Tycoon issued from the Daijokwan, Oct. 4 - Nov. 3, 1869. Original in Dajokan
Nisshi [Official Gazette], No. 103, Sep. 29, 2nd year of Meiji (lunar calendar), reproduced in Dajokan
Nisshi, Vol. 3, at 534 (Ishii Ryosuke ed., 1980).
196 J.D.D., Vol. 1-1, No. 382, Jul. 15, 1868. Letters from Higashi Kuze to the Representatives of France,
Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Prussia and the USA informing of the grant of a domain to
Tokugawa Kamenosuke [Iesato]. Jul. 15, 1868.
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the last Shogun was achieved when Tokugawa Yoshinobu was granted a princedom in
1902 for "his old services." 197 Regarding Aizu, which was regarded as the most
culpable of all, it was decided that about 1700 samurai be sent to Takada and 3200 to
Tokyo for imprisonment. 198 Kayano Gonbei Naganobu, karo of Aizu, 199 was ordered to
commit suicide for taking all the responsibility for Aizu's war with the Imperial
Government. 200 In 1870 the son of Matsudaira Katamori succeeded his father, was
ennobled and given new land in the most northern part of Honshu. 201 Many samurai of
Aizu settled in the new domain but life was so severe that they had to live in extreme
poverty.202 Former retainers of Aizu were in general not offered high-ranking positions
in the new Meiji Government. One of the exceptions was Shiba Goro, who served in
the Imperial Army, played an important part in liberating the siege of the Boxer
Rebellion and later became an army genera1. 203
 Matsudaira Katamori himself was
released from seclusion on February 14, 1872.204 As regards Enomoto Takeaki, the
rebel leader loyal to the Tokugawa to the end, he was granted a viscountship in 1887
because "after he was amnestied, he served for the Hokkaido Development Board in
1872, was appointed Vice-Admiral of the Imperial Navy in 1874, despatched to Russia
197 Ishin Shiryo Hensankai [Association to Compile Documents on the Meiji Restoration] (ed.), Fukkoku
Kazoku Fuyo [Genealogy of Noble Family, Reissued], at 466 (1982). Translated from Japanese by the
author. Nobility was established, and the noblemen of Kyoto and the daimyo were given the title kazoku,
which means "noble". See F.O. 46-111, No. 163, Encl.: Translation of Japanese Imperial decrees for
Kosei Kwan. 6th month. Later in 1884, five classes of nobility, equivalent to the European ones, were
established. See Kampo [Japanese Official Gazzette], No. 306, Jul. 7, 1884, at 2.
198 See Aizu Boshin Senshi Hensankai [Association to Compile Documents on the War in Aizu], Aizu
Boshin Senshi [The War in Aizu], at 655 (1933).
199 Karo is the high-ranking position under a daimyo.
200 Aizu Boshin Senshi Hensankai, supra note 198, at 660. See also Dajokan Nisshi, supra note 195, at
343.
201 Matsudaira Kafu [Genealogy of the Matsudaira Family], reproduced in Aizu Boshin Senshi
Hensankai, supra note 198, at 670-671.
202 Ishimitsu Mahito, Aru Meiji Jin no Kiroku [Record of a Man of Meiji], at 58-75 (1971).
203 Id. at 125-162.
204 Matsudaira Kafu, supra note 201, at 674.
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and China as Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, appointed as Minister
for Communications in 1885, and as Government Minister several times."205
3.6.2. THE LAWS OF WAR AND MEIJI JAPAN
The Japanese Civil War was the first major conflict in which Japan was engaged after
the Meiji Restoration. The priority of Japanese foreign policy in the Meiji period was to
revise the unfair treaties that the Shogunate had signed, so that Japan could have equal
relationships with the Great Powers. To achieve this goal, it was thought that the full
implementation of the laws of war was an ideal opportunity to demonstrate Japan's
willingness to adopt what were then considered ideas of the exclusively European-
oriented community of nations. In the Meiji era, Japan fought such international wars
as the Sino-Japanese War, the Boxer Rebellion and the Russo-Japanese War. It was
especially in the last war that Japan was praised for her scrupulous observance of the
laws of war.
In its philosophical aspect, humanity in warfare was not necessarily an idea held only by
the Europeans. Indeed, Bushido, the Japanese equivalent of chivalry, imposed heavy
duties on warriors. 206 Nevertheless, as has already been examined, it was true that those
who should have acted with honour did not, for instance, treat captured enemy samurai
humanely during the Civil War. Then what was the significance of the Japanese Civil
War? The answer is rather complex. After the war the warrior class was abolished and
all Japanese people were made equal. Curiously, however, with the abolishing of the
samurai, the Bushido was idealised and prevailed among former samurai who
dominated the Imperial Government. For instance, Admiral Togo and General Nogi,
205 Fukkoku Kazoku Fuyo, supra note 197, at 166. Translated from Japanese by the author.
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who are well-known for their willingness to obey the laws of war during the Russo-
Japanese war. Each belonged to low-ranking class of samurai and had fought on the
Imperial side during the Japanese Civil War. Even though the victory of the Imperial
Government over the Shogunate led to abolishing the samurai, the same victory had the
opposite effect of enhancing the Bushido, or the way of life of the samurai who no
longer existed.2"
3.6.3. THE RELEVANCE OF THE JAPANESE CIVIL WAR TO THE PRESENT TIME
The Japanese Civil War took place in 1868 to 1869, and doubt may be cast on the
relevance of the war to the present international humanitarian law. However, it has
significance today for the following reasons.
First, the Japanese samurai applied the laws of war of the time to a certain extend even
when the 1864 Geneva Convention was the only humanitarian instrument to which
Japan was not a party, and this shows the importance of custom. Custom being the only
tool for those States not party to a treaty, the Japanese Civil War shows an important
example about how custom could play a part.
Second, compared with the American Civil War, it may be true that the Japanese Civil
War is not as significant as its American counterpart. However, as this author stated in
Chapter 1, scholars tend to focus on one particular instance, but he is of opinion that
scholars should endeavour to examine other cases which occur at the same time in other
places. Therefore, civil wars other than the American Civil War, e.g. the Japanese Civil
War, should be focused. In this light, the Japanese Civil War is a rare example in which
206 See Nitobe Inazo, Bushido: The Soul of Japan (rev. enlarged, 1969) (1905). See particularly Chapter
V, Benevolence, the Feeling of Distress. See also Adachi Sumio, "The Asian Concept", in UNESCO,
The International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 13, 14-17 (1988).
207 Shiba Ryotaro, 'Meiji' to lu Kokka [The State whose Name is 'Meiji 7, Vol. 2, at 117 (1994).
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both parties to the Civil War acknowledged the existence of war at early stage, and in
addition the parties requested to the third parties that neutrality be observed. Such
behaviour of both contending parties to declare the state of war and to request neutrality
policy to foreign Powers was probably unheard-of at that time, and this is a unique
feature of the Japanese Civil War in comparison with the American Civil War.
Concerning the laws of war, what makes the American Civil War especially remarkable
was the introduction of Lieber's Code, which greatly influenced the later codification of
the laws of war. Even though the Japanese Civil War did not produce such an important
document which would influence the later development of the laws of war, however,
certain conduct of hostilities in the civil war was unique to the war; such as the use of
false flags, and protection of foreigners and the use of red flags for that purpose.
Furthermore, British doctors were sent even to remote area of Japan by the Imperial
Government to treat wounded and sick samurai, and such dispatch of foreign medical
personnel is suggestive of the present activity of the ICRC.
Third, the Japanese Civil War is particularly important in terms of reconciliation, which
is provided by Article 6 of Protocol II. Many recent civil conflicts originate from ethnic
problems, and the Japanese Civil War may not be a pertinent example since Japan did
not have ethnic problem at that time. However, there was hatred among certain han, e.g.
between Satsuma and Aizu, and the treatment of the defeated could have been severer.
Moreover, the Japanese Civil War shows how important reconciliation is; the reconciled
Japan achieved industrialisation and modernisation, which would set a precedent for
those States which are currently going through a civil war or through a reconciliation
process.
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CHAPTER 4
CUSTOM AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ON NON-
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
4.1. ROLE OF CUSTOM IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW ON CIVIL WAR
The Geneva Conventions are today almost universally ratified, and Protocol II is widely
ratified even though some of the "specially affected States" are not parties to the
Protoco1. 1 In consequence, there is a question whether custom is of any significance,
which is raised by Baxter:
Hence the paradox that as the number of parties to a treaty increases, it becomes
more difficult to demonstrate what is the state of customary international law
dehors the treaty.2
There are, however, two major reasons why the role of customary international law is of
great value; that is, the informality and binding nature of customary law.
Customary international law can be formed in a flexible manner and it can respond to
the reality of the world promptly, while the process of making treaties takes
considerable time. 3
 In domestic jurisdiction, a legislation body can meet and introduce
I As to up-to-date information on ratification of IHL, see "Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: ratifications, accessions and successions" (29 August 2000)
[hereinafter "List of Ratifications1which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at http://www.icrc.org/ .
As to "specially affected States", see infra. 4.4.1. Generality.
2 Baxter, "Treaties and Custom", 129 Recueil des Cours 25, 64 (1970-1). "Baxter's paradox" is discussed
in Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict, at 33 (1992); Theodore Meron, Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law in Customary Law [hereinafter Human Rights], at 50-52 (1989).
3 See North Sea Continental Shelf, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1969, p. 3 [hereinafter North Sea Continental
Shelf cases], para. 73; Baxter, id., at 97; Claude Bruderlein, "Custom in international humanitarian law",
IRRC, Nov-Dec 1991, at 579, 589; Theodor Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of
International Humanitarian Law" (hereinafter "The Continuing Role of Custom"), 90 (1996) AJIL 238-
249, 247; Shaw, International Law, at 58 (4th ed., 1997); Gennady M. Danilenlco, Law-Making in the
International Community, at 98 (1993).
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law to cope with new situations in a relatively short time, but in the international
community, the equality of sovereign States prevents such quick response. 4 Customary
international law can be established in an area in which treaty regulations are inadequate
or nonexistent. Custom can also be formed by subsequent practice, and the ICJ
examined this method in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 5 Indeed, many of the
humanitarian conventions were formulated after wars in which the introduction of new
and unconventional methods of warfare cast doubt on the existing rules. The 1925 Gas
Protocol6 resulted from the use of gas weapons during the First World War, the 1949
Geneva Conventions from the Second World War and the 1977 Protocols from the
Vietnam War.
Now, attention is placed on another role. Customary international law binds all States
regardless of ratification of treaties, 7 and this role may be the more important in
international humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict than the former role
because of the limited existence of customary international law in this field. Before
1977, there had been no international treaty concerning civil war apart from Common
Article 3 which is regarded as a "Convention in miniature", 8 and the introduction of
Protocol II is, therefore, an encouraging step towards regulating civil war. However, by
carefully examining today's non-parties of Protocol II, one can notice that many of
them are indeed facing civil war in their territory. 9 Hence, the proof of existence of
4 State's consent is necessary in order to bind the State by a treaty. See the Preamble, para. 3 and Article
34 of the Vienna Convention on the law of treaties [hereinafter the Law of Treaties], 1155 UNTS 331
(1980). As to the equality of sovereign States, see Article 2(1) of the UN Charter.
5 North Sea Continental Shelfcases, para. 75.
6 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 24 (1930) UKTS, Cmd. 3604.
7 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, paras. 70-71; Baxter, supra. note 2, at 102-103; Shaw, supra.
note 3, at 75.
8 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in
the Field: Commentary, at 48 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1952). Throughout this thesis, this Commentary is
referred to as "P ictet's Comm entaiy"
9 See "List of Ratifications", supra. note 1.
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customary rules contributes to ameliorating the plight of the victims in armed conflict in
which a State is not a party to Protocol II.10
A related question is denunciation. As to the four Geneva Conventions, Articles
/
63(I)/62(II)/142(III)/158(IV) respectively provide that a State which denounces the
Conventions is still obliged to obey customary rules. I1 Protocol II has a provision for
denunciation in Article 25, but it is silent on customary rules. I2 The reason for this
silence is unclear, but it may be that most provisions of Protocol II were at the time of
adoption innovative. 13 The problem of denunciation is theoretical in international
humanitarian law, and there has not been any denunciation until today. I4 However, it
needs to be emphasised, because of uncertainty in the future development of
international relations, that a denouncing State is still obliged to obey customary law
under Article 43 of the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties.15
4.2. RELATION BETWEEN CONVENTIONAL AND CUSTOMARY RULES
4.2.1. INTRODUCTION
The accelerated efforts to codify international law in the post-Second World War era
have resulted in a number of multi-national law-making conventions, among which are
the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocols. Law-making treaties are different
1 ° An exception is a persistent objector. See infra. 4.9.2. Persistent Objectors. Application of customary
rules depends on implementation. See infra. Chs. 9-10.
11 See Bruderlein's account on these Articles, Bruderlain, supra. note 3, at 582.
12 It is worth comparing with Article 99 of Protocol I. Even though this article does not mention
customary rules, the ICRC's Commentary states that "the whole of the relevant customary law" should be
observed by a State denouncing Protocol I. The ICRC's Commentary, para. 3857. However, this
Commentary does not allude to such obligations with respect to Article 25 of Protocol II. See id, paras.
4919-4929.
13 However, the contrary view is presented by Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 6-7.
14 Indeed, denunciation is non-existent in international humanitarian law. See Documents on the Laws of
War (Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff eds., 3rd ed., 2000).
15 See Bruderlein, supra. note 3, at 582-583. However, the denunciation of a treaty by a number of States
could change customary international law, see Baxter, supra. note 2, at 98.
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from mere contractual treaties, since the former is aimed at having a general effect.16
Although the emergence of law-making agreements brings clarity to international law, it
reveals the problem of relations between conventional and customary rules. For
instance, the -ICJ examined the customary status of the 1958 Geneva Conventions 17 on
the North Sea Continental Shelf cases. 18
 This is also a fundamental question of this
thesis; when one considers the application of humanitarian law on civil strife, which
rule should be relied on, custom or convention? 19
 The present author, therefore,
discusses the sources of the law of armed conflict on non-international armed conflict
before proceeding to the detailed examination of custom.
4.2.2. CUSTOMARY RULES
Despite efforts at codification, there are still certain areas, i.e. the "Hague" law, which
are not covered by Protocol II, and in these areas, the prohibition of certain conduct is
possible only through custom.20
 International humanitarian law on international armed
conflict would be of assistance on some occasions, but it cannot be invoked mutatis
mutandi on the others because of the different nature of the conflict. For instance, the
protection of prisoners of war in international war is possibly not applied to the situation
of civil conflict, since the legitimate government is almost always extremely reluctant to
16 See Shaw, supra. note 3, at 75.
17 Convention on the Continental Shelf, 499 UNTS 311 (1964).
18 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, paras. 25-85.
19 Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, 67 (1946) UKTS, Cmd.
7015 [hereinafter the UN Charter and Statute of the ICJ respectively]. "[T]he general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations" provided by Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the ICJ can be a source, but
the nature of this instrument itself is controversial, and its applicability to IHL is therefore remote. See
generally, Shaw, supra. note 3, at 77-82, especially, at 78-79.
20 See Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 244; Meron, Human Rights, supra.
note 2, at 72. Bond argues that Common Article 3 incorporates certain Hague rules "as limited by
reasonable interpretation". See James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 82-83 (1974).
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treat the captured rebels as prisoners of war. 21 The ascertainment of the existence of
customary rules therefore needs careful examination of practice and opinio furls.
4.2.3. COMPATIBILITY OF CONVENTIONAL AND CUSTOMARY RULES
Treaty provisions can be evolved into customary rules, 22 and the ICJ affirmed the three
stages of transformation of conventional rules into custom, namely declaratory,
crystallising and generating customary international law. 23 These criteria may be useful
_
in particular areas of law, such as the law of the sea and the law of treaties, which have
a long history. 24
 With reference to the laws of war on internal conflict, however, legal
regulation of such conflict is a comparatively new area, and moreover most provisions
of Protocol II are innovative and are not based on firmly established State practice.25
Under such immature circumstances, importance should be placed on the examination
of practice and opinio juris to determine the existence of customary rules from the
beginning.
When there are two identical rules in different sources, the significance of custom is
questioned. The ICJ claimed in the Nicaragua case that :
21 Regarding the treatment of those who are captured, see infra. Ch. 6.
22 Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 244.
23 As to crystallising rules, see North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 69; as to generating rules, para.
71; and as to declaratory rules, para. 81. See Oscar Schachter, "Entangled Treaty and Custom," in
International Law at a Time of Perplexity 717, at 718 (Yoram Dinstein ed., 1989); Cassese's five
categorisation in Antonio Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict and Customary International Law", 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, at 58-68 (1984)
[hereinafter "The Geneva Protocols"].
24 For instance, the ICJ referred to Article 62 of the Law of Treaties as "a codification of existing
customary law". See Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Jurisdiction of the Court,
Judgment, ICJ Reports 1973, p. 3, para. 36.
25 See the following chapters of this thesis. But cf the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4435 (stating that "the
existence of customary norms in internal armed conflicts should not be totally denied").
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It will therefore be clear that customary international law continues to exist and to
apply, separately from international treaty law, even where the two categories of
law have an identical content.26
The Court, however, found in the same case that custom and Article 51 of the UN
Charter do not precisely overlap. 27 It can be held that one should at first consider every
circumstance, 28 and if conventional and customary rules are identical, the role of
customary international law becomes future-oriented; that- is to say, subsequent practice
and opinio juris should be taken into account. Should two rules be not identical, these
rules may be interpreted and applied differently. 29 For instance, Article 18(2) of
Protocol II provides "relief actions for the civilian population". This is more detailed
than Common Article 3 which the Nicaragua case has confirmed as customary, 3 ° but
Article 18(2) does not mention the role of the ICRC. Therefore, there is a difference
between these provisions, though this difference does not hamper ICRC activities which
are provided by Common Article 3•31
4.2.4. CONVENTIONAL RULES
Many provisions of Protocol II are, as this thesis demonstrates, conventional rules,
which do not bind non-parties to the treaty and these provisions may be crystallised or
generated into customary rules because of the law-making nature of Protocol II. It may
appear to some that this approach to draw a firm line between conventional and
26 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, para. 179 [hereinafter Nicaragua case].
27 Nicaragua case, para. 176.
28 See Shaw, supra. note 3, at 77.
29 Id., at 83.
30 Nicaragua case, para. 216-220.
31 See the ICRC's Commentaiy, para. 4891 (stating that "Article 18, paragraph 2, does not in anyway
reduces the ICRC's right of initiative, as laid down in common Article 3 since the conditions of
application of the latter remain unchanged" (footnotes omitted)).
76
customary rules is too strict, and it is indeed not practicable to determine the exact time
of the establishment of custom. 32 However, the present author considers that
crystallising and generating rules are still the law which should be, and that they still
lack in binding force, for they are not based on practice and opinio furls.
At this stage of limited application of Protocol II, one should particularly pay attention
to the practice and opinio juris of non-parties to the treaty because these two elements
would demonstrate the application of a treaty provision which they have not ratified.33
In this light-, the observation of the practice and opinio juris of non-parties to Protocol II
is of great importance today because many "specially affected" states have not ratified
the convention, unlike the 1949 Geneva Conventions.34
4.3. GENERAL DISCUSSION ON PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
It is well established and accepted that "international custom" is "evidence of a general
practice accepted as law". 35 Customary international law is, therefore, a general
practice which is accepted as law, in other words, opinio juris. Furthermore, the ICJ
affirmed that treaty provisions that consist of "a fundamentally norm-creating
character" and are accompanied by State practice and opinio furls, can be transformed
to customary rules. 36 Normative rules give rise to rights and obligations to States, 37 and
obviously international humanitarian law is in the ambit of these rules. 38 The
32 See Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary
Reflections" in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead 115, at 123 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
33 See Baxter's account on "multilateral treaties as constitutive of new customary international law",
Baxter, supra. note 2, at 57-74.
34 As to "specially affected" States, see infra. 4.4.1. Generality.
35 See the Statute of the ICJ, Article 38(1)(c).
36 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 70-78.
37 See Weil, "Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?", 77 AJIL 413, at 413 (1983).
38 The provisions of Protocol II are either prescriptive, prohibitive or permissive. See id.
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normativity of international humanitarian law is therefore evident, and the following
discussion concentrates on the other two elements, practice and opinio juris.
Although international and domestic courts as well as scholars generally agree with the
.0
importance of practice to customary international law, many of them tend to concentrate
on statements, resolutions and conventions rather than to examine actual practice. 39 The
position of the ICJ on practice is ambivalent. In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear
Weapons, the ICJ reiterated the importance of both practice and opinio juris as "the
substance of [customary international] law". 4° However, the Court avoided examining
the "policy of deterrence",41 and it focused on discussing the existence of opinio juris.42
This attitude of the Court towards practice is merely a repetition of the judgment of the
Nicaragua case in which the Court stated that "The Court must satisfy itself that the
existence of the rule in the opinio juris of States is confirmed by practice", 43 but it
concentrated on analysing opinio juris.44
This emphasis on opinio juris is primarily because of the difficulty in obtaining
information on military operations. 45 Military information is probably the most
39 See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, ICJ
Reports 1996, p.66 [hereinafter Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons]; The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,
a/k/a "Dule", Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-
1-AR72, 2 Oct. 1995, reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996) [hereinafter Tadic case]. Meron appears to have
modified his opinion. He relied on opinio furls in "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law", 81
AJIL 348, at 361, 367, 369 (1987), but he later admits that "operational practice" is essential in "The
Continuing Role" supra. note 3, at 240-241. See also H.H.G. Post, "Some Curiosities in the Sources of
the Law of Armed Conflict in a General International Legal Perspective", 25 NYIL 83, 98 (1994).
" A dvisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, para. 64.
41 Id, para. 67.
42 Id., paras. 67-73.
43 Nicaragua case, para. 184.
" See the Court's findings on customary international law on the use of force and non-intervention, id,
paras. 187-209.
45 See Dieter Fleck, "The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Customary International
Law", 29 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 495, 500 (1990); Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at
31; Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 41. Wolfke's contention that "every event of international
importance is universally and immediately known" therefore appears too optimistic as regards
international humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict. See Karol Wolfke, Custom in
Present International Law, at 60 (2nd ed., 1993).
78
classified among government information, and declassification, if any, may take long
Years. 46 ICRC delegates, who are present in many civil conflicts, should have valuable
information on military situations, but they observe strict confidentiality in order to
maintain neutrality:47
The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia discussed:
In appraising the formation of customary rules or subject-matter, reliance must
-primarily be placed on such elements as official pronouncements of States,
military manuals and judicial decisions.48
Meron formerly argued that "it is extremely difficult to collect credible evidence of state
practice" and thus military manuals would be the most reliable evidence of practice.49
Similarly, Schachter argues that the necessity of demonstrating practice is reduced in
areas of normative rules if opinio juris is "clearly demonstrated and strong".5°
In spite of such difficulties inherent to internal conflicts, the present author is of the
opinion that specialists in international humanitarian law should endeavour to obtain
and examine information on practice, particularly actual practice. 51 The ascertainment
of customary international law without concrete evidence of practice would not be
convincing to both parties to civil war. 52 Then, they should carefully find the existence
46 As to the difficulty in obtaining information on military operations, see Tadic case, para. 99.
47 See infra. Ch. 9.
48 Tadic case, para. 99.
49 Theodor Meron in "Determining Customary International Law Relative to the Conduct of Hostilities in
Non-International Armed Conflicts", 2 American University Journal of International Law and Policy
471, 491-492 (1987) [hereinafter "Determining Customary International Law"]. Meron, however,
recognises their inadequacy with respect to civil conflicts when he states "I would hope that future
manuals of military law will give more attention to these [internal] conflicts". See Meron in "A
Discussion of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949", ASIL Proceedings 613, at 615 (1988)
[hereinafter "A Discussion of Protocol II"].
'° Schachter, supra. note 23, at 733-755.
Si Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 248.
82 See Burrus Carnahan in "Determining Customary International Law", supra. note 49, at 489 (in the
Humanitarian Law Conference held in 1987 he "cautioned that even though the rules [in the laws of war]
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or non-existence of customary international law by examining both practice and opinio
juris, because established customary international law in effect binds all States, whether
or not they have ratified relevant treaties. 53 It should be remembered that it is
governments- and rebel forces that apply the law, and an attempt to find customary
international law and apply this custom to real situations without examination of
practice would be unrealistic. 54 For a legitimate government which is almost always
reluctant to apply international humanitarian law to civil war, customary international
'
law whose existence is mainly based on opinio juris would not be persuasive to apply
the law. On the other hand, the rebel organisation which is probably not used to
applying international law might find it easier to implement international humanitarian
law if there were concrete examples of application in the past.
This writer considers that customary international law is "the law to be" while
convention is either/both "the law to be" and/or "the law should be". The determination
of a certain number of States to introduce a new convention to regulate what is not
regulated by custom does not automatically oblige the others to conform with it.
Therefore, practice and opinio juris are necessary for the establishment of customary
international law. 55 Furthermore, in non-international armed conflict, one side almost
always regards the other as illegitimate, which often results in exacerbating the
conditions of victims. Hence, convincing the parties to a conflict of the existence of
customary international law based on persuasive evidence becomes important. In
conclusion, Cheng's critical remark is worth noting:
are very humane and agreeable with fellow diplomats, they must be credible for soldiers to follow them").
A participant in the same Conference contended that "any attempt to state the law abstracted from state
practice often appears unrealistic to the people who actually apply the law". Id., at 487.
53 Law of the Treaties, Article 34.
54 Supra. note 52.
55 See Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 248.
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In any situation, it is absolutely necessary to distinguish between what is the lex
lata and what is only lex ferenda, and not fall into the trap of believing one's own
aspirations or those of others, however fashionable, to be the existing law.56
The importance of practice having been discussed and emphasised, this prominence
does not discard the necessity of opinio juris for the formation of custom. A State and a
rebel group can act, but it may be acting out of political or humanitarian considerations.
The difference between protocol or comity and custom is that the latter is observed as
-.legal obligation, 57 and therefore the State must consider that it is legally required to
conduct itself accordingly. For instance, even though State practice exists to grant
temporary asylum to those who escape from civil war, the US Court of Appeals stated:
We are not persuaded, however, that these nations acted in the belief that the
practice was required by international law. More plausibly, they acted out of
understandable humanitarian concern.58
Even if a State is a party to a treaty, the observance of the treaty by the State simply
because the State is a party, does not amount to the formation of customary international
law because the State is only fulfilling the treaty obligations. The belief of both parties
and non-parties that they are bound by customary rules is therefore necessary.59
Without opinio juris as one of the requirements for the establishment of custom, there
should be very few, if any, customary rules even on international wars, because of the
56 Bin Cheng, "How Should We Study International Law", 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law
and Affairs 214, 217 (1994-1995).
57 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 77; Michael Akehurst, "Custom as a Source of
International Law", 47 BYIL 1, 33 (1974-75) [hereinafter "Custom as a Source"]; Andrew Borrowdale,
"The future of the law of war: the place of the Additional Protocols of 1977 in customary international
law", 14 Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa 79, at 84 (1981).
58 Echeverria-Herrnandez v. U.S.I.N.S., 923 F. 2d 688, at 693 [Hereinafter Echeverria-Herrnandez case].
59 Theodor Meron, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law", supra. note 39, at 366-367; Meron,
Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 53.
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fact that violations of the laws of war occur in any armed conflict. The reason why
custom does not cease to exist even though there are violations of humanitarian rules is
that violating States and rebels legitimise their conducts and third States protest against
breaches of humanitarian law.6°
4.4. PREREQUISITES OF PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS61
4.4.1. GENERALITY
This prereciuisite stems from Article 38 of the Statute of the ICJ which provides "a
general practice". 62 The ICJ in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases emphasised
practice of "States whose interests are specially affected", 63 and this principle of
"specially affected States" is widely supported by various publicists. 64 International law
does not demonstrate the components of "specially affected States" in a legal light,65
and they differ from one area of international law to another, and each case should be
examined. 66 For instance, Switzerland is clearly a "specially affected State" with
reference to the customary status of the law of neutrality, 67 but it is not so as regards the
customary status of the use of continental shelf. In the laws of war on non-international
armed conflict, "specially affected States" could be defined as Great Powers and those
States which face civil war. 68 Concerning the former, these States are not likely to
60 See infra. 4.7.2. Denial and Justification by Belligerents for Their Own Conduct; 4.7.5 Protest against
Belligerents' Conduct by Third States.
61 See Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 94-98.
62 Emphasis added.
63 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 74.
64 See Baxter, supra. note 2, at 66; Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 75; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 63;
Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 78-79.
Danilenko, supra. note 3, at. 96.
66 See cf. Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 84 (arguing that even though "widespread and representative
participation in a practice" might lead to the establishment of custom, to what extent such participation is
necessary cannot be prescribed and "this must be judged in each case").
67 Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 249.
68 See Meron, id (referring to "nuclear powers, other major military powers, and occupying and occupied
states" as "specially affected states").
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encounter civil conflict, 69 but they can exercise influence on the international
community. 70 It is not plausible to exactly define which States are Great Powers, but
they at least include the Permanent Members of the Security Council, advanced
industrialise& States and regional Powers. 71 The practice of these States usually takes a
form other than actual wartime practice, such as publishing military manuals, legislating
military law, 72
 and acts of protest against violations.
States which face civil conflict are "specially affected" 73 even though many of them are
,
not so in pCacetime. Military activities become a main element of practice of these
States, though other forms of practice should not be disregarded. For instance, many
States facing civil conflicts in the 1990s were not parties to Protocol II, and such large
abstention from ratification would function against the creation of customary rules
through the Protoco1.74
4.4.2. UNIFORMITY
Practice must be "virtually uniform" 75
 because absolute uniformity is not possible.76
One deviation from uniform practice should be considered to be a breach, 77 but this
point is often disregarded in international humanitarian law since it is the spectacular
69 It is however difficult to deny the possibility of civil war in Great Powers. As a matter of fact, China,
France (in Algeria) and Russia (in Chechnya) experienced internal armed conflict after the Second World
War.
70 See Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 249. But see Abi-Saab, supra. note 32,
at 118-119; Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 23 (Akehurst contends that it is publicity,
rather than the power of States, that affect other States' practice, but it seems to the present writer that the
power of States make publicity more likely).
71 Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 249; Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2,
at 75-76.
72 As to the influence of standards of "leading nations", see Post, supra. note 39, at 98 and n.46.
73 Meron, "The Continuing Role of Custom", supra. note 3, at 249; Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2,
at 75-76.
74 See Meron, Human Rights, id., at 76.
75 North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 74. See also Akehurst, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of
International Law", 47 BYIL 273, 276 (1974-75); Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 83.
76 Brownlie considers "substantial uniformity" to be indispensable. See Ian Bronwlie, Principles of
Public International Law, at 5 (5th ed. 1998).
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violations of international humanitarian law that are more often remembered, 78 and a
breach of the law tends to be seen as the norm rather than an exception. 79 Schachter
writes:
Some of the norms referred to, particularly the rules on force and the humanitarian
rules of war, are brittle and prone to violation. It makes sense to recognize that in
these cases breaches are likely and that the rules would vanish if such breaches
were considered as 'State practice' creating new rules. This is an additional reason
to mininiize the necessity of uniform and consistent practice when there is a strong
opinio juris or the peremptory nature of the rule.8°
In non-international armed conflict the existence of customary international law is still
limited, and a breach of international humanitarian law does not automatically become a
violation of customary international law. Furthermore, if a State is not a party to
Protocol II, it is not responsible for a violation of this treaty, even though the State
and/or rebels may be morally responsible for the general principles of the laws of war
and condemned by the international community.
4.4.3. CONTINUITY
The ICJ judged in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that customary international
law can be formed "even without the passage of any considerable period of time", 81 and
77 Nicaragua case, para. 186.
78 Michael Harris Hoffman, "The customary law of non-international armed conflict: evidence from the
United States Civil War", IRRC, Jul-Aug 1990, at 322, 341.
79 See Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 61 (arguing that "To balance the greater visibility of
violations, it is therefore necessary that any inquiry into international practice should focus on cases of
conduct consistent with a norm").
89 Schachter, supra. note 23, at 735.
81 North Sea Continental Shelfcases, para. 73.
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most scholars agree with this formulation. 82 This is especially true in the areas where
technological advancement plays a considerable part, such as air and space law, and the
law of armed conflict also belongs to these areas since military technology progresses
_
rapidly. However, a State confronting civil war is extremely reluctant to apply
humanitarian law, and this unwillingness hinders the establishment of custom.
Furthermore, a gap exists between the time when the practice is conducted and when
information on the practice becomes available. Therefore, the ascertainment of
customary .international law takes a considerable time even though the custom has
formed long before the ascertainment.
4.4.4. RELEVANCE OF THE PREREQUISITES TO OPINIO JURIS
The above three conditions are almost always discussed in terms of State practice, but
they are also relevant to opinio juris. As to generality and "specially affected States",
their opinion can greatly influence the creation of custom. 83 Referring to uniformity,
States facing a civil conflict often express different views on the same subject," and
conflicting opinions makes the establishment of customary law, as well as its
ascertainment, difficult. 85 Therefore, opinio juris must be "virtually uniform".
Apropos of continuity, even one statement could bind a State, and it does not have to be
continuously expressed.	 However, as mentioned above, statements are often
82 See Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 16; Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 83;
Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 5; Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 64 and n.105; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 60;
Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 59.
83 See Schachter, supra. note 23, at 730-731. But see Maurice Mendelson, "The Subjective Element in
Customary International Law", 66 BYIL 177, 186 (1995) (Mendelson casts doubt on the role of these
States).
84 There are a countless number of examples of ambiguous positions taken by both States and rebels. See
infra. Chs. 5-9.
85 Regarding such difficulty, see e.g. infra. 4.7.2. Denial and Justification by Belligerents for Their Own
Conduct.
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inconsistent, and therefore the repetition of pronouncing the same view for a long time
would be more ideal for the finding of a firmly held opnio juris.
4.4.5. CONSIDERATIONS ABOUT THE PREREQUISITS IN HUMANITARIAN LAW
_
If a certaib rule is persistently observed in an internal conflict by all parties to the
conflict, it may be tempting to conclude that the rule has become customary because of
the practice. Cassese, for instance, held that certain customary rules had been created
during the Spanish Civil War, since "there evolved a general practice among third
States and concerned parties, and evidence exists that this practice was recognized as
flowing from a legal obligation". 86 It, however, seems that he took a different approach
when he wrote that "the repetition of protests by a great number of States and the
affirmation by some international body representative of the world community" are
scarce for the ascertainment of general principles concerning the prohibition of certain
weapons. 87 The present writer finds the latter argument more appropriate, since
customary law binds all States and the observance of a certain rule in only one conflict
is not adequate for the establishment of the rule as custom. International lawyers should
analyse at least major conflicts in a certain period to determine whether a certain
regulation is widely observed.
Another problem is the co-existence of conflicting practice and/or opino juris: in other
words, what a government or a rebel group says and does is often inconsistent.
Sommaruga as the former President of the ICRC questioned:
86 Antonio Cassese, "The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning
Internal Armed Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 287, 315 (Antonio Cassese ed.,
1975).
87 Antonio Cassese, "Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law", in The New Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict 161, 171-2 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
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The parties to internal conflicts very often publicly declare that the prisoners they
hold are treated humanely. Such statements may sound reassuring, but are they to
be believed when these same parties refuse to grant the ICRC access to the
prisoners in question?88
Practice and opinio furls must be virtually uniform and also continuous, so opposing
practice and/or opinio furls neither creates a customary rule nor destroys it. This is
especially true of the Salvadoran Civil War, in which both Government and rebel forces
did not always follow their eagerness to comply with international humanitarian law. 89
The last issue to discuss is the influence of a practice which is not known to
international lawyers. The Japanese Civil War is the most pertinent instance. It should
have influenced the laws of war of the late nineteenth century, for the recognition of
belligerency and a certain degree of mitigation of the situation - e.g. the humane
treatment of the wounded and prisoners - were observed. The fact is, however, that no
influential textbook of international law of that time referred to the civil war, and it did
not have any significance upon international law then.
To face this problem, first international lawyers ought to endeavour to obtain as much
reliable information as possible. Regarding the Japanese Civil War, a reason for the
ignorance may be that Japan was considered to be "half-civilised" by most international
lawyers of the time, and the Civil War should not have been so important. 9° However,
even today virtually no literature exists on the legal aspect of this subject, either in
Japanese or in other languages, and this can be regarded as negligence on the part of the
88 Cornell° Sommaruga, "Respect for international humanitarian law: ICRC review of five years of
activity (1987-1991)", IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 74, 82.
89 See infra. Ch. 5.
99 See e.g. Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in
Teaching, and in Historical Studies, §136 (1860).
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international lawyers, considering the importance of the said Civil War. Second,
however, if evidence of the observance of certain practice or opinio furls cannot be
found, such absence of documents should be interpreted as nonexistence of a particular
practice or opinio juris. For instance, according to Article 15 of Protocol II, it is
prohibited - to attack dams and dykes. However, there are only a few fragmentary
documents about practice of this provision, which should be explicated as lack of
information on practice, rather than as abstention.91
,
4.5. SUBJECTS OF PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
4.5.1. INTRODUCTION
Although international humanitarian law is part of international law, international
humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict is remarkable in terms of the
subject matter of practice and opinio furls since actors other than States play an
important role in such conflict. There are four possible candidates to be regarded as
subjects of practice; States; dissident groups; individuals; and international
organisations.
4.5.2. STATES92
States are the least controversial actor because it is the sovereign State which makes and
is bound by international law. Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ provides that
"Only States may be parties in cases before the Court" and Articles 3 and 4 of the UN
Charter also allow only States to become Members of the UN. The ICJ reaffirmed its
position in the Advisory Opinion on the Nuclear Weapons that customary international
91 See infra. Ch 8.
92 See Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 82; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 65.
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law would be ascertained by examination of "the actual practice and opinio juris of
States". 93
4.5.3. DISSIDENT GROUPS
In civil conflict, one cannot ignore the existence of dissident groups, but there is
difficulty in regarding them as a subject of practice and opinio juris. Article 34(1) of
the Statute of the ICJ is clear that the State is the only entity which may appear before
the Court, which does not leave any room for dissidents. In addition, States in internal
conflict are extremely reluctant to undertake any conduct in a way which might imply
the recognition of rebel organisations. Hence, though the term "dissident armed forces"
is used in Article 1(1) of Protocol II, the whole sentence of this paragraph is written in
the passive form without specifying any subject. Besides, Article 3(1) of Protocol II
provides that "Nothing in this Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the
sovereignty of a State". For instance, the following statement by the official spokesman
of the Russian Foreign Ministry shows the common attitude which States take towards
rebel groups:
The time has come, I think, quite resolutely to warn [some statesmen abroad]
against such attempt [to internationalize the problem]. We proceed from the fact
that there is no international legal document, not a single charter of international
organizations, which forbids states from defending the constitutional freedoms
and rights of their citizens and from undertaking all necessary measures to fight
93 See e.g. Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, para. 64. The Court in this Advisory Opinion referred
to the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 13, para. 27.
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against lawlessness, banditism and from restoring law and order on their own
territory."
Despite such inconclusive position of dissident groups, it can be submitted that their
conduct and opinions should be regarded as formal practice and opinio furls. To justify
this position, Cassese's argument on the formal applicability of Protocol II to rebel
groups is persuading. 95 He first relies on the effects of treaties on third parties which
are codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 96 The Convention
provides that a treaty binds a third party when there is an intention of the contracting
parties to create rights or obligations on third parties and when the rights or obligations
are accepted by a third party. 97 Regarding the first condition, Cassese is of opinion that
Article 6(5) of Protocol II provides the duty of "authorities in power... to grant the
broadest possible amnesty"; "the authorities in power" could be both the legitimate
goverment when it crushes a rebel group or the rebel group when it successfully defeat
the legitimate government; and therefore that this provision sets duty on both
goverment and rebel sides, which logically extends also to other rules of the
Protoco1. 98 Regarding the second condition, he argues that each case should be studied
in order to determine whether a rebel group, a third party to the Protocol, shows its
willingness to observe Protocol 11.99
94 "Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warns against internationalizing Chechnya problem", broadcast
by Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, in Russian, 1452 gmt, 20 Dec. 94, reproduced in BBC Monitoring,
Summary of World Broadcasts, Part 1 Former USSR, 3rd Ser., 22 Dec 1994, SU/2185, at B/8 (22 Dec.
1994).
95 Antonio Cassese, "The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed
Conflicts", 30 ICLQ 416 (1981).
96 Id., 423.
97 Id., 423.
98 Id., 427.
99 Id., 428.
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His argument is persuasive for two reasons. First, the contention logically links the
Vienna Convention with Protocol II through Article 6(5) of the Protocol. It is consistent
to maintain that, as long as Protocol II takes into consideration the possibility of a rebel
group to beC-ome "the authorities in power" after the conflict, the group should have
formal legal status. 100 Second, Cassese focuses on the temporary nature of the rebel
group, m which matches the reality of civil conflict. He correctly states that "rebels do
not become formal parties to the Protocol" since it is only States that become parties to
the treaty, but the temporary character allows rebel groups to be formally bound by the
Protocol. 1°2
If a rebel group has formal duties and obligations under Protocol II for the above
reasons, it is logical to conclude that the group's practice and opinio juris formally
contribute to the formation of customary international law, and the examination of such
practice and opinio juris is worth conducting. The ICTY refers to "the belligerent
States, Governments and insurgents" as "factors [that] have been instrumental in
bringing about the formation of the customary rules at issue". 103 Indeed, the Court cites
a statement issued by a rebel group in El Salvador.'"
4.5.4. INDIVIDUALS
Article 6 of the Nuremberg Charter introduced the criminal liability of individuals,105
and the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia further affirmed that:
100	 7.5la 427.
101
1d., 429.
102 •la 429.
103 Tadic case, para. 108.
104 Tadic case, para. 107.
1 °5 Charter of the International Military Tribunal in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the
International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November - 1 October 1949, at 10-16 (1947).
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customary international law imposes criminal liability for serious violations of
common Article 3, as supplemented by other general principles and rules on the
protection of victims of internal armed conflict, and for breaching certain
fundamenta-1 principles and rules regarding means and methods of combat in civil
strife. 1 °6 -
Notwithstanding such firm confirmation that a person may be liable for his or her war
crime, it is doubtful whether practice and opinion in relation to particular individual
conduct can substantially contribute to forming or destroying customary law. It is true
that individuals today have rights and obligations in certain areas of international law,
i.e. human rights and humanitarian law, and they are subjects of these limited fields of
law. 107 Moreover, it is individuals, not an unreal State, who physically act and make
statements in armed conflict. 108 However, it is States that respond to individuals' acts,
and thus these acts can be attributed to States rather than individuals. 1 °9 In addition,
considering "individual practice" and "individual opinio juris" for the ascertainment of
customary rules would bring chaos to both international and domestic courts, for there
is an enormous number of cases of such "practice" and "opinio juris", and assessing
them would simply be impossible.
Regarding individual soldiers, they are agents of either a legitimate government or a
rebel group, and their conduct should be regarded as the practice or opinio juris of the
State or of the rebel group, whether or not they obey order. Civilians may be
-
106 Tadic case, para. 134.
107 See Shaw, supra. note 3, at 190.
1 °8 Frits Kalshoven, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-International Armed
Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 267, 271 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1975).
109 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 11. As to rebels, see supra. 4.5.3. Dissident
Groups.
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responsible for their crimes committed during civil war, 110 but as discussed, the
dimension of individual responsibility is different from that of customary international
law. Even though Article 18 of Protocol II provides for relief activities by civilians,
such activities should be regarded as the result of disseminati on or instructions by
authorities. 14 I
4.5.5. INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONSII2
The role of international organisations is becoming more and more important in
international law, and this is also true to international humanitarian law on non-
international armed conflict. The ICRC's role in civil conflict is prominent, especially
in the area of implementation. 113 Besides, there are recent cases in which the UN plays
a part in humanitarian activities. 114 The view that the practice of international
organisations can persuade the formation of custom "in areas of their competence" is
widely shared by commentators. 115 The present writer considers it necessary to take
into account each organisation separately, since each organisation has its own legal
basis. Hence, it is worth discussing the ICRC and UN, for they are the two principal
organisations which play a significant part in humanitarian activities in civil war. As to
the ICRC, the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia stated:
110 See Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Crimes (with
Dissenting Opinion of the Soviet Members), Nuremberg, 30th September and 1st October, 1946,
Miscellaneous No. 12 (1946), Cmd. 6964, at 41-42; the wording of Article 6(1) of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for Rwanda [throughout this thesis this Statute is referred to as the Statute for
Rwanda], S/RES/955 (1994), reprinted as Doc. 97 in UN The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, at
387, Sales No. E. 96.1.20.
111 But see Kalshoven, supra. note 108, at 271 (emphasising the importance of individuals as actors of
international humanitarian law rather than States).
112 See Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 54-56 (Meron seems to recognise the subject status of
international organisations).
" 3 See infra. Ch. 9.
114 As to the humanitarian intervention in Somalia, see SIRES/794 (1992), reproduced as Doc. 35 in UN,
The United Nations and Somalia, 1992-1996, 214, UN Sales No. E. 96.1.8 (1996)
115 Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 83; and Shaw, supra. note 3, at 65.
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The practical results the 1CRC has thus achieved in inducing compliance with
international humanitarian law ought therefore to be regarded as an element of
actual international practice; this is an element that has been conspicuously
instrumental in the emergence or crystallization of customary rules.116
This writer is of the opinion that 1CRC activities are not equivalent to State practice and
opinio furls because of its characteristic as a private Swiss body, 117 but that its activities
can be regarded as highly authoritative evidence to prove the existence of customary
international law in international humanitarian law because of the organisation's
professional service offered to conflicts of any character. For example, 1CRC delegates
in civil conflict undertake visits to detainees held by adversaries, which reveals the
extent to which parties to a conflict conform with humanitarian instruments. 118 Even
though the ICRC does not have a right to conduct such visits, 119
 such outright denial
would imply both parties reluctance to apply the law of armed conflict. On rare
occasions does this organisation protest against gross violations of international
humanitarian law. 12° Such statements and protests are highly authoritative and valuable
because of the organisation's long history of involvement in humanitarian activities, and
the ICRC can persuade the belligerent concerned to conform to Protocol 11.121
The UN consists of States, 122
 and the Member States are able to make the UN a subject
of practice and opinio furls if they so wish. 123 The ICJ found in the Reparation case
118 Tadic case, para. 109.
117 See Articles 1 and 2, the Statute of the International Committee of the Red Cross, reprinted in IRRC
Mar-Apr 1988, at 1, 1. The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia did not consider the role of the opinio
furls of the ICRC. See Tadic case, para. 109.
118 See Common Article 3 and Article 18 of Protocol II.
119 The ICRC's Commentary, at 58; Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organisations
and Civil Wars, at 54 and 134 (1995).
120 E . -- .g see Press Release, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC strongly condemns shelling of civilians in
Tuzla", 26 May 1995, which can be found in the ICRC homepage at http://www.icrc.org/.
121 See Bruderlein, supra. note 3, at 587.
122 UN Charter, Articles 3 and 4.
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that the UN was "an international person" and that "it is a subject of international
124 Furthermore, UN humanitarian activities are endorsed by Security Council
resolutions which are binding on the Member States. I25 However, one should carefully
examine each case instead of jumping to the conclusion that all UN activities in civil
war are considered UN practice and opinio juris. As far as multi-national forces
activities endorsed by Security Council resolutions are concerned, national contingents
are under the jurisdiction of national military courts, and therefore their practice should
be regarded . as that of States, rather than that of the UN. 126 Hence, Canadian military
authorities dealt with Canadian soldiers who committed atrocities during the
humanitarian intervention in Somalia by way of court martia1.127
Concerning Security Council resolutions, they bind the Member States according to
Article 25 of the UN Charter. No Security Council resolution has attempted to ascertain
the customary status of a certain humanitarian rule, but Article 3 of the Statute of the
International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia refers to "the laws or customs of war"
128
with a list of certain conducts. 	 Are they customary because the Statute was
introduced as an annex to a Security Council resolution? First, this Statute was
specifically made to cope with atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia since
1991. 129 Second, the Statute does not elaborate what "the laws of war" are and also
what "the customs of war" are, and it appears that both of them vaguely mean the
123 AS to the principle of consent, see the Law of the Treaties, Preamble. As to international organisations
and custom, see Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 11; Danilenko, supra. note 3, at. 83.
124 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports
1949, p. 174, at 179.
125 *r.'run Charter, Article 25.
126 See cf. Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, The Blue Helmets, at 184 (1996) (arguing that a case in
Canada "again affirms the primacy of national court-martial jurisdiction in cases involving charges of
unlawful conduct by members of national contingnets serving in UN forces).
127 See Richard Cleroux, "Canadian troops 'blindfolded Somali children', The Times, July 6, 1996, at 16.
128 Statute of the International Tribunal, in S/RES/827 (1993), SCOR, 48th year, Res. and Dec., at 29
(1993). Throughout this thesis, this Statute is referred to as "the Statute for the former Yugoslavia".
129 Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 1.
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Hague law. With such limitation and impreciseness, it would be difficult to consider
that Article 3 of the Statute became customary because of the adoption of the Statute in
a binding resolution, though it is possible that the resolution declares what has already
been a customary rule.
The status of General Assembly resolutions is controversial because of their
recommendatory character under article 10 of the UN Charter. 13° The ICJ maintained:
The Court notes that General Assembly resolutions, even if they are not binding,
may sometimes have normative value. They can, in certain circumstances,
provide evidence important for establishing the existence of a rule or the
emergence of an opinio juris.131
The contention of the ICJ that General Assembly resolutions have value as evidence is
to be maintained in principle because of their recommendatory nature. However,
General Assembly resolutions could be used for political purposes, as often encountered
during the Cold War, and the reliability of these resolutions is not always obvious.132
Therefore, when one investigates these resolutions, all circumstances which lead to their
adoption should be considered, 133 such as the voting figures.134
The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia examined General Assembly resolutions 2444
and 2675 which were adopted unanimously, and determined that:
130 See generally H.W.A.Thirlway, International Customary Law and Codification, at 61-79 (1972).
131 Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, para. 70.
132 Shaw, supra. note 3, at 90-92; Thirlway, supra. note 130, at 76.
133 See Shaw's cautious approach, Shaw, supra. note 3, at 92 ("Nevertheless, one must be alive to the
dangers in ascribing legal value to everything that emanates from the [General] Assembly. Resolutions
are often the results of political compromises and arrnagements and comprehended in that sense, never
inteded to constitute binding norms").
134 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 6.
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they were declaratory of the principles of customary international law regarding
the protection of civilian populations and property in armed conflicts of any
kind... .135
One salient problem of this finding is that there was little attempt in the decision to
ascertain practice and opinio juris concerning the protection of civilians before the
adoption of the above resolutions. As Akehurst asserted, General Assembly resolutions
can become declaratory of existing customary rules, 136 but they alone cannot become
customary international law because they are not accompanied by practice. The
Tribunal did examine civilian protection in several civil conflicts shortly before
discussing the resolutions, 137 but it relied upon statements, agreements and military
instructions rather than practice. 138 Thus, it is doubtful if the Tribunal declared what
was then the existing customary law, because it did not establish the custom based upon
practice and opinio furls. In conclusion, it is plausible that a resolution of the Security
Council or the General Assembly declare the already existing customary rule, but it
alone cannot become custom because of a lack of practice.
4.6. EVIDENCE OF PRACTICE
4.6.1. RATIFICATION
The act of ratifying a convention can be regarded as practice, 139 though mere ratification
means in itself simply that a State which ratifies a treaty shows the State's willingness
135 Tadic case, para. 112.
136 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 4-8.
137 Tadic case, paras. 100-107.
138 Regarding civilian protection, the only exception is an example of the execution of two Nigerian
soldiers over the killing of four civilians. Tadic case, para. 106.
139 See North Sea Continental Shelf cases, para. 73, referred to and commented by Christopher
Greenwood "Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols" in Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict 93, at 99 and n.18 (Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991).
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to observe this treaty.140 Therefore opinio furls must be ascertained in order to find the
existence of customary international law. 141 For instance, a ratifying State may
pronounce its conviction that the ratified convention as part or on the whole is
customary. 142, In spite of such necessity to obtain opinio furls, the ICJ made the
following statement:
a very widespread and representative participation in the convention might suffice
of itself, provided it included that States whose _interests were specially
affected.I43
This assertion is especially true to the Geneva Conventions, and therefore Common
Article 3, because the treaties are today ratified by most States. The ICJ and Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia affirmed that Common Article 3 had acquired the customary
status, but argument about the process of transformation is lacking. 144 The Iranian
delegate contended in the General Assembly that most States had ratified the 1949
Geneva Conventions and that the universal recognition of the principles embodied in
the Conventions had been achieved. 145 The present writer contends that Common
Article 3, which is not subject to any significant reservation, obtained its customary
status by the early 1960s or possibly the late 1950s because of the ratification of the
140 Schachter, supra. note 23, at 724.
141 Schachter, id., at 725. But see Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols", supra. note 32, at 123-124
(arguing that if a State ratifies a treaty, she shows its willingness to observe the treaty as a legal
obligation, even though her intention may be contrary).
142 The possibility of such pronouncement with ratification is, however, remote.
143 North Sea Continental Shelfcases, para. 73. See also Thirlway, supra. note 130, at 58-59.
144 The ICJ in the Nicaragua case reaffirmed its view that the rules in Common Article 3 are "elementary
considerations of humanity". See Nicaragua case, para. 218. See also Tadic case, para. 98. Meron
argues that Common Article 3(1)(a)-(c) embody customary law because of its "elementary, ethical
character". See Meron, Human Rights, supra. note 2, at 34.
145 See Iran, UN GAOR 3rd Comm., 25th Sess., 1786th mtg, 12 Nov. 1970, para. 19, at 286-287, UN
Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1786 (1974).
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Geneva Conventions by most of the "specially affected States". I46 Almost all the States
belonging to the East and West had ratified the Conventions by 1960 as well as regional
powers and other States, and this wide ratification transformed Common Article 3 into
customary. 147 'Common Article 3 has been subject to violations even after it acquired
the customary status, but this status is intact because of a lack of opinio juris of
violating States.I48
One issue to discuss in the context of ratification is the "pick and choose" approach.
According tO this method, a State which decides to stay out of a treaty can "pick and
choose" customary rules which suits its interest from the whole treaty and disregard the
rest. 149 Abi-Saab, a participant in the Diplomatic Conference, is highly critical of this
posture, because the 1977 Protocols were entirely adopted after complicated process
and to "pick and choose" customary law from the Protocols would damage their
totality. 15° It is true that, once a State ratifies a treaty, she has to obey the treaty on the
whole, provided that she does not make any reservation to the treaty. However she is
free to feel if a provision of a convention is customary, when she is not a party to the
convention. Abi-Saab emphasised the entirety of the Protocols, but as far as Protocol II
is concerned, many provisions were either deleted or inserted or reformulated in the last
minute by the Pakistani delegate, and it is questionable that the Protocol should be
considered on the whole.
146 see "List of Ratifications", supra. note 1. As to "specially affected States" see supra. 4.4.1.
Generality.
147 It should be noted that the process of ratification of the Geneva Conventions is exactly the opposite to
that of Protocol II. It was "small" States which ratified the Protocol first, and many of the "specially
affected States" are still not parties to the Protocol.
148 Violating States tend to either deny or justify their conduct, and it is rare to challenge IHL. See infra
4.7.2. Denial and Justification by Belligerents for Their Own Conduct.
149 Abi-Saab, supra. note 32, at 125-126 and n.22.
150
	
at 124-126.
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Another question related to ratification is to what extent universal ratification
transforms a treaty into custom: in other words, whether the treaty becomes customary
in part or in toto. For example, in his publication of 1976 about international legal
aspects of prisoners of war, Rosas argued that provisions of Geneva Conventions III
which were-based upon "well-established" principles had become customary. I51 First,
the present writer considers a universally ratified convention to be customary in toto,
granted that significant reservations are not made, simply because all States declare that
they obey the whole convention. Second, however, there is difference between
provisions which represent the general principles of the laws of war and those which
exist out of the scope of those principles. In the context of the treatment of prisoners of
war in international war, as Rosas wrote, there are certain provisions which originated
from the general principles of the laws of war, 152 e.g. the humane treatment of prisoners
of war. I53 However, provisions of more technical nature, e.g. the election of prisoner of
war representatives, 154 may not be as significant as the provisions representing the
general principles. Many of the provisions in Protocol II are of general nature, and the
possible world-wide ratification of the agreement might not cause this problem.155
4.6.2. MEASURES OF NATIONAL IMPLEMENTATION
It is desired that a legitimate government takes necessary measures to enforce and
implement international humanitarian law. 156 The act of enacting legislation and of
151 Allan Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War, at 100 (1976).
152 As far as international war is concerned, the general principles of the laws of war have become
customary, primarily because of the existence of State practice prior to 1945. Thus, Rosas' "well-
established" principles are almost identical to the general principles of customary law.
153 Geneva Convention III, Article 13.
154 Geneva Convention III, Articles 79-81.
155 In Ch. 10, however, this author discusses the desirability of technical provisions in international
humanitarian law.
156 Detailed discussion on implementation and enforcement, see infra. Ch. 9.
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publishing military manuals are hence practice of States, 157 though both instruments
also reveal the intention of the State which introduces them. The introduction of
national legislations and military manuals varies according to States. Concerning the
former, for instance, the UK introduced the Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act
1995 158 which contains Protocol II as a whole. 159 The Joint Service Regulation for the
German armed forces of 1992 was restated and published as The Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts.160
Regarding Military manuals, the inclusion of rules out of treaty law in military manuals
would demonstrate the conviction of the State concerned, particularly if the State is not
a party to Protocol II, that the rules are customary, but it is true that military manuals "at
the very most" allude to Common Article 3• 161 In addition, the significance of military
manuals is not self-evident. For instance, in the Humanitarian Law Conference held in
1987, there was an intensive discussion on the value of military manuals. On the one
hand, Carnahan and Fenrick cast doubt on the significance of military manuals, and for
instance Carnahan argued that manuals likely focused on only "clear cut, easy cases".162
Gasser, on the other hand, disagreed with them, contending that "such manuals are of
great importance in influencing the behaviour of troops and also in indicating to the
opposing side in a conflict which rules the armed forces are ready to respect".163
157 See Bruderlein, supra. note 3, at 587; Fleck, supra. note 45, at 503; Meron, "The Geneva
Conventions" supra. note 39, at 361. As to national legislation, see Shaw, supra. note 3, at 66; Wolfke,
supra. note 45, at 77, 149.
15' Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act 1995 (c. 27), reprinted in 3(1995) Current Law Statutes.
159 As to this Act, see Peter Rowe and Michael A. Meyer, "The Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act
1995: A Generally Minimalist Approach", 45 ICLQ 476 (1996).
160 The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995).
161 The War Office, The Law of War on Land being Part III of the Manual of Military Law, para. 8
(1958); Hans-Peter Gasser in "Determining Customary International Law", supra. note 49, at 478.
162 Carnahan "Determining Customary International Law", id., at 488; Fenrick, id., at 493.
163 Gasser in id., at 494-495.
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Balancing these two opposite views appears to be important. On the other hand, as
Bond stresses, military manuals can be useful "indicators of the views of the right
behaviour of a particular military institution" if they are available. 164 Availability
matters because, should manuals be not available, there is no way of knowing if there is
any description of custom in them. Manuals that are readily available are usually those
of Great Powers which are not immediately facing civil conflicts, and the possibility
that a dissident group produces their own manuals is remote. 165 On the other hand,
military manuals are one of many forms of practice and of opinio juris, and considering
the other elements is also important. Moreover, Kwakwa rightly holds that "there could
be as many different customs as there are military manuals" since the content and ambit
of military manuals are different from State to State. I66 Lastly, these manuals do not
necessarily refer in detail to international humanitarian law on non-international armed
conflict. I67 In conclusion, military manuals may be a valuable source of the law if they
are obtainable and explicitly state the law of armed conflict on civil war, but in fact such
manuals are rather exceptional.
4.6.3. ACTUAL PRACTICE168
It has already been discussed that considering actual practice is necessary in order to
demonstrate to the parties concerned the existence of customary rules. Actual practice
can be divided into peacetime and wartime practice. The former primarily means the
dissemination of international humanitarian law to professional soldiers as well as
164 James E. Bond in id., at 490.
165 See Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 177 (stating that "no existing national liberation movement may make
its military manual known to the outside world").
166 Kwakwa, id., at 32. (footnote omitted).
167 Section 211 of the German Military Manual is therefore significant because of its mention of both
Common Article 3 and Protocol II. See Section 211 of Bundeswehr reprinted in The Handbook of
Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, supra. note 160, at 47-48.
168 See Bruderlein, supra. note 3 , at 587.
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civilians. Even if a non-party to Protocol II enacts a legislation including a provision of
dissemination, actual dissemination programme must be undertaken in order to claim
the customary status of Article 19 of Protocol II since a lack of practice would devalue
the domestic- legislation. 169 Another form of peacetime practice includes the
prosecution of war criminals of other States which are confronting civil war, though it is
not widely conducted.'"
Wartime practice in accordance with Protocol II would include; actual military
-
operations by armed forces; actual treatment of the detained soldiers (Article 5);
prosecution and punishment (Article 6); search and protection of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked (Articles 7 and 8); performance of medical personnel (Article 9 and 10);
activities of humanitarian organisations and civilians (Article 18); use of proper
emblems (Article 12); and dissemination (Article 19). This list is not exhaustive, and
the following chapters will discuss each practice.
4.6.4. ABSTENTION
The Permanent Court found in the Lotus case in 1927 that:
... it would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from
instituting criminal proceedings, and not that they recognized themselves as being
obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based on their being conscious
of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international
CUStOM. 171
169 Dissemination will be discussed in infra. Ch. 9.
17° Kadic v. Karadic, reprinted in 34 ILM 1592 (1995). Implementation will be discussed in infra. Ch. 9.
171 PCIJ Reports, Series A, No. 10, at 28. See Bronwlie's critical remark on this case. Brownlie, supra.
note 76, at 6.
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Among authorities, Akehurst considers "omissions and silence" State practice, 172 while
Danilenko argues that "positive indications" are necessary because of "the dubious
nature of abstentions". 173 Borrowdale states that an "overwhelming" scale of abstention
is necessary for the establishment of a customary rule. 174 This writer maintains that
abstention is an indispensable element of practice in the law of armed conflict in general
because of the prohibitive nature of the 1aw. 175
 For instance, a State and rebels shall
abstain from taking hostages, according to Common Article 3 and Article 4(2)(c) of
Protocol II which stipulate the prohibition of hostage taking. Subsequently, the less
evidence of acts of hostage taking, the more likely States and rebels abstain from
practising it.
The examination of abstention needs particular attention, for it is difficult to ascertain
why a party to a civil conflict is abstaining from a certain action; and also whether a
State is really abstaining. As far as the former problem is concerned, abstention from
ratification would be a pertinent example. States may abstain from ratification for
various reasons; abstaining States may intend not to ratify the treaty; but they may be
merely indifferent. 176 Therefore each situation must be taken into account. 177 For
instance, there seem to be two reasons for the intention of the USA not to ratify Protocol
II; one is that the US rejection to ratify Protocol I prevents it from ratifying Protocol II;
the other is that ratifying Protocol II is not a high priority on the agenda of the US
172 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 10. Shaw and WoIfke hold that the validity of
abstention depends on situations. Shaw, supra. note 3, at 63-64; Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 61.
173 Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 86 n.35.
174 Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 83.
175 Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 32 ("Indeed, in the law of war, custom is to be found more in acts of
restraint than in positive acts by state and non-state actors")
176 Baxter, supra. note 2, at 66-67.
177 Here, the intention of the State, in other words opinio juris, becomes essential.
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Senate. 178 The better interpretation of these two reasons would be that the US decision
does not amount to abstention from ratifying Protocol II because the intentions are
rather passive. Hence, concerning the US non-ratification of Protocol II, it neither
favours nor hinders the establishment of custom.
In civil war, another problem is that it is not always possible to determine practice of the
fighting parties. To give an example, in Chechnya, Chechen rebels resorted to taking
hostages on several occasions, especially in the later period of the conflict. 179
 On the
Russian side -, however, there is virtually no evidence available as to whether the Russian
forces abstained from hostage-taking. A better construction of this particular case
would be that the Chechens violated the prohibition of hostge-takings, because of the
existence of reliable evidence; however, whether the Russians refrained from such
conduct is indeterminable, for there is no reliable evidence. In addition, had the Russian
forces been renowned for good discipline and high morale, one could make a reasonable
assumption that they refrained from hostage-takings. However, ill-trained Russian
forces were reputed for their low marale and bad discipline, 180 and therefore the
reasonable assumption could not be made.
4.6.5. STATEMENT
The development of communication and international organisations brings the
opportunity for States to express their views, and the ICJ confirmed the validity of such
178 Michael J. Matheson in "A Discussion of Protocol II", supra. note 49, at 616. Matheson was Deputy
Legal Adviser of the US Department of State.
179 Keesing's June 1995, at 40608-9; Thomas de Wall, "Russian troops surround hostage-takers at border"
The Times, Jan. 11, 1996, at 11; Michael Evans, "Hostages caught in Russian chief's deadly rivalry", The
Times, Jan. 16, 1996, at 10
180 Christopher Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, at 2-7 (1996); Thomas de Waal, "Dejected troops tell
of chaos in army command", The Times, Jan. 20, 1996, at 12
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statements as State practice, as well as many authors. 181 Statements can be considered
practice because they are the result of the act of State's pronouncing their views, but the
present author would rather regard such statements as evidence of opinio juris since the
importance of them is what States think, which is expressed in those statements.
4.7. EVIDENCE OF OPINIO JURIS
4.7.1. ACCEPTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW BY BELLIGERENTS182
Both parties to a civil conflict tend to deny each other's existence, and therefore their
conviction that they adhere to Protocol II and Common Article 3 would be a valuable
source to ascertain the customary status of international humanitarian law on non-
international armed conflict. There are two ways of expressing opinio juris, namely
tacit and explicit. Explicit opinio juris would not be problematic because of its
clearness. 183 The Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, for example, referred to an
explicit statement of the Prime Minister of Congo in 1964 to obey the Geneva
Conventions. 184 Despite such clarity, one should analyse other statements in a conflict,
too, because it is questionable whether States and rebels follow their opinio juris. In the
Algerian War of Independence, the French Prime Minister stated that France would
adhere to Common Article 3, and indeed there was improvement in the treatment of
captured rebels. 185 However, subsequently, the French Government refused to regard
181 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 1-8; Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 698-699;
Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 87-88; and Shaw, supra. note 3, at 71. But cf Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 31
(arguing that belligerents make verbal practice "for public relations purposes" and it is not as reliable in
humanitarian law as in other areas of international law, such as the law of treaties).
182 The use of terms, such as acceptance, acquiescence, recognition, support, etc, should be careful if one
discusses the theory of customary international law. See e.g. Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 44-51. In this
chapter, the terms acceptance, acquiescence, denial, protest and recognition are used in an ordinary sense.
183 See Wolfke, id. at 62.
184 Tadic case, para. 105.
185 The statement is reprinted in Greenberg, Taw and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution', 11
Harvard ILJ 37-72, at 50 (1970). As to the conditions of detainees, see ICRC, The ICRC and the
Algerian Conflict, at 4-8 (1962).
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the conflict as a war. 186 Such conduct by the legitimate government indeed reduces the
value of explicit opinio furls.
Implicit opinio furls is more common but also more problematic.187 President Lincoln's
declaration of blockade is a pertinent example. He proclaimed the blockade of ports,
but he did not mention the recognition of belligerency of the rebels.188 Blockading ports
in a State's own territory would have implied the existence of war, but explicit
recognition of such a situation would have been politically difficult. Therefore, it is
necessary to -observe the whole conflict, and to discern if there is tacit opinio furls.
4.7.2. DENIAL AND JUSTIFICATION BY BELLIGERENTS FOR THEIR OWN CONDUCT
A belligerent party who violates a treaty or customary rule is most likely to justify its
position or deny the violation, and it is rare to challenge the established principles of
humanitarian law. 189 Moreover, in cases of internal conflicts, States usually regard the
situation as simply civil disturbance, and do not consider the application of the laws of
war at the outset. 19° The ICJ in the Nicaragua case stated that the justification by a
violating State "is to confirm rather than to weaken the rule". 191 Contrary to this
judgment, Meron considers the possibility of weakening custom should States not act in
accordance with the Geneva Conventions.192
186 De Gaulle used the termi "rebellion" in as late as 1961. See Keesing's, May 13-20, 1961, at 18093-
18094.
187 See Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 62 (stating that "In most cases the element of acceptance ... is fulfilled
tacitly, only by means of a presumption based upon various kinds of active or passive reactions to the
practice by the interested states...").
188 The declaration is reprinted in Williams Edward Hall, A Treatise of International Law, at 45 (Higgins
ed., 8th ed., 1924).
189 See Meron, "The Geneva Conventions", supra. note 39, at 369; Akehurst, "Hierarchy of Sources",
supra. note 75, at 276, n.5.
190 See Protocol II, Article 1(2).
191 Nicaragua case, para. 186.
192 Meron, "The Geneva Conventions", supra. note 39, at 370.
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One can claim that, even if practice is accompanied by contrary opinio furls, these
opposite elements neither create nor destroy custom because both two elements are
necessary for the creation or destruction of customary international law. 193 However, as
Meron contends, the ubiquity of incompatible elements can weaken the custom
concerned because such coexistence threatens the basis of custom which is evidence of
both practice and opinio juris under Article 38(1)(b) of the Statute of the ICJ.
4.7.3. RECOGNITION OF BELLIGERENTS' CONDUCT BY THIRD STATES
The recognition of belligerents' conduct by third States is clear and determinable, 194
 and
it is easily accessible because of the development of communication. Statements and
discussion in diplomatic conferences, the General Assembly and the Security Council
would include opinio furls stated by delegates. States can also express their conviction
whenever they find it necessary. The Russian invasion of Chechnya, for instance, was
acknowledged by the USA as "an internal Russian affair" and hoped "that order [could]
be restored with a minimum amount of violence and bloodshed".195
4.7.4. ACQUIESCENCE OF BELLIGERENTS' CONDUCT BY THIRD STATES
States may acquiesce to acts of belligerents who are facing civil conflicts, but
determining the existence of acquiescence is not facile since different reasons can be
possible; 196 the third States may simply not have the knowledge of the act; or they may
not have interest in it; or they may find other priorities. Akehurst disregards the
193 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process, at 22 (1994).
194 Cf. Danilenlco, supra. note 3, at 107-108 (stating that "express recognition of the legally binding
quality of observable rules of conduct are most effective"); Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 62 (arguing that the
most obvious way for a State to accept practice as custom is "by means of express declarations").
195 Keesing's, Dec. 1994, at 40326.
196 See Baxter, supra. note 2, at 66-67; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 70-71.
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motives of States which refrain from making public statements, 197 and this may be true
in certain areas of international law. For instance, in the law of outer space, the number
of States which can develop outer space is limited, and available information on the
space development has immensely increased. 198
 Under such circumstances, a State
which does not or cannot participate in the exploration of outer space can use available
information and decide if they explicitly support, or protest against, or acquiesce to the
practice of States conducting space programmes. However, in internal armed conflict,
,
the number of conflicts since the end of the Second World War has been enormous,
while obtainable information is limited. It is, therefore, difficult for States to pay
attention to every conflict, and not protesting against violations of international
humanitarian law may stem from a lack of information or of interest.
It can be suggested that if investigation into opinio juris and practice does not favour
acquiescence, the silence should be regarded as the nonexistence of opinio juris which
neither forms nor destroys customary rules. States may be expected to observe other
States' practice, 199 but in practice there are a number of occasions when the
international community simply does not pay attention on certain civil conflicts as the
present writer will demonstrate in the following chapters. Such indifference should not
be interpreted as acquiescence but as nonexistence of opinio juris because of a lack of
conviction or interest.200
197 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 39.
198 Shaw, supra. note 3, at 381.
199 See Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 108.
200 Charney, however, considers silence to be acquiescence.	 Jonathan I. Charney, "Universal
International Law", 87 AJIL 529, at 538 (1993).
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4.7.5. PROTEST AGAINST BELLIGERENTS' CONDUCT BY THIRD STATES
Protest has the effect of preventing the conduct from obtaining legal significance,
should third States protest against the conduct of belligerents. 2°1 Protest must be
explicit because there is no way of detecting "implicit protest". An appropriate example
would be the Indian and Sri Lankan protest against the Taliban announcement of its
intention to demolish a Buddhist statute should it fall into the hands of Taliban forces in
1997.202 Both India and Sri Lanka are "specially affected States"; the former as a
regional power and the cradle of Buddhism; and the latter as a Buddhist State. More
significantly, India and Sri Lanka are not parties to Protocol 11,203 and therefore these
protests can be construed as the conviction of these two States that cultural and religious
objects should be protected in non-international armed conflict, even though it is not
certain if they made this statement in the conviction that the protection is customary.
4.7.6. ACCEPTANCE OF HUMANITARIAN LAW BY STATES IN PEACETIME
In peacetime, States can express their opinio juris that they are bound by rules.
Peacetime dissemination, and the introduction of legislation and military manuals are
pertinent examples of such acceptance. 204 It is not possible for a State to implicitly
accept, or in other words, acquiesce to rules because of the impossibility to ascertain
such opinio juris.205 Moreover, "implicit acceptance" of rules by non-belligerent States
201 See Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 38-39; Bruderlein, supra. note 3, at 592.
202 Christopher Thomas, "Buddhist condemn Taleban over threat to blow up statute", The Times, 25 April
1997, at 18. This statute was, however, destroyed in 2001 by the Taliban. See infra. Ch. 8. The
protection of cultural objects is provided in Article 16 of Protocol II and Article 19 of Convention for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, 249 UNTS 240 (1956). Throughout this
thesis, this Convention is referred to as "the 1954 Hague Convention".
203 India is a party to the 1954 Hague Convention, while Sri Lanka is not. See UNESCO, "Convention
and Protocol for the Prohibition of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 14 May
1954)" at http:// www. unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html_eng/page9.shtml.
204 See supra. 4.6.2. Measures of National Implementation.
205 This acceptance by States is different from acquiescence of belligerents' conduct by third States.
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would lead to the dangerous conclusion that any convention could become customary
because non-ratifying States "implicitly" accept the rules.
4.8. ASCERTAINMENT OF CUSTOMARY RULES
4.8.1. INTRODUCTION
Having discussed the elements of customary international law, the present author now
turns to question of which institutions determine the law. Article 38 of the Statute of
the ICJ is authority that custom is a source of international law, but it does not specify
which institutions ascertain the existence of custom. The ICJ, ad hoc international
tribunals, domestic courts, including military courts, and publicists are seen as
empowered to determine the question of application of the law of armed conflict on
civil war at present.
Although the contention exists that international and domestic tribunals are a subject of
practice,206 the present writer regards their judgments more as evidence of customary
international law, because their primary function is to solve pending issues, as Article
38(1) of the ICJ Statute states that "The Court, whose function is to decide in
accordance with international law such disputes". For instance, if a court of a State
pronounces that the prohibition of a certain conduct of hostilities is customary
international law, it could be regarded as one form of both practice and opinio furls of
the State. If other courts of the State as well as the administrative and parliamentary
bodies of the State follow the ruling, it would be right to conclude that the State regards
the prohibition as customary. In this way the rulings could influence future practice and
opinio furls of a State, and should courts of other States facing civil wars and of any
206 Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 83-84.
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international court follow the ruling of the State, it would be possible to maintain that
the accumulated judicial decisions developed the prohibition of the conduct of
hostilities.207
As far as civil conflicts are concerned, however, domestic and international courts have
played only a limited value. Concerning international courts, recent judgments made by
the two criminal tribunals could be regarded as views expressed by the international
organs, but it is not difficult to predict whether they will be successfully followed by
similar tribUnals, particularly the International Criminal Court. Regarding domestic
courts, available information on them is limited, and moreover it is questionable if there
is a cumulation of consistent judgments, according to the above hypothesis.
4.8.2. THE ICJ
Although the ICJ is the most authoritative institution in international law, it is not
possible for rebel groups or individuals to take a case to the ICJ, since only States have
standing to take cases to it. 208 The ICJ examined customary international law and
Common Article 3 in the Nicaragua case,209 but it was the only occasion when the
Court directly investigated international humanitarian law on non-international armed
conflict. In addition, this case was marred by the refusal of the USA in the
proceedings. 21 ° In the Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, the Court avoided the
analysis of the use of nuclear weapons in internal conflict, 211 while in the 1996
207 Igor P. Blishchenko, "Judicial Decisions as a Source of Intematioal Humanitarian Law", in The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 41, 44-5 (Antonio Cassese ed., 1979).
208 The Statute of the ICJ, Article 34(1).
209 See Nicaragua case, para. 218-220.
210 See "Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the
International Court of Justice", reprinted in 24 ILM 246 (1985).
211
	
Court avoided the analysis of a use of nuclear weapons in internal conflict. See Advismy Opinion
on Nuclear Weapons, para. 50.
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Genocide case international humanitarian law invoked by Bosnia-Herzegovina212 was
not discussed because "the Court can find no provision relevant to its jurisdiction in any
of the above-mentioned [humanitarian] instruments". 213 The role of the ICJ in finding
customary rules in the laws of war on civil war will probably remain limited,
considering State sovereignty. However, should the ICJ conduct investigation on that
area of law, the finding of the ICJ should be treated as highly authoritative evidence of
aw. 2 14
4.8.3. AD Hoc INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
The armed conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia resulted in the establishment
of ad hoc international tribunals. In the Tadic case, for instance, the Tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia undertook a lengthy discussion on the customary status of
international humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict. 215
 Judgments by
the two Tribunals should be considered highly authoritative because both Tribunals
were established by a Security Council resolution under Chapter VII which in virtue of
Article 25 of the UN Charter binds all Member States of the U4.216
The future of ad hoc international tribunals is uncertain, and the fact remains that these
two tribunals are the only ones in 50 years. As far as customary international law is
212 The invoked rules were "the Customary and Conventional International Law, including but not limited
to the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, their First Additional Protocol of 1977, the Hague Regulations
on Land Warfare of 1907, and the Nuremberg Charter, Judgment, and Principles". Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 595, para. 39. (Emphasis added). Although Bosnia-Herzegovina did
not list Protocol II or Common Article 3, it left room for these instruments, as the above emphasised
wording implies.
213
214 Bronwlie, supra. note 76, at 19; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 86; Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 145.
215 See Tadic case, paras. 96-136.
216 As to the former Yugoslavia, see S/RES/827 (1993), supra. note 128; as to Rwanda, see S/RES/955
(1994), supra. note 110. However, as to enforcement, States are required to "cooperate with" the
Tribunals. See Article 29(1) of the Statute for the former Yugoslavia and Article 28(1) of the Statute for
Rwanda.
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concerned, however, the findings of ad hoc tribunals are authoritative, and greatly
contribute to ascertaining customary rules of international humanitarian law on internal
conflict.
4.8.4. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
The International Criminal Court, established by its Statute in 1998, applies Common
Article 3 for "serious violations", 217 and "the laws and customs applicable" to civil
conflict for "Other serious violations", when the Court judges crimes committed in non-
international armed conflict. 218 At the time of the writing of this thesis, this Court has
not functioned, and it is not possible to declare the value of its judgments. However,
when it operates, its findings would be as valuable as the judgments of the ICJ and the
two ad hoc International Tribunals.
Having said so, the actual adoption of the Rome Statutes contributes to the development
of customary international law in non-international armed conflicts. First, the Rome
Statute was adopted by 120 States in favour, 7 against with 21 abstentions by non-
recorded vote. 219 As this chapter indicates, this author emphasises the careful approach
towards ascertaining customary rules, and the actual adoption of a multilateral treaty
does not automatically transform the treaty into customary international law; otherwise
all the multilateral treaties would become customary upon adoption. The voting was
not recorded, which makes one difficult to examine the voting pattern, but according to
the press release on the adoption of the Statute, China, India, Israel and the USA
217 Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(c).
218 -la Article 8(2)(d).
219 Press Release, L/ROM/22, "UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to
Establish Permanent International Criminal Court", (17 July 1998) at http:// www. un.org/icc/pressrel/
Irom22.htm.
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explained that they had voted against the Rome Statute, 22° and their opposition should
not be overlooked because they are "specially affected" States. In addition, 21
abstentions should not be overlooked, either. 221 Notwithstanding such oppositions or
abstentions, the fact that 120 States were in favour of the treaty signifies that a majority
of the States acted to adopt the Statute (State practice) and were willing to adopt it
(opinio furls). Some provisions of the Rome Statute merely repeat what is already
customary, e.g. Common Article 3, but the rest may have the effects of either generating
or crystallising customary rules, and the 120 States' votes for the actual adoption of the
treaty might accelerate the process of transforming what is merely treaty-based law into
custom.
Second, the Statute introduced "serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
armed conflicts not of an international character", defining what "war crimes" in civil
conflict are. This is a useful tool for the establishment of war crimes in customary law
as well as treaty law. Moreover, the ICTY and ICTR are ad hoc mechanisms, but the
Rome Statute is a treaty of permanent character, adopted at a diplomatic conference, so
the Statute which introduces "serious violations" would have more influence in the
development of customary law than ad hoc tools.
4.8.5. DOMESTIC COURTS
The position and function of domestic courts in international law are unclear because
there is not any firmly established view on them. 222 Neither UN Charter nor the Statute
of the ICJ provides guidance on the role of domestic courts. Nevertheless, domestic
220 1d.
221 Singapore, Sri Lanka and Turkey explained that they had abstained. Id.
222 However, Brownlie argues that "Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the [ICJ] is not confined to
international decisions...". Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 23.
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courts are expected to play a part in implementation of international humanitarian
law,223 and indeed there are some judgments by domestic courts relating the law of
armed conflict applicable to civil war. 224 The reliability of the judgments of domestic
courts however depends on each State's justice system. For instance trials in the
Rwandan courts are proceeding parallel with the International Tribunal for Rwanda, but
there are concerns as to the fairness and adequacy of legal proceedings in Rwanda,
particularly given the decimation of the legal community and instruments in the
conflict. 225 . As Brownlie rightly states that "the value of these decisions varies
considerably, and may present a narrow national outlook or rest on a very inadequate
use of the source". 226 In addition, as Akehurst correctly pointed out, it is the quality of
judgments and publications, the latter to be discussed below, that matters.227
4.8.6. PUBLICISTS
The opinions of publicists have considerable value even though their role is
"subsidiary" under Article 38(1)(d) of the Statute of the ICJ. 228
 For international
humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict, the role of publicists is of great
significance, because the number of judicial decisions which are easily available has
still been limited. It is, however, true and deplorable that the works on this issue are
almost non-existent,229 in spite of the frequent occurrence of civil war in the present
223 There is no provision regarding implementation in civil conflict apart from Article 19 of Protocol II,
but Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions require the parties "to respect and to ensure respect
for" the conventions "in all circumstances". Detailed discussion on this point will be made in infra. Ch.
9.
224 Recent examples are judgments in Rwandan courts, e.g. see "Hutus sentenced to death", The Times,
January 4, 1997, at 11. In US courts, see Echeverria-hernandez case, supra. note 58, at 689-694.
225 Payam Akhavan, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment" 90 AJIL 501, 509-510 (1996).
226 Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 23.
227 Akehurst, "Hierarchy of Sources", supra. note 75, at 280.
228 See Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 156. The ICJ itself has not made use of any individual work in its
judgment. See also Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 24-25; Shaw, supra. note 3, at 92.
229 Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 33.
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world. Research into this area of law is inadequate, not to mention research into its
customary status, and many civil wars are simply "forgotten". 230 Therefore, the present
writer calls for the development of in-depth research into this field so that the role of
publicists will be fulfilled.231
During the task of ascertaining customary rules, publicists should take an objective
attitude because what they are seeking now is lex lata, not lex ferenda. Should they not
be able to find customary rules, then, they can propose the future development, but the
finding of customary law itself must be undertaken in an objective manner, even if the
result of such a method may appear to be "inhumane". 232 Hence, remarks by two jurists
are hereby cited. Brownlie contends:
It is, however, obvious that subjective factors enter into any assessment of juristic
opinion, that individual writers reflect national and other prejudices, and further,
that some publicists see themselves to be propagating new and better views rather
than providing a passive appraisal of the law.233
Borrowdale argues:
It is unlikely that an exception in favour of humanitarian law whereby such law
enjoys immediate passage into custom will be of any value, for such an exception
2313 To name a few, publications on the application of the laws of war in the civil wars in Sri Lanka and
Bougainville, Papua New Guinea are almost non-existent even though they are long-lasting and fiercely
fought. As to disparity in coverage of conflict by the media, See Bellamy, supra. note 180, at 34.
231 See Christa Meindersma, "Applicability of Humanitarian Law in International and Internal Armed
Conflict", 7 Hague Yearbook of InternationalLaw 113, 139 (1995).
232 But see Bruderlein, supra. note 3, at 594 (stating that "It is possible to steer the development of
customary law in the direction of treaty law, simply by working to strengthen its provision. The legal
expert is consequently faced with a choice: he may either leave it to the States of the world community to
legislate for the protection of victims of armed conflicts in accordance with their own interests or he may
"take the side" of the victims and militate in favour of strengthening humanitarian lawthrough the
development of customary law").
233 Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 24.
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would also ensure the passage of provisions such as article 1(4) which has arisen
primarily out of political and not humanitarian motives.234
4.8.7. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCES
Abi-Saab contends that customary law may be formed in a course of a diplomatic
conference. 235
 However, the examination of the Official Records of the Diplomatic
Conference, which took place between 1974 and 1977 to adopt the two Protocols, in the
following five Chapters proves his remark to be Utopian, even considering that he
participated in the Conference. Moreover, the attendance of experts in the law of armed
conflict to the Conference was limited, and government officials were not always well-
informed of the subject which was being discussed. 236 Besides disappointment would
follow the expectation that participants should have examined practice in various armed
conflicts in the Conference; the Official Records reveal that a few delegates mentioned
civil wars which their States faced. Last, the present Protocol II resulted from last-
minute compromise which was achieved by efforts of the Pakistani representative. 237
 It
can be held that discussion made by participants in a diplomatic conference may be
valuable sources of information about the customary status of certain law, but as far as
Protocol II is concerned, there were not thorough debates about the customary status of
the law relating to civil conflict.238
234 Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 87.
235 Abi-Saab, supra. note 32, at 123; Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols", supra. note 23, at 59-66.
236 See highly critical comments on lack of enthusiasm on the side of participating governments in the
Diplomatic Conference. Keith Suter, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare, at 130-131(1984).
237 The ICRC's Commentary, §4413.
238
	
infra. Chs. 5-9.
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4.9. EXCEPTION TO THE EFFECT OF CUSTOMARY RULES
4.9.1. INTRODUCTION
The effect of customary international law is, as indicated, to bind all States. 239
However, persistent objectors and new States are problematic. If a State is a persistent
objector to a certain practice, the State is not obliged to obey it. On the other hand, it is
generally agreed that new States are bound by custom, though how to bind an entity
which does not exist when custom is formed is problematic. These two problems are
usually argued in the context of opinio furls, but it is difficult to distinguish the opinio
furls of these States from their practice, and therefore these problems are dealt with
here.
4.9.1 PERSISTENT OBJECTORS24°
In the Fisheries case the ICJ has recognised the principle of persistent objection as
exempting Norway from customary obligations, 241
 and many writers also confirm the
validity of this principle. 242
 This rule has captured the attention of two prominent
scholars of international humanitarian law. In accordance with Cassese, a State which
does not wish to be bound by a newly emerging customary rule should express its
opposition in a diplomatic conference so that the future application of the rule to the
State will be prevented. 243
 In his article, Cassese implies that Israel is a persistent
239 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 24.
2413 See the critical analysis of this theory by Jonathan I. Charney, "The Persistent Objector Rule and the
Development of Customary International Law", 56 BYIL 1 (1985) [hereinafter "The Persistent Objector
Rule"].
241 Fisheries case, Judgment of December 18th, 1951, ICJ Reports 1951, p. 116, at 131.
242 Akehurst, "Custom as a Source", supra. note 57, at 24; Borrowdale, supra. note 57, at 88-89;
Brownlie, supra. note 76, at 10; Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 113; Kwakwa, supra. note 2, at 60-61 n.93;
Shaw, supra. note 3, at 72; Wolfke, supra. note 45, at 66. But see the doubt cast by Charney, "The
Persistent Objector Rule", supra. note 240, especially at 21-24.
43 Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols", supra. note 23, at 64.
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objector to the customary status of Article 1(4) of Protocol I because the State totally
opposed to the provision. 244 On the contrary, Abi-Saab regarded the rule as "a transient
phenomenon" since a State's persistent objection either successfully prevents or
succumbs to the formation of custom.245
This rule has not posed a serious problem to Protocol II, for there is no available
evidence which shows persistent objection against Protocol II since 1977. Besides, the
persistent objector rule does not function where there is no custom, and as will be
shown in the subsequent chapters, the number of customary laws applicable to internal
conflict established since 1977 is indeed limited. As regards Cassese's argument, Israel
is not a persistent objector because the present author contends in Chapter 5 that Article
1(4) of Protocol I has not attained customary status. In conclusion, the persistent
objector rule has little part in the present international humanitarian law on non-
international armed conflict, though there will be room for the role of this theory should
there be a new convention in the future.
4.9.3. NEW STATES
The principles of consent and sovereign equality, which are fundamental in public
international law, cannot solve the problem of new States in customary international law
since these States are, according to the majority view, bound by custom which has been
established before their existence. 246 At present, the law of armed conflict applicable to
civil war has not faced this problem. Because of the limited existence of customary
rules in Protocol II, new States indeed have the opportunity to practice and to reveal
n• n••••...
244 Id. at 69-70, 103-4.
245 Abi-Saab, supra. note 32, at 124-125.
246 See Danilenko, supra. note 3, at 113-114; Mendelson, supra. note 83, at 188-189; Shaw, supra. note 3,
at 72.
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their opinio juris before the future formation of custom in this area of law, though no
evidence demonstrates objection of a new State to customary humanitarian law.
,
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CHAPTER 5
CUSTOM AND PROTOCOL II, PART I: MATERIAL FIELD OF
APPLICATION'
5.1. THE LAWS OF WAR BEFORE 1949
De Vattel, who distinguished civil war from popular tumults, seditions, insurrection
and rebellion, made the following definition of civil war: -
When a party is formed within the State which ceases to obey the sovereign and
is strong enough to make a stand against him, or when a Republic is divided into
two opposite factions, and both sides take up arms, there exists a civil war. 2
Other early writers did not attempt to make a definition, but it should have been
presumed that there must have been war similar to international war between licit
authorities and a rebel group to be regarded as civil war. For instance, Twiss assumed
"a State of War de facto between parties" as a condition for foreign States to recognise
such situation. 3 Therefore, intensity should have been also presupposed.
Cassese argues that certain regulations concerning conduct of hostilities in internal
conflict became customary during the Spanish Civil War, but he admits that those rules
are applicable only to conflicts that have achieved the magnitude of the Spanish Civil
Article 2 of Protocol II is discussed in infra. Ch. 6.
2 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns Vol. III, Translation of the Edition of 1758 By Charles G.
Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, Book III, §292 (Michel E. Slatkine and Jiri
Toman reprint eds., 1983) (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758). Regarding popular tumults, seditions,
insurrection and rebellion, see id., §289. Regarding rebellion, see id., §292.
3 Sir Travers Twiss, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the
Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War, 2nd ed. rev., §38 (1875).
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War,4 the requirements of which resemble those set in Article 1(1) of Protocol II. His
argument appears to be appropriate because, as discussed above, there should have
been the state of war to be classified as a civil war. There is indeed one feature
common to the American, Japanese and Spanish Civil Wars; that is, both the legitimate
Governments and the rebel groups were equipped with naval forces, which in practice
fought maritime battles.' No civil war has had serious naval engagements since the
end of the Spanish Civil War, 6 and therefore since 1945 few civil conflicts could have
been governed by the regulations which Cassese regards as customary.
5.2. THE REGIME OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE 1950s AND 1960s
Article 3 common to the 1949 Geneva Conventions was innovative, and it was adopted
after lengthy meetings. 7 The suggestion that the phrase "armed conflict not of an
international character" be defined was dropped in the 1949 Diplomatic Conference.8
Even though the Pictet's Commentaries mentioned a list of criteria that might
constitute such armed conflict, 9 Pictet, its author, was not in the opinion that Common
Article 3 would not cover situation in which any of the listed criteria was not
fulfilled. 10 He wrote that these conditions "are not obligatory and are only mentioned
as an indication" and that "We think, on the contrary, that the Article should be applied
4 Antonio Cassese, "The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning
Internal Armed Conflict" in Current Problems of International Law 287, at 316 (Antonio Cassese ed.,
1975).
5 Cf. Lindsay Moir, "The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts to 1949", 47 ICLQ 337, 342-343 (1998) (arguing that the recognition of
the belligerency of insurgents by third States took place "most commonly in maritime situations").
6 There are reports on maritime fightings in the Sri Lankan Civil War, but a rebel group has not had
forces amounting to a navy, and available information indicates that their equipment has been limited to
boats. See e.g. Vijitha Yapa, "Tamil suicide boat sinks navy ship in siege of lookout base", The Times,
Jul. 20, 1996, at 16.
7 G.I.A.D. Draper, The Red Cross Conventions, at 14 (1958).
8 Pictet's Commentary, at 49.
9 Id., at 49-50. The Commentary's criteria directly result from American and Australian proposals. See
Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference, 1949, Vol. II-B, at 121 [hereinafter FR]
10 Pictet's Commentary, at 50.
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as widely as possible" because "certain rules... were already recognized as essential in
all civilized countries". 11 It is also suggested by the ICRC's Commentary that when
the degree of armed conflict is low and the conditions of Article 1(1) are not satisfied,
Common Article 3 will be applicable.12
Notwithstanding opinion favouring the broader application of Common Article 3, it
was intended to be application to only, as Bond argues, "a limited range of conflicts".13
The Final Record of the Diplomatic Conference indicates that many States were not in
favour of -applying the law of armed conflict to low intensity conflicts. 14 The
Australian delegation's remark reflected such prevailing view, which is as follows:
The Australian Goverment believes that international law and Conventions
should apply when civil war was of such magnitude as to be full-scale war.15
Until the adoption of the 1977 Protocols, certain observance of Common Article 3 had
been observed, even though the application was de facto basis, rather than de jure.16
The Congolese declaration to observe the Geneva Conventions has already been
mentioned. 17
 In the Algerian War of Independence, the French Government agreed to
accept a mission of the ICRC "in conformity with Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions" in a communiqué of 1956, 18 while it continued to refuse to admit the
11 Id., at 50.
12 The ICRC's Commentary, §4457.
13 James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 56-57 (1974).
14 --,PK Vol. II-B, at 121.
15 Id., at 42. Australia proposed an amendment of draft Article 2 which also appears in Pictet's
Commentary. Id., at 121; Pictet's Commentary, at 49-50.
16 See Bond, supra. note 13, at 58.
17 See supra. Ch. 4.
18 "White Paper on the Application of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 to the French-Algerian Conflict",
at 20, reprinted in Eldon van Cleff Greenberg, "Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution", 11
Harvard ILJ 37, 50 (1970).
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existence of armed conflict. 19 In the Biafran War, the Nigerian authorities issued the
Operational Code of Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces, in which the compliance
with the Geneva Conventions was expressly stated.2°
It is therefore appropriate to refer to the conclusion of Bond regarding the necessity of
intensity in civil war. 21 First, States which face internal conflicts are not of the opinion
that they are bound by Common Article 3. 22 Second, they however begin to accord to
certain rules if their conflicts prolong. 23 Third, and as conclusion, "armed conflict not
of an international character" in Common Article 3 is no more than traditional civil
war which attains certain magnitude.24
5.3. DRAFTING PROTOCOL II IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1974 TO 1977
5.3.1. ARTICLE 1 (DRAFT ARTICLE 125)
In the Diplomatic Conference, some Eastern and Third World States expressed their
favour of restricting the application of Protocol II, fearing the infringement of
sovereignty.26 Certain Western States, particularly Norway, were against the idea of
restricting the scope of application of Protocol II because such restriction would bring
19 For instance, in his press conference of 11 April 1961 on French policy on Algeria, President de
Gaulle kept referring to the conflict as "rebellion". Keesings, 13-20 May 1961, at 18091-18092. See
also Bond, supra. note 13, at 60.
29 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,a/k/a "Dule", Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 Oct. 1995, para. 73, reprinted in 35 ILM 32 (1996),
[hereinafter Tadic case (2 Oct. 1995)]. See Bond, id., at 59. (Bond argues that the Nigerian
Government acknowledged no legal obligations).
21 Bond, id., at 60, 61.
22 Id., at 60.
23 1d., at 60-61.
24 1d.,la at 61.
25 Draft Protocol II, Article 1, 1 OR, P 3, at 33.
26 Regarding Communist States, e.g. see the proposed amendments of East Germany, 4 OR, CDDH/I/88,
at 89; East Germany, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.22, para. 29, at 207. Concerning developing States, see e.g.
India, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.23, para. 48, at 224. In this thesis, Eastern States refer to States belonging to
the Communist bloc during the Cold War, while Western States to those belonging to the Capitalist bloc.
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less humanitarian protection, 27 while other Western States were in favour of the draft
article.28 Fifty-eight States voted in favour, five against and twenty-nine abstained in
the voting, and Article 1 of Protocol II was thus adopted. 29 This adoption reflected
neither the tension between the East and West nor difference between North and South.
The Eastern States and most of the Western States were in favour of the article, while
the Third World States that were so united in adopting Article 1 of Protocol I which
internationalises armed conflict for self-determination were split. One could maintain
that the almost unanimous support of the Eastern and Western States for Article 1 of
Protocol II cannot be interpreted in the affirmation of the customary status of this
article because this article was a product of consensus that was not strongly endorsed
by those States. For instance, Canada explained their vote by stating that she voted in
favour of the article "in the spirit of compromise and common appreciation of the
objectives for Protocol II"• 3 ° Besides, there were five oppositions and twenty-nine
abstentions, including influential Third World States, such as Algeria, India, Indonesia
and Nigeria, which should have worked against the confirmation of the customary
status of Article 1.
5.3.2. ARTICLE 3 (DRAFT ARTICLE 431)
India proposed that Draft Article 4 be amended so that Protocol II would not be
inapplicable in case of the existence of "external intereference". 32 This proposed
amendment, however, did not attract a wide support in the Diplomatic Conference
27 E.g. the proposed amendment of Norway, 4 OR, CDDH/I/218, at 9; Norway, 8 OR, CDDH/1/SR.23,
paras. 12 and 13, at 217; New Zealand, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.23, para. 21, at 218.
28 E.g. the Netherlands 8, OR, CDDH/I/SR.23, para. 39, at 222; Italy, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.23, para. 45, at
223.
29 7 OR, CDDH/SR.49, para. 65, at 69, 70.
30 Canada, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.49, Annex, at 77.
31 Draft Protocol II, Article 4, 1 OR, P 3, at 34
32 Proposed amendment of India, 4 OR, CDDH/I/240, at 16.
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because the victims of civil conflict in which interference occurs might not be
protected, 33 and India finally "agreed not to press its amendment to the vote but
reserved the right to take it up later." 34 Apart from this Indian proposal strengthening
the protection of sovereignty, there was no notable opposition to draft Article 4, which
was adopted by consensus as Article 3 of Protocol 11.35
It is difficult for one to imagine the situation where States are opposed to the protection
of sovereignty and the prohibition of non-interference, and indeed there was no active
opposition in the Diplomatic Conference to this regard. One participant later wrote:
"Though this extreme proposal [of India] was not pushed through, it was symptomatic
of the general state of mind and atmosphere which prevailed at the Conference on the
subject [of non-intervention]". 36 It could be therefore argued that States implicitly
supported Article 3 in the Conference.
5.4. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
5.4.1. AFGHANISTAN (1989-)
After the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan confronted internal war
instead of welcoming peace. 37 The Soviet-installed Najibullah Government in Kabul
was finally ousted by the Mujaheddin in April 1992. 38 Fighting among various
factions ensued, but the Taliban, which was established in October 1994, took control
33 E.g. Poland, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR. 30, para. 21, at 304.
34 Report of Committee I, Second Session, 10 OR, CDDH/219/Rev. 1, para. 109, at 43.
35 See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 8, at 86.
36 Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International Dimensions of
Humanitarian Law 217, 233.
37 The author concentrates on the civil conflict after the Soviet withdrawal.
38 Patrick Brogan, World Conflicts, at 134 (3rd ed., 1998).
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of Kabul in September 1996. 39 Although the Taliban forces effectively placed the
southern part of Afghanistan under control, it could not achieve a total victory.40
Several warring groups maintained command structure, which enabled the ICRC to
conduct humanitarian assistance. 41 Neither the Government nor any opposition group
has united the war-torn State since the Soviet departure, which indicates the existence
of military occupation by rebels. 42 The rebel groups have been able to undertake
military operations against the central Government or among each other. For instance,
when rebel-groups attacked Jalalabad in March 1989, President Najibullah admitted in
his appeal to the American and Soviet leaders that "extensive offensive attacks" had
been undertaken by the oppositions. 43 Later, the Taliban fought fiercely to the extent
that it was almost able to conquer whole Afghanistan in May 1997. 44 There have been
a number of reports about atrocities in Afghanistan, but vehement contending parties
have at least showed their willingness to obey rules of international humanitarian law.
For example, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a leader of a main opposition group, ordered the
humane treatment of the prisoners of war. 45 The Taliban, on the other hand, advocated
39 Id., at 135.
la at 135-136.
41 See Yves Sandoz, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Law of Armed Conflict
Today", International Peacekeeping, Winter 1997, at 86, 91.
42 For example, in 1989 the Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights reported
situations of human rights "in government-controlled areas" and "in areas not under government
control" as well as "in combat areas". UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of
human rights in Afghanistan prepared by the Sepcial Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance
with Commission on Human Rights resolution 1988/67, paras. 29-55, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1989/24 (16 Feb.
1989). He however admitted the difficulty of ascertaining the precise areas occupied by the Government
and rebels. See id. para. 30.
43 "Najibollah appeals to Gorvachev and Bush", broadcast by Kabul home service in Dan, 1600 gmt, 10
Mar. 1989, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 3, Far East, 3rd Ser., FE/0408, at C/5 (14 Mar.
1989).
44 Christopher Thomas, "Northern Afghan towns fly Taleban's white flag", The Thnes, May 22, 1997, at
17; Brogan, supra. note 38, at 135.
45 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted
by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1991/78 [hereinafter Report on Afghanistan of 1992], para. 51, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/33 (17
Feb. 1992).
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the supremacy of Sharia over international law46 and the humane treatment of those
who were captured according to the Islamic law. 47 The ICRC has been able to visit
combatants detained by various groups since 1989, 48 even though visits to captives
have been subject to military situation.49
The Afghan Civil War demonstrates difficulty in determining the legal character of the
conflict. First, on the side of the rebels, there are so many actors in the conflict, and
each party must be examined to verify the law, i.e. either Common Article 3 or
Protocol Ii, applicable to contentions between the Afghan Government and each
group. 5° However, undertaking such investigation into each warring group would be
almost unfeasible because of a proliferation of opposition forces and lack of reliable
information. Second, the existence of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan is not
always self-evident in Afghanistan, and this is particularly the case with the Taliban,
which has been occupying a large part of the country, including Kabul, but has not
achieved world-wide recognition. 51 With such difficulty in ascertaining the applicable
law to the Civil War, this author is reduced to making only the vague conclusion that
many fighting in Afghanistan, including those involved in the Taliban, are situations to
be governed by Common Article 3 rather than Protocol II. 52
46 UN Commission on Human Rights, Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1996/75, para. 31, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/59 (20 Feb. 1997).
47 1d., para. 51.
48 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1989, at 62-63; Reference Report 1990, at 52, 53; Annual Reports 1991,
at 64; 1992, at 61; 1993, at 104; 1994, at 105; 1995, at 125; 1996, at 135; 1997, at 152; 1998, at 163;
1999, at 159.
49 See e.g. the ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 152.
SO Fightings among the rebelling groups are under Common Article 3.
Si The Taliban has been recognised by Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. See
"Taleban Demolishes 2 Huge Stone Buddhas", International Herald Tribune (The Hague), March 5,
2001, at 6.
52 A Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights wrote that 1949 Geneva Convention
III and 1977 Protocol I would be applicable to the prisoners of war in Afghanistan, but he should have
bore in mind the internal character of the conflict after the withdrawal of the Soviet forces. See Report
on Afghanistan of 1992, supra. note 45, para. 49.
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5.4.2. BOUGAINVILLE, PAPUA NEW GUINEA (1990-)
One of the least known secessionist conflicts would be the war in Bougainville, Papua
New Guinea (PNG). The Bougainville Revolutionary (Republican) Army (BRA)
sought the secession of Bougainville from PNG and proclaimed the independence of
Bougainville on May 17, 1990. 53 There was unrest in the late 1980s but the situation
intensified in May 1990 by the imposition of a naval blockade on Bougainville by
PNG and by the declaration of unilateral independence. 54 In the declaration, "the
Interim President of the Republic of Bougainville" claimed that "the people of
Bougainville" had been prevented from obtaining an independent State by PNG. 55 The
Government of PNG did not recognise the existence of a secessionist movement, even
though it showed ambivalence towards the conflict. In its statement, the Government
declared that: "Bougainville is an integral part of the Independent Sovereign State of
PNG"; "Secession is non-negotiable"; and "Bougainville Crisis is an internal domestic
matter.. •,,56 Regarding the BRA, the PNG Government outlawed the group because
"the raising of unauthorized forces is contrary to the laws of Papua New Guinea".57
On the other hand, the Government admitted the existence of "armed conflict" and of
"human rights violations involving our Forces and the BRA".58
53 Response by the Government of Papua New Guinea to the United Nations Commission on Human
. Rights Resolution on Alleged Human Rights Violation on Bougainville Province of Papua New Guinea
23rd September 1994 [hereinafter Respnse by the PNG Government], reprinted in UN Commission on
Human Rights, Human rights violations in Bougainville, Report of the Secretary-General, at 5, 12, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1995/60, (16 Feb. 1995).
54 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Report by the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Papua
New Guinea island of Bougainville from 23 to 28 October 1995 [hereinafter Special Rapporteur's
Report from 23 to 28 October 1995], para. 32, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (27 Feb. 1996). As to the
declaration, see "Declaration of Independence Republic of Bougainville", reprinted in Bougainville:
Perspectives on a Crisis, Apps., at 107 (Peter Polomka ed., 1990).
55 "Declaration of Independence Republic of Bougainville", id.
56 Response by the PNG Government, supra. note 53, at 23.
57 "Press Statement Hon. Ted Diro, MP, Minister for State: Bougainville Republican Army Outlawed",
reprinted in Bougainville: Perspectives on a Crisis, supra. note 54, Apps., at 87. Emphasis added.
58 Response by the PNG Government, supra. note 53, at 20.
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If one applies the four requirements mentioned in the Article 1(1) of Protocol II, the
BRA exercised certain control over its members to some extent, even though the
BRA's command structure seemed to be rather unsatisfactory. 59 Regarding occupation,
the landing of the PNG armed forces on the southern part of the island "for the first
time ... in- two years" in May 1992 would indicate the occupation of whole
Bougainville by the rebels for a considerable time. 6° Even the Government of PNG
admitted that there were areas not controlled by its forces or "not safe". 61 Last,
available information does not indicate whether or not the BRA showed its willingness
to observe international humanitarian law. As the satisfaction of the four prerequisites
is not evident, it would be appropriate to conclude that the war was not in the ambit of
Protocol II.
5.4.3. CHECHNYA, RUSSIA (1994-1996)
On December 11, 1994 an offensive was officially launched by the Russians against
the Chechen rebels, which was followed by massive air raids on the city of Grozny.62
The Russian Government consistently regarded the conflict as a domestic problem.
Soon after the direct involvement of the Russian forces in Chechnya, Grigoriy Karasin,
the official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry, stated that "these events [in
Chechnya] lie exclusively within the internal competence of the Russian Federation
and are its own internal affair", and he referred to the Chechen rebels as "illegal armed
59 Special Rapporteur's Report from 23 to 28 October 1995, supra. note 54, para. 31.
60 "PNG forces land on rebel-held island", (a) Text of report by Radio Australia external services in
English, 0800 gmt, 13 May 1992; (b) Excerpt from report by Radio Australia external services in
English, 0900 gmt, 13 May 1992, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 3, Far East, FE/1368, at
B/13 (30 Apr. 1992).
61 Response by the PNG Government, supra. note 53, at 26-28.
62 See Keesing's, Dec. 1994, at 40325.
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groups". 63
 Besides, criminal proceedings were launched by the Russian Procurator
General's office "against illegal actions of criminal armed formations on Chechnya's
territory" on charges of "banditry and terrorism" under the Russian criminal code.64
The Russian Constitutional Court examined the legitimacy of the presidential decrees,
including the one of December 9, 1994, and ruled that they were licit. 65 What is
significant with this ruling is that it was stated in the decision as follows:
It is the responsibility of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation to bring
order to the legislation governing the use of the Russian Armed Forces and the
resolution of other matters arising during abnormal situations and conflicts,
including matters arising out of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 11).66
Two different opinio juris co-existed: the Court mentioned the applicability of
international instruments, while the Government denied it. There is no evidence to
suggest that the Russian Government changed its standing concerning the applicability
of the law of armed conflict after the ruling of the Court.
63 "Russian Foreign Ministry spokesman warns against internationalizing Chechnya problem", broadcast
by Ostankino Radio Mayak, Moscow, in Russian, 1452 gmt, 20 Dec. 1994, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2185, at B/8 (22 Dec. 1994).
64 "Criminal proceedings instituted against Chechen illegal units operating since 1991", broadcast by
Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1843gmt, 13 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring,
SWB, Part 1, Fromer UUSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2202, at B/8 (16 Jan. 1995).
65 Aleksei Kirpichnikov, "The Decisions on Sending Troops into Chechnya Are Declared
Constitutional", Sevodnya, Aug. 1, 1995, at 1, reprinted in 47 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet
Press, No. 31, at 4,4 (1995).
66 The reply of the Russian Government to the note verbale of the Secretary-General, reprinted in UN
Commission on Human Rights, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the
Russian Federation, para. 49, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/13 (26 Mar. 1996).
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The Chechen rebels were "well-trained" and "well-organized", as Russian Defence
Minister admittingly described them. 67 In January 1996 it was reported that "The
separatists control roughly the southern mountainous third of the republic...". 68 At
almost the same time, it was also reported that about one-tenth of Grozny had been
controlled-by the Russian forces according to "The staff charts". 69 Regarding the
willingness to obey the laws of war, Dudayev, the Chechen rebel leader, remarked that
"captives will now be dealt with according to the laws of wartime" at the very
beginning of the conflict. 70 However, a more comprehensive statement about the law
of armed conflict is not available, and in practice the Chechen side was to be blamed
for their brutalities.71
Was the conflict in Chechnya between 1994 and 1996 under Protocol I, because the
Chechens sought for self-determination? 72 Whether the Chechens are "peoples" in
international law or not, in practice even Protocol II was not applied by the Russian
Government, not to mention Protocol I. Indeed, the applicability of Protocol I was
rarely discussed, and the ICRC par exemple stressed that Common Article 3 and
"Grachev, Yerin and Stephashin hold press conference in Mozdok", broadcast by Ostankino Channel
1 TV, Moscow, in Russian, 1840gmt, 29 Dec. 1994, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1,
Former USSR, 3d Ser., SU/2190, at B/3 (31 Dec. 1994).
68 Thomas de Waal, "Dejected troops tell of chaos in army command", The Times, Jan. 20, 1996, at 12
'"Izvestiya' report claims Russian control one-tenth of Grozny", Text of article "Moscow has stated:
military phase is over. Fighting in Groznyy continues" in `Izvestiya', Moscow, in Russian, 21 Jan. 1995,
at 1, reprinted in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd. Ser., SU/2208, at B/7 (23 Jan.
1995).
"Dudayev: no more playing peacemakers, POWs to be dealt with by war laws", broadcast by ITAR-
TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian, 1299 gmt, 14 Dec. 1994, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3d Ser., SU/2180, 16 Dec. 1994.
71 See infra. Chs. 6-8.
72 This author does not ascertain the customary status of Article 1(4) of Protocol I regarding the
internationalisation of fighting for self-determination, but he concurs with Kwakwa who denies the
customary status of the said article. Edward Kwakwa, The International Law of Armed Conflict, at 65
(1992); but cf Georges Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some
Preliminary Reflections" in, Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challeges Ahead: Essays in Honour
of Frits Kalshoven 115, 120 (Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., 1991) (arguing that Article
1(4) is an interpretation of the 1949 Geneva Conventions).
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Protocol II be applied. 73
 Furthermore, as already examined, the willingness of the
rebels to observe Protocol II remained somewhat obscure, and therefore the Protocol
might not have been applicable, either.
5.4.4. EL SALVADOR (1981-1992)
In October 1979 a coup succeeded in overthrowing a military regime and a junta was
consequently established in El Salvador. 74 The Frente Farabundo Marti para la
LiberaciOn Nacional (FMLN), a rebel group, undertook -a general assault against the
Government forces in January 1981, 75 and the conflict continued until January 1992
when a peace agreement was reached between the contending parties.76
The applicability of Protocol II to the civil conflict in El Salvador is not to be doubted.
The ICRC's Annual Report 1983 wrote as follows:
In accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Conventions covering such
conflicts (Article 3 common to the Conventions, and Additional Protocol
the ICRC has for the fourth consecutive year continued its protection and
assistance activities... .77
An almost identical phrase was used in the following Annual Reports. 78 The four
requirements of Article 1(1) of Protocol II were met, and El Salvador should have
employed the treaty as its party. 79 Regarding rebel control of land, the FMLN
73 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 203.
74 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 475.
75 Id., at 477.
76 1d., at 484.
77 The ICRC, Annual Report 1983, at 29, referred to by Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, at 366
(1994).
78 See the ICRC, Annual Reports 1984, at 32; 1985, at 36; 1986, at 36; 1987, at 39; 1988, at 43; 1989, at
39; and Reference Report 1990, at 40. This point is also raised by Best, id., at 366 n.139.
79 See Michael Bothe, "Article 3 and Protocal [sic] II: Case Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador", 31
AULR, 899, 906 (1982); Best, id., at 366.
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occupied "certain parts of the national territory", 80 though particularly in an early stage
the extent of rebel occupation might have been limited. 81 For instance, the guerrilla
attack by the FMLN in January 1981 failed in the cities but the organisation was able
to control "several border provinces". 82 With respect to command structure of the
dissidents,-Bothe contended that certain military and governmental structure existed in
the FMLN. 83 Concerning scale of military operations by the rebel group, its military
offensive of January 1981 could be regarded as the beginning of a series of
hostilities. 84 Violence was exacerbated during 1980, 85 and the assassination of
Archbishop Romero, as the Commission on the Truth for El Salvador put it,
"symboliz[ed] the point at which human rights violations reached their peak and
presag[ed] the all-out war between the Government and the guerrillas that was to
come". 86 However, it was at the end of 1980 when the FMLN was formed by five
different groups and the unified organisation undertook the first major operations
against the Government in January 1981. 87 With reference to the rebels' willingness to
observe Protocol II, the FMLN together with another rebel organisation showed its
"determin[ation] to respect the humanitarian norms contained in the Geneva
Conventions and Protocol II Additional". 88 In practice, for instance, it was reported
80 Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
transmitting the report presented on 15 March 1993 by the Commission on the Truth [hereinafter Report
by the Commission on the Truth], S/25500 (1 Apr. 1993), at 297 & 392 n.5, reproduced in UN, The
United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, Doc. 67, 290, UN Sales No. E. 95.1.12 (1995).
81 Compare Bothe, supra. note 79, at 906 ("Very few villages or towns, if any, seem to be in the hands
of the FNLM, which controls mainly uninhabited areas") with Waldemar A. Solf, (No title), 31 AULR
927-933, at 932 (1982) ("They do have control over a sufficient part of the remote rural areas of the
country to conduct such [concerted military] operations.")
82 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 477.
83 Bothe, supra. note 79, at 906.
84 Compare Bothe, id. (`this control over scattered areas has enabled the leftists to engage in military
operations for a certain time, arguably "sustained," and they apparently have done so in a systematic,
coordinated way, arguably "concerted." [footnote omitted]) with Solf, supra. note 81.
85 Report by the Commission on the Truth, supra. note 80, at 302, 303.
86 . r.,la at 302.
87 1d., at 302, 303. However, the rebels regarded the operation as 'the "firnal offensive". See id, at 303.
88 Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberation Nacional & Frente Democratico Revolucionario, The
Situation of Human Rights in the Salvadoran Armed Conflict January-September 1985, at 76 (1985).
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that activities to disseminate international humanitarian law had been conducted for
FMLN fighters for the first time in 1982.89
This Salvadoran Civil War did reflect the Cold War as the Americans supported the
Government, while the Cubans, Nicaraguans and Russians the opposition group.9°
However, the degree of foreign interference in El Salvador was low, and the
applicability of Protocol II to the struggle was not hampered by the involvement of
third Powers. The USA sent assistance to El Salvador, most of which turned to be of
military use,91 and American military advisers trained Salvadoran soldiers. 92 On one
occasion when the FMLN lauched an offensive in November 1989, American Green
Berets were besieged in part of the Hotel El Salvador by the guerrillas, but the
existence of the Green Berets were not sufficiently explained by the American
authorities. 93 However, the US Congress allowed neither the despatch of troops to El
Salvador94 nor the direct involvement of American advisers in military operations.95
Concerning support from Communist States, there was smuggling of arms from Cuba,
Nicaragua and indirectly the US SR, 96 but it seems that their active participation in the
civil conflict did not take place.
Notwithstanding such situation favourable to the invocation of Protocol II, it is
questionable whether the treaty was de jure applied by the legitimate authorities. In
1982 the Government of El Salvador made critical comments on the interim report of
Compare Bothe, supra. note 79 (he is silent on this requirement) with Solf, supra. note 81, at 932 ("To
the best of my knowledge, the FNLM has never claimed that Protocol II is applicable") and Best, supra.
note 77, at 367 n.142 ("It is also matter for debate, when and how the El Salvador insurgents'
humanitarian commitment was registered".)
89 The ICRC, Annual Report 1982, at 32.
"Brogan, supra. note 38, at 473 & 479.
91 1d., at 478.
92 Id.
93 Id., at 482.
94 Id., at 473.
95 1d., at 477.
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the Special Representative of the UN Commission on Human Rights. 97 In this
document, the Salvadoran Government praised activities conducted by the ICRC,98 and
stated that it "understands and is aware of its legal and moral responsibility in this
matter [as ,improving the human rights situation in El Salvador]" and that "[the
ICRC's] humanitarian endeavours are fully supported by the Government". 99 On the
other hand it declared that "El Salvador is suffering from an acute outbreak of
terrorism which is being used by extremist organizations... . "100 The term "terrorism"
was repeatedly used in the same document, which demonstrates that for the Salvadoran
Government, acts committed by the rebels were not of warfare but of mere terrorism.
It seems to the present writer that the Government of El Salvador considered, or tried
to consider, that the situation should have been governed by human rights law because
a situation of terrorism is excluded from application of the laws of war. 1 ° 1 It should be
added that, in the Salvadoran comments, there was no mentioning of humanitarian
treaties.
Another point that would cast doubt on the de jure application of humanitarian
instruments is massive violations of the law of armed conflict. 102 The above statement
of El Salvador that its Government supported ICRC activities was neither self-
flattering nor temporary. For example, according to the ICRC's Annual Report 1985,
regular visits to detainees held by the Salvadoran authorities were conducted by ICRC
delegates, while visits to Government soldiers captured by the FMLN were not always
96 1d., at 479.
97 UN Commission on Human Rights, Comments of the Government of El Salvador on the interim
report of the Sepcial Representative on the situation of human rights in El Salvador (A/36/608), in Note
by the Secretary General [hereinafter Comments of the Salvadoran Government], at 2, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1982/4 (21 Jan. 1982). See Bothe, supra. note 79, at 905 n.17.
98 UN Commission on Human Rights, id., at 5-7. This point is also noted in Bothe, id., at 907 n.25.
99 UN Commission on Human Rights, id., at 5.
m° Id., at 7. Emphases added.
101 Protocol II, Article 1(2).
102 See Bothe, supra. note 79, at 907
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possible. 103 Nonetheless, the Government forces and agents were notorious for
massacring and "disappearing" civilians. 104 The existence of "death squads" that killed,
according to Brogan, eight hundred people per month between 1980-82 and twenty
thousand in total l °5 contradicts the authorities' willingness to implement the laws of
war that is materialised as a form of acceptance of the ICRC mission from an early
_
phase. 106 The rebel side could not escape from criticism against their conducts
contrary to the law, either. To give a few examples, in 1985 the FMLN was reminded
by the ICRC several times to respect the Red Cross emblem and its activities. 107 The
indiscriminate use of mines by the opposition group that resulted in deaths of civilians
was reported.'"
In conclusion, the application of Protocol II and Common Article 3 to the civil conflict
in El Salvador was short of de jure, 1 °9 because of the Salvadoran Government's
position not to acknowledge the existence of war with the rebel group and also because
of flagrant violations of the law of armed conflict attributed to both sides.
5.4.5. LIBERIA (1989-1997)
In December 1989 Charles Taylor began campaigns against the Government headed by
Samuel Doe, and in September 1990 another rebel leader Prince Johnson captured and
killed Doe, which left Liberia without government.110 Despite the intervention of
forces of a regional organisation, civil war continued until 1997, when Charles Taylor
103 The ICRC, Annual Report 1985, at 36-37.
104 See Report by the Commission on the Truth, supra. note 80, at 312-365.
105 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 476.
106 See Bothe, supra. note 79, at 907-908.
107 The ICRC, Annual Report 1985, at 36.
108 Report by the Commission on the Truth, supra. note 80, at 307.
109 See Best, supra. note 77, at 365-6.
110 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 67-68.
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was elected as the President of Liberia in election."' What was noticeable with the
Liberian Civil War was, first, there were many armed groups fighting with each other.
The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor, was probably
the largest rebel group, but there were others, such as the Liberia Peace Council (LPC),
the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and the United Liberation Movement for
Democracy (ULIMO). 112
 Second, this conflict was notorious for its savagery. One
could rightly argue that what occurred in Liberia would be the most tragic and
inhumane through the 1990s. Even the ICRC which usually refrains from making a
public statement on atrocity committed in a conflict released the following account
about the war in Liberia:
The ICRC once more deplores and condemns the serious and systematic
violations of the elementary rules of international humanitarian law and of the
minimum principles of humanity that have been committed since the start of the
conflict in December 1989.113
Sandoz questioned if the situation could be regarded as "armed conflict" when the
Government collapsed. 114
 According to the ICRC's Commentary, such a situation is
not governed by Article 1(1) but Common Article 3,115 and the clear wording of the
111 Id., 68-70.
112 As to rebel groups in Liberia, see generally, Stephen Ellis, "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency", in
African Guerrillas 155 (Christopher Clapham ed., 1998).
113 Jean-Daniel Tauxe (ICRC Delegate General for Africa), "Liberia: humanitarian logistics in question",
No. 312 IRRC, May-Jun. 1996, at 352, 352.
114 Yves Sandoz, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Law of Armed Conflict
Today", Vol. 4, No. 4, International Peacekeeping, Winter 1997, at 86, 91. He also refers to Somalia as
one of such situations.
115 The ICRC's Commentaly, para. 4461 (stating that Protocol II does not apply to a situation where
"several factions confronting each other without involvement of the government's armed forces", but
Common Article 3 applies to such situation). See also Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel White,
International Organizations and Civil Wars, at 67 (1995); Christa Meindersma, "Applicability of
Humanitarian Law in International and Internal Armed Conflict", 7 Hague Yearbook of International
Law 113, 126 (1995).
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former Article confirms this view. 116 Theoretically, therefore, Liberia ought to have
been covered by Common Article 3, but the record of the application of the law was
extremely poor, as the following Chapters demonstrate. The Security Council passed
Resolution 788, (1992), in which "all parties to the conflict and all others concerned"
were called upon "to respect strictly the provisions of international humanitarian
_
law". 117
 No available information shows that the Resolution was taken seriously by
the warring factions.
5.4.6. RWANDA (1994)118
The conflict in Rwanda that has attracted much media attention, as well as response by
the international community in a form of creating an international tribunal, started
when a plane crash killed the Presidents of Rwanda and Burundi in Kigali. 119
 Acts of
genocide by majority Hutu against minority Tutsi and moderate Hutu immediately
commenced, but at almost the same time the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), mainly
the Tutsi organisation, began fighting with the Rwandan Government forces which
resulted in the RPF victory in August 1994. 120 Hutu culprits of the genocide and others
fled to neighbouring countries, and hostilities resumed in 1996 when exiled Hutu
rebels invaded Rwanda.121
Concerning the applicability of Protocol II, the Commission of Experts established by
the Security Council to investigate genocidal acts and war crimes in Rwanda found
116 See Georges Abi-Saab, supra. note 36, at 228-9.
117 Article 5, S/RES/788 (1992), SCOR, 47th year, Res. and Dec., at 99 (1992).
118 Civil conflict in Rwanda has been prolonging, but in this thesis focus is placed on a short period
between April and August 1994.
119 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 32-33.
120 .. ..la, at 33-34. The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the customary status of the laws of war,
including war crimes, and thus the problems of genocide and crimes against humanity are not within its
scope. As to the aspects of genocide and crimes against humanity in the Rwandan conflict, see e.g.
Alain Destexhe, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Translated into English from French
by Alison Marschner (1995).
140
that the situation in the State had been a non-international armed conflict to be covered
by Common Article 3 and Protocol 11. 122 The Commission also argued that those who
had conducted operations in Rwanda had been 'individuals under a responsible
command that conducted "sustained and concerted military operations" involving
strategic planning and tactical sophistication'. 123 The Commission did not refer to the
occupation of a territory by the RPF, but it is clearly shown by a map attached to the
Secretary-General's report on Rwanda. 124 Finally, the RPF showed its willingness to
the ICRC to abide by the Geneva Conventions and Protocols. 125
 Information on the
actual military practice on the side of the RPF is limited, and the ICTR in the Akayesu
case did not refer to this point. 126 However, it could be presumed that the rebel group
was at least able to implement Protocol II with its intention to observe humanitarian
rules as well as with its military strength and command structure. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda considers that both Common Article 3 and Protocol II
were applicable to this civil war, 127
 and the above information on the rebel group
conform with this judgment.
121 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 34.
122 Security Council, Letter from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
transmitting the final report of the Commission of Experts, Annex, Final report of the Commission of
Experts established pursuant to Security Council resolution 835 (1994) [hereinafter Final report of the
Commission], paras. 106, 108, 110, UN Doc. S11994/1405 (9 Dec. 1994), reproduced as Doc. 107 in UN,
The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-1996, 415, UN Sales No. E. 96.1.20 (1996).
123 Id., para. 111. Footnotes omitted.
124 See Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Rwanda, reporting on the
political mission he sent to Rwanda to move the warring parties towards a cease-fire and recommending
that the expanded mandate for UNAMIR be authorized for an initial period of six months, at 298, UN
Doc. S/1994/640 (31 May 1994). reproduced as Doc. 64 in UN, The United Nations and Rwanda, 1993-
1996, 290, UN Sales No. E. 96.1.20 (1996).
125 UN Human Rights Commission, Report on the situation of human rights in Rwanda submitted by Mr.
R. Degni-Ságui, Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, under paragraph 20 of
Commission resolution E/CN.4/S-3/1 of 25 May 1994, para. 54, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/7 (28 Jun. 1994).
126 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept., 1998, at http://
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement1akay001.htm.
' 27 1d., paras. 618-627.
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5.4.7. SOMALIA (1988-)
Ethiopia and Somalia were in rivalry which resulted in war, 128 and the former
organised a Somali National Movement (SNM) that represented one of the Somali
clans. 129 In May 1988 a civil war started with the SNM's attacks against the
government forces in the northern part of Somalia. 130 In the late 1990 Mogadishu was
besieged by the rebels and President Siad fled from the capital, leaving Somalia totally
anarchic. 131 Somalia was divided by warlords who could exercise their power only on
their respective clans.132
Somalia has posed the same problems as Liberia. First, the Government of Somalia
collapsed, and fighting were made among various factions based upon clans, among
which were the SNM, the Somali National Alliance (SNA), the Somali Salvation
Democratic Front (SSDF), United Somali Congress (USC), and the self-claimed
Republic of Somaliland. 133 Second, warring parties to the civil war paid little respect
to the law of armed conflict, and barbarity was rife. For instance, the ICRC was
compelled to rely on armed guards to protect its activities because of worsening
security. 134 Looting, killing and raping were not uncommon in the capital city of
Mogadishu, and the situation was worse in the northern part of Somalia. 135 Third,
international intervention did not change the situation to a better direction, and
atrocities continued between clans. For instance, it was reported that southern
Mogadishu had been inflicted with heavy fighting between factional forces, which
128 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 97-99.
129 Id., at 99.
13 ° Id., at 100.
131 Id., at 100.
132 Id., at 101.
133 As to factions, see generally Daniel Compagnon, "Somali Armed Movements", in African Guerrillas
73 (Christopher Clapham ed., 1998).
134 The 1CRC, Annual Report 1992, at 46.
135 See Compagnon, supra. note 133, at 79.
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resulted in more than 300 deaths and 1,400 wounded, among whom many were
civilians, between December 13 and 21, 1996.136
In short, Somalia, as Liberia, is a pertinent case to be governed by Common Article 3,
primarily because there has been no central government. 137 Somalia has been
abandoned by the international community since the withdrawal of the UN forces,
even though the sufferings of victims in the Somalia has been continuing.138
5.4.8. SRI LANKA (1983-)
There was inter-communal unrest in the 197 0s in Sri Lanka, but it was in July 1983
that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LI TE or the Tamil Tigers), an organisation
advocating the creation of a Tamil state, 139 began military operations against the Sri
Lankan Government, which have continued until today.
140
 Fighters of the LTTE are
well trained and disciplined who have caused heavy losses of the Government
forces. 141 The LTTE has held control of part of the territory of Sri Lanka, particularly
the northern area, and in 1985 the Sri Lankan delegate at least admitted the existence
of "a prohibited zone" and "a security zone". 142 Particularly in the former area where
136 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Somalia, prepared by
the Independent Expert of the Commission on Human Rights, Ms. Mona Rishma-wi, pursuant to
Commission resolution 1996/57 of 19 April 1996, para. 38, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/88, (3 Mar. 1997),
revised by E/CN.4/1997/88/Corr.1 (1 Apr. 1997).
137 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 115, at 67. As to the latest political situation, see Abdi Ismail
Samatar, BBC Focus on Africa, Jan.-Mar. 1999, at 26.
138 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at 125-130.
139 S.S. Misra, Ethnic Conflict and Security Crisis in Sri Lanka, at 63-67 (1995). This thesis focuses on
the L'TTE, the strongest group among various organisations. As to other parties, see id, at 65-67.
140 see generally Brogan, supra. note 38, at 252-260. According to the Sri Lankan Government, "The
events of July 1985 were caused by a minority of lawless elements in particular circumstances". UN
Commission on Human Rights, Note verbale dated 30 January 1984 from the Permanent Mission of the
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka to the Secretary-General, para. 44, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1984/10 (1 Feb. 1984).
141 Misra, supra. note 139, at 65.
142 Sri Lanka, UN Commission on Human Rights, 41st Sess., Summary Record of the 52nd mtg., para.
36, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/SR.52 (20 Mar. 1985). Since 1990, the LTTE seems to have established a
highly-organised administrative structure. See Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers: armed
struggle for identity, at 63-4 (1994).
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rebels were undertaking operations, action could be taken by the army against them.I43
However, available information does not show the eagerness of the Tamil Tigers to
conform with international humanitarian law. For instance, since 1989 the
Government of Sri Lanka has accepted ICRC activities, especially its visits to
detainees and dissemination, 144 while the LTTE has received them to a much lesser
extent, I45 and moreover the LTTE guerrillas were famous for their brutalities.146
The Sri Lankan Government neither granted the prisoner of war status to the dissidents
nor admitted the applicability of the law of armed conflict. According to a
representative of Sri Lanka in a meeting of the Commission on Human Rights, "Sri
Lanka had no prisoners of war: all those in prison had violated the laws of the country
and were treated in accordance with the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Treatment of Prisoners". 147 On the other hand, he pronounced that 'The dissident
groups in Sri Lanka could not be considered as "organized armed group"; rather, they
were gangs which were exterminating each other. Nor could those gangs be said to
control any territory at all. The conditions set forth in the [Second] Protocol ...,
therefore, did not exist in Sri Lanka ..." . 148 According to an official report of 1992, the
Government noted that the LTTE was controlling northern areas, but it did not refer to
humanitarian instruments but to human rights law.I49
143 Statement by Sri Lanka, id., para. 36. See also Misra, supra. note 139, at 72-73.
' 44 The ICRC, Annual Report 1989, at 64.
145 As to dissemination, see the ICRC, Reference Report 1990, at 64. As to ICRC visits to those
detained by the LTTE, see the ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 75.
146 See e.g. "Terror in Sri Lanka", The Economist, Feb. 10, 1996, at 18. The LTTE interprets military
targets broadly. See Hellmann-Rajanayagam, supra. note 142, at 54, 96; Misra, supra. note 139, at 74.
147 Sri Lanka, UN Commission on Human Rights, 43rd Sess., Summary Record of the 34th mtg., 2nd pt.,
para. 50, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.34/Add.1 (11 Mar. 1987).
148 Sri Lanka, UN Commission on Human Rights, 43rd Sess., Summary Record of the 47th mtg., para.
53, UN Doc. E/CN.4/I987/SR.47 (11 Mar. 1987). He also denied the applicability of the Geneva
Conventions. See Sri Lanka, UN Commission on Human Rights, 43rd Sess., Summary Record of the
46th mtg., 2nd pt., para. 37, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/SR.46 (9 Apr. 1987).
149 Overseas Publicity Division, Government Information Department, Sri Lanka, Human Rights in Sri
Lanka: Status Report, at 5-7 (1992).
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Even though the LTTE has been fighting for self-determination, this conflict has not
been internationalised according to Protocol I. Should the State be a party to Protocol
II, the application of the treaty would still be questionable, because of the reluctance of
the separatist group to obey the laws of war. In conclusion, similar to the conflict in
Chechnya, Common Article 3 appears to be the only international applicable rule.
5.4.9. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (1991-1995)
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was split up in the early 1990s, and the
conflicts resulting from the disintegration brought a countless number of atrocities
which Europe had not seen for fifty years. 15° The conflict in the former Yugoslavia
had both international and non-international aspects, it can be regarded as
"internationalised". 152 Regarding war between the Serbs and Croats that started with
the proclamation of independence by Croatia, the representatives of the both sides
agreed that they would abide by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and 1977 Protocol 1•153
Considering conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina that broke out with the approval of her
independence in the referendum of February 1992, the parties to the conflict agreed to
comply with most of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their first Protoco1. 154 Hence,
it appears inappropriate to discuss the conflict in the former Yugoslavia in this thesis
that focuses on non-international armed conflicts, but this author uses the war for the
following reasons.
150 See Brogan, supra. note 38, at 437-453.
151 Tadic case (2 Oct. 1995), para. 77.
152 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 115,
153 Tadic case (2 Oct. 1995), para. 73; the
supra. note 115, at 94.
154 Tadic case (2 Oct. 1995), id., at 55-56;
White, id.
at 94.
ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 89; McCoubrey and White,
the ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 93; and McCoubrey and
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First, while the conflict was "internationalised", its non-international nature cannot be
disregarded. The conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was more non-internationa1, 155
 in
which Croats, Muslims and Serbs not belonging to regular armed forces played an
important role. The war in Croatia might have been more international than the one in
Bosnia-Herzegovina, but irregular militias participated in the conflict. 156 Mallerson
gives a persuasive example:
In Bosnia-Herzegovina where a village fought against a village and a neighbour
against a neighbour, where Muslims in Bihac revolted against the mainly Muslim
Government in Sarajevo, one can hardly deal with the conflict as a single
international armed conflict.157
The ICTY has carefully examined the nature of the conflict in its jurisprudence. To
take two examples, in the Rajic case, focus was placed on a link between a Croatian
armed group in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian armed forces, and the Trial
Chamber found, after examining the link, that the former had been supported by the
latter and therefore that the conflict between the Croatian armed group and the
Bosnian Government's armed forces had assumed international character. 158 In the
Tadic case, the Appeals Chamber overturned the Trial Chamber's finding that had
regarded the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina until May 19, 1992 as international
without specifying the type of conflict after the date. 159 The Appeals Chamber relied
on Article 4(A)(2) of Geneva Convention III regarding the requirements to be
155 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 115, at 94.
156 Brogan, supra. note 38, at 446.
157 Rein Milllerson, "International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", 2 Journal of Armed Conflict
Law 109, at 112 (1997).
158 Prosecutor v. Ivica Rajic, a/k/a Viktor Andric, Review of the Indictment Pursuant to Rule 61 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Case No. IT-95-12-R61, 13 Sept. 1996, paras. 9-21, at http:// www.
un.org/icty/raj ic/trialc2/decision-e/60913612htm.
159 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Judgement, Case No. IT-94-1-A, 15 Jul. 1999, paras. 83-162, reprinted in
38 ILM 1518 (1999).
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militias and found, after examining the nature of the relationship between the
Bosnian Serb Army and Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that the latter
had had control over the former and therefore that the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina bad been international in character even after May 19, 1992.160
Both cases show that the ICTY examined in detail the nature of the conflict. In the
Tadic case in particular, the Trial Chamber's finding was overturned by the Appeals
Chamber, and this fact alone reveals the difficulty in determining the character of the
conflict. In . the view of international humanitarian law, as the ICTY found in its
judgment, the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina was "internationalised", but in reality
there were non-international elements, and the examination of the conflict would
therefore become a useful comparison with other civil wars which are analysed in
this thesis.
Second, the parties to the conflict flagrantly violated the law of armed conflict
applicable to international conflicts, and the effect of the internationalisation should
be doubted. In the following Chapters such atrocities will be referred to, but it is
worth mentioning here that the ICRC passed a number of public statements and
appeals, part of which denounced the cruel acts committed by the parties to the
conflict. 161 Thus, the conflict in the former Yugoslavia should be discussed and
compared with civil conflicts which took place during the 1990s in which violations
of international humanitarian law were rife.
160 Id., particularly paras. 88-97 (regarding Geneva Convention III) and paras. 146-162 (regarding the
relationship between the two armies). It is worth mentioning that the Court in this case examined in
length to what extent control over a rebel group by a foreign State was necessary to transform an internal
conflict into an international one. The Trial Chamber relied on the "effective control" test adopted in the
Nicaragua case, but the Appeals Chamber found the text not persuasive. Instead, it employed the
"overall control" test, which had been adopted in various international, regional and domestic courts, in
order to determine whether the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had control over the Republika Srpska.
See id., paras. 98-145.
161 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1991, at 88; 1992, at 92, 93; 1993, at 147-148.
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5.5. EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY STATUS
5.5.1. ARTICLE 1(1)
The civil war in El Salvador seems to be the only example examined in this thesis in
_
which the applicability of Protocol II was unquestionable, and with such lack of
_
practice, it would not be plausible to regard the requirements set in Article 1(1) of
Protocol II as customary. Thus Common Article 3 should play a role, since it is
considered to be "the last resort" in an non-international armed conflict when Protocol
II is not applicable. 162 As Article 1 of Protocol II states, the treaty "develops and
supplements [Common] Article 3 ... without modifying its existing conditions of
application", and this clear wording indicates that the scope of Common Article 3
exists, independent of that of Protocol II. 163 Moreover, Draper wrote:
It is not easy to imagine that a State will claim the legal right before the forum of
world opinion to murder, torture and mutilate, and leave the wounded untended,
because the victims are, or were, only bandits.164
The reality is, however, that even this very concise provision has been often violated
and has not been formally applied. The experiences of the above conflicts demonstrate
the following paradox. On the one hand, as just stated, Common Article 3 should be
the last resort in an internal conflict where Protocol II cannot prevent cruelties, but on
the other such civil war which needs the most basic protection incorporated in this
terse article is in practice the least likely to be governed by it. Liberia appears to be the
162 See Rodney G. Allen et al, "Refining War: Civil Wars and Humanitarian Controls", 18 Human
Rights Quarterly 747, 766 (1996); Meindersma, supra. note 115, at 126; Michael Veuthey,
"Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Non-International
Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross", 33 AULR 83, 89 (1983).
163 See Abi-Saab, supra. note 36, at 229.
164 Draper, supra. note 7, at 17.
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most pertinent example of such paradox, analysed in this chapter, and so are Chechnya,
Rwanda and Somalia.
5.5.2. ARTICLE 1(2)
Although this thesis confines itself to armed conflicts, 165 there are situations which do
not amount to armed conflicts. For instance, the United Kingdom has been
confronting violence in Northern Ireland. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a
military organ pursuing the unification of Ireland by force, and the organisation has
been "under responsible command". 166 However, the IRA has not controlled any part
of Northern Ireland with an exception of "no-go" areas in Belfast and Londonderry for
a brief period. 167
 In addition the IRA neither "carr[ies] out sustained and concerted
military operations" nor "implement[s] ... Protocol [II]" because of its terrorist
nature. 168
 In Bahrain, unrest started in December 1994, led by opposition groups
mostly of Shia for parliamentary democracy that existed for a short period after
independence.' 69 It has not been the armed forces but the security forces (police) that
have dealt with the riotings, I7° and the dissidents have not resorted to the use of armed
weapons. For instance, it was "stones and Molotov cocktails" that were used by
165 This thesis confines itself to the contention that international humanitarian law is not customarily
applicable to riot situation. Therefore which law should be applied to such occasion should be found
elsewhere. See e.g. AsbjOrn Eide, "Internal Disturbances and Tensions", in UNESCO, International
Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 241 (1988). It is, however, worth noting that the ICRC is usually
allowed to visit those who are detained in relation to internal disturbances, which contributes to
ameliorating the situation. See e.g. Abi-Saab, supra. note 36, at 238.
166 See C. P. Walker, "Irish Republican Prisoners - Political Detainees, Prisoners of War or Common
Criminals?", 19 The Irish Jurist 189-225, at 224 (1984).
167 See Report of the C0177MiSSi017 to consider legal procedures to deal with terrorist activities in
Northern Ireland. Chairman: Lord Diplock, Cmnd. 5185, at 9; Walker, id., at 213; Tim Pat Cogan, The
IRA, at 374 (rev, new ed., 1995).
168 See Walker, id., at 219.
169 See "Bahraini fireworks", The Economist, Apr. 6, 1996, at 17; Michael Binyon, "Bahrain rounds up
1 ,500 protesters", The Times, 22 Dec. 1994, at 8; Anthony H. Cordesman, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and
the UAE, at 81 (1997).
170 See Cordesman, id., at 83 and 386 n.80, 107-111.
149
demonstrators against the security forces in December 1994.  171 The Bahraini
Government has not regarded the situation as armed conflict, and at the beginning of
the unrest, the Ambassador of Bahrain to the UK used terms such as "international
terrorist organisations" and "terrorist acts".172
The above tWo examples are only a handful of the recent situations not amounting to
civil wars, and neither Protocol II nor other humanitarian rules has been formally
invoked by a State facing such situation. Therefore this non-applicability of the treaty
confirms the well-established principle that international humanitarian law, one
instrument of which is Protocol II, does not regulate the conducts undertaken in
situations short of armed conflict, as provided by Article 1(2) of Protocol 11.173
Accordingly, one could contend that this provision is customary.
5.5.3. ARTICLE 3
This Article contains two principles of international law, the principle of inviolable
sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. 174 These principles are as old as
international law itself, 175 and are incorporated in paragraphs 1 and 7 of Article 2 of the
UN Charter, respectively. They are firmly established principles in international law
whose customary status was confirmed by the ICJ, 176 and it can be argued that Article
3 merely reiterates them. 177 Involvement of foreign States and/or international
171 Id., at 81.
172 "Letter from Karim Ebrahim Al Shakar to the Editor of 16 Jan. 1995, Unrest in Bahrain", The Times,
Jan. 18, 1995, at 19.
173 Regarding the non-applicability of international humanitarian law to violent situation, see e.g.
McCoubrey and White, supra. note 115, at 20-21, 68-71.
174 See the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4499.
175 See Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, at 17-20 (7th rev. ed.,
1997).
176 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v.
United States of America), Merits, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1986, p. 14, paras. 202-213, particularly 202
and 212.
177 See the ICRC's Commentary, paras. 4500, 4502.
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organisations in an internal conflict is almost inevitable, as the above analysis indicates,
and there is fear that the sovereignty of State which is facing internal conflict is
infringed by Protocol 11. 178 However, as far as Article 3(1) is concerned, no State or
organisation has ever "invoked" Protocol II "as a justification for intervening, directly
or indirectly_ ... in the armed conflict ... of the High Contracting Party...". Therefore,
the customary status of this paragraph has not been damaged.
178 See Kwakwa, supra. note 72, at 22, 23.
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CHAPTER 6
CUSTOM AND PROTOCOL II, PART II: HUMANE TREATMENT
6.1. THE LAWS OF WAR BEFORE 1949
De Vattel, on the one hand, upheld the humane treatment of the hors de combat,'
women, children, old people, 2 other civilians, 3 and prisoners of war. 4 He, on the other
hand, acknowledged that the sovereign could punish the leaders of a rebel group.5
Wheaton and Woolsey also asserted the protection of civilians 6 and prisoners of war, 7
even though the protection they sustained is quite different from today's more detailed
protection. "Treating captured rebels as prisoners of war", Lieber's Code provided,
"neither proves nor establishes an acknowledgment of the rebellious people, or of the
government which they may have erected, as a public or sovereign power". 8 The Code
also stipulated that "the leaders of the rebellion or chief rebels" might be tried "for
high treason" if amnesty had not been granted.9
Both sides of the Spanish Civil War expressed their willingness to treat prisoners of
war humanely. 1 ° In practice, the ICRC was permitted to visit only a few prisons and
Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Vol. HI, Translation of the Edition of 1758 By Charles G.
Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, Book III, §140 (Michel E. Slatkine and Jiri
Toman reprint eds., 1983) (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758). De Vattel argued that quarter should
be given, but with exception. See id., §140-141.
2 1d., §145.
3 Id., §§146-7.
" Id., §§148-153. De Vattel, however, did not deny the possibility of certain deviation from the humane
treatment of prisoners of war, e.g. enslavery. See e.g. §152.
5 Id., §294.
6 Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, §345 (James Brown Scott ed., 1936) (Edition of
Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ed. by George Grafton Wilson, 1866); Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to
the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and in Historical Studies, §129 (1860).
7 Wheaton, id., §344; Woolsey, id., §128.
8 Lieber's Code, Article 153.
9 Lieber's Code, Article 154.
10 See supra. Ch. 2.
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general exchange of prisoners did not take place, even though improvements of the
conditions of prisoners were seen after visits and the small number of exchange was
achieved. 11 Besides, the rebel group denied its resort to hostage-taking and
"deplore[d]" the killing of persons who were famous domestically and
internationally. 12 As to the protection of women and children, the legitimate
Government indicated its willingness to exchange women and children whom it had
captured, while the rebels who, they claimed, were "inspired by the loftiest sentiments
of humanity" declared that women and children would be let out of its occupying zone,
if they wished to do so.13
6.2. THE REGIME OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE 1950s AND 1960s
Common Article 3 introduced the humane treatment of non-combatants to "armed
conflict not of an international character". A list of prohibited acts include "violence
to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and
torture"; 14 "taking of hostages"; 15 "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular
humiliating and degrading treatment; 16 and "the passing of sentences and the carrying
out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by
civilized peoples".17
There was practice of both the observance and violation of these provisions in civil
conflicts in the 1950s and 1960s. During the Algerian War of Independence, the ICRC
11 General Report of the International Red Cross Committee on its activities from August, 1934 to
March, 1938, at 113-122, Doc. No. 12a (1938).
12 1d., at 128.
13 The rebels set conditions that the Government would undertake the same action to women and
children in the Government's zone. Id., at 128.
14 Common Article 3(1)(a).
15 Common Article 3(1)(b).
16 Common Article 3(1)(c).
153
criticised the French use of torture in its confidential report, which was
unprecedentedly published in a French newspaper. 18 The FLN, an Algerian rebel
group, sought to demonstrate its willingness to treat French soldiers in their hands as
prisoners of war, 19 while the French came to grant the de facto prisoners of war status
to some of the captured Algerians, especially if they held guns on capture. 20
"Considerable improvements" in treatment of detainees were reported by the ICRC
after its visits to Algerian prisoners in Algeria. 21 However, ICRC visit to French
prisoners held by the Algerian rebel group was made only once. 22 At the beginning of
the civil conflict in Yemen, the Royalists slaughtered all those who were captured, but
later they treated prisoners humanely in camps. 23 However Boals argued that it was
primarily the presence of ICRC delegates, not necessarily international humanitarian
law, that helped to ameliorate the conditions of detainees. 24 During the conflict in
Nigeria, despite allegations about atrocities committed by the Nigerian armed forces,
the Government in general seemed to have been willing to treat captured enemy
soldiers as prisoners of war and to punish those who conducted cruelties. 25 On the
other hand, the treatment of Nigerian soldiers captured by the Biafran rebels was more
problematic, and they might have been maltreated, and faced starvation.26
12 Common Article 3(1)(d).
18 A summary of the ICRC report in Le Monde is found in Keesings, 12-19 March 1960, at 17309-10.
18 See Eldon van Cleff Greenberg, "Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution", 11 Harvard ILJ
37, 59-60 (1970).
28 Id., at 58-9.
21 The ICRC, The ICRC and the Algerian Conflict, at 6 (1962).
22 Id., at 9-10.
23 Kathryn Boats, "The Relevance of International Law to the Internal War in Yemen", in The
International Law of Civil War 303, 315 (Richard Falk ed., 1971).
24 Id., at 315-6.
25 As to the Nigerian Government and the laws of war, see Allan Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of
War, at 196-201 (1976).
26 As to the Biafran secessionists and the laws of war, see Rosas, id., at 201-2.
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General Assembly Resolution 2676 (XXV) 27 regarding prisoners of war would have
been significant had it been adopted universally, since according to the Resolution the
protection of prisoners of war was not limited in international armed conflict. In
paragraph 1, t'all parties to any armed conflict" were called upon "to comply with the
terms and provisions of the [Third] Geneva Convention".28 In addition, paragraph 5
suggested that "combatants in all armed conflicts not covered by article 4 of the
[Third] Geneva Convention of 1949 be accorded the same humane treatment defined
by the principles of international law applied to prisoners-of war". 29 The wording of
paragraph 1 is more inclusive than that of paragraph 5 because the former only referred
to "any armed conflict" while the latter designated "all armed conflicts not covered by
article 4 of the Geneva Convention". Even though there is a difference between the
two paragraphs, paragraph 5 could have covered internal conflict since Article 4 of the
Geneva Convention III sets the categories for prisoners of war in international armed
conflict.
Resolution 2676 (XON) was, however, fiercely opposed by both Eastern and Third
World States that claimed that the Resolution was introduced by the Americans to
justify their position in the Vietnam war. In the adoption of the Resolution at the
General Assembly, the Eastern European States and many Third World States voted
against, and there were twenty abstentions which included not only many Third World
States but also France and Portuga1. 3° Before the voting took place in the General
Assembly, the USSR strongly condemned the USA because the captured American
27 G.A. Res. 2676 (XXV), UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, UN Doc. A/8028 (1970).
28 G.A. Res. 2676 (XXV), para. 1. Emphasis added.
29 G.A. Res. 2676 (XXV), para. 5. Emphasis added. The British delegate pronounced their reservations
in the Third Committee on this paragraph because the protection of prisoners of war might be extended
to "even those who used arms in pursuit of criminal ends". See UK, UN GAOR 3rd Comm., 25th Sess.,
1804th mtg. para. 30, UN Doc. A/C.3/SR. 1804 (1 Dec. 1970).
30 UN GAOR, 25th Sess., 1922nd pin. mtg. para. 130, UN Doc. A/PV. 1922 (9 Dec. 1970). (67/30/20).
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soldiers in Vietnam were "not prisoners of war but interventionists", while the USA
attempted to have the same footing as the aggressed Vietnamese by introducing the
Resolution. 31 With such strong opposition especially from the Communist bloc, it is
difficult to susSain that this Resolution has declared the customary status of the humane
treatment of prisoners of war in internal conflict.
6.3. DRAFTING PROTOCOL II IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1974 TO 1977
6.3.1. ARTICLE 2 (DRAFT ARTICLE 232)
In the Diplomatic Conference, Article 2 on the whole was adopted by consensus. 33 It
appears from the documents of the Diplomatic Conference on this Article that there
were not extensive arguments on this Article. Besides, it was adopted by consensus
and it is not possible to observe the opinio furls of the voting States from the record.
6.3.2. ARTICLE 4 (DRAFT ARTICLES 6 AND 3234)
Some States were not in favour of draft Article 6 in toto since the Article would take
place of national laws that have already prohibited the acts provided by the Article.35
Others, on the other hand, supported the whole draft Article. 36 The drafting of the
present Article was a very complicated procedure;37 some provisions survived through
31 See USSR, UN GAOR, 25th Sess., 1922nd pin. mtg. paras. 65-81, especially 66, 73, UN Doc. A/PV.
1922 (9 Dec. 1970).
32 Draft Protocol II, Article 2, 1 OR, Part 3, at 33-34.
33 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, at 85.
34 Draft Protocol II, Articles 6 and 32, 1 OR, Part 3, at 35, 41-42, respectively.
35 E.g. Nigeria, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 21, at 327; India, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 22, at 327.
36 E.g. Switzerland, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 29, at 328; Ukrainian SSR, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para.
31, at 327.
37 See Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977
Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, at 640-641 (1982).
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the Diplomatic Conference, but the Article on the whole was the product of last-minute
compromise and also of merger between draft Articles 6 and 32.38
The area overlapping between the present Article 4 and Common Article 3 was the
least controver-sial in the Diplomatic Conference; i.e. the first and second sentences of
paragraph (1); 39 paragraph (2)(a) except for corporal punishment° and paragraph
(2)(c) and (e). 41 It is true that there are differences in terms between the above-
mentioned two Articles, and for instance paragraph 1 of Article 4 is not identical with
paragraph 1 of Common Article 3. However, such differences did not become a matter
of controversy in the Diplomatic Conference.
There was no noticeable discussion regarding the last sentence of paragraph 1,
paragraph 2(f), (g) and (h), and hence, it is difficult to determine the customary status
of these provisions. With respect to paragraph 3, significantly, throughout the
discussion about this paragraph, no State openly opposed it. 42 On the other hand there
were disagreements as to details of the paragraph and, therefore, various amendments
were proposed. 43 The better interpretation of the discussion about paragraph 3 in the
Diplomatic Conference would be that this paragraph might have had a generating
effect upon the formation of customary rule about the general protection of children
because of the nonexistence of opposition against it. However, as examined later there
have been violations of the protection of children in recent civil wars, and such
positive effect was probably negated.
28 Pakistan, 8 OR, CDDH/427 and CDDH/430, at 20.
39 Adopted by consensus. See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 16, at 87.
49 Adopted by consensus. See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 35, at 89.
41 No voting for these sub-paragraphs is recorded.
42 The work compiled by Levie is useful when one needs to overview the discussion on each article and
paragraph. See The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, at 186-199 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987).
43 See the above note and Levie, id., at 187-189.
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There was disagreement among the participants in the Diplomatic Conference on
corporal punishment, collective punishment and terrorism, and therefore it is difficult
to consider them to be in accordance with custom existing at that time. As to corporal
punishment, Canada stated that the prohibition of such punishment would be contrary
to many national laws, which provide the kind of punishment." With reference to
collective punishment, the original term "collective penalties" was replaced by the
present wording,45
 because the original term may refer to penal law in domestic law.46
Apart from this linguistic problem, Pakistan proposed to delete the prohibition of
collective punishment, which was supported by Canada and Iraq. 47 However, the sub-
section was saved at the last minute by consensus. 48 Concerning terrorism, 49 when
Committee I adopted the draft Article, a clause about the prohibition of terrorism was
adopted in the present form.5°
6.3.3. ARTICLE 5 (DRAFT ARTICLE 851)
Certain part of draft Article 8 was subject to debate and a number of amendments,
while the Official Records do not document thorough discussion about the rest of the
draft Article. 52
 The humane treatment provided by the present Article 5(1)(b) was
considered to be unrealistic for implementation. The Canadian representative
suggested that the treatment be less obligatory, since rebel groups in particular would
44 Canada, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 12, at 423.
48 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 29, at 88.
46 E.g. France, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 20, at 83; Spain, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 21, at 88; Finland,
7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 24, at 88.
47 Pakistan, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 18, at 87; Iraq, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 19, at 87; Canada, 7
OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 26, at 88. In addition, the delegate of India earlier opposed this prohibition,
which, he argued, was out of date in many States. India, 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.73, para. 3, at 427.
48 See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 29, at 88.
4° The prohibition of terrorism is dealt with, together with Article 13, in infra. Ch. 8.
8 ° See 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.39, para. 7, at 410 (26/17/19).
Si Draft Protocol II, Article 8, 1 OR, Part 3, at 35-36.
82 See Bothe, supra. note 37, at 643-648; Levie, supra. note 42, at 205-241.
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not be able to fulfil such obligation, 53 and other delegates supported his view or
expressed similar opinions. 54 However Committee I adopted a provision which is
identical to the present Article 5(1)(b) by consensus, 55 and there was no further
significant reMark on this subparagraph.
Reception of relief and religious practice were originally not mandatory requirements,
but they became compulsory in draft Article 8(1)(c) and (d) respectively adopted by
Committee 1. 56 The former subparagraph was adopted by 28 votes to 23, with 7
abstentions, 57 which demonstrate many delegates' dissatisfaction. The Canadian and
Indonesian representatives explained their discontent with the obligatory nature of the
subparagraph. 58 As regards the latter on religious practice, it was adopted by
consensus. 59 The Canadian delegate "welcomed the compromise reached on paragraph
1 (d)".6°
The similar wording of Article 5(4) regarding the release of detainees was adopted in
Committee I, but many States voted against it or abstained. 61 Italy, for instance,
explained after the voting that, even if a party to a civil war releases captives, taking
necessary measures for the safety of those who are released would be impossible in
53 8 OR, Canada, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 71, at 337.
54 See e.g. Federal Republic of Germany, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 72, at 337; India, CDDH/I/SR.32,
8 OR, para. 87, at 340; Iran, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 82, at 339-340; Nigeria, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32,
para. 84
'
 at 340.
5 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.39, para 18, at 413-414. The reason why this controversial provision was adopted
by consensus is not clear, but it might be that compromise was reached.
56 See 10 OR, CDDH/219/Rev.1, at 53. This adopted draft Article 8(1)(c) and (d) are identical to Article
5(1)(c) and (d) respectively.
57 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.39, para. 20, at 414.
58 Canada, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 13, at 423; Indonesia, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 9, at 423.
59 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.39, para. 50, at 416.
60 Canada, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR. 40, para. 13, at 416.
61 8
 OR, CDDH/I/SR.39, para. 63, at 418 (42/11/6)
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practice. 62 An Indonesian delegate concisely regarded the adopted paragraph as
"irrelevant and unacceptable to his delegation".63
Discussion about other provisions of Article 5 was either nonexistent or fragmentary.
The least problematic provision was the protection of the wounded and sick, 64 which
was virtual]."Y not discussed. 65 Except for a statement made by Indonesia, there is no
remark by other delegates on working conditions for the detainees as provided by
Article 5(1)(c) . 66 As to the special treatment of captured women, very little is recorded
apart from Canada's statement and proposal to make such treatment less mandatory.67
There was little discussion that would indicate the legal nature of paragraph 2,
subparagraphs (b) to (e) and paragraph 3. Overall the Official Records do not reveal
the customary nature of any provision of Article 5, even though it could be argued that
Article 5(1)(b) to (d) and Article 5(4) were not customary because of disagreements
about the provisions in the Diplomatic Conference.
6.3.4. ARTICLE 668 (DRAFT ARTICLES 9 AND 1069)
Article 6 resulted from the merger of draft Article 9 about principles of penal law and
draft Article 10 about penal prosecution. Regarding the former draft Article, some
States" supported the opinion of the ICRC that the principles described in the draft
62 Italy, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, paras. 2-3, at 421.
63 Indonesia, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 9, at 423.
64 Protocol II, Article 5(1)(a).
65 The only notable remark on this provision was made by the Canadian delegate, who stated that "There
was no difficulty over paragraph 2 (a) [of draft Article 8], which referred to the wounded and sick...".
Canada, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 71, at 337.
66 The Indonesian delegate stated that the obligation of draft Article 8(1)(e) should not be compulsory.
See Indonesia, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.40, para. 9, at 423.
67 Canada's proposal, 4 OR, CDDH/I/37, at 23-24; Canada, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 71, at 337.
68 Article 6(5) will be discussed in infra, Ch. 8.
69 Draft Protocol II, Articles 9 and 10, 1 OR, at Part 3, at 36.
70 See e.g. Iran, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 27, at 347; Argentine, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 29, at
347; GDR, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 38, at 349.
160
Article were already part of all legal systems of the world. 71 The Belgian
representative even stated that the principles of both draft Articles embodied
customary rules. 72 Other States were concerned with the fact that draft Article 9 was
worded in a general manner, instead of limiting its application to internal conflict. Iraq
raised this concern, which was shared by India and the USA. 73 The American
representative, therefore, proposed to make this draft Article applicable only "With
respect to offences related to the conflict". 74 Concerning draft Article 10, which set
detailed rules on the procedure of prosecution, it was difficult to satisfy all
participating States, each of which had its own domestic law, and this difficulty was
revealed by a number of proposals for amendments.75
Now, focus is placed upon each paragraph of Article 6. Regarding the death penalty,
draft Article 10(3) provided the postponement of execution of the death sentence for
those who are "found guilty of an offence in relation to the armed conflict" until the
end of hostilities, but such provision was rejected in the final vote. 76 On the other hand,
the prohibition of imposing the death sentence upon minors and pregnant women did
not attract criticism, even though the additional phrase "and mothers of young
children"77 was put to vote in Committee 1, 78 and was adopted by concensus in the
final vote.79
With reference to the principle of non-retroactivity set in Article 6(2)(c), its relevance
was not questioned, even though the term "under the law" resulted from compromise
71 The ICRC, 8 OR, CDDH/l/SR.33, para. 26, at 347.
72 Belgium, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 41, at 350.
73 See Iraq, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 51, at 351; USA, 8 OR, CDD1-I/I/SR.33, para. 55, at 352; India,
8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.33, para. 60, at 353.
74 USA, 4 OR, CDDH/I/258, at 31.
75 4 OR, at 32-37.
76 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 86, at 95.
77 Article 6(4) uses the phrase "or mothers of young children".
78 Adopted by 37/2/9. 10 OR, CDDH/234/Rev.1, para. 90, at 131.
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after discussion. 8° Committee I adopted the wording "under national or international
law", 81 but as the Argentinian representative stated to make his reservation about this
sub-paragraph, a legitimate government's recognition of a law of rebels as "national
law" would be "unlikely". 82 Pakistan proposed paragraph 2(c) of draft Article 10
whose wording is the same as the present one of Article 6(2)(c) ,83 and this proposed
second paragraph was adopted by consensus."
Apart from the above two provisions of Article 6 of Protocol II, intensive discussion
did not take place about other paragraphs and sub-paragraphs. Thus, the present writer
considers that the customary status of Article 6 was not confirmed in the Diplomatic
Conference. It is true, as already discussed, that sub-paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) of
Article 6(2) originated from draft Article 9, which was considered by some
representatives to be principles embodied in major legal systems. On the other hand,
there were delegates who felt that penal prosecutions in internal conflict should be
dealt with by domestic law rather than an international treaty. 85 Also, there was
contention that principles of human rights law were not automatically applicable to
civil war and therefore that they should be made applicable specifically to such
conflict. 86 The latter view would imply that human rights provisions, which were
inserted in Protocol II, were innovative at its adoption in the context of non-
international armed conflict. In conclusion, the existence of conflicting views about
Article 6 would signify the innovative nature of the Article.
79 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 78, at 94.
80 The ICRC 's Commentary, para. 4604.
81 Adopted by 35/3/4. 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.63, para. 64, at 301.
82 Argentina, 9 OR, CDDH/1/SR.64, para.54, at 314. See also the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4605.
83 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 292.
84 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 78, at 94.
85 See especially explanations of vote by Kenya and Nigeria after the final adoption. Kenya and Nigeria,
9 OR, CDDH/SR.50, Annex, at 101, 102 respectively.
86 See Iraq, India and USA, supra. notes 73.
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6.4. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
6.4.1. AFGHANISTAN
The Taliban has been introducing measures which appear to be in violation of various
humanitarian provisions. For instance, it has imposed harsh corporal punishment upon
those who commit crimes against strict Islamic law and penalties include amputation
and stoning. 87 The Taliban treatment of women challenges the principle of equal
humane treatment. To give a few examples, 88 female patients cannot be examined by
male physicians unless it is necessary, and female patients are "accompanied by her
close relatives (maliram)". 89 Furthermore, the Taliban prohibited female medical staff
from working, and ordered female patients to use only one medical institution.90
Negotiations took place among the Taliban and international organisations, such as the
UN and ICRC, and the warring group allowed women to use main hospitals in Kabul
and also to work as medical staff.91
Even if the internal war in Afghanistan has been atrocious, there were signs of
willingness to treat captured combatants humanely. The report of the UN Commission
on Human Rights refers to an order Concerning all the prisoners of war given by the
87 UN Commission on Human Rights, Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1996/75 [hereinafter Final report on Afghanistan of 1997], paras. 44-6, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1997/59 (20 Feb. 1997); Anthony Loyd, "Taleban's rough justice wins approval from crime-
plagued Kabul citizens", The Times, Nov. 13, 1996, at 14.
58 As to other prohibitions, see Christopher Thomas, "Taleban outlaws women and white socks", The
Times, Apr. 4, 1997, at 16; Christopher Thomas, "Women must walk quietly", The Times, Jul. 22, 1997,
at 11.
89 "Taliban Islmaic Movement of Afghanistan Rules of work for the State hospitals and private clinics
based on Sharia principles", Article 1, reproduced in Final Report on Afghanistan of 1997, Appendix II,
supra. note 87.
90 The ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 151.
91 Id.
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leader of one of the dissident parties. 92 According to the order, first, "No person is
allowed to insult, threaten, harass or murder a prisoner of war", 93 which corresponds to
the fundamental guarantees set by Article 4. Second, prisoners of war would receive
the same clothes and food as the Mujahedin. 94 Third, the prisoners of war would not
have more working days than the Mujahed should they be required to work. 95 Fourth,
"the same medical care as the Mujahedin" would be received by the prisoners of war.96
Fifth, family visits to prisoners of war would be permitted. 97 Last, the prisoners of war
would receive "[aldequate attention" on their "intellectual development". 98 This order
would be one of the few available documents that show at least the willingness of the
rebels to treat captured soldiers humanely.
Despite the above order, which on the whole is according to Article 5 of protocol II,
the treatment of detainees has differed from time to time, and also from party to party.
Considering visits to detainees held by the Government, the ICRC was granted
unlimited access to them in November 1991. 99 In 1992 the newly established
Government of Afghanistan granted amnesty to the political prisoners who were
captured by the former Government, and the ICRC therefore found its visits to
detainees "for a while no longer necessary". I °° Accordingly, the number of those who
were visited by ICRC delegates was not significant in the following year,
92 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan submitted
by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human Rights
resolution 1991/78, para. 51, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1992/33 (17 Feb. 1992).
93 Id. This corresponds to the fundamental guarantees set by Article 4 of Protocol II.
94 Id. The distribution of food is stipulated by Article 5(1)(b) of Protocol II.
95 Id. This corresponds to Article 5(1)(e) of Protocol II.
96 Id. This corresponds to Article 5(2)(d) of Protocol II.
97 Id. Protocol II does not have a corresponding provision.
98 Id. What exactly "intellectual development" is not clear, but it might include religious development,
which can be read in Article 5(1)(d) of Protocol II.
99 The ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 64.
1 °° The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 59, 61.
1 ° 1 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 104.
101 though it
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increased l02 until 1996 when prisons were opened and detainees released by the newly
installed authorities. 103 The year 1997, however, saw a rapid increase in the number of
detainees, and the ICRC was not able to visit those captives in the hands of "one of the
main parties', among whom many were feared to have been executed. 104
 Places of
detention visited by the ICRC were overcrowded and unhygienic, and the ICRC
improved sanitation facilities and provided detainees with clothes for cold winter.105
Messages were exchanged between internees and their families through the
organisation.1°6
6.4.2. BOUGAINVILLE
There is only piecemeal information on the protection of civilians in this conflict, but
some documents of the UN Commission on Human Rights on this conflict are
available. For example, in reply to information of the Amnesty International on
"extrajudicial executions, torture, rape, beatings and harassment of civilians" attributed
to the PNG Government forces, 1 °7 the Government admitted that both sides conducted
atrocities, and emphasised the existence of measures to protect human rights. 108
Before this statement, the PNG Government wrote a statement, according to which
"Members of the security forces who have been found guilty [of human rights
violations] have been severely disciplined and dismissed from the forces".1°9
102 In 1994 about seven hundred fifty detainees in total were visited by the organisation; in 1995 four
thousand. See the ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 102; 1995, at 123.
103 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 135.
1" The ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 152.
105 id.
106 _id.
107 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human rights violations in Bougainville, Report of the
Secretary-General, at 4, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/60 (26 Jan. 1994). The report also refers to atrocities
committed by the BRA. See id.
108 ,la at 20.
109 UN Commission on Human Rights, Letter dated 10 February 1992 from the Ambassador of Papua
New Guinea to Belgium and the European Community addressed to the Chairman of the Commission on
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However, allegations of cruelties committed by both warring parties in the conflict
continued. Thus, according to a UN document issued in 1996, the PNG forces resorted
to extrajudicial killing of no less than sixty-four individuals in about five years, and
dumped some bodies at sea or burned the others.11° Prisoners of war are, the report
alleged, non--existent. 111
 In spite of "a well-established system of courts which gives
full protection of law", the report also claimed, "in practice recourse to justice is very
limited".112
6.4.3. CHECHNYA
Serious cases of hostage taking were seen in Chechnya. In January 1996 Chechen
soldiers occupied a hospital in Kizlyar, outside the Chechen republic and took more
than 3,000 patients as hostages in the hospita1. 113
 As a result of overnight negotiations,
most of the hostages were released and 160 hostages, including thirty women and
fifteen children, were carried with Chechen rebels in buses towards Chechnya. 114 The
buses were stopped in Pervomaiskoye by the Russians and the rebels took hostages
again in that town. 115
 On the early morning of January 15, the Russian forces gave
warning to the rebels that the village would be attacked unless the hostages were
released and three hours later the Russians bombed the village school and houses in
Human Rights, Bougainville issue - Statement by the Government of Papua New Guinea, para. 2(e), UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1992/76 (20 Feb. 1992).
110 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly N'diave, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/66,
Addendum, Report by the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Papua New Guinea island of
Bougainville from 23 to 28 October 1995, para. 50, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (27 Feb. 1996). As
to the treatment of bodies, see infra. Ch. 7.
111 1d., para. 54.
112 1d., para. 58.
113 Thomas de Waal, "Russian troops surround hostage-takers at border", The Times, Jan. 11, 1996, at
11; Philippa Fletcher, "Patients tell of 24-hour terror", id. The problem of protection of medical
facilities will be discussed in infra. Ch. 7.
114 De Waal, id.
113 "The Chechen nightmare continues", The Economist, Jan. 13-19, 1996, at 40; Thomas de Waal, id.
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which the hostages were still kept. 116
 President Yeltsin announced the killing of 153
rebels and capture of 30, with escape of 82 hostages.117
The Russian authorities were extremely cautious about using the term "prisoner of
war". • According to the press service of the Russian Justice Ministry, the ICRC and
Russian authorities agreed that "the term prisoners of war [was] not applicable in this
situation..." and that "Under the existing legislation it cannot be applied to persons
detained" even though they accorded that meetings of ICRC delegates with detainees
could be arranged by Russian officials.118
There were allegations that "filtration camps" existed in which captured Chechen
fighters were subjected to torture. 119 A Major-General of the Interior Ministry denied
that there were "concentration camps" for captured fighters, while he acknowledged
the existence of "detention centres" in which the detainees were identified. 120
According to one of the delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe, the delegates had observed the violation of human rights in "places of
detention", while they were not shown "screening camps" by the Russians, who
insisted the non-existence of such facilities. 121 Sergei Kovalev, "a human rights
defender" who visited "screening camps", claimed that Russian authorities resorted to
116 Carlotta Gall, "Villagers see tanks blast their homes into rubble", The Times, Jan. 16, 1996, at 10;
Michael Evans, "Hostages caught in Russian chiefs' deadly rivalry", id.
117 Thomas de Waal, "Dejected troops tell of chaos in army command", The Times, Jan. 20, 1996, at 20.
118 "Justice minister receives Red Cross delegation", broadcast by Interfax news agency, Moscow, in
English, 1729 gmt, 7 Feb. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser.,
SU/2223, at B/8 (9 Feb. 1995).
119 Thomas de Waal, "Chechen fury at 'torture camps', The Times, 30 Sept. 1995, at 14.
128 'General denies existence of "concentration camps" for Chechens', broadcast by Interfax news
agency, Moscow, in English, 1205gmt, 24 Feb. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1,
Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2238, at B/5 (27 Feb. 1995).
121 "Council of Europe delegation saw human rights violations in Chechnya", broadcast by Estonian
Radio, Tallin, in Estonian, 1700gmt, 11 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former
USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2328, at B/6 (13 Jun. 1995).
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torture in those camps. 122 The ICRC's Annual Report 1995 did not mention such
facilities, but the total number of internees visited by ICRC delegates was not large,123
and it would be reasonable to assume that more detainees were held in non-favourable
conditions by-both parties in the conflict.
Among other violations which have been reported is widespread looting; for instance,
Deputy Director of the Russian Federal Counterintelligence Service admitted the
existence of pillage among Russian soldiers, even though he claimed that there were
more among Chechen fighters. I24 Child soldiers were allegedly fighting in Chechnya,
which was acknowledged by the Chechen authorities.125
6.4.4. EL SALVADOR
A well-known massacre befell El Mozote, a village in El Salvador, in which more than
two hundred civilians, including women and children, were allegedly executed.126
According to the Truth Commission, men were tortured before execution, while
women and children were machine-gunned separately. 127 The massacre was denied by
the authorities of El Salvador, but the examination of exhumed bodies revealed that a
mass killing had taken place. I28 Accordingly, the Commission found that "The El
122 
"Sergey Kovalev presents report on conditions for Chechen detainees", broadcast by Russia TV
channel, Moscow, in Russian, 1600gmt, 30 May 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1,
Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2318, at B/7 (1 Jun. 1995).
123 The delegates visited 530 detainees held by the Russian authorities and 170 internees held by the
Chechen side. See the ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 206.
124 "Deputy head of counterintelligence admits Russian troops engaged in pillaging", broadcast by
ITAE-TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in English, 1825gmt, 28 Feb. 1995, reproduced in
BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2241, at B/7 (2 Mar. 1995).
123 UN Commission on Human Rights, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the
Russian Federation, Report of the Secretary-General, para. 74, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/13 (26 Mar.
1996).
136 See Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council
transmitting the report presented on 15 March 1993 by the Commission on the Truth, S/25500 (1 Apr.
1993), at 347-351, reproduced in UN, The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-1995, Doc. 67, 290,
UN Sales No. E. 95.1.12 (1995).
127 Id., at 348.
138 Id., at 349-350.
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Mozote massacre was a serious violation of international humanitarian law and
international human rights law". 129 On another occasion, six Jesuit priests and other
two civilians were murdered at the Pastoral Centre of Jose SimeOn Cana Central
American University by personnel of the Salvadoran armed forces.139
According to the study of Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, both sides of the Salvadoran Civil
War forcibly recruited the underage. 131 There was even "a school" organised by one of
the factions of the FMLN, but the curriculum of the school was based upon more
ideology and military training.132
The ICRC having received the original permission of general visits to detainees in 1979,
even before an armed conflict took place, delegates of the institution regularly visited
detainees held by the Salvadoran Government. 133 Thus the ICRC mission in El
Salvador seems to have been successful, compared with other conflicts that this thesis
examines, I34 but one should pay attention to Best's comments. According to him, the
delegates had not been able to meet with "disappeared' and assassinated" civilians,
and in addition the ICRC was not informed of "thousands of detainees" whom the
organisation was able to visit only after they underwent "torture and other
maltreatment". 135
129 1d., at 351
130 As to this case, see id., at 312-317.
131 Ilene Cohn and Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, Child Soldiers, at 24-25 (1994).
132 Id., at 94-5.
133 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1979, at 36; 1980, at 29; 1981, at 25-6; 1982, at 31; 1983, at 29-30; 1984,
at 32; 1985, at 36; 1986, at 38; 1988, at 43-4; 1989, at 40. However, at the beginning of the civil
conflict in El Salvador it was difficult for the delegates to visit internees held by the security forces. See
the ICRC, Annual Report 1981, at 26.
134 The exception is Sri Lanka.
135 Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, at 368 (1994).
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The record of ICRC visits to detainees held by the FMLN is not always satisfactory.136
The International Committee began to undertake visits to those held by the dissident
organisation in 1982, 137 but the FMLN was not always cooperative. According to the
ICRC's Annual Report 1983, it was the policy of the opposition group to release armed
personnel of the Government forces soon after their capture. 138 On the other hand, in
1984, the ICRC was not permitted to visit personnel of the Salvadoran armed forces
"who had been detained for a considerable time by the Front", 139 and situations did not
improve in the subsequent years.14°
6.4.5. LIBERIA
The ICRC Delegate General for Africa summed up atrocities committed in the
Liberian Civil War:
For six and a half years the civilian population, the wounded, persons placed
hors de combat and prisoners have been regularly subjected to killings, torture,
mutilation, hostage-taking, forced labour, looting, destruction of property and
forced displacements. Children have been enlisted to fight and even dead bodies
have been desecrated".141
Liberia was, therefore, in a distressing predicament throughout its conflict, but
particularly on April 6, 1996 the situation deteriorated to the extent that "there was a
n......
136 See id., at 368.
137 The ICRC, Annual Report 1982, at 31.
138 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1983, at 30; also 1984, at 32.
139 The ICRC, Annual Report 1984, at 32.
14° The ICRC, Annual Reports 1985, at 36-7; 1986, at 38; 1988, at 44; 1989, at 41. Annual Reports 1988
and 1989 use the identical paragraph as follows: "The ICRC also endeavoured to afford protection to
military personnel and civilians captured by the FMLN. Approaches to FMLN leaders were stepped up
with a view to having the ICRC regularly notified of the capture of civilians or armed forces personnel
and ensuring that the persons detained are treated in accordance with the rules of international
humanitarian law and are visited by delegates". Though implicit, this paragraph reveals that visits to
FMLN-held detainees were unsatisfactory.
141 Jean-Daniel Tauxe, "Liberia: humanitarian logistics in question", /RRC, May-Jun. 1996, at 352, 353.
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complete breakdown of law and order in Monrovia". 142 Five days later, soldiers of all
factions occupied and looted the headquarters of UNOMIL and other UN related
facilities, even though the leaders of the two major factions promised to stop such
conduct. I43 The looting of and failure to return vehicles and other properties to the
United Nations and other organisations seriously undermined humanitarian
operations. I44 On another occasion, combined forces of a few factions placed hundreds
of civilians including foreigners and ECOMOG soldiers into barracks where conditions
were regarded as "desperate" and used them as human shields against attacks from
their opponents. 145 Furthermore, on September 28, 1996, a massacre took place in
Sinje, resulting in the death of at least twenty-one civilians who "suffered decapitation,
castration and blunt object trauma, in addition to gunshot wounds".I46
President Doe was captured and then tortured by a rebel leader and his subordinates in
September 1990. 147 Torture itself being hidious, what is abominable with this torture
in particular is that the scene of torturing the former President was videotaped and
became available across West Africa.I48
Contending factions might have punished looters, but it is questionable if pillagers
were given fair trials and appropriate punishments. For example, according to an eye-
witness account given by Huband, a group of soldiers belonging to one of the factions
142 Security Council, Seventeenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia [hereinafter Seventeenth progress report], para. 14, UN Doc. S/1996/362,
(21 May 1996). See also Tauxe, id., at 352.
143 Seventeenth progress report, paras. 15, 28 and 29, id. As to looting of ICRC properties, see Tauxe,
id., at 353.
144 Security Council, Eighteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia, para. 34, UN Doc. S/1996/684 (22 Aug. 1996).
145 Seventeenth progress report, supra note 142, Annex I, para. 1.
146 Security Council, Nineteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia [hereinafter Nineteenth progress report], para. 31, UN Doc. S/1996/858 (17
Oct. 1996).
147 Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War, at 192-193 (1998).
148 See id., at 192-193.
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captured two persons "in civilian clothes", whom the soldiers condemned for being
looters; the accused had been kicked and beaten before they were shot. 149 There
appears to have been no trial for the captured.
The UN Secretary-General's eighth report of 1994 states that "The use of 6,000
children in combat is a flagrant example of disregard for the rights of the child".150
Later when fighting intensified in Monrovia in April 1996, many combatants were
under eighteen years of age who "seemed to operate with Little organizational structure
or control from their commanders". 151 Moreover, the number of child soldiers in
Liberia was raised from 6,000, to 15,000, to 20,000 in the nineteenth report of 1996.152
It is neither possible nor necessary to count the exact number of child soldiers, 153
 and
importance lies in the fact that child soldiers were widely used in Liberia. In
Liberia, 154 there were special sites to demobilise child soldiers, and for instance the
Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General claimed that three sites had
accommodated 136 children and that fifteen children had had reunion with their
families.155
There is little reliable information as to those who were deprived of liberty in Liberia.
Even though the ICRC's Annual Reports contain such information, it seems that the
149 Id, at 177-179.
130 Security Council, Eighth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, para. 35, UN Doc. S/1004/769 (24 Jun. 1994). Cohn and Goodwin-Gill mention the
recruitment of children particularly by the NPFL. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, supra. note 131, at 29, 40,
42.
131 Seventeenth progress report, para. 16, supra. note 142.
132 Nineteenth progress report, para. 16, supra. note 146.
133 See US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1994, at 140 (1995).
This Reports referred to the estimate of "some sources" that "10 percent of the 40,000 to 60,000
combatants are under 15 years of age".
134 Sierra Leone, a neighbouring State of Liberia, also has a large number of child soldiers. See "Under-
Age Killers", The Economist, Dec. 12-18, 1998, at 70.
155 Security Council, Third Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, para. 27, UN Doc. S/1994/463 (18 Apr. 1994); cf. Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, supra.
note 131, at 135-6, 140.
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ICRC's visits to detainees were subject to a situation, which was not always favourable
to the organisation. The institution, for instance, was able to visit over one thousand
detainees held by various factions in different places throughout 1993, 156 and was also
able to see several hundred internees at the beginning of 1994. 157
 However, the
situation wOrsened by the end of 1995, and the ICRC was capable of visiting only a
small number of detainees from then onwards.158
After forty-three UNOMIL and six NGO personnel were- detained and mistreated in
Liberia, the detention was "strongly condemn[ed]" and regarded as "a flagrant
violation of international humanitarian law" by the Security Counci1. 159 The Secretary-
General reported the mistreatment and beating of some of the detained before their
release by 18 September 1994. 160 The Security Council adopted a resolution
unanimously in which the Council "Condemns ... the detention and maltreatment of
Mission observers, [ECOMOG] soldiers, humanitarian relief workers and other
international personnel, and demands that all factions strictly abide by applicable rules
of international humanitarian law".161
6.4.6. RWANDA
Among the victims in Rwanda, it is unclear how many were the victims of armed
conflict, but a "report on violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda" was
156 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 37.
157 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 38.
158 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 38; 1995, at 39-41; 1996, at 40, 42.
159 Security Council, Detention of UN military observers and non-governmental staff in Liberia, UN
Doc. S/PRST/1994/53 (13 Sept. 1994), Press Release Security Council, Resolutions and Statements of
the Security Council, SC/5974, at 180 (12 Jan. 1995).
160 See Security Council, Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia, para. 32, UN Doc. S/1994/1167 (14 Oct. 1994).
161 Article 7, S/RES/950 (1994), SCOR, 49th year., Res. and Dec. 1994, at 77.
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produced by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda. 162 According
to the report, there have been allegations about "summary or arbitrary executions
carried out by RPF forces", 163 torture, mutilation, rapes, disappearances and
lootings. 164 The report raised "concerns ... about the low numbers of prisoners and
fears ... that most of those captured may have been killed".I65
Since the end of the internal conflict in Rwanda, a number of people have been
detained for their alleged involvement in genocide or alleged offences concerning State
security, many of whom have been waiting for trial in overcrowded detention
centres. 166 The ICRC has visited detainees; provided them with food and medical
treatment; transmitted messages between detainees and their families; and endeavoured
to improve the hygiene of places where they are detained. I67 However, the number of
the detainees who have been registered by the ICRC have increased from 16,000 in
1994 to 120,000 in 1997, and the situation has not improved. I68 One crucial reason for
this inhumane treatment is that arbitrary arrests are not uncommon due to inefficient
justice system in Rwanda, which in effect result in more detainees.169
As regards family reunion, the ICRC and other governmental and non-governmental
organisations have registered children who left Rwanda unattended, and helped them
reunite with their families.170
162 Security Council, Letter dated 21 July 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council transmitting the report on violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda
during the conflict, prepared on the basis of the visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights to Rwanda (11-12 May 1994), UN Doc. S/1994/867 (25 Jul. 1994), reproduced in UN,
The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, Doc. 77, at 313, UN Sales No. E.96.I.20 (1996).
163 1d., para. 9.
I" Id., para. 16.
165 Id., para. 10
166 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 61; 1995, at 59-60; 1996, at 56-59; 1997, at 72-74.
167 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 61; 1995, at 59-60; 1996, at 56-59; 1997, at 72-74.
168 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 61; 1997, at 72-74.
169 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1996, at 57; 1997, at 72.
170
	
ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 58; 1995, at 61; 1996, at 60; 1997, at 75.
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Some articles of the Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda correspond with
detailed provisions in Article 6 of Protocol II. Thus the rights to information and
defence I71
 can be found in subparagraphs of (a), (b) and (d) of Article 20(4) of the
Statute. 172 Individual criminal responsibility 173 is provided by Article 6. 174 The
competence-of the Tribunal is limited to crimes committed "between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994" by Article 1, 175 which accords with the principle of non-
retroactivity. 176 Presumed innocence 177
 is guaranteed by Article 20(3),
to trial in one's own presence 179 by Article 20(4)(d). 180
 In accordance with Article
20(4)(g), 181
 the accused are "Not to be compelled to testify against himself or herself
or to confess guilt". 182
 Last, imprisonment is the only form of penalty, according to
Article 23.183
6.4.7. SOMALIA
The international community paid close attention to the Somali Civil War as long as
United Nations forces were staying in Somalia, but before and after the UN
intervention information on the conflict is minimal. Besides, during the intervention
only incidents related to the UN forces were focused, and reports on fightings among
the warring factions were not sufficient.
._......,
171 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(a),.
172 See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 21(a), (b) and (d).
173 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(b).
174 See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 7.
175 See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 1.
176 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(c).
177 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(d).
178 See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 2 1(3).
179 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(e).
18° See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 21(4)(d).
181 See also the Statute for the former Yugoslavia, Article 21(4)(g).
182 Protocol II, Article 6(2)(f).
183 See Protocol II, Article 6(4).
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It is not well-known that the northern part of Somalia was devastated well before the
arrival of the UN forces. According to extensive reports by the Human Rights Watch,
when the city of Burao was captured by the SNM in May 1989, the rebel forces killed
"a number of military officers and officials".184 Looting was rife among Government
soldiers when they advanced into the city centre. 185 The Government forces, moreover,
attacked the Issalc clan after they had prompted the non-Issaks to leave Burao. 186 At
almost the same time an armed struggle occurred in Hargeisa, the largest city of
northern Somalia, in which looting, mass arrests, killing and maltreatment of detainees,
indiscriminate killing of civilians, and rape were allegedly prevailing. 187 Even though
the port city of Berbera did not become a theatre of war between the Government and
SNM forces, the Somali authorities arrested those whom they suspected of possible
collaboration if the SNM had attacked the city. 188 For the same reason, the Somali
army reportedly killed civilians "in an extremely brutal fashion".189
From 1988 to 1991 the ICRC was not able to conduct adequate protection services for
detainees. 190 In 1992 delegates of the Committee visited internees held by various
contending groups in certain cities and distributed "medical and non-food assistance,
and occasionally food". 191 In the subsequent years the ICRC was capable of visiting
prisoners, 192 but the number of visited detainees is extremely limited, 193
 and one could
184 Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People, at 128 (1990). As to report on Burao, see id.,
at 128-132.
185 Id., at 129.
186 Id., at 131.
187 As to report on Hargeisa, see id., at 132-150.
188 •la at 150-154. As to report on Berbera, see id., at 150-158.
189 Id., at 155. According to the Human Rights Watch, no less than five hundred people became victims
with their throats cut. See id.. As to the killings in Berbera, see id., at 155-158.
190 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1988, at 29; 1989, at 25; 1991, at 36; Reference Report 1990, at 28.
191 The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 48.
192 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1993, at 83-4; 1994, at 88-9; 1995, at 88.
193 For instance, according to Annual Report 1995, "delegates visited detainees held by the warring
parties in Somalia and particularly in Somaliland (over 400)". The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 88.
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rightly presume that there were more prisoners who were not protected. In 1997 no
activity of the ICRC for detained Somalis was reported.194
As to education for children, the UNESCO played a major part in providing education
to Somali children and training teachers. 195 Between January 1993 and October 1995,
the organisation satisfied the educational needs of 250,000 children "through the
introduction of a standardized curriculum"; distributed "more than 1 million textbooks
and teacher guides"; and offered "teacher training for 267 schools".196
6.4.8. SRI LANKA
Indiscriminate bombing of civilians is rife. To refer to one example, in February 1996
bombs placed by the LTTE exploded in Colombo, killing and injuring a number of
civilians. The European Union issued a statement which "strongly condemns" the
killing, because "there is no justification for targeting areas that are so heavily
populated by civilians".197
Cohn and Goodwin-Gill describe how children have been recruited by the Tamil
Tigers. 198 Recruitment is believed to be unforced, but there were allegations of an
aspect of compulsion in enlistment. 199 Those child soldiers are detached from their
194 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 99-103.
195 See Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia submitted in
pursuance of paragraph 13 of Security Council resolution 954 (1994), para. 33, UN Doc. S/1995/231
(28 Mar. 1995), reproduced in UN, The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, Doc. 110, at 480, UN
Sales No. E. 96.1.8 (1996).
1961d.
197 Security Council, Letter dated 6 February from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United
Nations Addressed to the Secretary General, Annex, Statement on the recent bombing in Colombo,
issued on 6 February 1996 by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union, at 2, UN Doc.
S/1996/89 (7 Feb. 1996).
198 Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, supra. note 131, at 29, 31, 35, 39-42.
199 1d., at 29.
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families, and some claim that they are only offered military training without school
education.20°
In spite of its continuous offer of services since 1983, 201 it was in 1989 that the ICRC
_
was allowed by the Sri LanIcan authorities to embark upon its activities,202 but since
then, the number of detainees visited by the organisation has been considerable.203 It
appears that the Sri Lankan authorities has notified the families of detainees of their
detention, and the ICRC has assumed the responsibility when there is no
communication from the authorities to the families of intemees. 204 Notwithstanding
such cooperation, the ICRC expressed its concern about the fate of those who
disappeared.205 On the side of the LTTE, the ICRC has been permitted to visit only a
small number of detainees held by the group.206
6.4.9. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA2"
Flagrant violations of humanitarian rules, e.g. murder, cruel treatment, torture, rape
and malnutrition, are reported in internment camps established by the parties to the
conflict. 208 The ICRC openly condemned the situation of detainees held by the
warring factions and also the use of methods, such as "harassment, murder,
confiscation of property, deportation and the taking of hostages". 209 "Ethnic
200 Id., at 96.
201 The ICRC, Annual Report 1983, at 41.
202 The ICRC, Annual Report 1989, at 63-64.
203 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1989, at 64; 1990, at 17; 1991, at 75; 1992, at 66-67; 1993, at 110-112;
1994, at 112-113; 1995, 134-135; 1996, at 143-144; 1997, at 158; 1998, at 174-175; 1999, at 169-170,
172; Reference Report 1990, at 62.
204 See e.g. the ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 113.
205 The ICRC, Reference Report 1990, at 62; Annual Reports 1992, at 66; 1993, at 111.
206 Supra. note 203.
207 Rights of the accused guaranteed by the Statute for the former Yugoslavia have been already
mentioned above.
208 See Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, at 130-1
(1995).
209 "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC's solemn appeal to all parties to the conflict", IRRC, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at
492, 492.
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cleansings"21 ° were often undertaken in a brutal fashion.211 Among those who were
forced to move, some were singled out and put into places of detention, where they
were subject to "[Numiliation, terror and mental cruelty" and also "they were forced,
on pain of death, to perform atrocities against each other - mutilation, physical and
sexual, and, often, mutual killing".212
ICRC delegates visited a large number of prisoners held by the fighting parties from
the start of the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. 213 According to the ICRC's Annual
Report 1993, those delegates visited about seventeen thousand prisoners, delivered
food and other basic goods "[w]herever necessary", and forwarded their messages to
their families.214 Exchange and release of prisoners were undertaken by the warring
groups, and in total thirteen thousand captives had been freed in 1993. 215 In spite of
such encouraging signs, the ICRC made an appeal to the parties in the war not to make
use of prisoners "as human shields" and compel them "to work on front lines".216
6.5. EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY STATUS
6.5.1. ARTICLE 2
Paragraph 1 provides the equal treatment of those who are affected and this is
embodiment of the non-discrimination principle that has gained universal
recognition. 217 This paragraph is almost identical to Common Article 3(1), and thus it
could be rightly argued that Article 2(1) of Protocol II is customary in the context of
210 As to the aspect of forcible movement of civilians, see infra. Ch. 8.
211 See generally Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, at 269-284 (1995).
212 Id., at 270.
213 According to the ICRC's Annual Report 1991, delegates visited more than five thousand prisoners.
The ICRC, Annaul Report 1991, at 90.
214 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 148.
215 Id., at 149.
216 Id., at 148.
217 See the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4482.
179
Common Article 3(1). This paragraph is so general that it could cover vast areas of
violations of laws of war. For instance, a State or a rebel group is liable for massive
transfer of civilians or so-called ethnic cleansing because this comprehensive provision
prohibits discriminate treatment of non-combatants,218 even though the State concerned
is not a party to Protocol II and therefore is not bound by Article 17 of the treaty.
The only occasion where this paragraph was openly violated would be the treatment of
the women by the Taliban, who invoked Islamic law for justification. In Rwanda,
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, there was practice of discriminatory nature, but
opinio juris has not been ascertained. Therefore the customary status of Article 2(1)
remains intact.
Reliable information is scarce concerning paragraph 2, even though the maltreatment
of detainees in Rwanda after the civil war on a massive scale is a gross violation of this
paragraph. Besides, even though this paragraph provides "fundamental guarantees"
incorporated into Articles 5 and 6 for continually detained prisoners, 2I9 the following
investigation demonstrates that most of these Articles are not customary. For these
reasons, it would be difficult to sustain that Article 2(2) has obtained customary status.
6.5.2. ARTICLE 4
Customary rules found in Article 4 deriving from Common Article 3 220 are as follows:
the first two sentences of paragraph 1; paragraph 2(a) except for "health and physical
or mental well-being of persons" and "corporal punishment"; paragraph 2(c); and
paragraph 2(e) except for the last part of sentence "rape, enforced prostitution and any
218 See "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", /RRC, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 181, 183.
219 The ICRC's Commentary, paras. 4494-4495.
229 Cf. the Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(c) (providing "serious violations" of Common Article 3). See
Antonio Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and
Customary International Law", 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, 107-8 (1984).
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form of indecent assault". All the conflicts examined above saw violations of some or
all of the provisions, but these violations were not accompanied by opinio juris that
ignored the legitimacy of these provisions. Therefore, these stipulations continue to be
customary, even though they are subject to breaches.
Other provisions need analysis. Giving quarter to those who lay their arms is a
fundamental rule of the Hague law, 221 but no practice or opinio juris is available to this
author about quarter. Therefore, it would be reasonable to find that the last sentence of
Article 4(1)-is not customary.222
The prohibition of "violence to ... health and physical or mental well-being of persons"
may expand protection, 223
 but it is not clear what constitutes "health and physical or
mental well-being of persons". It may be that all forms of atrocity violate those
elements, and accordingly there may be ample practice breaching this prohibition. On
the other hand, no available information indicates the existence of opinio juris about
this particular phrase. Therefore, it might be reasonable to consider that this wording
is not customary because of the possible existence of violations as well as a lack of
opinio juris.
Corporal punishment has been a particular problem in Afghanistan under Taliban,
which justifies such punishment by resorting to sharia. Although this thesis does not
mention the Civil War in Sierra Leone, in this conflict there have been an
overwhelming number of victims of corporal punishment. 224 Apart from these
221 The ICRC's Commentwy, para. 4525; cf. Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(x) (listing "Declaring that no
quarter will be given" as one of "Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed
conflicts not of an international character).
222 But see Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111.
223 The ICRC's Commentary, para. 4532.
224 See Barbara Crossette, "A Ghastly Campaign of Terror in Sierra Leone", International Herald
Tribune (The Hague), 30 Jul. 1998, at 1.
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conflicts, such form of punishment is not frequently imposed in other civil conflicts,
and States as well as rebels may be refraining from resorting to the punishment.
However, there is a scarcity of opinio furls concerning this punishment. In conclusion,
however gruesome it may be, the prohibition of corporal punishment has not yet
attained customary status. It may, however, be noted that the 1949 Geneva
Conventions prohibit the impositiion of such punishment in international armed
conflict.
-,
Collective punishment has been observed in conflicts related to difference of ethnicity
or similar nature. Many were killed by different ethnic groups for acts they had not
committed225 in the former Yugoslavia and Somalia. The genocide in Rwanda, which
took place along with its Civil War, may be regarded as massive collective punishment.
On the other hand, evidence which shows practice and opinio furls supporting the
prohibition of collective punishment is not sufficiently acquired by this writer. In
consequence, collective punishment is not customarily banned.226
The prohibition of "rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault",
particularly rape, has been violated in many civil wars, such as those in Liberia,
Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The ICTY sentenced a Bosnian Croat to
imprisonment in its "first judgment to deal exclusively with rape as a war crime".227
Yet a number of practices existed, and besides it is questionable if many "specially
affected States" have expressed their belief that such conduct in internal strife is
contrary to customary law. Therefore, similar to corporal punishment, even though
225 AS to the interpretation of collective punishment, see Geneva Convention IV, Article 33; the ICRC's
Commentary, paras. 4535-6.
226 But see Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111.
227 "War criminal jailed", The Times, 11 Dec. 1998, at 17.
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"rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault" are horrific by nature,
the customary status of the prohibition of these acts has not been firmly established.228
The banning of slave trade dates back to the nineteenth century, but the prohibition of
slavery was achieved in 1926 when the Slavery Convention was introduced. 229
 This
Convention has been widely ratified, 23° and slavery has been domestically banned by
almost all States. 231
 Today, the prohibition of slavery is part of the human rights
law,232
 but it indeed predates the development of that branch of law. Article 2 of the
1926 Slavery Convention does provide the material scope of application, and therefore
it is possible to contend that the customary proscription extends to civil conflict. Thus,
slavery is customarily banned, 233
 which results from the customary interdiction of
slavery.
Massive pillage has been observed in Chechnya, Liberia, Somalia, and the former
Yugoslavia, and this alone prevents customary prohibition of looting from being
formed.234 Even though the Russian authorities and certain warring groups in Liberia
seem to have punished some looters, this willingness to observe the interdiction of
pillage is not a major phenomenon.
228 But see the Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(vi).
228 See International Convention with the object of Securing the Abolition of Slavery and the Slave
Trade, UKTS 16 (1927), Cmd. 2910; Antonio Cassese, International Law in a Divided World, §§33, 168
(1986).
238 United Nations, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary General: Status as at 31
December 1997, at 699-700, UN Doc. ST/LEG/SER.E/16, UN Sales No. E.98.V.2 (1998).
231 2 Restatement of the Law: Third Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, Reporters' Note 4 to
§702, reprinted in D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, at 728 (5th ed., 1998); the
ICRC 's Commentary, para. 4541.
232 E.g. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 4, G.A. Res. 217 (III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Part I, Resolutions, at 71.
233 Cf. Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111 (arguing that the prohibition of slavery is one of the new rules
which are "mere extensions and expansions of existing customary rules").
234 But see the Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(e)(v); Cassese, id.
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The prohibition of "threats to commit any of the foregoing acts" extends the scope of
application of paragraph 2(a) to (h). 235
 Such threats might be frequently made, but the
problem is that it is actual violation, not mere threats, that is usually reported. To what
extent threats are made is, therefore, not determinate, and this subparagraph has not
obtained customary status yet.236
As to child soldiers, 237
 Article 4(3)(a), (b) and (e) remain to be treaty provisions
because of fragmentary information on practice and opinio juris. Practice contrary to
Article 4(3)(c) and (d) has prevailed, but the present writer contends that the
prohibition of the governmental recruitment of children under fifteen years old became
customary because of almost universal ratification of the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.238 First, Article 38(1) of the Convention obliges parties to this treaty "to
respect and to ensure respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to
them in armed conflicts which are relevant to the child", but one should not jump to
the conclusion that all five subparagraphs of Article 4(3) of Protocol II have become
customary in connection with Article 38(1). Many States, including many "specially
affected States", are not parties to Protocol II, and for them the Protocol is not
"international humanitarian law applicable to them". The same is true of Article 3 8(4)
which requires States to protect children "In accordance with their obligations under
international humanitarian law". Protocol II is not "international humanitarian law" in
stricto sensu for non-parties to it.
235 The ICRC's Commentary, para. 4543.
236 But see Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111.
237 See id., at 110.
238 Convention on the Rights of the Child, reprinted in 28 ILM 1448 (1989). Regarding a list of ratifying
States, see UNESCO, "Status by Treaty: Convention on the Rights of the Child" which can be found in
the UNICEF homepage at http:// www. unhcr.ch/ . See the Rome Statute, Ariclet 8(2)(e)(vii).
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Second, Article 3 8(2) and (3) prohibits the recruitment of children under fifteen years
of age and provides a rule of recruitment of children between fifteen and eighteen
years old, and they have themselves become customary with near universal ratification
of the Child Convention. This Convention is part of human rights law, and this author
briefly mentions in Chapter 1 that customary humanitarian law exists separate from the
custom of human rights law. However, the almost universal ratification of this
agreement signifies that almost all States solemnly agree to abide by the treaty,
including Article 38 which deals with the problem of humanitarian law.
The only States that have not ratified the Child Convention are Somalia and the
USA.239 All the other States have ratified the treaty and the nature of customary law as
binding non-parties to a treaty is not of significance. The former's non-ratification
derives from the fact that there is no established Government of Somalia which is
competent to ratify a treaty. 240 As customary law prohibits the recruitment of children
by armed forces of a State, today's Somalia is not within the purview of the Child
Convention because of the non-existence of a lawful government. As regards the USA,
the only remaining superpower, its non-ratification does not undermine the customary
status of the prohibition of child soldiers, as all the other States except Somalia are
bound by the Convention anyway. Moreover those under eighteen years of age in the
USA need their parents' consent to volunteer and they are not assigned to combat.241
Therefore recruitment of children is not plausible in the US domestic law, and the non-
ratification does not pose a serious problem.
239 See UNICEF, "Frequently asked questions: Q: Who has not ratified and why not?" at http://
www.uniceforg/crc/faq.htm.
240 See id.
241 Cohn and Goodwin-Gill, supra. note 131, at 69 n.37.
185
One salient problem is that Article 38 of the Convention cannot be applied to a rebel
group because "State Parties" to the Convention are the subject of the Convention.242
Therefore the customary prohibition of recruitment of children under fifteen years of
age is applicable only to States, not rebel groups. Another problem is that even with
the achievement of universal character it is necessary to observe whether Article 38 of
the Child Convention will be observed. If child soldiers continue to be used in internal
conflicts, the Convention would become futile.
Lastly, the ICTR stated in its judgment that all the guarantees provided by Article 4 of
Protocol II are customary because they "reaffirm and supplement Common Article 3"
which the Court found customary. 243 While the ICTR's judgments are highly
authoritative, the present writer differs from the above finding for the following
reasons. First, it is not clear from the judgment which provisions of Protocol II
"reaffirm and supplement Common Article 3" and which do not. As Article 1 of
Protocol II states, the Protocol "develops and supplements [Common] Article 3", and
should one follow the logic of the ICTR, the whole Protocol could be regarded as
customary. Therefore, it is necessary to examine which provisions develop and
supplement Common Article 3 before jumping to the conclusion. Second, it is true
that many of the provisions in Article 4 are identical to Common Article 3 and
therefore customary, but other provisions do not appear in Common Article 3 and
therefore examination of State practice and opinio juris needs to be undertaken. As
long as the ICTR states that a certain article of Protocol II, which is not included in
Common Article 3, is customary in its highly authoritative judgment, the Court should
undertake examination of the two essential elements of custom. For instance, the
242	 7.5
.ta at 69.
243 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayesu, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept., 1998, para. 610,
at http:// www. ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm  [hereinafter Akayesu case].
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ICTY analysed State practice and °pink) furls in its judgment in the Kupreskic case for
reasoning the customary prohibition of reprisa1. 244 Even though this author's opinion
on reprisal differs from the ICTY's finding in the case, 245 the ICTY's method of
examining the process of formation of custom is more appropriate than the ICTR's
approach to ascertain customary status of Article 4 in the Akayesu case.
6.5.3. ARTICLE 5
The status of detainees in civil war is probably the most difficult problem, as
governments are extremely reluctant to treat rebels as "prisoners of war". 246 Article 5,
therefore, does not give "special treatment" to the detainees, since it is applicable to all
"persons whose liberty has been restricted" and it does not single out a particular group
of people, as Geneva Convention III does, to confer those who cease to fight the status
of prisoners of war. 247 On the other hand, it is true that as a conflict intensifies,
legitimate authorities tend to treat captured enemies as prisoners of war de facto, if not
de jure. 248 One commentator argues that captured rebels belonging to national
liberation movements tend to be treated as prisoners of war should they obey
international humanitarian law, 249 while another even wrote, just before the conclusion
of the Diplomatic Conference in 1977, that there were customary rules which obliged
parties to a large-scale civil war to treat captives and civilians humanely, in accordance
with draft Articles 6 to 10.250
244 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al, Judgement, Case No. IT-95-16-T, 14 Jan. 2000, paras. 532-533,
at tittp:// www. un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/kup-tj000114e.pdf.
245 See infra. 9.4.1. Reciprocity and Belligerent Reprisal.
246 See supra. 6.4.3. Chechnya.
247 Georges Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International Dimensions of
Humanitarian Law 217, 234 (1988).
248 See supra. 5.4.4. and 6.4.4. El Salvador.
249 Edward Kwakwa, International Lem) of Armed Conflict, at 83 (1992).
259 Allan Rosas, supra. note 25, at 291 (1976). Articles 4 to 6 of Protocol H originate from draft Articles
6 to 10. See supra.
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Despite certain observance of certain humane treatment of captured soldiers in civil
conflicts, it would be difficult to consider that any provision of Article 5 has become
customary251 with the exception of Article 5(1)(a), which is customary in the context of
Common Article 3. In Afghanistan there was a document in favour of humane
treatment of prisoners, and in El Salvador and Sri Lanka the ICRC was enabled to
conduct its protective activities quite freely for detainees held by the respective
authorities. However, in other conflicts the treatment of captured fighters was either
inadequate or desperate. Among the internal conflicts examined in this thesis, no State
acknowledged that captured rebels would be treated humanely according to Protocol II.
The Rome Statute avoids referring to detainees, not to mention prisoners of war, and
moreover it emphasises the principle of sovereignty, similar to Article 3 of Protocol
11.252
6.5.4. ARTICLE 6(1) TO (4)
The introductory sentence of Article 6(2), read together with Article 6(1) , is customary,
since the introductory sentence "reaffirmed" Common Article 3(1)(d) .253 The rest of
Article 6 has not obtained customary status, because practice is lacking. 254 Very little
information is available concerning how in practice individuals are prosecuted or
punished for "criminal offences related to the armed conflict". There must be trials in
all civil wars, judging those who are charged for crimes connected to those conflicts,
but difficulty in obtaining such information may imply that the justice system does not
function in a proper fashion. The Statutes of the International Tribunals for Rwanda
and the former Yugoslavia may be encouraging signs of implementing the standards of
231 But see Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111.
252 The Rome Statute, Article 8(3)
233 ICRC, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.34, para. 3, at 357.
254 But see Cassese, supra. note 220, at 111.
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penal prosecution similar to Article 6, but in practice it would be much doubted
whether governments facing internal conflicts are willing to follow such procedures.
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CHAPTER 7
CUSTOM AND PROTOCOL II, PART III: WOUNDED, SICK AND
SHIPWRECKED
7.1. THE LAWS OF WAR BEFORE 1949
Before the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Convention, medical protection had been
scarcely discussed. De Vattel tersely mentioned the protection of the sick; 1 while
Woolsey cáncisely stated that "Even military hospitals are spared, if not misused for a
hostile purpose". 2 Lieber's Code provided the protection of the wounded and hospitals
in a rudimentary way.3 The 1864 Geneva Convention and the following conventions
of humanitarian nature, therefore, augmented medical protection, but the same
protection did not extend to civil wars until 1949 when the four Geneva Conventions
included Common Article 3.4
In spite of non-existence of treaty provisions before 1949, there were examples in
which certain medical treatment was provided for victims of civil wars. The protection
of wounded and sick samurai in the Japanese Civil War have been already discussed in
Chapter 3. When a rebellion took place on the Japanese Kyushu island in 1877,
Hakuaisha, which became the Japanese Red Cross Society in 1887 with Japanese
ratification of the Geneva Convention, was established 5 and its own emblem was
1 Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Vol. III, Translation of the Edition of 1758 By Charles G.
Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, Book III, §145 (Michel E. Slatkine and Jiri
Toman reprint eds., 1983) (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758).
2 Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching,
and in Historical Studies, §131 (1860).
3 Lieber's Code, Articles 34-5, 71, 79, 115-116.
4 See supra. Ch. 2.
5 Olive Checkland, Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan, 1877-1977, at 6 (1994).
190
authorised for use by the Japanese Government. 6 Even though no evidence suggests
the actual use of the emblem, 7 the organisation helped wounded soldiers of both sides.8
During the Spanish Civil War, the Spanish Government explicitly stated the protection
of the Red Cross emblem while the junta of Burgos made a formal declaration to obey
the 1929 Geneva Convention in which the protection of the emblem was provided. 9 In
practice, hospitals and army medical units used the emblem and the former escaped
from bombardment, even though violations of the protection of the emblem were
reported)°
7.2. THE REGIME OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE 1950s AND 1960s
Common Article 3 provides the humane treatment of non-combatants in general" as
well as the collection of, and care for the wounded and sick in particular. 12 Between
1949 and 1977 there were attempts particularly by the ICRC and other relevant
organisations to expand medical protection in non-international war, 13 but the
realisation of codification of such rules had to wait for the adoption of 1977 Protocol II.
Apart from Resolution 2675(XXV) of the General Assembly which prohibits attacks
against "hospital zones", 14 no reference was made to other measures for medical
protection in the Resolutions 2673 to 2677. As to medical practice between this period,
little information is available, which neither favours nor disapproves the customary
status of medical provisions in Common Article 3. For example, authors of
6 Information provided by the Library of the Japanese Red Cross Society. Sent on Nov. 25, 1998. The
Red Cross emblem was adopted by the Japanese Red Cross Society after the 1864 Geneva Convention
was ratified by Japanese.
7
8 John F. Hutchinson, Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, 204 (1996).
9 General Report of the International Red Cross Committee on its activities from August, 1934 to March,
1938, Doc. No. 12a, at 127, 128 (1938).
at 105-108.
"Common Article 3(1).
12 Common Article 3(2).
13 See the ICRC's Commentaiy, §§4620-7.
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publications concerning the Algerian War of Independence placed little focus upon this
issue. I5 Hence, customary regulations apropos of medical protection had been limited
to Common Article 3 before 1977.
7.3. DRAFTING PROTOCOL II IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1974 TO 1977
7.3.1. ARTICLE 7 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1216)
During debate about draft Article 12, there was no significant statement that would
support its -customary status." However there was no notable disagreement about the
draft Article either, and the difference between the East and West was non-existent.
The first and second paragraphs of draft Article 12 were amended and adopted by
consensus in the plenary meeting. 18 Throughout discussion on draft Article 12,
attention centred on who should be protected by this draft Article. Thus, the Soviet
Union, Byelorussia and Ukraine proposed an amendment that clarified the definition of
the wounded and sick. 19 Significantly, the USA was supportive of the Soviet
amendment,2° but such elucidation was not accepted, and adopted Article 7 of Protocol
II is almost identical to Article 10 of Protocol 1. 21 The Australian amendment that the
14 G.A. Res. 2675(XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 76, U.N. Doc. A18028 (1971).
15 See e.g. Arnold Fraleigh, "The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law" in The
International Law of Civil War (Richard Falk ed., 1971); Eldon van Cleff Greenberg, "Law and the
Conduct of the Algerian Revolution. Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution", 11 Harvard ILJ
37 (1970).
16 Draft Protocol II, Article 12, 1 OR, Part. 3, at 37.
17 See The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, at 307-323 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987).
18 7
 OR, CDDH/SR.51, para. 16, at 109. The third and forth paragraphs were separated as Article 12 bis.
13 OR, CDDH/221/Rev.1, at 192.
19 Amendment by the Byelorussian SSR, Ukrainian SSR and USSR, 4 OR, CDDH/11/238, at 45. In this
proposed amendment, the wounded and sick are defined as being "belonging to any Party to the conflict
or to the neutral part of the population...".
29 USA, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.25, para. 63, at 256.
21 It is not clear why the amendment was not adopted but Chairman's suggestion ought to be noted that
"The wording used in draft Protocol II should not differ from the text in draft Protocol I unless there was
a good reason for using different wording in relation to non-international conflicts from that used in
relation to international conflicts". 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.26, para. 62, at 266-267.
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shipwrecked should be protected as well as the wounded and sick was adopted and
successfully included in Article 7.22
7.3.2. ARTICLE 8 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1323)
The Official Records reveal that there were some discussions about the shipwrecked
and dead, while the rescue of the wounded and sick did not become an issue. Draft
Article 13 mentioned neither the shipwrecked nor the dead, and Australia proposed an
amendment that included the shipwrecked in the scope of the draft Article. 24 . As to the
collection of the wounded and sick, an ICRC representative stated that draft Article 13
"supplemented the rule in [Common] Article 3 25 and another representative of the
organisation later accepted the Australian proposal to include the shipwrecked. 26 The
American and Dutch delegates favoured the ICRC text, contending the difficulty in
practice to search for those who were shipwrecked.27
As to the treatment of the dead, however, the ICRC delegate referred to the feeling of
the institution that "article 13 could be supplemented by a provision" concerning the
corpses. 28 The British representative suggested the addition of collection of the
bodies,29 to which the ICRC delegate did not raise objection. 3° Pakistan proposed an
amendment that provided search for the wounded, sick, shipwrecked and dead
"Whenever circumstances permit" and that was adopted in the plenary meeting. 31 In
22 Australia, 4 OR, CDDH/II/225, at 44-45.
23 Draft Protocol II, Article 13, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38.
24 Australia, 4 OR, CDDH/II/226, at 49.
25 The ICRC, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.26, para. 66, at 266.
26 The ICRC, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 10, at 270
27 USA and the Netherlands, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, paras. 6 and 7, respectively, at 269, 270.
28 The ICRC, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.26, para. 67, at 267. (Emphasis added).
29 UK, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 12, at 270. See also Canada, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 11, at
270.
36 The ICRC, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 13, at 270.
31 7 OR, CDDH/SR.51, para. 21, at 110. Whether the proposal was adopted by consensus is not
indicated.
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conclusion the Official Records on the whole do not show the declaratory nature of this
Article.
7.3.3. ARTICLE 9 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1532)
States, such as the UK, the USA, and Yugoslavia emphasised the importance of
defining the term "medical personnel" because this problem is related with
qualification for wearing the Red Cross emblem. 33 On the other hand, Pictet as a
representative of the ICRC asserted the use of the general expression because of the
difficulty in distinguishing military personnel from civilians in internal conflict. 34 The
amended draft Article proposed by Pakistan did not clarify the term "medical
personnel", and this provision was adopted in the plenary meeting. 35 Therefore, it was
the definition of the term, not the protection of the medical and religious personnel per
se, that caused debate. Whether the protection was customary at that time was not
indicated by any representative in the Conference.
7.3.4. ARTICLE 10 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1636)
Draft Article 16(1) and (2), which corresponds to Article 10(1) and(2) of Protocol II,
was rarely discussed, while draft Article 10(3), origin of Article 10(3) of Protocol II,
caused disagreement among delegates. The Canadian representative proposed the
deletion of paragraph 3 because it would infringe on the sovereignty of States and this
proposal was supported by Indonesia and the USA. 37 The delegate of the UK also
32 Draft Protocol II, Article 15, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38.
33 UK, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 46, at 275; USA, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.27, para. 40, at 275, at 340;
Yugoslavia, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 6, at 282.
34 The ICRC, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 4, at 281.
35 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 54. As to the adoption of Article 9, see 7 OR, CDDH/SR.51, at 112.
Whether it was adopted by consensus or not is not clear from the text.
36 Draft Protocol II, Article 16, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38.
37 Canada, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 14, at 283; Indonesia, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 19, at
283; USA, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 15, at 283.
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favoured the effacement of the paragraph because it might not be applicable to non-
international armed conflict in practice. 38 On the other hand, States such as Denmark,
Sweden and the USSR supported the paragraph. 39 An intermediate view that the
application of the paragraph would depend on the situation, was taken by Cuba and
West Germany.° In the final stage, a Pakistani amendment was proposed and adopted
by consensus in the plenary meeting.41
Through discussion, several delegates referred to the humanitarian nature of the draft
Article. For instance, the Soviet delegate supported the admissibility of interference in
order to humanise conflicts. 42 The West German representative doubted the
supremacy of the sovereignty of States over protection of the victims in armed conflict
and his American counterpart shared his views. 43 However, considering that Article 10
is a product of compromise that can be read in the Official Records, it would be
difficult to sustain that Article 10 reflected customary rule existing at that time.
Paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft Article 16 did not become an issue in the Diplomatic
Conference, and one might be tempted to support the customary status of the first two
paragraphs of Article 10 of Protocol II. However, a lack of opinion about the
paragraphs would not support the contention that they were customary. Considering
paragraph 3 and 4 of the said Article, the existence of disagreement among the
delegates over paragraph 3 of draft Article 16 clearly tells their non-customary nature.
38 UK, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 24, at 284.
39 Denmark, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 20, at 284; Sweden, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 27, at
285; USSR, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 25, at 284.
49 Cuba, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 30, at 285-286; FRG, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 31, at 286.
41 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 56; 7 OR, CDDH/SR.51, para. 42, at 112.
42 USSR, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.41, para. 37, at 453.
43 West Germany, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.21, para. 38, at 207; USA, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.21, para. 43, at
209-210.
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7.3.5. ARTICLE 11 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1744)
Discussion about this article was probably one of the shortest in the Diplomatic
Conference. The United States redrafted brief ICRC draft Article 17 according to the
corresponding provisions of draft Protocol j•45 This amended draft Article was
adopted provisionally by voting, 46 but Pakistan further amended the draft Article,
deleting paragraph 3 in compliance with the "gentleman's agreement". 47 The Pakistani
amendment was adopted by consensus. 48 Debate about draft Article 17 did not touch
on its substance and why the draft Article that was once adopted by voting had to be
reduced to two paragraphs in the last stage is not revealed by the Official Records. In
short, it is uncertain, judging from lack of information, whether Article 11 was
customary at the adoption of Protocol II.
7.3.6. ARTICLE 12 (DRAFT ARTICLE 1849)
The protection of the Red Cross emblem itself did not become a matter of debate, but
"who is entitled to wearing the emblem" caused controversy. Among several problems
in the Diplomatic Conference raised about the emblem, three major questions are
worth mentioning here. One was the insertion of religious personnel in the Article, as
Iraq stated that this was contrary to the tradition of certain States. 5° Another point
was whether those who belonged to local Red Cross branches should also be entitled to
" Draft Protocol II, Article 17, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38.
45 USA, 4 OR, CDDH/II/235, at 57-58; USA, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 47, at 288.
46 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 46, at 288 (34/1/15). How the participating States voted is not clear
from the Official Records.
47 Pakistan, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.51, paras. 43, 46, at 113.
48 7 OR, CDDH/SR.51, para. 47, at 113.
4° Draft Protocol, Article 18, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38.
5° Iraq, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.40, para. 37, at 435. See also Indonesia, 11 OR, CDH/II/SR.31, para. 46, at
324. It should be noted that available information does not record statements made by other States
disagreeing the inclusion of the religious personnel in the Article and also that the Indonesian and Iraqi
representatives did not explicitly refer to their own religion.
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the emblem, because there were such cases in civil conflict at that time. 51 The other is
whether it was obligatory to wear the emblem because some delegates were in favour
of the "optional" use of the emblem. 52 Notwithstanding such variety of contentions,
the Diplomatic Conference adopted by consensus Article 12 of Protocol II in the
plenary meeting. 53 Judging from the Official Records, there is no indication that would
suggest the customary status of Article 12 of Protocol II. Before proceeding to
subsequent practice and opinio juris, it is worth pointing out that, in spite of the
problem of the proliferation of emblems, namely Red Cross, Red Crescent, and Red
Lion and Sun, this issue was not raised in the Diplomatic Conference except by Israel
that used the Red Shield of David de facto.54
7.4. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
7.4.1. AFGHANISTAN
Hospitals and medical personnel have been no more immune from bombardment than
civilians in Afghanistan. Medical facilities organised by the ICRC have been playing
an important part in treating the wounded and sick, but at times they have been
overwhelmed by the number of victims. In October 1989 an office of the Afghan Red
Crescent in Kabul suffered a rocket attack, resulting in two deaths and thirteen injuries,
and the ICRC has appealed to the parties to the civil war to respect the civilians as well
as the emblems. 55 In 1993 two hospitals in Kabul assisted by the International
Committee were assaulted "On several occasions", which caused civilian casualties.56
51 See Denmark, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.40, paras. 5, 6, at 429, 430, respectively.
52 E.g. USSR, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.40, para. 61, at 438.
53 Pakistan amended its own amendment that was finally adopted. See Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427,
CDDH/429, at 59. As to adoption, see 11 OR, CDDH/SR.51, para. 48, at 113, 114.
54 Israel, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.28, para. 49, CDDH/II/SR.40, para. 39, at 289, 435 respectively.
55 The ICRC, Annual Report 1989, at 58.
56 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 103.
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In 1994 one-third of all the war-wounded in Kabul was treated by those two hospitals,
and they had to function beyond their capacity. 57
 In the same year medical staff and
facilities suffered artillery bombardments.58
7.4.2. BOUGAINVILLE
Concerning the secessionist war in Bougainville, the UN Special Rapporteur
transmitted a report that bodies of those who were extrajudicially executed by the PNG
Defence Force had been either thrown away from helicopters into the sea or "covered
with rubber tyres and burnt". 59 Later, the BRA made a claim that a government
helicopter had dropped into the sea the corpses of civilians who had been killed by
PNG troops at Arawa hospita1. 6° In June 1992, it was admitted by a PNG Defence
Force officer that six civilians had been killed and their bodies dropped to sea by
helicopters in February 1990. 61 Except for those incidents, little reliable information is
available.
7.4.3. CHECHNYA
Regarding the collection of bodies, in January 1995 talks were undertaken between the
Russian and Chechen military authorities about collecting, identifying and burying
bodies that lay on the streets of Grozny. 62 The Russian Government made an appeal to
57 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 105.
58 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 103.
59 U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly N'diave, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/66,
Addendum, Report by the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Papua New Guinea island of
Bougainville from 23 to 28 October 1995 (hereinafter Report on Bougainville), para. 50, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (27 Feb. 1996).
60 "Bougainville rebel radio says civilians killed by PNG forces dumped at sea", broadcast by Radio
Australia in English, 1900 gmt, 1 May 1993, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, Part 3 Far East, FE/1630,
at B18 (6 May 1993).
61 Report on Bougainville, supra. note 59, para. 73.
62 "Russian and Chechen forces meet to discuss burial of soldiers killed in conflict", broadcast by ITAR-
TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian, 0709gmt, 6 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2195, at B/6 (7 Jan. 1995).
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the Chechen dissident to halt fighting for forty-eight hours, 63 and there was a report of
the Chechen acceptance of the appeal. 64 However, according to the Russian
Government press service, the Chechens did not react positively to the proposal for the
temporary cease-fire. 65
 About two weeks after the initial talks were held, the press
service reported the presence of "many corpses on the street" and even the placement
of booby-traps on them.66
As for violations of the protection of medical facilities, Chechen fighters occupied a
hospital in Kizlyar in which there were more than 3,000 patients. 67 The Chechen
rebels killed "at least 13 civilians and seven policemen", 68 and laid mines on the lower
storeys of the hospita1. 69 In addition, patients claimed that the hospital had been shot at
by the Russian forces." After the occupation of the hospital, Dudayev, Chechen leader,
admitted in his interview that he had ordered the attack on Kizlyar to treat their own
63 "Russian government proposal on 48-hour cease-fire", broadcast by ITAR-TASS news agency (World
Service), Moscow, in Russian, 2155gmt, 9 Feb. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1,
Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2198, at B/5 (11 Jan. 1995).
64 "Dudayev accepts Russian government's cease-fire conditions", broadcast by RIA news agency,
Moscow, in English, 1416gmt, 10 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former
USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2199, at B/6 (12 Jan. 1995).
65 "Government press service: Chechens did not respond to cease-fire offer", by ITAR-TASS news
agency (World Services), Moscow, in Russian, I742gmt, 10 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring,
SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2199, at B/6 (12 Jan. 1995).
66 "Government press service reports capture of presidential palace in Groznyy", broadcast by ITAR-
TASS news agency (World Service), Moscow, in Russian, 1521gmt, 19 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2207, at B/2 (21 Jan. 1995).
67 Thomas de Waal, "Russian troops surround hostage-takers at border", The Times, Jan. 11, 1996, at 11;
Philippa Fletcher, "Patients tell of 24-hour terror", id. Another well-reported incident was the hostage-
taking of hospital patients and staff by the Chechens in Budennovsk. See U.N. Commission on Human
Rights, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of the Russian Federation, Report of
the Secretary-General, para. 56, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/13 (26 Mar. 1996).
68 De Waal, id. But Interfax reported "the deaths of 14 civilians, seven militiamen and two servicemen
of the federal forces...". See also "Kizlyar death toll put at 23", broadcast by Interfax news agency,
Moscow, in Russian, 2323 gmt, 10 Jan. 1996, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former
USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2507, at B/11 (12 Jan. 1996).
69 Philippa Fletcher, "Patients tell of 24-hour terror", The Times, Jan. 11, 1996, at 11. See also "Mine
clearance work completed at Kizlyar hospital", broadcast by Radio Russia, Moscow, in Russian, 0800
gmt, 11 Jan. 1996, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2507, at
B/11 (12 Jan. 1996).
70 Fletcher, id.
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wounded fighters. 71 The Russian side, too, did not respect the protection of medical
facilities and staff. According to a Chechen doctor, the hospital in which he originally
worked in Grozny was "flattened" by the Russian forces on December 31, 1994.72
Although the staff of the hospital had already transferred the wounded to a nuclear
shelter, the Russian security forces not only took away a generator necessary for the
critically injured but also ordered those in the shelter to leave it "to make way for six
officers". 73 Even after signing of the peace accord, when Grozny was recaptured by
Chechen fighters on August 6, 1996, the Russians attacked hospitals in the city. 74 The
Chechen doctor himself had his leg broken when he was evacuating with patients.75
The emblem was not always respected, either. On one occasion a Russian doctor
serving the Russian forces alleged that Chechen dissidents had downed "three
ambulance helicopters with clearly seen red crosses on them". 76 On December 17,
1996, six of the Red Cross staff working for a hospital near Grozny were killed in the
institution by Chechen gunmen, which resulted in the fleeing of aid workers. 77 Aslan
Maskhadov, Chechen Prime Minister, declared that "every measure to find the
criminals" would be taken and "the punishment they deserve" be given to them, 78 and
71 `Dudayev predicts "hundreds of similar operations" to Kizlyar', an interview with Dzhokar Dudayev
originally published by `Moskovskiy Komsomolets', Moscow, in Russian, 11 Jan. 96, reproduced in
BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2507, at B/8 (12 Jan. 1996).
72 Carey Scott, "Surgeon hero tells of Grozny's hell", The Sunday Times, 1 Sept. 1996, at 1. 15.
73 Id.
74 Id. See also "Chechen rebels: medical staff and patient killed in Russian attack on hospital",
broadcast by Ekho Moskvy radio, Moscow, in Russian, 0400 gmt, 11 Aug. 1996, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, SU/2688, at B/11 (12 Aug. 1996).
75 Scott, supra. note 72.
76 'Russians report activities of Chechnya "fanatics", broadcast by ITAR-TASS news agency (World
Service), Moscow, in English, 0845gmt, 16 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1,
Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2203, at B/5 (17 Jan. 1995).
77 Richard Beeston, "Aid workers quit Chechnya over Red Cross deaths", The Times, 18 Dec. 1996, at
10; "Six Red Cross doctors murdered in Chechnya", broadcast by Radio Russia, Moscow, in Russian,
0900 gmt, 17 Dec. 1996, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser.,
SU/2798, at B/7 (18 Dec. 1996).
78 "Red Cross murder suspects arrested", broadcast by NTV, Moscow, in Russian, 1600 gmt, 19 Dec. 96,
reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2801, at B/14 (21 Dec. 1996).
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it was indeed soon announced by the Chechen authorities that those suspected of
committing this atrocity had been arrested.79
7.4.4. EL SALVADOR
Efforts of the ICRC to provide and maintain medical facilities were continuous. 80 For
instance the ICRC was able to assist people in places not under the Salvadoran
Government's control in 1986, and transferred the wounded and sick, both civilian and
combatant, to medical institutions where sufficient treatment was available. 81 Besides,
ICRC medical assistance even extended to those interned in detention places.82
There were, however, reports on attacks against hospitals and their personnel. In
March 1984 an ambulance was attacked and two local Red Cross staff were killed.83
Next year there were incidents in which ambulances of the National Red Cross Society
were fired, and the ICRC appealed to the rebel forces to respect the Red Cross emblem
and its activities. 84 As the conflict intensified at the end of November 1989,
ambulances belonging to the El Salvador Red Cross in a mission to evacuate the
wounded were attacked. 85
 Apart from Red Cross institutions, in April 1989 a mobile
hospital of the FMLN was attacked by the Salvadoran air force, which resulted in the
deaths of the staff and a patient. 86 The Truth Commission found "substantial
79 Richard Beeston, "Chechen murder suspects held", The Times, Dec. 21, 1996, at 13.
80 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1981, at 27; 1982, at 32; 1983, at 30-1; 1984, at 33-4; 1985, at 37-8; 1986,
at 39; 1987, at 42-43; 1988, at 45-6; 1989, at 41-2.
81 The ICRC, Annual Report 1986, at 39. Similar transfer continued. The ICRC, Annual Reports 1988,
at 45; 1989, at 41.
82 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1983, at 30; 1984, at 33-4; 1985, at 38; 1986, at 39; 1987, at 41; 1988, at
44.
83 The ICRC, Annual Report 1984, at 32.
84 The ICRC, Annual Report 1985, at 36.
85 The ICRC, Annual Report 1989, at 39.
86 See Security Council, Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council transmitting the report presented on 15 March 1993 by the Commission on the Truth,
S/25500 (1 Apr. 1993), at 333-334, reproduced in U.N., The United Nations and El Salvador, 1990-
1995, Doc. 67, 290, U.N. Sales No. E. 95.1.12 (1995)
201
evidence" that at least a French nurse was captured alive and executed by an air force
unit. 87 The Commission also ascertained "full evidence" that in September 1990 one
Spanish doctor working for the FMLN had been summarily executed by the
Government armed forces.88
7.4.5. LIBERIA
The treatment of the wounded, sick and deceased was far from satisfactory and attacks
against medical institutions and Red Cross facilities were rife. According to the
account given by Huband, a journalist, who visited St Joseph's Catholic hospital in
July 1990, fighters of various parties were accommodated in the same rooms without
difficulty. 89 However, when he visited the John Fitzgerald Kennedy hospital in
Monrovia, the facility was deserted by doctors, and bodies were left without being
buried. 90 He made the second visit to the JFK hospital two weeks later, and found no
patients in the facility because, according to a nurse, the patients of a particular tribe
were taken out of the hospital and killed.91
To name a few incidents about violations of medical facilities and places protected by
the Red Cross emblem, which are reported in relatively reliable sources, in July 1990
soldiers belonging to the government armed forces massacred hundreds of civilian
refugees in a Lutheran church which was protected by the Red Cross emblem. 92 In
September 1994, the Phebe hospital was attacked, resulting in several deaths among
hospital workers as well as internally displaced people. 93 In December 1996, civilians
87 Id., at 334.
88 Id., at 334-336.
89 Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil War, at 150-152 (1998).
90 1d., at 131-132.
91 Id., at 153-154.
92 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1990, at 11; 1991, at 23, n.7; Huband, id., at 173-175, 203..
93 See Security Council, Seventh progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia, para. 38, U.N. Doc. S/1994/1167 (14 Oct. 1994); "Gunmen said to have
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who sought refuge in a government hospital were forced out of the building and made
human shields by soldiers belonged to the ULIMO-J faction. 94 The government
hospital was attacked by a mortar, which resulted in civilian casualties.95
The misuse of the Red Cross emblem was a matter of concern to the ICRC. According
to its report, the sign was "commonly displayed in shop windows, pharmacies and
even on vehicle windscreens" in order "[t]o provide [protection] against all
contingencies".96
The ICRC was able to provide medical assistance in Liberia, even though its Annual
Reports are not always suggestive of the extent of its support to the wounded, sick and
dead. For instance, in 1991 the role of the ICRC was, it claimed, limited because of "a
large number of assistance programmes" of other non-governmental organisations.97
However, in 1996 there were few mentions about medical activities, presumably
because the extreme situation made the ICRC difficult to conduct its activities
generally in Liberia.98
7.4.6. RWANDA
The Civil War in Rwanda saw a number of attacks against medical facilities and staff,
and of disrespect of the Red Cross emblem. For example, patients were killed inside
Red Cross ambulances, while the Kigali Central Hospital and its neighbouring surgical
hospital set by the ICRC were attacked, resulting in casualties among both patients and
killed over 80 at hospital near Gbarnga", broadcast by AFP news agency, Paris, in English, 1424 gmt, 5
Oct. 1994, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 5, Africa and Latin America, 3rd. Ser., AL/2190,
at A/9 (7 Oct. 1994).
94 Security Council, Fifteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer
Mission in Liberia, para. 24, U.N. Doc. S/1996/47 (23 Jan. 1996).
95 Id
96 The ICRC, ICRC Bulletin, July 1991, No. 186, at 4.
97 The ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 26.
98 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 40-2.
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staff. 99
 According to Medecins Sans Frontieres-Belgium, in April 1994 patients whom
the organisation treated were taken out of a hospital in Butare and killed by the
Presidential Guard. 100 In May 1994 an orphanage in Butare was attacked where
orphans and Rwandan Red Cross volunteers were killed. 101 Bodies, either of victims
of war crimes or genocide, were scattered around in Rwanda and, for instance, there is
a gruesome description of corpses which were piled near the British camp in Kigali.1°2
7.4.7. SOMALIA
Attacks against Red Cross facilities and staff were frequent in Somalia. In 1990 the
secretary of the Somali Red Crescent Society and an ICRC official were killed on
separate occasions. 103 The SNM captured and later released three Red Cross personnel
who the SNM claimed had been transported in a military lorry of the Somali
Government. 104 According to the ICRC' s Annual Report 1992, there were "countless
death threats and physical assaults" against ICRC personnel, and there were casualities
among local employees of the organisation and National Society staff. 1 °5 Security
problems were also reported in the ICRC's Annual Reports 1993 and /994. 1 °6 In order
to cope with such a violent situation, the ICRC was compelled to rely on armed
guards, 1 °7 but Sommaruga, the then President of the ICRC, later avowed that such
99 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 54-55, 59.
100 "Government soldiers reported to have killed patients in Butare hospital", broadcast by Radio France
Internationale, Paris, in French, 2130 gmt, 24 Apr. 1994, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 5,
Africa and Latin America, 3rd Ser., at A/3, AL/1981 (26 Apr. 1994).
101 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 55; "ICRC confirms reports that 21 orphans and 13 Rwanda
Red Cross officials killed", broadcast by (a) RTBF Radio 1, Brussels, in French, 1500gmt, 3 May 1994
and (b) Swiss Radio International Bern, in English, 1500gmt, 3 May 1994, reproduced in BBC
Monitoring, SWB, Part 5, Africa and Latin America, 3rd Ser., AL/1989, at A/2 (5 May 1994)
102 Christopher Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, at 7 (1996).
193 Keesing's, Nov. 1990, at 37844-5; the ICRC, Reference Report 1990, at 28.
194 Keesing's, Nov. 1990, at 37845.
105 The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 45.
196 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1993, at 83; 1994, at 85-6.
197 The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 46.
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reliance on fighting parties would damage the ICRC's neutrality and impartiality. 108
He, however, admitted that the protection of ICRC property had been inevitably
undertaken by armed guards on some occasions.109
Under such difficulty, there were activities to rescue the wounded and sick. There is a
report that doctors belonging to SOS Children's Village, a charitable organisation,
undertook surgical operations to hundreds of wounded persons in Mogadishu, when
fighting intensified in the city in January 1991. 110
 The ICRC and the Somali Red
Crescent Society also provided medical facilities for those who were injured.111
However, it is not certain to what extent the wounded and sick were treated humanely
in the Somali Civil War.
7.4.8. SRI LANKA
In 1990 the parties to the Sri Lankan Civil War agreed to establish a "safety zone"
around the Jaffna Teaching Hospital in which the wounded and sick were treated and
protected under the ICRC. 112 It appears that there was no major violation of the zone,
but at the end of 1993 the zone was infringed probably by the Government forces.' 13
The protection continued until 1995, when the Sri Lankan armed forces attacked Jaffna
and the patients and staff vacated the Hospita1. 114 The detereoration of the situation in
108 Cornelio Sommaruga, "Humanitarian action and peace-keeping operations", IRRC, Mar.-Apr. 1997,
at 178, 181.
1 °9 M., at 181.
110 Peter Biles, "What Will Happen to Siad's Children", BBC Focus on Africa, Apr.-Jun. 1991, at 5, 7.
111 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1992, at 47-8; 1993, at 84-5; 1994, at 87-88; 1995, at 87-8; 1996, at 97;
1997; at 101; 1998, at 112; 1999, at 127-128.
112 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 113.
113 The ICRC's Annual Report 1993 does not specify the responsibility of the Government of Sri Lanka,
but the authorities were likely to be accountable, since a protest was sent to the Ministry of Defence by
the head of the ICRC delegation. See the ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 113.
114 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 133.
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1995 presented difficulty to ICRC medical activities in the Jaffna peninsula which
most needed such assistance.115
7.4.9. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
International humanitarian law was grossly violated in the former Yugoslavia. To
name only a few cases, in spite of agreement reached by all the parties concerned about
an evacuation of patients from a hospital in Zagreb to Pakrac in 1991, a convoy of
vehicles with the emblem was attacked, resulting in an injury of a nurse. 116 The
respect of the Red Cross emblem was not observed, 117 and an appeal was made by the
ICRC to respect the emblem and also protect the wounded and sick) /8 Many hospitals
were subject to indiscriminate bombardments; 119 supplying medical assistance to
besieged towns was difficult; and the state of medical services became "desperate" in
such places.12°
7.5. EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY STATUS
Despite extensive legal coverage over the protection of the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked in international wars since the establishment of 1864 Geneva Convention,
such protection in civil conflicts found place for the first time in Common Article 3,
but in a much reduced form. Part III of Protocol II was therefore an advancement, for
the rudimentary stipulations about medical protection set in Common Article 3 were
strengthened. 121
115 Id., at 133-134.
116 The ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 88.
117 Id., at 91
118 ia at 88.
119 See the ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 145; Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International
Organizations and Civil Wars, at 135 (1995).
120 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 151.
121 Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts, at 657 (1982).
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Concerning the determination of the customary status of this Part of Protocol II, the
first difficulty lies in the fact that, as in many conflicts discussed above, available
information on medical care of victims in internal conflict is extremely limited, and
ascertaining practice and opinio juris is not facile. The ICRC's Annual Reports may
be reliable so.urces, but if any, report on medical activities conducted by warring
parties is very rare. Second, it appears to this author that scholars pay less attention to
medical protection than to other humanitarian safeguards, e.g. the protection of
detainees, refugees and civilian populations in general. For example, commentaries on
Part III of Protocol II made by Bothe and others are very concise, compared with their
commentaries on other Parts of the Protoco1.122
Regarding each article, Article 7(1) of Protocol II merely reaffirmed the customary
rule incorporated in Common Article 3(2). In Article 7(2), the general humane
treatment of the wounded and sick "In all circumstances" can be considered customary
in the context of the introduction of Common Article 3(1). However, it is questionable
if the rest of the paragraph is customary because there is little practice and opinio juris
available. It may be presumed that the wounded and sick are treated "to the fullest
extent practicable and with the least possible delay" and without distinction "other than
[on] medical grounds" in certain facilities organised by the International Red Cross and
NG0s. However, there is virtually no reliable document as to whether warring parties
to internal conflicts treat their respective enemies in accordance with such priorities.
The ICRC's Commentary states that Article 7 "reaffirms and develops" the obligations
enshrined in Common Article 3. 123 Nevertheless, it appears to the present author that
122 See id., at 655-665.
123 The ICRC's Commentary, §4634.
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paragraph 1 of Article 7 and part of paragraph 2 reaffirm the existing customary law,
while most of paragraph 2 develops it.124
It is difficult to consider that Article 8 of Protocol II on the whole reaffirmed the
existing customary law of 1977, 125
 even though Common Article 3(2) provides for
_
collection of the wounded and sick. The fact that wounded and sick persons exist in
every conflict implies that there have been certain efforts to search for them, but to
what extent such endeavours have been conducted in internal conflicts - e.g. whether
"all possible measures ... [are]... taken, without delay" and whether protection is given
to the wounded and sick "against pillage and ill-treatment" - is not determinable.
Practice and opinio juris regarding this issue are non-existent. Considering the
collection of the dead, a failed proposal for a cease-fire to collect bodies in Grozny
indicates the difficulty of such activity in actual combat. Besides, there was disregard
for the respect of the deceased in Bougainville and Liberia. However, overall there is
little evidence to reveal the customary status of the collection of the corpses.
Taking together Articles 7 and 8, there are two points to mention. First, even though
part of these Articles reaffirm customary rules, they are not always complied with in
many conflicts examined above. Second, the protection of the shipwrecked appears to
be non-customary because of the fact that maritime fightings are extremely rare in
recent civil wars, and there is virtually no practice and opinio juris regarding this point.
124 Cf. Antonio Cassese, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict
and Customary International Law", 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, 111-2 (1984) (arguing that
Articles 7 and 8 "reaffirm and enlarge upon a rule contained in Common Article 3") (footnote omitted);
The Rome Statute, Art. 8(2)(c).
125 According to the 'CRC's Commentary, "Article 8 develops and reaffirms the obligation.., which is
already contained in [Common Article 3(2)]". The ICRC's Commentary, §4648. But see Cassese, Id., at
111-2.
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Articles 9 to 12 have not obtained customary status 126 because of a lack of practice and
opinio juris that would support such status. The ICRC's Commentary carefully avoids
to declare that these Articles "reaffirm and develop" the existing law, 127 as it does so in
Articles 7 and 8. Medical facilities, transports and personnel, including those of the
International Red Cross, were attacked particularly in Afghanistan, Chechnya, Liberia,
Rwanda, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. The distinctive emblem was not always
respected in these conflicts. It may be that the draftsmen of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions presumed that a State in civil war would not attack the emblem, but States
were not obliged to accept Red Cross activities at the start under Common Article 3,128
and therefore the respect of the emblem was not automatic. Very little reliable
documentation is available on detailed provisions, such as the prohibition to compel
doctors to act "contrary to ... the rules of medical ethics" (Article 10(2)) or the
cessation of protection of medical units and transports (Article 11(2)). In conclusion, a
lack of practice and opinio juris does not endorse the contention that any of Articles 9
to 12 has become customary.
According to the Rome Statute, its Article 8(e)(ii) proscribe intentional assaults upon
both medical facilities and the medical staff with "the distinctive emblems of the
Geneva Conventions", corresponding to Articles 11 and 12 of Protocol II. Article
8(e)(iv) prohibits intentional "attacks against.., hospitals and places where the sick and
wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives", relating with Article
11 of Protocol II. Article 8(e)(xi) prohibits "physical mutilation or .. medical
experiments", which can be regarded as a broad interpretation of Article 10(1) and (2)
126 Cassese contends that Articles 9 to 12 are innovative and that "they will only become binding on
those States which ratify the Protocol". Cassese, id., at 111.
127 The ICRC's Commentary, §§4659 (Art. 9), 4680 (Art. 10), 4707 (Art. 11), 4730 (Art. 12).
128 James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 131 (1974).
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of Protocol II. These provisions may pass into custom if a large number of "specially
affected States" ratify the Statute.
../
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CHAPTER 8
CUSTOM AND PROTOCOL II, PART IV: CIVILIAN POPULATION
8.1. THE LAWS OF WAR BEFORE 1949
Early scholars' views on the protection of civilians having been already mentioned in
Chapter 6, they also considered that the poisoning of springs was against the laws of
war, which may be relevant to Article 14 of Protocol II. Those authorities also
mentioned the protection of cultural properties. 2 Lieber's Code also prohibited the
above methods of warfare.3
Humanitarian assistance to civilian populations in internal conflict was an innovative
instrument devised in Common Article 3 and developed by Protocol II. During the
Spanish Civil War, the ICRC did not generally consider "the feeding of the civilian
population" to be "a part of [its] duties" with an exceptional case in which delegates
in Madrid distributed tins of condensed milk to "the infants whose health was
menanced". 4 Evacuation of civilians was agreed in Salamanca and Barcelona, but the
application of the agreements were "very limited". 5 However, the proposal of the
Committee to establish a "neutral zone" in Madrid in order to save civilians from
I Emer de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Vol. III, Translation of the Edition of 1758 By Charles G.
Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, Book III, §157 (Michel E. Slatkine and Jiri
Toman reprint eds., 1983) (James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1758); Dana's note in Henry Wheaton,
Elements of International Law, 360 n.166 (James Brown Scott ed., 1936) (Edition of Richard Henry
Dana, Jr., ed. by George Grafton Wilson, 1866); Theodore D. Woolsey, Introduction to the Study of
International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching, and in Historical Studies, §127 (1860).
2 De Vattel, id., §168; Woolsey, id., §131. The most explicit was de Vattel, while the others did not
argue for the protection of cultural objects per se.
3 As to the prohibition of the use of poisons, see Article 16. As to the protection of cultural properties,
see Articles 34-6.
4 General Report of the International Red Cross Committee on its activities from August, 1934 to
March, 1938, Doc. No. 12a., at 110-111(1938).
5 Id., at 122-123.
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warfare was agreed and respected by both parties. 6 Besides, the Royal Navy
evacuated refugees from the Spanish Civil War for humanitarian reasons.7
8.2. THE REGIME OF THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE 1950s AND 1960s
Even in international wars there had been no multilateral convention specifically
applicable to civilians before the adoption of 1949 Geneva Convention IV. In
internal conflicts Common Article 3 indirectly refers to the protection of the civilian
population, as the provision limits its personal scope of application to "Persons taking
no active part in the hostilities". Cassese argues that, during the Spanish Civil War,
parties to the War, Great Powers and international organisations invoked rules upon
the protection of civilians so frequently that "a general legal conviction evolved as to
their applicability to all large-scale civil wars". 8 However, the present writer wonders
why the protection of civilians was not inserted either in Common Article 3, had it
become customary law during the Spanish Civil War.
Practice between 1949 and 1977 also shows the doubtfulness of the customary
protection of civilians as such. In the Algerian War of Independence, acts of
terrorism were rife, which resulted in a number of deaths among civilians. 9 In the
Yemeni Civil War, there was disregard of the protection of civilians, and "the
distinction between military and civilian personnel", Boals claimed, "practically did
6 A "neutral zone" was also established in Bilbao. See id., at 125. Cassese also refers to this point.
See Antonio Cassese, "The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning
Internal Armed Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 287, 297 and n.15 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1975).
7 James Cable, "Naval Humanitarianism", 11 International Relations 335, 340-343 (1993).
8 Cassese, supra. note 6, at 298.
9 The Battle of Algiers in January to March 1957 and the bombing of a casino in June 1957 are two
well-known examples. See Alistaire Horne, A Savage War of Peace, at 183-207 and 209-211
respectively (rev. ed., 1987).
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not exist in Yemen". 1 ° In the Biafran secessionist war, the "Operational Code of
Conduct for Nigerian Armed Forces" declared that the Nigerian forces would protect
the civilian population, and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (IGTY) concludes that "the trend initiated with the Spanish Civil War"
about the protection of civilians was confirmed by this Nigerian willingness to
comply with such protection. 11 However, there were massacres of civilians, which
prompted the ICRC to appeal to the warring parties to comply with humanitarian
rules, among which was civilian protection. 12 Furthermore; the Nigerian Government
was extremely reluctant to give permission for the ICRC to airlift relief operations to
civilians in need.13
Resolution 2675(XXV), which provides the protection of civilians, was adopted in the
General Assembly by a majority of States in 1970. 14 The interpretation of this voting
is not plausible because how States voted is not recorded, but support by the
overwhelming number of States cannot be overlooked. Paragraphs 2 to 5 of the
Resolution overlap the protection of the civilian population provided by Article 13(1)
and (2) of Protocol II and the principles of distinction and military necessity.
Paragraph 6 prohibits attack against "Places or areas designated for the sole
protection of civilians, such as hospital zones or refugees". Paragraph 7 provides that
civilians "should not be the object of reprisals, forcible transfers or other assaults on
their integrity". Paragraph 8 claims the applicability of the Declaration of Principles
10 Kathryn Boals, "The Relevance of International Law to the Internal War in Yemen", in The
International Law of Civil Wars 303, 316 (Richard Falk ed., 1971).
11 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,a/k/a "Dule", Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 Oct. 1995, para. 106, reprinted in 35 ILM 32
(1996) [hereinafter Tadic case].
12 Hans Haug, Humanity for all, at 112-3 (1993).
13 Id., at 113-115.
14 UN GAOR, 25th Sess., 1922nd plen. mtg. para. 127, UN Doc. A/PV. 1922 (9 Dec. 1970). 109
States in favour, with 8 abstention.
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for International Humanitarian Relief to the Civilian Population in Disaster Situations
to "situations of armed conflict".15
The ICTY regarded this resolution as well as a precedent resolution as "declaratory of
the principles of customary international law regarding the protection of civilian
_
populations and property in armed conflicts of any kind...". 16 It is true that the
overwhelming number of States supported this resolution, which might be interpreted
as their acknowledgement of the resolution as declaratory of custom. However,
practice in the above civil conflicts could not confirm such interpretation, for there
were violations of protection of civilians. It would also be appropriate to argue that,
had the resolution been of declaratory character, it would have been smooth to adopt
provisions relating to the protection of civilians in the Diplomatic Conference, but the
following analysis of the records of the Conference would suggest otherwise.
8.3. DRAFTING PROTOCOL II IN THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF 1974 TO 1977
8.3.1. ARTICLE 13 (DRAFT ARTICLE 2617)
Drafting Article 13 of Protocol II was a complicated process, with a number of
proposals for amendments. 18 Concerning Article 13(1) of Protocol II, no argument
about this paragraph is documented. As regards Article 13(2), its first paragraph is
almost identical to the first sentence of draft Article 26(1), while its second paragraph
is a more detailed version of draft Article 26(2). The delegate of the ICRC explained
15 The Declaration was adopted in the twenty-first International Conference of the Red Cross. See
"Resolutions adopted by the XXIst International Conference of the Red Cross", IRRC, Nov. 1969, at
608, 632-633.
16 Tadic case, para. 112. Bond was rather sympathetic to the Nigerian reluctance to accept Red Cross
relief. See James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 130 (1974).
17 Draft Protocol II, Article 26, 1 OR, Part 3, at 40. Focus is placed upon the protection of civilians
provided by paragraphs 1 and 2 of draft Article 26, and other paragraphs relating to the "Hague" law
and reprisals will be discussed later.
18 See The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, at 449-470 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1987).
214
that draft Article 26(1) "merely reaffirmed international law" with exception of the
phrase "methods intended to spread terror" which "had been included to express
intention". 19 As far as the former sentence is concerned, no strong opposition is
recorded. However delegates were not in agreement with the introduction of
prohibition of terrorism in the second paragraph. Thus the Canadian proposal for
amendments included the deletion of the second sentence of paragraph 1,20 and the
USA supported these amendments. 2 1 The Soviet delegate suggested that the wording
'methods "intended to" spread terror' be changed to 'methods "that" spread terror'.22
The Swiss representative favoured the inclusion of the interdiction of terrorism.23
With such various opinions upon the prohibition of terrorism, Committee III adopted
the introduction and paragraph 1 of the amended Draft Article 26 together by
consensus, which corresponded to the present Article 13(1) and (2) respectively. 24
Article 13(3) provides the scope of those who are considered civilians. This
paragraph, which is almost identical with draft Article 26(3) was, together with
paragraphs 2 and 3, was adopted by consensus,25 but the wording of the paragraph
was not supported by a number of States.26
States, such as Norway and Switzerland, referred to the principle of civilian
protection during the Diplomatic Conference, 27 but the references were exceptional.
19 The ICRC, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.5, para. 7, at 36. Draft Article 26(1) contained the second
paragraph which prohibited the use of terrorism. This point will be shortly discussed.
113 Canada, 4 OR, CDDH/III/36, at 76.
21 USA, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.8, para. 72, at 67.
22 USSR, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.9, para. 15, at 73. See also Algeria, Egypt, Democratic Yemen, Iraq,
Kuwait, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Syria, UAE, 4 OR, CDDH/III/48/Rev.1 and Add.1
and Add. 2, at 78.
23 Switzerland, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.9, para. 22, at 74.
24 See 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 14, at 390; Article 26 adopted by Committee III, 15 OR,
CDDH/215/Rev.1, at 321.
25 7 OR, CDDH/SR. 52, para. 78, at 134.
26 In Committee III, the wording "and for such time as" was put to a vote and adopted (28/5/29). 14
OR, CDDH/III/SR. 37, para. 14, at 390.
27 Norway, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.9, para. 8, at 72; Switzerland, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.9, para. 23, at 74.
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Furthermore, the ICRC's draft Article 26 originally consisted of five articles, but only
the first two survived. In addition, draft Article 26 adopted by Committee III
included articles relating indiscriminate bombings of civilians and the method of
human shield, 2! but they were deleted in the last-minute proposal of Pakistan. In
conclusion, this complicated process of drafting Article 13 should not be regarded as
evidence that it was declaratory of firmly established rules concerning the protection
of civilians in non-international armed conflict.
8.3.2. ARTICLE 14 (DRAFT ARTICLE 2729)
A number of States, including Ireland, the Philippines and the USSR, expressed their
support for either the ICRC text or amended ones. 30 However, Canada proposed the
deletion of the draft Article, arguing that the provision would infringe upon State
sovereignty, 31 and the USA supported this contention. 32 The Canadian delegate stated
that they were against the draft Article because of the danger of interference and that
he objected to attacks against civilian objects referred to in the provision. 33 Facing
discord, Pakistan proposed to efface the draft Article, 34 but the amended form of the
said Article was adopted by consensus. 35 Most statements recorded in the Official
Records favour the adoption of the draft Article, 36 but the Canadian opposition was
strong. The draft Article would have been deleted according to the Pakistan proposal
28 Article 26(3) and (5) adopted by Committee III, 15 OR, CDDH/III/294, at 321.
29 Draft Protocol II, Article 27, 1 OR, Part 3, at 40.
30 Ireland, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.18, para. 5, at 152; Philippines, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.18, para. 8, at
152-153; USSR, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.18, para. 3, at 151.
31 Canada, 4 OR, CDDH/III/36, at 85 and 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.17, para. 41, at 149-150.
32 USA, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.18, para. 7, at 152.
33 Canada, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.17, para. 41, at 149-150. See also USA, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.I8,
para. 7, at 152.
.54 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 87.
36 7 OR, CDDH/SR.52, para. 90, at 137.
36 E.g. Holy See, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.52, paras. 82-3, at 136; USSR, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.52, para. 84, at
136; France, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.52, para. 86, at 137.
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without intervention by the Holy See. 37 Taking into consideration both support by
many States and strong opposition by certain States, i.e. Canada, it may be that the
Diplomatic Conference had the generating effect upon Article 14 of Protocol II as
customary law,,even though subsequent practice and opinio furls may have prevented
Article 14 from becoming firmly established customary law.
8.3.3. ARTICLE 15 (DRAFT ARTICLE 2838)
Veuthey as the delegate of the ICRC expounded that the draft Article would introduce
..
the "absolutely automatic" protection of the exhaustively listed facilities. 39 Among
proposed amendments was one of Canada that propounded the deletion of the
Article.40 This amendment was rejected by thirty-nine votes to two, with twenty-two
abstentions,41 but in its explanation of vote, Canada expressed the danger that some
provisions of draft Protocol II would infringe upon State sovereignty. 42 Iran and
Nigeria found "a spirit of compromise" essential, but they also raised a question of
sovereignty. 43 At the same time, Norway and Sweden showed their opposition to the
Canadian proposal. " A simplified form of draft Article 28 was proposed by
Pakistan45 and was adopted by consensus.46 The Canadian proposition having been
defeated by voting, nevertheless, opposition towards draft Article 28 was strong, as
explained by the above States, and the existence of customary law as to the
37 See Michael Bothe et al, New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflict, at 681 (1982).
38 Draft Protocol II, Article 28, 1 OR, Part 3, at 41.
39 The ICRC, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.18, para. 16, at 154.
40 Canada, 4 OR, CDDH/III/36, at 88.
41 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 16, at 391.
42 Canada, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, paras. 21, 22, at 392. See also Romania, 14 OR, CDDH/I1I/SR.37,
paras. 30, 31, at 394.
43 Iran, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, paras. 26, 27, at 393; Nigeria, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 23, at
393.
44 Norway, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 28, at 393; Sweden, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 33, at
394.
45 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 90.
46 7 OR, CDDH/SR.52, at 138.
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prohibition of attacks against the specified facilities in civil war would have been
doubtful at the time of the Diplomatic Conference.
8.3.4. ARTICLE 16
Draft Protocol II originally had no provision concerning the protection of cultural
heritage, and "specially affected States" in which historical properties centre proposed
to insert a provision relating to the prohibition of attack against objects of cultural
importance. 47
 In subsequence, draft Article 20 his that is almost identical to the
present Article 16 was adopted in Committee III by consensus. 48 Pakistan, however,
propounded the deletion of this draft Article,49 and there was an intense discussion
about the proposal between July 3 and 6, 1977. 5° Thirty-five voted in favour of the
draft Article, which resulted in the final adoption of the draft Article, but fifteen
opposed and thirty-two abstained. 51
 Reasons for oppositions and abstentions varied,
and to give a few examples, India expressed its opposition in its explanation of vote
because the introduction of the draft Article would be contrary to State sovereignty.52
The Netherlands abstained because of the absolute protection of the cultural heritage
that it argued would result in violations of the said Article. 53
 Finland voted against
because it emphasised the protection of human beings rather than that of cultural
assets. 54 Opposing or abstaining States claimed that they were not against the
47 Afghanistan, Egypt, Ghana, Greece, Holy See, Italy, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Spain, Yugoslavia, 4 OR,
CDDH/III/GT/95, at 65.
48 15 OR, CDDH/III/SR.49, para. 3, at 107; 15 OR, CDDH/236/Rev.1, at 418.
49 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 65.
5° See the relevant discussion in 15 OR, CDDH/SR.51, CDDH/SR.52, CDDH/SR.53, at 121-143.
3 1 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 12, at 143.
52 India, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 159.
83 The Netherlands, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 161-162.
34 Finland, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 156-157.
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protection of cultural heritage per se, 55 but the voting pattern and statements by
participants reveal the strong possibility that Article 16 was not customary in 1977.
8.3.5. ARTICLE 17 (DRAFT ARTICLE 2956)
The delegate of Canada suggested that draft Article 29 be deleted because it would
invite foreign interference. 57
 Among States that objected to the Canadian overture
and supported the draft Article were Finland, Honduras, Switzerland, and the US SR.58
The Canadian proposal was put to the vote and was rejected. 59 Seven States voted for
the deletion and twenty-five abstained, while thirty voted against. 60 Canada, Iran,
Ireland, Nigeria and Romania voiced concern over danger of infringement of
sovereignty by the draft Article in their explanations of votes. 61 A Pakistani proposal
that was not different from the original draft Article in content was adopted by
consensus.
62
 It can be argued that the customary law relative to forced movement of
civilians was not confirmed because of split views on the draft Article.
8.3.6. ARTICLE 18 (DRAFT ARTICLES 14,33 AND 3563)
Relief organisations, such as the Red Cross, having played an essential role in civil
war, Article 18 of Protocol II regarding their activities was a product of large
compromise in the Diplomatic Conference. The present Article 18(1), adopted by
55 Finland, id; Indonesia, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 159-160; The Netherlands, 7 OR,
CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 161-162; UK, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, Annex, at 162-163.
56 Draft Protocol II, Article 29, 1 OR, Part 3, at 41.
57 Canada, 4 OR, CDDH/III/40, at 94 and 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 531, at 225.
58 Finland, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 58, at 226; Honduras, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 57, at
226; Switzerland, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.24, para. 53, at 225-226; USSR, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.24,
para. 54, at 226.
14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para. 19, at 391.
60 Id. How States voted is not clear from the Official Records.
61 Canada, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, paras. 21-22, at 392; Iran, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR. 37, paras. 26-27,
at 393; Nigeria, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, para.23, at 392; Romania, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.37, paras.
29-31, at 393-394.
62 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 95; 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 14, at 143-144.
63 Articles 14, 33 and 35, draft additional Protocol II, 1 OR, Part 3, at 38, 34 and 34 respectively.
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consensus," originated from Pakistan's amendment which was a combination of draft
Article 14 and the amended draft Article 33(1), 65 while Article 18(2) resulted from
the first sentence of the amended draft Article 33(2) and adopted by consensus.66
The Official Records reveal that some Third World States par excellence feared that
relief operations could become advantageous to rebel forces. The Nigerian delegate,
for example, proposed an amendment to Article 33(5) to strengthen the power of a
legitimate government so that the goverment could "reserve the right to terminate"
relief efforts. 67 He justified such discretionary power by explaining that rebels were
disguised as medical staff during his own country's civil war. 68 Another point was
disagreement about which relief organisations draft Article 33(1) signified. Indonesia,
on the one hand, claimed that a national society of the Red Cross was the only
organisation to be trusted by both warring parties to a civil war. 69 Holy See, on the
other, expressed a concern that draft Article 33(1) might force relief organisations
other than the Red Cross to accept its own rules." As regards relief activities by
civilian populations, the Dutch and Soviet representatives were doubtful that civilians
could extend their rescue efforts to the sea. 71 In conclusion, strong objection to the
insertion of Article . 18 in Protocol II among Third World States indicates that the
Article was not customary at the time of its adoption.
64 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 57, at 150.
65 Pakistan, 4 OR, CDDH/427, at 51; 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 57, at 150. Draft Article 14 was
therefore deleted by consensus. See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 58, at 150.
66 7 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 30, at 146. Before adoption, Finland had proposed to delete draft Article
33(3) to (5) and also to amend draft Article 33(2). See Finland, 4 OR, CDDH/435, 437, at 105, 106
respectively. This Finnish proposal for deletion was adopted by fifty-eight votes to three, with twenty-
two abstentions, while the other for amendment adopted by consensus. See Kuwait, 7 OR,
CDDH/SR.53, para. 29, at 146.
67 Nigeria, 12 OR, CDDH/II/SR.95, para. 4, at 413.
88 Nigeria, 12 OR, CDDH/II/SR.95, para.13, at 415.
89 Indonesia, 12 OR, CDDH/II/SR.88, para. 38, at 351.
7° Holy See, 12 OR, CDDH/II/SR.98, para. 1, at 455.
71 The Netherlands, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.44, para. 29, at 490; USSR, 11 OR, CDDH/II/SR.44, para. 27,
at 490.
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8.4. SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE AND OPINIO JURIS
8.4.1. AFGHANISTAN
Indiscriminate bombings have left Afghanistan ruined since 1989. To give a few
instances, in January 1994 fighting broke out in Kabul, with massive indiscriminate
bombings which resulted in the killings of civilians and also in the creation of
displaced people. 72 The President of the Security Council made a statement which
"deplores the continuing large-scale fighting in Afghanistan", 73 while the Afghan Red
Crescent Society undertook relief operations for the displaced:74 In 1996 the Taliban
attempted to capture the capital city of Kabul and fought fiercely with its opposition,
which led to numerous civilian casualties. 75 In September 1996 a Taliban plane
reportedly killed forty civilians, including women and children, in a village near
Kabul:76
Relief operations have been conducted by the ICRC and Afghan National Society
even when many humanitarian agencies were forced to evacuate from Afghanistan.
In 1995 during the blockade of Kabul the ICRC was still able to deliver goods to the
city, despite difficulties in meeting all the needs. 77 In the next year the ICRC and
Afghan Red Crescent Society were able to assist civilians both in Kabul and
provinces.78
72 UN Commission on Human Rights, Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
submitted by Mr. Felix Ermacora, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1993/66, para. 16-25, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994153 (14 Feb. 1994).
73 "Expression of concern over large-scale fighting in Afghanistan", S/PRST/1994/4, Press Release
Security Council, Resolutions and Statements of the Security Council 1994, UN Doc. SC15974 (12 Jan.
1995).
74 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 104.
78 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 130-2.
76 Michael Dynes, "Taleban bomb raid kills 40 civilians", The Times, Oct. 25, 1996, at 15.
77 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 124.
78 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 131-2.
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Afghanistan has had rich cultural heritages since prehistoric time but many have been
continuously pillaged and destroyed since the 1979 Soviet invasion. 79 When the
Special Rapporteur of the UN Commission on Human Rights visited the Kabul
Museum, he "was shocked" at the devastation and pillage of the museum. 80 Later
another Special Rapporteur was informed by Afghan authorities that they would
protect the cultural objects, but at the same time looting continued. 81 In 2001, the
Taliban regime destroyed the Buddha statutes in the Bamiyan Valley and other
cultural objects. 82 International efforts, including those of many Muslim States, to
stop the destruction could not prevent the regime from demolishing the cultural
heritage. 83 Concerning military use of cultural sites, it was reported that a castle in
Kabul was occupied by the Taliban troops who had placed a tank aiming at the city of
Kabul."
8.4.2. BOUGAINVILLE
Apart from information on violations of civilian protection in Bougainville given in
Chapter 6, it is alleged that the blockade of the island brought hardship to the
islanders. The UN Commission on Human Rights took note of information given by
Amnesty International and Medecins sans Frontiêre as well as other sources. 85
According to Amnesty International, the PNG Government established "care centres"
79 Christopher Thomas, "Lost forever: a nation's heritage looted by its own people," The Times, Oct.
22, 1996, at 1.
89 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
submitted by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1994/84, para. 41, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/64 (20 Jan. 1995). See also Thomas, id.
81 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Final report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
submitted by Mr. Choong-Hyun Paik, Special Rapporteur, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1996/75, para. 90, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1997/59 (20 Feb. 1997).
82 "Taleban Demolishes 2 Huge Stone Buddhas", International Herald Tribune (Hague), Mar. 5, 2001,
at 6.
83 Id.
84 See Thomas, supra. note 83.
85 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human rights violations in Bougainville, Report of the
Secretary-General, at 4-6, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1994/60 (26 Jan. 1994).
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which were supposed to protect islanders of Bougainville. 86 However, the
Government, Amnesty claimed, forced local people to move in those centres, in
which "constant surveillance, intimidation and persecution" were conducted. 87
Módecins sans Frontiêre argued that Bougainvillians were suffering from the
blockade, which made medical assistance to the island difficult. 88 Responding to the
allegations of Amnesty International, the PNG Government categorically denied the
maltreatment of civilians in care centres, 89 and stated that it "[was] doing the best it
can to protect, feed and cloth[e] [displaced families]"." Replying to a letter of
Mddecins sans Frontiêre, the Government insisted the non-existence of blockade and
insecurity in Bougainville caused by the rebel group, which made the transportation
of medicines difficult. 91 According to a report of the Special Rapporteur on
extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions published in 1996, blockade still
continued and therefore there was a lack of basic needs for islanders.92
8.4.3. CHECHNYA
There was massive aerial bombardment in Grozny by the Russian forces at the
beginning of hostilities which caused a number of civilian casualties and the
destruction of buildings, including hospitals. 93 President Yeltsin announced that
instructions were given not to conduct bombings which could result in civilian deaths
86 Id., at 4.
" Id., at 4.
" Id., at 5.
89 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human rights violations in Bougainville, Report of the
Secretary-General, at 20, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1995/60 (16 Feb. 1995).
Id., 29.
91 Id., 20-1.
92 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or
arbitrary executions, Mr. Bacre Waly N'diave, submitted pursuant to Commission resolution 1995/66,
Addendum, Report by the Special Rapporteur on his mission to Papua New Guinea island of
Bougainville from 23 to 28 October 1995, para. 39, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/4/Add.2 (27 Feb. 1996).
93 US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practice for 1994, at 940 (1995). See
also Richard Beeston, "Lebed puts death toll at 90,000 in separatist conflict", The Times, Sept. 4, 1996,
at 13.
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in Grozny. 94 However, even he wondered why bombing had not been stopped since
he had information on bombardments in Grozny. 95 There are so many contradicting
and unconfirmed reports on these bombardments, and it is difficult to ascertain what
exactly occurred in Grozny from late December of 1994 to early January of 1995, but
it is almost certain that there were indiscriminate bombings by the Russian forces in
the city.96
One of the most infamous massacres in Chechnya is the one which occurred in
Samashki in- April 1995 in which hundreds of civilians were attacked by Russian
soldiers, many of whom were influenced by alcohol or drugs. 97 It was reported that
there had not been Chechen rebels in the village when the Russians bombed it.98
Young men were subjected to beating, torture and execution because of the fact that
they were of military age. 99 Moreover, grenades were thrown into basements
indiscriminately in which there were civilians, most of whom were women, children
and old people.1°°
The ICRC brought goods for the relief of internally displaced persons, but its effort
was not always successful because of the security situation in Chechnya. 101 At the
94 "Yeltsin's speech on Chechnya", Text of live broadcast of Russian President Boris Yeltsin's address
to the nation on the situation in Chechnya, broadcast by Ostankino Channel 1 TV, Moscow, in Russian,
1305gmt, 27 Dec. 1994, reproduced in BBC monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser.,
SU/2187, at B/6 (28 Dec. 1994).
95 See "Russian Security Council meeting on Chechen crisis; Yeltsin calls for date to end of military
operations", broadcast by Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English, 1124gmt, 6 Jan. 95, reproduced
in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2195, at B/4 (7 Jan. 1995).
96 See e.g. Keesing's, December 1994, at 40325; Keesing's, January 1995, at 40368-9.
97 UN Commission on Human Rights, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of
the Russian Federation, Report of the Secretary-General [hereinafter The situation of human rights in
Chechnyab paras. 58-60, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1996/13 (26 Mar. 1996); Thomas Goltz, "Slaughter of the
innocents", The Sunday Times, 16 Apr. 1995, at 1. 16.
98 Goltz, id.
99 Id.
100 See The situation of human rights in Chechnya, supra. note 97, para. 59; Goltz, id.
101 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 206.
224
end of 1996 security became so problematic that all humanitarian institutions, except
for the ICRC, had to evacuate from Grozny. 102
8.4.4. EL SALVADOR
/
Contrary to the claimed willingness of both parties to the Salvadoran Civil War to
observe international humanitarian law, 1 °3 there were a number of reports on assaults
upon civilians, one of which was a massacre which took place in El Mozote which
has already been mentioned in Chapter 5. The Truth Commission examined another
widely known killing of civilians which occurred in Las Hojas. 1 " It was alleged that
in February 1983 sixteen peasants had been arrested and shot dead by army
personnel. 1 °5 Criminal proceedings ensued, but the case was dismissed by courts,
among which the Supreme Court of El Salvador argued that amnesty should be
applied to the accused. 1 °6 The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights issued
a resolution suggesting the Salvadoran Government undertake investigations,'" and
the Truth Commission, which found "full" or "substantial evidence" against the
culprits, supported this resolution.'"
Among violations of international humanitarian law committed by the FMLN, the
killing of mayors in the period of 1985 to 1988 is particularly noteworthy.' °9 What is
different from clandestine assassinations of mayors is that the rebel group openly
regarded mayors whom the organisation claimed to have close links with the military,
1 °2 Id., at 204.
1 " See supra. Ch. 5.
1 " See Security Council, Letter dated 29 March 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of
the Security Council transmitting the report presented on 15 March 1993 by the Commission on the
Truth, S125500, 1 Apr. 1993, at 328-330, reproduced in UN, The United Nations and El Salvador,
1990-1995, Doc. 67, at 290, UN Sales No. E. 95.1.12 (1995).
105 See id., at 328.
106 Id., at 329.
1 °7 Id.
108 Id., at 329-330.
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as "military targets". 110 The Truth Commission rightly argued that the execution of
mayors by the dissident group had not only disregarded the due process of law but
also ignored the fact that they were not combatants." Unlike Article 50 of Protocol I,
Article 13 of Protocol II does not define the term "civilians", but Article 13(3) at least
provides thatthe protection of civilians "unless and for such time as they take a direct
part in hostilities". Hence mayors who were killed in pursuant to the policy of the
FMLN should have been civilians because they were not in combat.I12
With reference to relief activities, the ICRC and Salvadoran Red Cross were able to
assist civilian population throughout the Civil War in El Salvador, despite
interruptions which were caused by intense military situations or by unwillingness of
both the Government and rebel forces.I13
8.4.5. LIBERIA
In the conflict in Liberia, there have been a number of massacres. 114
 One occasion
that drew the attention of the Security Council was the massacre near Harbel on 6
June 1993 in which a number of civilians were killed and wounded. The President of
the Council issued a note that expressed a shock and sadness of the Security Council
over the matter and condemnation of the massacre. 115
 In addition, the representative
of Liberia attributed the massacre to the National Patriotic Front of Liberia that he
109 See id., at 365-368.
110 , ,. 5la at 367.
1 " id.
112 Id.
113 See e.g. the ICRC, Annual Report 1983, at 30-31.
114 As to a journalist's visual account of a massacre of civilians, see Mark Huband, The Liberian Civil
War, at 101 (1998).
115 Security Council, "Note by the President of the Security Council", UN Doc. S/25918 (9 Jun. 1993).
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regarded as "a terrorist organization". 116 The massacre resulted in the appointment of
a panel of inquiry by the Secretary-Gener a1 . 117 In September 1995, soldiers belonged
to the NPFL killed "an undermined number of civilians" in Tapeta, which led to the
detention of those who were allegedly involved. 118
 The NPFL announced that a
national court would try the detained, 119
 but there is no available information on the
trials, if any.
Under such extreme violence, the undertaking of relief operations depended upon the
situation. The ICRC was one of the few organisations which was able to conduct
relief activities throughout the civil war, but unlimited access to civilians was not
always possible. The year 1996 in particular saw complete anarchy in Liberia, and all
humanitarian institutions, including the ICRC, withdrew from the lawless State.12°
The ICRC considered the resumption of humanitarian assistance unlikely without
political settlement, for resources to relieve civilians turned to be beneficial to
contending factions which looted those supplies. 121 When ICRC delegates returned to
Liberia in 1997, however, the organisation found assistance unnecessary because of
the return of peace to the country.122
116 Security Council, Letter dated 8 June 1993 from the representative of Liberia to the Secretary-
General, SCOR 48th Sess., Supp. for Apr., May and Jun. 1993, at 323, UN Doc. S125919 (9 Jun.
1993).
117 Security Council, Letter dated 4 August 1993 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council, SCOR, 48th Sess., Supp. for Jul., Aug. and Sept. 1993, at 156, UN Doc. S/26265 (7
Aug. 1993). It appears that the panel has not published its foundings.
118 Security Council, Thirteenth progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
Observer Mission in Liberia, para. 52, UN Doc. S/1995/881 (23 Oct. 1995).
119 See id.
120 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 40-41; see also Martin Fletcher and Peter Capella, "US force
sails for Liberia as anarchy imperils rescue", The Times, Apr. 13, 1996, at 13.
121 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 41.
122 The ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 44, 46.
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8.4.6. RWANDA
According to a report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to Rwanda,
there were about 1,650,000 internally displaced persons and more than half a million
refugees. 123 Among them were those who were compelled to move with the
,
advancement of front lines. 124
 The security of the places where displaced persons and
refugees were accommodated was not adequate, as abductions and killings were
reported inside those camps. 125 There were occasions in which humanitarian
assistance could not be conveyed, which resulted in the starvation of those who
needed it. 126 Water was contaminated by the bodies which were "thrown into rivers
and lakes".127
The presence of delegates of the ICRC was able to spare the lives of those who would
have been otherwise killed, but the Committee admitted that it had been able to
protect the civilians "only on a very limited scale". I28 As far as internally displaced
persons and refugees were concerned, the International Red Cross, I29 the UNHCR and
other organisations 13 ° brought assistance to them.
123 Security Council, Letter dated 21 July 1994 from the Secretary-General to the President of the
Security Council transmitting the report on violations of international humanitarian law in Rwanda
during the conflict, prepared on the basis of the visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights to Rwanda (11-12 May 1994), para. 11, UN Doc. S/1994/867 (25 Jul. 1994) [hereinafter
The report of the UNHCR on Rwanda], reproduced in UN The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996,
Doc. 77, at 313, UN Sales No. E.96.1.20 (1996). According to the ICRC's Annual Report, there were
two million refugees and half a million displaced persons at the end of 1994. The ICRC, Annual
Report 1994, at 54.
124 The report of the UNHCR on Rwanda, id., para. 12. See also the ICRC, id.
125 The report of the UNHCR on Rwanda, id, para. 13.
126 1d., para. 14.
127 , ,.la, para. 15.
128 The ICRC, Annual Report 1994, at 55.
129 See id., at 55-7.
139 As to activities of the UNHCR and other organisations in Rwanda, see generally General Assembly,
Update on the Rwandan emergency by the Executive Committee of the Programme of the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, paras. 16-40, UN Doc. A/AC.96/825/Add.1 (26 Sept. 1994),
reproduced in UN, The United Nations and Rwanda 1993-1996, Doc. 90, at 337, Sales No. E.96.1.20
(1996).
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8.4.7. SOMALIA
Civilians were affected to a considerable degree in Somalia, as "The indiscipline of
the combatants and the total lack of respect for the most elementary rules of combat
took a heavy toll of the civilian population...". 131 At the beginning of the civil war in
1988, the northern part of Somalia suffered from indiscriminate killings of civilians,
which was denied by the Somali Government. 132 In September 1990 the European
Community condemned killings of twenty people which were conducted by the
Somali forces in Berbera. 133 Ferocious fighting ensued the collapse of the
Government in Mogadishu, and in the contention of late November 1991 alone one
thousand civilians were estimated to have been indiscriminately slaughtered. 134
 At
that time only a handful of organisations, including Medecins Sans Frontiêre and the
ICRC, were coping with a flood of injured persons in Mogadishu.135
The ICRC undertook what it regarded as "its biggest relief operation since the Second
World War" in Somalia, 136 but such efforts were subject to disruption because of the
worsening of the situation during 1992. 137 Nevertheless, the ICRC was able to
downsize its relief activities in 1993, as situations greatly improved with the start of
distribution of food by other institutions. 138 Little attention has been paid to Somalia
since the complete withdrawal of the UN forces from the country, but relief efforts
131 The ICRC, Annual Report 1991, at 35.
132 Keesing's, Jul. 1988, at 36005. See also Keesing's, Jun. 1989, at 36757.
133 Letter dated 14 September 1990 from the Permanent Representative of Italy to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General, at 2, UN Doc. A/45/517 (18 Sept. 1990).
134 Keesing's, Jul. 1991, at 38564.
1351d.
136 The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 44.
137 Id., at 46.
138 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 85-86.
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have been continually made, 13 9 despite a report of "severe malnutrition" of civilians
in 1995.14o
8.4.8. SRI LANKA
Civilians in the northern part of Sri Lanka in particular have suffered severely from
continuing civil conflict. The Government of Sri Lanka has provided those civilians
with food and other items necessary for survival, but the actual conveyance of the
goods has been conducted by the ICRC. 14I
 The Sri Lankan Red Cross Society, in
cooperation with the ICRC, has also played a significant part in helping displaced
people in the war-torn State. 142
 In spite of these efforts made by the International Red
Cross, it is reported that many civilians were suffering from malnutrition in 1997,
because of worsening situations. I43 In 1999, the deliveries of assistance as well as
civilian movements were blocked due to fighting in the northern part of Sri Lanka.144
Sri Lanka is a multi-religious society and religious sites have been targets of Tamil
forces. The Tamils and Muslims who used to have amicable relationships have had
clashes since 1985, 145
 and on two separate occasions in 1990 the LTTE killed one
hundred Muslims in each mosque while prayer was in progress. 146 The LTTE
however later denied its direct involvement in the bombing of August 3.147
139 See the ICRC, Annual Reports 1994, at 87; 1995, at 86-87; 1996, at 93; 1997, at 100-101; 1998, at
111-115; 1999, at 126-127.
14° The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 87.
141 See the ICRC, Annual Reports 1990, at 17; 1991, at 76; 1992, at 67; 1993, at 12; 1994, at 113-114;
1995, at 133; 1996, at 141; 1997, at 157; 1998, at 173-174; 1999, at 169.
142 The ICRC, Annual Reports 1990, at 17; 1991, at 76;1992, at 67-68; 1993, 113-114; 1994, at 114;
1995, at 135-136; 1996, at 141-142; 1997, at 158, 160; 1998, at 174-175; 1999, at 171.
"3 The ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 156-157.
"a The ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at 169.
145 See Hellmann-Rajanayagam, The Tamil Tigers, at 89-92 (1994).
146 See UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the visit to Sri Lanka by three members of the
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (7-18 October 1991), para. 35, UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1992/18/Add.1 (8 Jan. 1992).
147 Hellmann-Rajanayagam, supra. note 148, at 90 and n.151.
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8.4.9. THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
There were massive violations of the protection of civilians. One of well-known
incidents was the bombing of a market in Sarajevo in February 1994, resulting in
sixty-nine deaths and more than two hundred injuries. 148 The Bosnian Serbs were
suspected of the attack, even though their leader denied such allegation. 149 The same
market was bombed by a shell again in August 1995, which left at least thirty-three
dead. 150 The EU regarded the assault as "barbaric", and the USA had condemned the
Bosnian Serbs before the responsibility for the attack was established.151
Civilian populations inside "ethnic enclaves", which were environed by opposing
forces, became short of food and medicines, and means of transportation of relief
assistance were not immune from attacks. 152 One of the "ethnic enclaves" was
Srebrenica, which had been encircled by the Serbs who took control of the town in
July 1995. 153 During the siege, food became scarce, as few humanitarian relief
convoys were allowed ir1. 154 In 1993 sick and wounded people were evacuated to
Tuzla under the ICRC, which was able to deliver goods, such as medicine and food to
people in Srebrenica.155
There were a number of reports about assaults against cultural objects and places of
worship, which would not be incredible if one considers the nature of the conflict to
148 Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, at 107 (1995);
Laura Silber and Allan Little, The Death of Yugoslavia, at 343-5 (1995).
149 Silber and Little, id., at 343-5.
1 " Stacy Sullivan, "Shell in Sarajevo market kills 33", The Times, Aug. 29, 1995, at 1.
151 Michael Dynes and Ian Brodie, "Germany leads the condemnation of market massacre", The Times,
Aug. 29, 1995, at 8.
152 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148, at 114, 131.
153 See generally Silber and Little, supra. note 148, at 293-305.
154 r r.,la at 294-295.
155 The ICRC, Annual Report 1993, at 151.
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be religious and ethnic. 156 For instance, a bridge in Mostar, which was built in the
sixteenth century and renowned for its beauty, was destroyed by artillery bombings of
the Bosnian Croats in November 1993.157 A Bosnian radio programme condemned
the destruction of the bridge, 158
 while its Croatian counterpart claimed that it was
used "on a- daily basis" by the Muslims for military transportation. 159 The
Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina condemned the Croatians for the destruction of
the Mostar bridge. 160
 Apart from the destruction of this well-known bridge, there was
a report of art objects pillaged throughout the former Yugoslavia which were brought
to, and sold in the UK.I61
"Ethnic cleansing" took place in the former Yugoslavia, 162 and the ICRC resorted to
publicly appeal to the warring groups not to transfer civilians in a forcible and brutal
way. 163 Among the examples of "ethnic cleansing" was the forcible movement of
Muslim population from Srebrenica. After the fall of the town, forty thousand
Muslims, one estimate claims, fled the town.164
-
156 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148, at 117.
157 Silber and Little, supra. note 148, at 323.
158 "Sarajevo, Zagreb radios report destruction of Mostar's Old Bridge", broadcast by Radio Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat, 1400gmt, 9 Nov. 1993, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB,
Part 2: Central Europe, the Balkans, 3rd Ser., EE/1843, at C/6 (11 Nov. 1993).
159 "Sarajevo, Zagreb radios report destruction of Mostar's Old Bridge", broadcast by Croatian Radio,
Zagreb, in Croatian, 1400gmt, 9 Nov. 1993, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 2: Central
Europe, the Balkans, 3rd Ser., EE/1843, at C/7 (11 Nov. 1993).
169 "Bosnian authorities protest over destruction of Mostar Old Bridge", broadcast by Radio Bosnia-
Hercegovina, Sarajevo, in Serbo-Croat, 2100gmt, 9 Nov. 1993, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB,
Part 2: Central Europe, the Balkans, 3rd Ser., EE/1843, at C/7 (11 Nov. 1993).
161 Stephen Grey, "Bosnian art plunder sold in Britain", The Sunday Times, 16 Jun. 1996, at 1.7.
162 As to "ethnic cleansing" and international humanitarian law, see Yves Sandoz, "The International
Committee of the Red Cross and the Law of Armed Conflict Today", International Peacekeeping,
Winter 1997, at 86, 88-90.
163 "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC's solemn appeal to all parties to the conflict", IRRC, Sept.-Oct. 1992,
at 492, 492-493.
164 Silber and Little, supra. note 148, at 304.
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8.5. EXAMINATION OF CUSTOMARY STATUS
8.5.1. ARTICLE 13 AND ARTICLE 4(2)(d)
The above study shows that the protection of civilians is not obeyed by belligerents in
many of the recent conflicts. 165 Even in the Salvadoran Civil War, in which Protocol
II was de facto applied, there were violations of this protection. 166 Massive violations
of civilian lives have been observed in Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia and the former
Yugoslavia. In Chechnya there were indiscriminate bombardments at the beginning
of the hostilities. Violations of the laws of war may be often exaggerated, but the
above conflicts show that the protection of civilian population has been continuously
breached. McCoubrey and White write:
As a general principle [Article 13(1)] may sound decidedly utopian; it is
important to stress that the principle neither is, nor is intended to be, in any
sense talismanic.167
According to the ICRC's Commentary, "Article 13 codifies the general principles ...
[of the protection of civilians] ... already recognized by customary international law
and by the laws of war as a whole". 168 It is true that the general principle of the
protection of civilians was codified in Article 13, but it is questionable that the
principle was "already recognized by customary international law". As discussed in
Chapter 2, the general principles can be transformed into custom only when the
requirements of practice and opinio juris are met. As there have been so many
165 See also McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148, at 196.
166 See also supra. Ch. 6.
167 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148, at 105. Note that the commentators did not make this
statement in the context of customary law.
168 The ICRC's Commentary, para. 4761.
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violations of the principle of civilian protection, it remains to be moral as long as a
State in internal conflict is not a party of Protocol 11.169
There is one problem left for discussion, namely terrorism. Acts of terrorism should
be suppressed because they are contrary to the principles of humanity and distinction,
but the problem of terrorism in civil war is "one man's terrorism is another man's
legitimate act for freedom". 17° The Rome Statute, while considering the protection of
civilians to be "serious violations of the laws and customs", does not refer to
terrorism. 171 - Furthermore, the interpretation of terroristic acts are not well-
established. 172 Article 13(2) provides that "Acts or threats of violence the primary
purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited" and
this would be the only definition of terrorism available in Protocol II. For example, if
a rebel group places a bomb in a crowded bus whose explosion results in the deaths of
all passengers, will it be regarded as an act of terrorism according to the definition
given by Article l3(2)?' First, it would be difficult to ascertain whether spreading
terror was the primary purpose of the rebels to lay the bomb. Second, the dissidents
may legitimise the bombing, believing that it was not their "primary purpose to
spread terror among civilian population". Last, the definition of "terror" is not clearly
established in international law, 174 and therefore it is not certain if, in the above
hypothetic case, terror is a situation where other commuters feel uneasy to take the
bus every morning or whether they decide not to use the bus anymore.
169 As a treaty provision, the principle has legal value. But see Antonio Cassese, "The Geneva
Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and Customary International Law", 3
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55, 112 (1984).
170 See McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148, at 68.
171 Article 8(2)(e)(i).
172 See Frits Kalshoven in "Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?", Proceedings of ASIL 109,
117 (1985).
173 McCoubrey and White consider certain conducts, e.g. "leaving bombs in crowded shopping
centres" to be "almost universally ... classified as 'terrorise." McCoubrey and White, supra. note 148,
at 68.
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Another related problem would be a proliferation of the use of the term "terrorism".
The Special Rapporteur's report on Afghanistan referred to terrorist acts committed
by both the Government and rebel forces, but he seemed to have included
indiscriminate- attacks against civilians into a category of terrorism. 175 Thus, for
instance, in his 1990 report, he gave an account of dissidents' missile attacks on
Kabul that killed numerous number of civilians. 176 The opposition group explained
that missiles were targeted to military objects but the Special Rapporteur dismissed
this claim because he eyewitnessed that the rockets "mostly" had struck civilians,
"regardless of their target". 177 He, therefore, failed to explain whether it was the
rebel's primary purpose to spread terror among civilians in Kabul. Indeed, he
rejected the contention of the dissidents that they were attacking military targets. In
conclusion, Article 4(d) and the second paragraph of 13(2) are not customary because
of the difficulty in interpreting the term terrorism 178 even though such acts are
contrary to the principles of humanity and distinction.
8.5.2. ARTICLE 14
The prohibition of starvation might be implicit in Common Article 3, which provides
the humane treatment of non-combatants, but Article 14 of Protocol II is a new
specific rule in non-international armed conflict. 179 The problem of Article 14 is that
the prohibition of starvation is limited, as the ICRC 's Commentary stated that:
"Starvation is prohibited as a method of combat, i.e., when it is used as a weapon to
174 See id.
175 E.g. UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Felix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1989/67, paras. 72-73, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1990/25 (31 Jan. 1990).
176 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report on the situation of human rights in Afghanistan
prepared by the Sepcial Rapporteur, Mr. Fenlix Ermacora, in accordance with Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1990/53, para. 69, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1991/31 (28 Jan. 1991).
'77 1d.
178 But see Cassese, supra. note 169, at 111.
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destroy the civilian population". 18° Among the civil wars which have been examined,
the Civil War in the former Yugoslavia should be the only occasion when starvation
was used as an instrument to cause the sufferings of civilians. In the northern part of
Sri Lanka people are reportedly suffering from malnutrition, but it is not certain
whether the_ Sri Lankan Goverment deliberately takes measures to destroy the
population of the region.
One author claimed the illegality of the ECOWAS blockade of part of Liberian
territory under control of the NPFL, which resulted in the starvation of people in that
area, 181 but this contention is based on his claim that the Liberian Civil War was
internationalised. The present writer has already held that this conflict is in the scope
of Common Article 3, which does not provide siege warfare. Should the war be in the
ambit of Protocol II, it would be still difficult to regard the blockade as contrary to the
treaty, for the application of Article 14 of Protocol II is limited, as has been already
discussed. It appears that the embargo was introduced not to starve civilians but to
reduce the NPFL to submission, 182 and Article 14 seems to be inapplicable to the
given situation.
In conclusion, except for massive violations in the former Yugoslavia, there is no
evidence to suggest that starvation has been used against civilians "as a means of
combat". States and rebels may have been refraining from such conduct, but there is
no opinio juris to explain such abstention. Therefore, Article 14 has not become
customary.183
179 The ICRC's Commentary, para. 4794.
180 Id., para. 4799.
181 See K. Oteng Kufuor, "Starvation as a Means of Warfare in the Liberian Conflict", 41 NILR 313
(1994).
182 See id., at 315.
183 See Cassese, supra. note 169, at 110.
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8.5.3. ARTICLE 15
Virtually no information is available on the protection of facilities, such as dams,
dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations, and the nonexistence of information,
therefore, neither favours nor denies the formation of customary law.184
8.5.4. ARTICLE 16
The protection of cultural objects and of places of worship is one of the most
underresearched areas of international humanitarian law, and few scholars discuss
State practice and opinio furls concerning this topic. 185 Apart from practice and
opinio furls about the destruction of cultural objects in Afghanistan and the former
Yugoslavia, little information is available on the protection of cultural objects, 186 and
in conclusion Article 16 of Protocol II has not become customary.187
The 1954 Hague Convention on cultural property exists separately from Protocol
1/.188 According to Article 19 of the Hague Convention, this treaty is applicable "In
the event of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring within the
territory of one of the High Contracting Parties...". This definition of civil conflict is
almost identical to that of Common Article 3; neither Articles precisely defines such
conflict. 189
 Therefore, the ambit of application of the Hague Convention is broader
184 See id.
185 For instance Tanja in his article briefly noted the destruction of cultural objects in the Gulf War and
the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. See Gerard J. Tanja, "Recent Developments Concerning the
Law for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict", 7 Leiden Journal of
International Law 115, 115-116 (1994).
186 Information on the protection of cultural objects in Sri Lanka is fragmentary.
187 But see Cassese, supra. note 169, at 112.
188 Article 16 of Protocol II provides "Without prejudice to the provisions of the [1954] Hague
Convention...".
189 Jirf Toman, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary on
the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its Protocol,
signed on 14 May 1954 in The Hague, and on other instruments of international law concerning such
protection, at 210 (1996).
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than Protocol II, which sets four requirements in its Article 1.190 Notwithstanding the
possibility of wider application, the above study does not show that the Convention
has been invoked. Furthermore, the ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention is not
as smooth as 4977 Protocol II, and such "specially affected States" as Afghanistan,
Algeria, China, Sri Lanka, Japan, the UK and the USA have not ratified the treaty.191
In subsequence, one can maintain that the protection of cultural objects remains to be
treaty based.192
8.5.5. ARTICLE 17
Forcible transfer of civilian population has become a grave problem particularly in
the conflicts in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. Indiscriminate bombardments in
Afghanistan and Chechnya also caused displaced people. These forced movements of
civilians have been condemned by States, the UN and the ICRC, and the Rome
Statute inserts the forcible displacement of civilians in a list of "serious violations of
the laws and customs". 193 Yet there is practice of violating this prohibition of
compelling non-combatants to move, and therefore the customary law prohibiting
such movements has not been established yet.
8.5.6. ARTICLE 18
It appears to the present writer that there are two separate provisions concerning relief
activities: paragraph 2 of Common Article 3 and Article 18 of Protocol II. Common
Article 3 explicitly confers the right to initiative to the ICRC, and is more detailed
190 Id., at 386-7.
191 As at August 4, 2000, 99 States were parties to the Convention. See UNESCO, "Convention and
Protocol for the Prohibition of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict (The Hague, 14 May
1954)" at http:// www. unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html_eng/page9.shtml.
192 But see Cassese, supra. note 169, at 108-9, 112.
193 Article 8(2)(e)(viii).
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than Protocol II in a sense that the Protocol does not mention the role of the ICRC.194
As Common Article 3 is customary on the whole and its threshold is lower than that
of Protocol II, the ICRC can take initiative in any non-international armed conflict.195
Despite the ICRC's right to initiative, the receiving government is not committed to
accepting such offer. 196 However, some scholars disagree. For instance, one scholar
argues that Common Article 3(1)(a) implicitly obliges a goverment and rebel
organisation to accept humanitarian relief. 197 Mtillerson, while admitting the
possibility that legitimate governments or other groups can refuse humanitarian
assistance during internal conflict, contends that "they cannot do so without any
adverse consequences for them" and further that "as an extreme measure, assistance
can be given even without consent".I98
The fact is that the ICRC is almost always allowed to undertake relief operations in
civil conflicts, 199
 but whether it can fully function depends on the intensity of the
conflicts and also on the will of the parties concerned. In El Salvador the ICRC was
able to function well, while humanitarian organisations, including the ICRC, had to
withdraw from Liberia for security reasons. Therefore, it can be held that, though
States can refuse assistance, it does not imply that States do often refuse it.
194 See Georges Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International
Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 217, 232 (1988) (stating that "this omission [of the role of the ICRC
in Protocol II] cannot change the legalities of the situation").
195 See id. Having said so, certain magnitude is indispensable for Common Article 3 to be applied to
civil conflict. See supra. 5.2. The Regime of the 1949 Geneva Convention in the 1950s and 1960s.
196 See Pictet's Commentary, at 58. See also Abi-Saab, supra. note 194, at 224-225; James E. Bond,
supra. note 16, at 132. Compare with "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", IRRC, Mar.-Apr.
1995, at 181, 188.
197 John Baloro, "International Humanitarian Law and Situations of Internal Armed Conflicts in
Africa", 4 RADIC 449, 462 (1992).
198 Reis Mtillerson, "International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", Journal of Armed Conflict
Law 109, 128 (1997).
199 See "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", supra. note 196, at 190; Claudio Caratsch,
"Humanitarian Design and Political Interference: Red Cross Work in the Post-Cold War Period", 11
International Relations 301, 310 (1993).
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Relief organisations, other than the ICRC, play an essential part in recent civil
conflict, and these organisations can be supplemental to each other. The above
examination of the wars reveal that National Red Cross Societies play an important
role, along with the ICRC. The UNHCR helps specifically refugees who have fled
outside their...original State.200 International humanitarian law, on the other hand, does
not categorise the refugees, and particularly those who are displaced within the
boundaries of a State are under protection of Common Article 3 and Protocol 11.201
Therefore ICRC's right to initiative stemming from Common Article 3 includes the
rendering of its services to internally displaced persons.202
The Security Council has often referred to humanitarian assistance in its resolutions.
For example, under Resolution 788 (1992), "Member States, the United Nations
system and humanitarian organizations" were "commend[ed]" to "provid[e]
humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in Liberia". 203
 The 1993
Cotonou Agreement also states that "The Parties agree that every effort should be
made to deliver humanitarian assistance to all Liberians, particularly children".204
Notwithstanding various activities undertaken by various international organisations,
the contention that Article 18 has become customary is doubtful. First, there are
occasions where relief organisations cannot conduct their activities, and even the
ICRC is no exception. Second, even if a State allows humanitarian institutions to
undertake operations, it is difficult to determine whether she does so out of legal
200 See Baloro, supra. note 197, at 467-469, 470.
201 See "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", supra. note 196, at 187-189; Frëderic Maurice
and Jean de Courten, "ICRC activities for refugees and displaced civilians", /RRC, Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 9,
13; Francoise Krill, "ICRC action in aid of refugees", IRRC, Jul.-Aug. 1988, at 328, 335.
202 See "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", id., at 190; also Baloro, supra. note 197, at 470.
203 S/RES/788 (1992), SCOR, 47th Year., Res. and Dec., 1992, at 99, Article 12.
2" Security Council, Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the representative of Benin to the Secretary-
General, U, SCOR 48th Year., Supp. for Jul., Aug. and Sept. 1993, at 158, UN Doc. S/26272 (9 Aug.
1993), Annex, Agreement, Article 17, Section E.
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obligation or out of humanitarian concern. In the former Yugoslavia, all parties
agreed to comply with international humanitarian law, and in El Salvador the parties
to the conflict were applying Protocol II almost de jure. However, apart from these
examples, opinio juris about the acceptance of relief activities is not easy to obtain.
Third, as there are so many organisations which offer their services to the situation of
_
civil war that the examination of all their activities would be simply impossible. In
conclusion, Article 18 of Protocol II is not customary, 205 even though in practice
humanitarian organisations are allowed to perform their functions in many conflicts.
Besides, Common Article 3 remains to be customary, despite difficulties that the
ICRC have faced in certain recent civil wars.
205 See Cassese, supra. note 169, at 110.
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CHAPTER 9
CUSTOM AND "IMPLEMENTATION"
9.1. INTRODUCTION
Protocol II has only one provision for its implementation, namely Article 19 regarding
dissemination, and discussion on this Article would suffice for the ascertainment of the
customary status of Article 19. However, methods for implementation is so important
for the actual application of international humanitarian law that analysis on those
methods needs to be conducted in this Chapter.
In this Chapter, to avoid confusion, the word "implementation" with quotation marks
includes implementation, enforcement and reconciliation while implementation without
quotation marks signifies implementation only. The present author interprets
"implementation" as the whole process of implementation, enforcement and
reconciliation. Implementation is a system to secure the application of international
humanitarian law before a breach takes place. 2 Enforcement is a set of rules to rectify a
violation of the law which has already been carried out. 3 There are a number of devices,
both legal and non-legal, concerning implementation and enforcement, but in this thesis
those of a legal nature are chiefly considered, i.e. dissemination and the ICRC for
implementation, and reciprocity, reprisal, war crimes, internal reports and UN action for
enforcement. The third category of "implementation" is reconciliation, which is the
process of rebuilding a devastated State by lenient means of law and politics.
'This Chapter is based on the present author's research paper submitted to the ICRC in 1997 for the
Summer Course on International Humanitarian Law held in Warsaw in August 1996.
2 See G.I.A.D. Draper, "The implementation and enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of
the two Protocols of 1978", 164 Recueil des Cours 1,9 (1979411).
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9.2. TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND "IMPLEMENTATION"
Today almost all States are parties to the Geneva Conventions, and this fact alone has a
significance in the States' willingness to accept the treaties. 4 The ratification of
Protocol II is not as prevalent as that of the Geneva Conventions, but the figure should
not be underestimated; 149 States, including Britain, China, Russia and France, are
parties to the Protoco1. 5 Despite these figures, international humanitarian law is not
always "implemented", and one may be tempted to conclude that the law is extremely
vulnerable to policy of the State. In addition, because the government and rebels are
reluctant to enforce international humanitarian law, an approach which involves the
creation of international instrument(s) as the key to the "implementation" of the law of
armed conflict, may be appealing. Obradovic, for instance, proposed that a special
agency be established in the United Nations with special but optional competences over
civil war. 6 However, treaty obligations require the State to establish domestic
mechanisms for "implementation".
As provided by Article 26 of the Law of Treaties, it is fundamental that a treaty "is
binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith". 7 The
significance of this principle, namely pacta sunt servanda, is confirmed by the ICJ.8
3 See id.
4 See "Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: ratifications,
accessions and successions" (as at 29 Aug. 2000), which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at
http://www.icrc.org/.
5 Id.
6 Konstantin Obradovic, "Enquiry Mechanisms and Violations of Humanitarian Law", in Independent
Commissions on International Humanitarian Issues, Modern Wars 121, 139-140 (1986). However, his
definition of international conflict expands to "an 'internal' conflict which entails any form of
intervention by foreign power(s) automatically leads to the application of the Geneva Conventions"
(emphasis added). It seems to the present writer that almost all the civil wars are international according
to his interpretation. See id., at 140.
7 Malcolm Shaw, International Law, at 633 (4th ed. 1997); Edward Kwakwa, International Law of Armed
Conflict, at 171, 172 (1992).
8 Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Report 1974, p. 253, para. 49;
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France), Judgment of 20 December 1974, ICJ Report 1974, p. 457, para.
46. The Court referred to these cases in Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and
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Besides, Article 27 of this Convention provides that domestic law may not be invoked
by a party to a treaty "as justification for its failure to perform a treaty". In addition to
the Vienna Convention, Common Article 1 reads:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances.9
According to Pictet's Commentary, the State shall "prepare ..., in peacetime, the legal,
material or other means of loyal enforcement of the Conventions" and, should the State
fail to execute its duties, other parties to the Convention shall direct the failing State's
attitude to respect for these Conventions. 19 Besides, the expression "in all
circumstances" signifies that "the application of the Convention does not depend on the
character of the conflict". 11 It is therefore logical to maintain that Common Article 1
accommodates the basis of "implementation", and that it is applicable to non-
international armed conflict. 12 Thus, one can hold that the parties to the Geneva
Conventions and/or Protocol II, are obliged to implement these treaties "in good faith"
and to introduce domestic law, if necessary.13
against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
ICJ Reports 1984, P. 392, para. 60.
9 On Common Article 1, see Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in
Contemporary Conflicts", in 1 European Commission, Law in humanitarian crises 13, 31-32 (1995);
Kwakwa, supra. note 7, at 180.
10 Pictet's Commentary, at 26.
"Id., at 27. Emphasis added.
12 See Umesh Palwankar, "Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for
international humanitarian law", IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9, 12; Denise Plattner, "The penal repression of
violations of international humanitarian law applicable in non-international armed conflicts", IRRC, Sept.-
Oct. 1990, at 409, 419.
13 See G.I.A.D. Draper, supra. note 2, at 20 (1979-111).
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9.3. IMPLEMENTATION14
Contrary to enforcement which is not explicitly included in Common Article 3 and
Protocol II, the two major devices for the implementation of international humanitarian
law, namely the ICRC and dissemination, are stipulated in them. However, the
-
implementation of international humanitarian law, in particular its dissemination, is not
always easy, because States as well as rebels are usually reluctant to implement
international humanitarian law. It is hence necessary to show why the two devices for
implementation are so important as to be willingly accepted by both States and rebels.
9.3.1. DISSEMINATION
9.3.1.1. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
In order to prevent violations of humanitarian law, the sufficient dissemination of the
law is essentia1. 15 In general, peacetime dissemination is necessary since it takes time
for the law to be instructed in a State. 16 Common Article 1 introduces the necessity for
the Contracting Parties to "respect and to ensure respect" of international humanitarian
law, which is materialised by Article 19 of Protocol II. Article 19 reads:
This Protocol shall be disseminated as widely as possible.
Debate about draft Article 37, 17 which provided the dissemination of Protocol II, in the
Diplomatic Conference is not noticeable, even though the Official Records reveal the
support by Canada, the USA and the UK. 18 The Pakistani delegate proposed to delete
14 It is worth mentioning that neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II provides the system of Protecting
Powers, mainly because the legitimate government would regard it as interference. See Kwakwa, supra.
note 7, at 22-25 (Kwakwa is critical about a lack of supervisory or implementation mechanism in
Common Article 3 and Protocol II).
15 See Hilare McCoubrey, International Humanitarian Law, at 66-67 (2nd ed., 1998).
16 See Geoffrey Best, War and Law Since 1945, at 146 (1994); Kwalcwa, supra. note 7, at 172, 173.
17 Draft Protocol II, Article 37, 1 OR, P3, at 44.
18 Canada, 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.59, para. 243, at 243; USA, 9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.59, paras. 37-8, at 243; UK,
9 OR, CDDH/I/SR.59, paras. 42, at 244.
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the draft Article, but in the last minute he simplified the Article, which was adopted by
consensus. 19 Considering the fact that the availability of records about discussion on
draft Article 37 is limited, it is not plausible to determine whether Article 19 was
declaring the -existing customary law. However, if one bears in mind that the Article
was saved in the final moment in a much reduced form, it would be possible to argue
that there was conflicting view on the obligation of disseminating international
humanitarian law on civil conflict.
9.3.1.2. THE IMPORTANCE AND RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF DISSEMINATION
Compared with Article 83 of Protocol I, one noticeable difference is that Article 19 of
Protocol II is written in the passive form and the objects of dissemination are not
indicated. 20 This alone shows the sensitivity of the laws of war applicable to civil
conflict. The ICRC's Commentary states that it is the responsibility of the legitimate
government and insurgents to introduce all necessary means to disseminate international
humanitarian law to both military personnel and civilians. 21 It is imperative for the
government to disseminate that branch of law to its armed forces since their personnel
are most likely to use the knowledge of the law. 22 However, few governments are
willing to disseminate humanitarian law applicable to situations in which its very
existence is at stake. 23 The dissidents may also find it difficult to undertake
dissemination programmes for various reasons; they may be lacking in knowledge of
international humanitarian law; they may not have both manpower and finances to
19 7
 OR, CDDH/SR.53, para. 62, at 151.
29 The ICRC draft was similar to Article 83. See the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4905.
21 The ICRC's Commentary, para. 4909.
22 See Michael Bothe, "The role of national law in the implementation of international humanitarian law",
in Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of Jean
Pictet 301, at 304 (Christophe Swinarski ed., 1984).
23 See id., at 301.
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disseminate the law; or they may not want to spend their resources for dissemination
since their ultimate goal is to achieve victory at all costs.24
In practice, for example, the ICRC was authorised by the Salvadoran Government to
give instruction to its armed forces, which resulted in some improvements in El
,
Salvador. 25 The ICRC has been continuously able to spread the knowledge of
international humanitarian law to both the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE forces.26
During the conflict in Chechnya, the ICRC undertook dissemination programmes for the
Russian armed forces.27
Notwithstanding such instances, the dissemination of international humanitarian law is
not always satisfactory. Dissemination for Russian soldiers having been already
mentioned, the ICRC's Annual Report wrote that in the Caucasus region, to which
Chechnya belongs, "there was little knowledge of humanitarian law". 28 This
demonstrates the fact that peacetime dissemination was inadequate. When the Somali
Civil War intensified in 1992, "posters, leaflets for distribution at check-points and
booklets explaining international humanitarian law and Red Cross/ Red Crescent
principles had gone to press". 29 However, there was no government in Somalia then,
and whether the ICRC was able to disseminate the law of armed conflict to contending
factions is not clear. Besides, there were massive violations of humanitarian law in
Somalia, which reveals the insufficiency in dissemination in the war-torn State. The
24 See Kwakwa, supra. note 7, at 176 (referring to the difficulty of dissemination in national liberation
movements).
25 See McCoubrey, supra. note 15, at 74-75.
26 See e.g. the ICRC, Annual Report 1997, at 158-9.
27 The ICRC, Annual Report 1995, at 201-203, particularly 201.
28 1d., at 201.
29 The ICRC, Annual Report 1992, at 49.
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same was true in Liberia, and for instance in the 1CRC's Annual Report 1996 little
mention is made about dissemination.30
Another problem is dissemination to civilian population, which is regarded as a
"deplorable situation" by Kalshoven. 31 In general, it is not practicable to expect
civilians to obtain deep understanding of humanitarian rules, 32
 but they must have a
certain knowledge of it since they have rights and obligations based on those rules in
armed conflict. For instance, the War Crimes Tribunal in Nuremberg established the
principle of individual responsibility, which is strengthened by the Geneva Conventions
and Protocol 1.33
It can be held, judging from the above information, that the dissemination of
international humanitarian law on civil war is still not satisfactory, and therefore it has
not become customarily obligatory. The ICRC as well as National Societies often
assume dissemination programmes, but to what extent a government, which is legally
and principally obliged to conduct dissemination, spreads the knowledge of the laws of
war, is not certain. The establishment of the Advisory Service in the ICRC which
provides information on national implementation is encouraging, 34 but it is important to
emphasise that a State should disseminate humanitarian law in peacetime so that the
knowledge of the law would be useful in wartime.
30 The ICRC, Annual Report 1996, at 40.
31 Frits Kalshoven, Constraints on the Waging of War, at 70 (2d ed., 1991). See also the ICRC's
Commentary, para. 4911.
32 See McCoubrey, supra. note 15, at 72-73.
33 Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Article 6, in Trial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 14 November - 1 October 1949, at 10 (1947); Judgment
of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Crimes, at 3, Cmd. 6964
(1946). See also Articles 50 (Geneva Convention 1)/51 (11)/130 (111)/147 (IV); Article 85 (Protocol I)
34 On the Advisory Service, see Paul Berman, "The ICRC's Advisory Service on International
Humanitarian Law: the challenge of national implementation", IRRC, May-Jun. 1996, at 338.
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9.3.2. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
The ICRC has long-standing principles of neutrality and impartiality which are trusted
by the parties to conflict.35 In particular, the ICRC plays an important part in visiting
detainees and improving their conditions. For instance, ICRC delegates visited Algerian
•n
detainees in France during the Algerian conflict, which resulted in "considerable
improvements" for the prisoners. 36 A more recent example is the Sri Lankan Civil War
where ICRC delegates undertook visits to more than three thousand detainees held by
the Sri Lankan Government and also to thirty-eight detainees held by the Tamil Tigers.37
It is almost inconceivable that other organisations would be allowed to visit the captured
by the parties to the conflict.
Despite such encouraging endeavours, the ICRC faces problems with its operations in
civil conflict. First, the legitimate government and rebels are not always keen to accept
ICRC delegates. The government may refuse ICRC representatives by claiming that no
armed conflict exists. In the former Portuguese colonies, Portugal insisted the non-
existence of conflict and the ICRC was invited by the new Government to visit captured
rebels only after the coup in Portugal in 1 974• 38 The rebels may be suspicious of the
ICRC because of its confidentiality and ties with the legitimate government. 39 Another
difficulty is that, in some conflicts, the ICRC has to call off its operations because of the
dangers that its staff faces. In December 1996,
  Red Cross aid workers were killed in
Chechnya, which led to the ICRC order to evacuate its personnel immediately from
35 See Best, supra. note 13, at 376-377.
36 The ICRC, The ICRC and the Algerian Conflict, at 6 (1962).
37 The ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at 172.
38 Heather Wilson, International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, at 156
(1988) (referring to Allan Rosas, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict, at 162-163 (1976)).
39 See Best, supra. note 16, at 379-380.
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Chechnya. 4° The third point is its rejection to take part in enforcement process. Even
though the ICRC encounters atrocities and thus obtain evidence, it declares that it would
not give any testimony to international war crimes tribunals.41
Common Article 3 provides the role of the ICRC which "may offer its services to the
Parties to the conflict". Pictet's Commentary states that this article "is of great moral
and practical value". 42 The ICRC' s right to initiative became customary when the
Geneva Conventions on the whole were ratified by "specially affected States", 43 and the
above inforrhation indicates that its right has not been seriously challenged. On the
other hand, it depends on each party to accept the initiative, and recently there have been
incidents impairing the safety of the ICRC staff, which underr- ,; -,es implementation of
the unique role of the organisation.
Despite such difficulty, it can be maintained that the ICRC should keep its role as a
neutral organisation which has been trusted by both legitimate governments and
insurgents. It is obvious that in many recent civil wars, various ICRC activities are
accepted by warring parties. 44 The observance of neutrality therefore only reinforces the
position of the ICRC, which can contribute to creating belligerents' confidence in the
organisation and also help prevent tragedies occurring to ICRC delegates. Its refusal to
provide evidence to international tribunals is justified in order to maintain its neutrality.
Traditionally, the ICRC has refrained from resorting to public opinion, but it has made
appeals in public to bring extremely gross violations of international humanitarian law
40 Richard Beeston, "Aid workers quit Chechnya over Red Cross deaths", The Times, Dec. 18, 1996, at
10.
41 Hans-Peter Gasser, "The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law: The International
Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations' involvement in the implementation of international
humanitarian law", paper presented in the International Symposium on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the United Nations, Geneva, 19-21 October (19 Oct. 1995), which can be found in the
ICRC's homepage at http:// www. icrc.org/.
42 Pictet's Commentary, at 58.
43 See supra. Ch. 4.
44 See supra. Chs. 5-8.
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to an end if no alternative exists. 45 For instance, the ICRC censure of an attack against
civilians in Tuzla, Bosnia-Herzegovina, was appropriate because of the extremely
gruesome nature of this shelling. 46 Such public statements are not contrary to neutrality
and confidentiality, since the aim is to return an extreme situation to one which
resembles normality, rather than to condemn a belligerent's existence or conduct.
9.4. ENFORCEMENT
A lack of enforcement is probably the most serious problem- for public international law,
and international humanitarian law is no exception. 47 The punishment of war criminals,
which seems the most well-known enforcement mechanism, usually does not take place.
Such a predicament is exacerbated in non-international armed conflict where justice is
hardly obtainable. In such circumstances, the State's duty to enforce the law is in
danger, and therefore the examination of enforcement is an essential area of study, even
though Protocol II does not have provisions for enforcement. In light of this, this
section will place emphasis on the problems of war crimes, but the possibility of the
introduction of other measures are also explored.
9.4.1. RECIPROCITY AND BELLIGERENT REPRISAL
Traditionally, reciprocity was invoked by the State which claimed that it would not obey
the laws of war since its enemy did not observe them. The phrase "in all circumstances"
in Common Article 1 dismisses reciprocity both in international and non-international
45 Michael Veuthey, "Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in
Non-International Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross", 33 AULR
83, 89-90 (1983).
46 Press Release 95/18, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC strongly condemns shelling of civilians in Tuzla",
(26 May 1995) which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at http://www.icrc.org/.
47 Best, supra. note 16, at 391.
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armed conflict. 48 On the other hand, positive reciprocity is used by the ICRC to
persuade the parties in conflict to mutually observe international humanitarian law.49
Reprisal is an unlawful act against the illegal conduct of the enemy State which
'
becomes legal because of the nature of the original illegal assault. Both Common
Article 3 and Protocol II are silent on reprisal, though Pictet's Commentary states that
they are "implicitly prohibited". 5° The Diplomatic Conference could not reach an
agreement to prohibit acts of reprisal in internal war. 51 For instance, the British
representative argued that only in international conflict did reprisal exist, 52 but his
Swedish counterpart refuted this contention by supporting the inclusion of a provision
about reprisal in Protocol 11. 53 Finland was eager to insert the proscription of reprisals
in Article 4, what was then draft Article 6. 54 A few States explicitly supported the
Finish proposa1.55
However, the interpretation of this reticence would be that reprisals are not totally
banned in situations of non-international armed conflict. 56 As Aldrich noted, reprisal is
a "downward spiral into greater savagery", and therefore may only result in a reciprocal
action by the enemy reprisa1. 57 For instance, during the Algerian War of Independence,
reprisals were extremely severe. 58 Notwithstanding this defect, the fear that the enemy
might resort to reprisal could have considerable deterrent effects on belligerents not to
undertake acts contrary to international humanitarian law. Furthermore, in the situation
48 Pictet's Commentary, at 25.
49 Veuthey, supra. note 45, at 89.
SO Pictet's Commentary, para. 4530.
51 See id., at 1372 n.17.
52 UK, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.20, para. 41, at 177.
53 Sweden, 14 OR, CDDH/III/SR.20, para. 50, at 178.
54 See proposed amendment of Finland, 4 OR, CDDH/I/93, at 18.
55 See e.g. Sweden, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.32, para. 45, at 331.
56 See James E. Bond, The Rules of Riot, at 101 (1974); Draper, supra. note 2, at 49.
52 George H. Aldrich, "Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects", in 2 Armed Conflict and the
New Law, Effecting Compliance 3, at 8 (Hazel Fox and Michael A. Meyer eds.,1993).
58 One of the worst reprisals was the massacre in Philippeville. See Alistair Horne, The Savage War of
Peace, at 118-122 (revised ed., 1987).
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where the parties in civil conflict attempt to deny each other's existence, the deterrence
of belligerent reprisals may be one of the few effectual instruments to make the enemy
observe the laws of war. Practice of States and rebel groups in recent conflict is scarce,
which signifies a lack of practice to make the prohibition of reprisal customary. In
Chechnya, Chechen rebels menaced the shooting of five Russian prisoners a day if the
Russian forces did not stop bombing Shatoi, and five executions were reported that day,
followed by four others the next day. 59 After forty-eight paratroopers were captured by
the Chechen separatists, the Russian forces sent an ultimatum to the effect that failure to
immediately release them would result in bombing mountain villages. 60 However, apart
from this example, no available information indicates instances of reprisal.
It is, however, necessary to examine the views expressed by the ICTY regarding
reprisal. In the Martic case, the Court stated that the prohibition of reprisal could be
inferred from Article 4 of Protocol II 61
 and therefore that "the rule which states that
reprisals against the civilian population as such, or individual civilians, are prohibited in
all circumstances, even when confronted by wrongful behaviour of the other party, is an
integral part of customary international law and must be respected in all armed
conflicts". 62 Later in the Kupreskic case, the Court also held that the prohibition of
reprisal has emerged "[d]ue to the pressure exerted by the requirements of humanity and
the dictates of public conscience".63
59 See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, The situation of human rights in the Republic of Chechnya of
the Russian Federation, Report of the Secretary-General, para.57 and at 25 n.17, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/1996/13 (26 Mar. 1996).
60 "Russian troops losses; paratroopers taken prisoner", broadcast by NTV, Moscow, in Russian,
1600gmt, 9 Jan. 1995, reproduced in BBC Monitoring, SWB, Part 1, Former USSR, 3rd Ser., SU/2198, at
B/3 (11 Jan. 1995).
61 Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Decision, Case No. 11-95-11-R61, 8 Mar. 1996, para. 16, reprinted in 108
International Law Reports 39 (1998) [hereinafter Martic case].
62 Id., para. 17.
63 Prosecutor v. Zoran Kupreskic et al, Judgement, Case No. I1-95-16-T, 14 Jan. 2000, para. 531, at
http:// www. un.org/icty/kupreskic/trialc2/judgement/kup-tj000114e.pdf  [hereinafter Kupreskic case].
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Comments should be made on the Court's finding. Regarding the Martic case, this
author would emphasise the fact that the Diplomatic Conference dropped the inclusion
of the prohibition of reprisals. Such important matters as reprisal, which caused
disagreement during the Diplomatic Conference, could be difficult to be inferred.
Moreover, the Rome Statute did not have a provision on reprisals. Regarding the
Kupreskic case, the Court first relies on many States' acceptance of prohibition of
reprisals and second on the fact that in the past fifty years reprisals against civilians have
been "normally refrained from" by "the States that have participated in the numerous
international or internal armed conflicts". 64 It may be true, as the Court points out, that
very rarely have States claimed that reprisals against civilians are legitimate, 65 but as
this writer points out in Chapter 4 the reason why States abstain from certain conduct is
not always clear, and in his opinion such abstention neither favours nor hinders the
creation of custom. In addition, the Court should have closely examined conflicts, as
this author does in this thesis, to examine if there is an example of reprisal or abstention
from reprisal. For the above reason, his opinion differs from the Court's finding.
9.4.2. WAR CRIMES
There is no explicit provision for war crimes in Common Article 3 and Protocol II,
which makes the prosecution of war crimes extremely difficult in non-international
armed conflict. It is, however, possible to infer legal obligations upon both States and
rebel groups to prosecute war crimes. Regarding States, they are bound by Common
Article 3, and Common Article 1 obliges them to "respect and ensure respect for" the
four Conventions, including Common Article 3, "in all circumstances". 66 Therefore,
based on those two provisions, States have to deal with war crimes in civil conflicts.
64 Id., paras. 532-533.
65 Id., para. 533.
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Furthermore, since Protocol II "develops and supplements" Common Article 3, it is
logical to conclude that the States' obligations to prosecute war crimes extends to
Protocol II. Concerning rebel groups, they are also required to conform with Common
Article 3,67 but the obligations in Common Article 1 do not extend to them since they
are not "High Contracting Parties". Having said so, as this author discussed in reference
to Cassese's argument in Chapter 4, rebels are bound by Protocol II. Moreover, since
Protocol II applies to both States and rebel groups when the latter satisfy the
requirements set by Article 1 of Protocol 11, 68 it is logical to argue that rebel groups
assume all the responsibilities, including prosecution of war crimes, vis-A-vis States. As
regards third parties, rebel groups again assume responsibilities towards third States
since it would not be fair to impose the duties of Protocol II only upon the legitimate
government, but not rebel groups. 69 The above contention, therefore, support the idea
that both States and rebel groups are obliged to prosecute war crimes. The problem is,
however, that there is no mechanism in international law to ensure that the obligations
are fulfilled. Indeed there is no notion of war crimes in Common Article 3 or Protocol
II, and national courts or rebels' tribunals, if any, would find it difficult to try war
criminals without any clear standards.
Facing with the difficulty in prosecuting war criminals in national level, an international
tribunal set up by the Security Council can also have jurisdiction over war crimes, as the
foundation of the Tribunal for Rwanda proves. 70 Regarding the hierarchy of those
competences, Article 8(1) of the Statute for Rwanda provides "concurrent jurisdiction"
of national and international tribunals, while Article 8(2) renders "primacy over the
66 Pictet's Commentary, at 26 ("It is for the State to supervise their execution [in accordance with
Common Article 1].")
67 Pictet's Commentary, at 51.
68 Antonio Cassese, 'The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed
Conflicts', 30 ICLQ 416, 430 (1981).
69 1d., at 431.
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national courts" to the International Tribunal. In addition, according to Article 9(2) of
this Statute, the Tribunal can try a person who has already been tried in a national court
if the proceedings or prosecution were inadequate. Furthermore, according to Article
8(2)(c) to (e) of the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over
"serious violations" of certain humanitarian rules.
There are two contentious points concerning war crimes. The first concerns the
definition of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, since even if
humanitarian- law and the Security Council provide the competences of national and
international tribunals respectively, they cannot judge suspects for these crimes if the
crimes are not defined. The Statute for Rwanda, however, specifies "serious violations"
of Common Article 3 and Protocol II, genocide, and crimes against humanity, 71 and so
does the Rome Statute. 72 However, it is not certain whether the notion of "serious
violations" is accepted by a majority of States; i.e. the number of States that have
ratified the Rome Statute is still limited. 73 Therefore, it would be right to conclude that
the notion has not obtained customary status.
Another issue is that both national and international judicial bodies are not always
"fair". With regard to domestic trials, they can become biased and partial because of
antagonisms peculiar to civil conflict. For instance, although Rwandan courts conduct
trials of crimes against humanity and genocide, they do not allow defence lawyers. 74 It
may be too early to evaluate the Rwandan trials, but Alchavan considers their "practical
significance" to be "very limited" because of the destruction of the justice system during
7° See the Statute for Rwanda, Article I. On the power of the Security Council, see the UN Charter,
Article 25.
71 The Statute for Rwanda, Articles 2-4.
72 Article 8(2)(c) to (e)
73 As of 30 April 2001, thirty States are parties to the Rome Statute. See "Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court: Ratification Status as of 30 April 2001" at http:// www. un.org/law/icc/
statute/status.htm.
74 "Hutus sentenced to death", The Times, Jan. 4, 1997, at 4.
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its civil war. 75 International tribunals are also not immune from criticism concerning
fairness. Best may be right to argue that the Military Tribunals in Nuremberg and
Tokyo became completely one-sided, but that this situation was "historically unique".76
However, one-sidedness exists even in the Tribunal for Yugoslavia since the majority of
those who are indicted are Bosnian Serbs. 77 In the 1970 General Assembly, the
Government of Sri Lanka pointed out the danger that the justice to the defeated sought
by the victor "seemed to be disporportionately [sic] weighted on one side". 78
Furthermore, it is unforeseeable that an international tribunal could have jurisdiction
over a civil conflict within one of the Great Powers, especially the permanent members
of the Security Council:79 The problem of fairness is highly political, and international
humanitarian law alone may be vulnerable to political pressures. 8° However, it is at
least possible for the State to introduce necessary legislatures and other measures to be
well prepared in peacetime for fair trials of war crimes once conflict occurs.81
9.4.3. INTERNAL REPORTS82
A government facing civil conflict may authorise its officials or other experts to
investigate its own misconduct. Reports produced by such investigations may result in
the application of international humanitarian law to civil conflict. 83 For instance, with
75 See Payam Akhavan, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment", 90 AJIL 501, 509-510 (1996).
76 Best, supra. note 16, at 400. On the one-sidedness of the International Military Tribunals, see
B.V.A.ROling, "The law of war and the national jurisdiction since 1945", 100 Recueil des Cours 323,
especially at 428-432 (1960-11).
77 Michael Evans, "Nato plans snatch squad to hunt war criminals in Bosnia", The Times, Dec. 19, 1996,
at 9.
78 Ceylon, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., 3rd Comm., 1780th mtg, para. 38, UN.Doc. A/C.3/1780 (5
Nov.1970).
79 See Christopher Bellamy, Knights in White Armour, at 30 (1990) (stating that "[the UN] would never
dare interfere in the internal affairs of a strong one - like Russia, in its internal operation against Chechnya
in 1994-95, however appalling the abuses of human rights and however well publicised").
813 See Roberts, supra. note 9, at 72.
81 See supra. 9.2. Treaty Obligations; 9.3.1. Dissemination.
82 The present writer is indebted to valuable advice on this point given by Professor Roberts in a
conversation in Warsaw. See also Roberts, supra. note 9, at 41.
83 Id.
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reference to British practice of illegal procedures of interrogation in Northern Ireland,
Gardiner made a minority report in which he condemned these procedures, and within
this report he also recommended that the Geneva Conventions be instructed to the
military personnel in accordance with Article 144 of Geneva Convention IV. 84 On
another occasion, Bennett made a number of recommendations on interrogation
operations and supervision of the arrested. 85 Four years after this Bennet Report,
Jellicoe stated that the recommendations which Bennett had made were "implemented
fully and fairly". 86
 It may be that these internal reports are perhaps effective only in
certain States, and most States which face civil war are unable to even authorise internal
investigations. However, the British experience reveals that internal review can be
valuable and its introduction should be positively considered in a situation where
enforcement is not sufficient.
9.4.4. THE UNITED NATIONS
The UN's attempt to undertake humanitarian intervention to protect the victims in non-
international armed conflict is a recent phenomenon. Humanitarian intervention by the
State may be contrary to both Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and State practice, 87 but
Article 25 of the UN Charter provides obligations for the Member States to "accept and
carry out" Security Council resolutions. Despite such legitimacy, UN humanitarian
intervention is problematic. Having regarded "the magnitude of the human tragedy" in
Somalia, the Security Council authorised the use of all necessary means by the Member
States to "establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief
84 Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors appointed to consider authorised procedures for the
interrogation of persons suspected of terrorism. (Chairman: Lord Parker of Waddington), especially at
22, Cmnd. 4901 (1972), discussed by Roberts, id.
85 Report of the Cominittee of Inquiry into Police Interrogation Procedures In Northern Ireland
(Chairman: H. G. Bennett), especially the summary of recommendations at 135-140, Cmnd. 7497 (1979).
86 Review of the Operation of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 (by Earl
Jellicoe), at 30, Cmnd. 8803 (1983).
87 See Shaw, supra. note 7, at 802-803.
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operations". 88 The UN campaign in Somalia, however, was not regarded in a
favourable light by the belligerents, and this resulted in the withdrawal of the US-led
forces. 89 Judging from these two cases, one could submit that the Security Council
should realise, that the cause of these humanitarian disasters is the existence of armed
conflict and,„ therefore, its primary aim should be to bring conflict to an end, though
humanitarian relief can be undertaken in parallel.
9.5. RECONCILIATION
In non-international armed conflict, the winning side always becomes, or continues to
be the legitimate government, which usually undertakes harsh treatment against the
defeated. The aftermath of the Spanish Civil War is a pertinent example; the end of the
conflict was followed by the exile of Republican leaders and the violent repression of
former low ranking Republican officials whose number is never to be calculated. 9° No
provision on the cessation of the application of international humanitarian law is found
either in Common Article 3 or in Protocol II, but it is appropriate to consider that the
laws of war cease to be applied to civil conflict when hostilities no longer exist.
However, the end of the hostilities in civil war should not be the end of the interest
which the law of armed conflict shows, since as discussed, inhumane acts are not
uncommon at the aftermath of conflict.
9.5.1. DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE
Unlike other paragraphs of Article 6 of Protocol II which were adopted by consensus in
the final stage of the Diplomatic Conference, 9/ the adoption of its paragraph 5 displayed
88 S/RES/794 (1992), reproduced in U.N., The United Nations and Somalia 1992-1996, Doc. 35, at 214,
U.N. Sales No. E.96.I.8 (1996). (Emphasis added).
89 See Keesing's, May 1993, at 39451.
90 On the aftermath of the Spanish Civil War, see Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, at 919-927 (3rd
ed., rev, and enlarged, 1990).
91 See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 78, at 94.
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antagonism of States toward the stipulation, as a majority of delegates either voted
against it or abstained. 92 After the voting, Spain explained her opposition to Article
6(5), arguing that only States could decide to grant amnesty, 93 while Zaire expounded
that she had voted for the paragraph on the understanding that it was not mandatory. 94 It
_
can be maintained that the result of the voting alone is sufficient to indicate the
innovative nature of the paragraph.95
9.5.2. THE RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF RECONCILIATION
,
The difficulty of reconciliation having been discussed, recent developments in
reconciliation movements are noticeable, and two of the latest efforts are focused on
here. In Guatemala, a peace agreement between the government and rebel groups
finally ended the civil war in December 1996 which had continued for more than three
decades.96 A law of reconciliation was passed in its parliament which provided for the
admission of the rebels as a legal party; amnesty to both government soldiers and
dissidents who violated human rights; and punishment for crimes against humanity. 97 In
South Africa where the struggle against apartheid was waged, the Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Bill was enacted by the President in July 1996 which thus
established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 98 Amnesty would be granted to a
person who had committed political crimes on the condition that he or she would
disclose the truth and that the crimes were not "gross violations of human rights". 99 A
surprising step was taken by the leaders of the African National Congress, Inkata
92 Adopted by 37/15/31. See 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, para. 100, at 96.
93 Spain, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, ANNEX, at 103. See also Nigeria, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, ANNEX, at 102.
94 Zaire, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, ANNEX, at 104-105. See also Saudi Arabia, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50,
ANNEX, at 102-103.
95 As to the mandatory nature of the paragraph, see the ICRC's Commentary, para. 4617, construed by
Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organizations and Civil Wars, at 26-27 (1995).
96 Tunku Varadamajan, "Hardcore gunmen threaten Guatemalan peace accord", The Times, Dec. 30,
1996, at 7.
97 Id.
98 Keesing's, Jul. 1995, at 40361.
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Freedom Party and Nationalist Party who apologised for their violent conducts during
apartheid before the Commission.1°°
9.5.3. THE PROBLEMS OF RECONCILIATION
The aim of Article 6(5) is to promote reconciliation in order to assist the reconstruction
of a war-torn State, 101 but in practice "the authorities in power" are not always willing to
execute it and the suppression of the defeated is not unusual. In Afghanistan, 102 which
is not a party to Protocol II, the former President was executed by hanging in public by
the Taliban. 103 Though this civil war is not yet over, such intolerant attitude towards a
former regime may not only prolong the conflict but also impede a course of
reconciliation at the end of hostilities. In Liberia, it was agreed that amnesty would be
granted to those who committed acts "while [in] actual combat or on authority of any of
the Parties in the course of actual combat".'"
Another difficulty is how to strike a balance between amnesty and prosecution of war
criminals. On the one hand, amnesty would most likely benefit both military personnel
and dissidents who have committed war crimes or crimes against humanity. On the
other, the State is under obligation to take legal actions against those who have
undertaken conducts contrary to humanitarian rules. Miillerson, par exemple, prefers to
interpret Article 6(5) of Protocol II in such a way as to limit the personal scope of
application to those who have not committed "war crimes or crimes against
Inigo Gilmore, "De Klerk begs forgiveness for apartheid", The Times, Aug. 22, 1996, at 1.
100 Inigo Gilmore, "Mbeki apologises for ANC atrocities during struggle", The Times, Aug. 23, 1996, at
11 (on African National Congress); Inigo Gilmore, "Buthelezi apologises to ANC for years of violence",
The Times, Sept. 6, 1996, at 15 (on Inkata Freedom Party); "De Klerk owns up to wrongs of the past", The
Times, Aug. 22, 1996, at 11 (on Nationalist Party).
101 The ICRC's Commentaly, para. 4618.
102 Afghanistan voted for the adoption of Article 6(5) in the Diplomatic Conference, and explained her
willingness to observe the whole Article. See Afghanistan, 7 OR, CDDH/SR.50, at 99.
193 Christopher Thomas and Zahid Hussain, "Najibullah executed by rebels", The Times, Sept. 28, 1996, at
1.
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humanity". 105 Nevertheless even he concedes that "different approaches" to justice and
amnesty exist among States which experienced civil conflicts or internal disturbances
and that "One could hardly recommend to do something that is simply impossible or too
dangerous".' '3_6
It seems that Guatemala struck a balance to some degree by leaving room for repressing
crimes against humanity, though it is reported that resentment exists against the law of
amnesty which will pardon mostly army officers. 1 °7 South Africa, where trials against
crimes committed during the apartheid period are held, has the same dilemma as
Guatemala. When the former Defence Minister and nine other suspects of murder and
conspiracy to murder were acquitted, there was both praise for, and bitterness against
the decision of the Durban Supreme Court, and President Mandela called for the people
to respect the judgment.1°8
9.5.4. THE PROSPECTS OF RECONCILIATION
One way to strike a balance would be to consider the severity of the crimes committed.
Article 6(5) does not recommend general amnesty but "widest possible amnesty", which
could limit the ambit of application to those who have committed no crimes or lesser
ones. 1 °9 In civil conflict, especially ethnic ones, resentment against the enemy may help
to prevent rational judgment, but such an unreasonable view of the enemy is dangerous
since "not all the enemies are criminals". Even if some of them are guilty of conduct
incongruous to humanitarian provisions, their crimes are not always grave breaches of
104 Security Council, Letter dated 6 August 1993 from the representative of Benin to the Secretary-
General, Annex, Agreement, Section G, Article 19, UN SCOR 48th Sess., Supp. Jul., Aug. and Sept.
1993, at 158, 162 U.N. Doc. S/26272 (9 Aug. 1993).
105 Rein Miillerson, "International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", 2 Journal of Armed Conflict
Law 109, 122 (1997).
106	 7.2la at 130.
107 "Peace, maybe", The Economist, January 4-10, 1997, 53, at 54.
108 I •mgo Gilmore, "Mandela defends judge's acquittal of apartheid general", The Times, Oct. 12, 1996, at
13.
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humanitarian law. Protocol II failed to provide grave breaches, not to mention the
enforcement mechanism. II ° The Rome Statute provides "serious breaches" of
international humanitarian law in civil conflicts, but whether such classification has
achieved acceptance of a majority of States is in doubt. In short, it is important to firmly
establish the definition of war crimes, especially grave breaches in non-international
_
armed conflict, because a person should not be punished severely for a crime which is
not in the scope of grave breaches)"
The clear definition of war crimes is one solution, but it still leaves the problem of
national implementation unsolved. Although programmes of reconciliation are today
undertaken by a number of States that have faced civil conflict or internal disturbance,
such as in South Africa and some Latin American States, it is not certain whether other
States will follow this tendency. The horrifying consequence of the Taliban occupation
of Kabul has already been mentioned. Although international and national tribunals for
the Rwandan genocide have been much publicised, national reconciliation itself has not
been smooth. One report describes worries of both Tutsis and Hutus; the former dread
that Hutus might murder them in order to kill witnesses, while the latter hesitate to
return to Rwanda in fear of vengeance 112 Although this problem is highly political,
international humanitarian law can play a role in disseminating the importance of
reconciliation incorporated in Article 6(5) of Protocol II. Hence, the ICRC initiative to
disseminate international humanitarian law after conflict is an encouraging step towards
109 See McCoubrey and White, supra. note 95, at 76.
110 See cf. Frits Kalshoven, in "Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?", 79 Proceedings of ASIL
109, 122 (1985) (stating that "the whole system of grave breaches applied only in international armed
conflicts and never in situations of internal armed conflicts...").
111 See the detailed discussion in supra. 9.4.2. War Crimes.
112 See "Welcome home", The Economist, December 7-13, 1996, 74, at 74-75.
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ensuring a better peace process. 113 A suggestion made by McCoubrey and White is
worth quoting:
The best that can be done is to urge the greatest measure of humanitarianism in the
-,
conduct of both sides and then to exhort, as article 6(5) of 1977 Additional
,
Protocol II does, the widest possible amnesty thereafter.114
113 Regarding the ICRC's dissemination, see e.g. "Before, during and after crisis", IRRC, May-Jun. 1995,
at 239.
114 McCoubrey and White, supra. note 95, at 76.
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CHAPTER 10
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
10.1. CONCLUSIONS
In Chapter 2, it is found that, before the end of the Second World War, the
recognition of belligerency was of legal value particularly in the areas of neutrality
and maritime rights, while such recognition, both in theory and practice, rarely
governed the regulations concerning conduct of hostilities. Nevertheless, the general
principles of the laws of war, which are moral obligations, have been applicable to
civil war since the time of classical international law. Those general principles
include the principles of humanity, military necessity, distinction and proportionality.
In Chapter 3, the Japanese Civil War, which has been rarely mentioned in textbooks
of international law, is discussed. This civil war is unique in a sense that both sides
of the war were recognised by Great Powers as belligerents. However, the protection
of the wounded, sick, shipwrecked and foreigners was observed to a certain extent out
of humanitarian, rather than out of legal obligation stemming from the recognition.
Additionally, the granting of amnesty to defeated samurai is noticeable, some of
whom became prominent in the establishment of modern Japan.
In Chapter 4, it is discussed that practice and opinio juris are the two indispensable
elements for the establishment of customary law. Practice should be undertaken and
opinio juris be expressed in a "virtually uniform" way by "specially affected States".
In international humanitarian law on non-international armed conflict, the practice
and opinio juris, States, dissident groups and international organisations, such as the
UN, contribute to forming custom, while those of the ICRC, may be of evidential
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value. However, "individuals' practice and opinio furls" cannot be taken into
consideration.
The evidence of practice includes ratification; measures of national implementation;
actual practice; abstention; and statement. The evidence of opinio juris consists of
acceptance of international humanitarian law by belligerents; denial and justification
by belligerents for their own conduct; recognition of belligerents' conduct by third
States; acquiescence of belligerents' conduct by third States; protest against
belligerents' - conduct by third States; and acceptance of international humanitarian
law by States in peacetime.
The ascertainment of customary law is conducted by the ICJ, ad hoc international
tribunals, the International Criminal Court, domestic courts and publicists. There are
two exceptions for the formation of customary law, namely persistent objectors and
new States.
In Chapters 5 to 8, the customary status of each provision of Protocol II is discussed.
Article 1(2) is a customary provision as international humanitarian law has been
applicable to armed conflicts. The provisions of Protocol II that are customary
because of the already customary Common Article 3 are Article 2(1); part of Article
4(1), (2)(a), and (2)(e); Article 4 (2)(c); Article 5(1)(a); Article 6(1) and introduction
of (2); part of Article 7; and part of Article 8. The customary rules that derive from
the general principles of international law are Article 3 and Article 4(2)(f). Besides,
the almost universal ratification of the Child Convention has transformed part of
Article 4(3)(c) into custom. The rest of Protocol II is not customary.
In Chapter 9, this author discusses "implementation" which implies a whole process
of implementation, enforcement and reconciliation. First, the Contracting Parties to
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the Geneva Conventions and/or Protocol II are under obligation to "implement" these
agreements. The main instruments of implementation are dissemination and the
ICRC. Concerning enforcement, reciprocity is not justified today. Belligerent
reprisal is, however, not completely prohibited by Common Article 3 and Protocol II.
The recent _development of international and national war crimes tribunals is
significant, but it is necessary to define war crimes in civil conflict, and also to bring
fairness to these tribunals. Another recent development of enforcement, namely UN
humanitarian intervention, is not necessarily successful, and the UN should consider
the purpose of its intervention.' Internal reports may be useful to rectify the wrongs
which have been done. Finally, reconciliation is essential for the reconstruction of a
State.
10.2. RECOMMENDATIONS
10.2.1. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN DANGER
Before the adoption of the Protocols, Rubin expressed his concern over enhancing the
rules of Article 3, because a rebelling party to a civil conflict would find it impossible
to obey the strengthened prescriptions. 2 His prediction turned to be more or less true
since dissident groups, as well as governments, have committed atrocities contrary to
the enhanced regulations of Protocol II in civil conflicts that have occurred during the
last decade of the twentieth century. The aim of this thesis is to examine the
customary status of Protocol II by applying the theory of customary law, but this
author finds that no provision of the Protocol has become a customary rule based on
practice and opinio juris.
'Adam Roberts, "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts" in 1
European Commission, Law in humanitarian crises 14, 67 (1995).
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It is found in Chapter 4 that Common Article 3 became customary because of the
world-wide ratification of the Geneva Conventions. Indeed, universal ratification
seems to be the easiest method to transform treaty rules into customary. However,
ratification has a drawback. The Civil Conflicts in Chechnya, El Salvador, Liberia
and Rwanda_have been discussed throughout this thesis. A scathing irony of these
conflicts is that the States concerned had ratified Protocol II before internal war
occurred in their territories, 3 but there were massive violations of international
humanitarian law in these conflicts. Because of a lack of information, it is not
possible to discern why these States ratified the treaty, but this author, having found
the co-existence of ratification of Protocol II and violations of the law of armed
conflict, wonders if the States decided to ratify the treaty only for niceness or if the
States did not take into consideration future "implementation" of the Protocol.
"We must do something", but only in a way that ensures the compliance of States and
rebels with the law of armed conflict. In the following, this author makes
recommendations for the future development of international humanitarian law in
internal conflict.
10.2.2. THE IMPORTANCE OF DOMESTIC "IMPLEMENTATION"
First, domestic "implementation" should prevail over new codification. Confronted
with humanitarian crises, one may be tempted to suggest that a new treaty that would
bring the catastrophe to an end be innovated and ratified by a majority of States as
soon as possible. For instance, the director general of the UNESCO called for new
international rules on the protection of cultural properties after the Buddha statutes in
2 Alfred P Rubin, "The Status of Rebels under the Geneva Conventions of 1949", 21 ICLQ 472, 485-
486 (1972).
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Afghanistan were destroyed. 4 Nevertheless it must be remembered that, as mentioned
above, many States recently in conflict were parties to Protocol II while wanton
disregard of even fundamental principles of humanitarian law occurred in those States.
The present author is of the opinion that there are already existing international rules
that need to be incorporated in domestic law and it might be futile to codify more
comprehensive international treaties when States could not "implement" even the
existing conventions.5
The present -writer would take a cautious approach to the recent trend toward the
expansion of international jurisdiction over civil conflicts. The establishment of the
two ad hoc International Tribunals and International Criminal Court is one of the
most important recent developments in international humanitarian law. Moreover, in
August 2000 the Security Council passed a resolution which "Requests the Secretary-
General to negotiate an agreement with the Government of Sierra Leone to create an
independent special court" with jurisdiction over "crimes against humanity, war
crimes and other serious violations of international law". 6 As discussed in Chapter 9,
punishing those who violate international humanitarian law is a salient part of
enforcement, but it appears to the present writer that justice is done to some war
criminals, but not all, and Mtillerson for instance admits that punishing all those who
commit war crimes would not be plausible. 7 However, would it be just to take a firm
stance towards suspected Bosnian Serb war criminals, while alleged war criminals in
Somalia and Sri Lanka are less likely to be punished? If international jurisdiction is
3 The years of ratification as follows: El Salvador (1978); Liberia (1988); Russia (1989); Rwanda
(1984). See the ICRC, Annual Report 1999, at 370-373.
"UNESCO demands international laws on cultural vandalism", Japan Times, Mar. 15, 2001, at 4.
5 Rubin, supra. note 2, at 496; Hilare McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, International Organizations
and Civil Wars, at 126 (1995).
6 S/RES/1315 (2000) at http:// www. un.org/
 Docs/scres/2000/res1315e. pdf/.
7 See e.g. Rein Mallerson, "International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", 2 Journal of Armed
Conflict Law 109, 109, 131 (1997).
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exercised over war crimes, this should be justly exercised; otherwise, this jurisdiction
may be abused by certain influential States.
This author would not negate the legitimacy of international jurisdiction, but
considering that there is no international enforcement mechanism similar to the police
_
in every State, he emphasises the importance of domestic enforcement of IHL. It is
true that, as examined in Chapter 9, States are legally responsible for the prosecution
of war crimes according to Common Articles 1 and 3, but they do not introduce such
measures accordingly. For instance, in the common law system, treaties need to be
incorporated into domestic law through an act of Parliament, 8 and many States in this
legal system indeed have introduced Geneva Conventions Acts. 9 One of the examples
of the Geneva Conventions Acts is that of Australia, I9 but the Act neither refers to
Common Articles 1 and 3 nor Protocol II, even though Australia is a party to Protocol
II. On the side of a rebel group, they too have to prosecute war crimes, as this author
argued in this thesis, but there is only rudimentary evidence which indicates the
existence of such prosecution by a dissident group.
Notwithstanding lack of enthusiasm on the part of both States and rebels, the ICRC
could persuade them into adopting measures to enforce international humanitarian
law. For instance, States are urged by the ICRC to "extend the scope of their Geneva
Conventions Acts so that, in compliance with the principle of universal jurisdiction,
they encompass serious violations of Common Article 3... and Protocol II... ". I I In
relation to insurgents, there is no information on the ICRC's corresponding activities,
but the organisation often requests the insurgents to comply with international
8 International Committee of the Red Cross, Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law,
National Implementation of International Humanitarian Law, Annual Report 1998, at 53.
9 Id., at 59-60.
10 Reprinted in id., at 75-94.
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humanitarian law, which would, if successful, result in the reduction in war crimes.
In spite of the fact that there are so many international, regional, or non-governmental
organisations in the world, the ICRC as a neutral organisation appears to be the only
body trusted by both States and rebels to assume responsibilities for ensuring
compliance with the law of armed conflict by parties to civil war.
Dissemination is another important tool of "implementation" to be seriously
undertaken. The present writer is not so optimistic as to claim that, had the laws of
war been disseminated adequately, there would have been less civil wars and less war
crimes in the late twentieth century. The fact is that the sufficient dissemination of
humanitarian law has been extremely difficult and that a number of civil wars have
occurred in which acts of brutality have been rife. Despite such unfortunate
circumstances, with the knowledge of the laws of war, it is likely that there would
have been fewer violations. Dramatic action, e.g. banning all anti-personnel
landmines, may be effective to educate the public about certain cruel aspects of war,
but at the same time the wounded and sick must be cared for and the bodies collected
and decently buried, the action of which hardly attracts the attention of the public.
Therefore, the dissemination of humanitarian rules would be useful and essential in
spreading knowledge of those rules, both well-known and less well-known. As
examined in Chapter 9, States and rebels are usually reluctant to disseminate
international humanitarian law, and therefore the ICRC and National Societies should
be further encouraged to disseminate the law.
' I Id., at 65.
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10.2.3. TOWARDS A UNIFIED AND PLAIN HUMANITARIAN LAW12
When one considers the problem of today's international humanitarian law and the
long-term prospect of the law, he or she should consider the following hypothesis.13
Suppose there are rebel groups X, Y and Z in State A, which is a party to the Geneva
Conventions and their Protocols. As regards fighting between the legitimate
Government of State A and each rebel group, rebel group X does not satisfy the
conditions of Article 1(1) of Protocol II, and therefore Common Article 3 is
applicable. -Rebel group Y, on the other hand, satisfies those requirements, and
Protocol II applies. Rebel group Z is a national liberation front and, therefore, the
Geneva Conventions and Protocol I apply. Furthermore, even if a specialist could
ascertain the status of rebel groups X to Z, he or she may not be able to confirm the
status of newly formed rebel groups P and Q! This hypothesis could be further
complicated by the intervention of a third State in this conflict, even though this goes
beyond the scope of this thesis.
This assumption reveals the undesirable state of law today, that is there are different
laws between international and non-international wars, and even between civil
conflicts. 14 Soldiers of group X could benefit only from Common Article 3 upon
capture; those of group Y have the benefit of partial protection afforded by Protocol
II; those of group Z could enjoy the full protection of international humanitarian law.
This is a strange phenomenon, considering the fact that the laws of armed conflict
12 Regarding "a unified humanitarian law", the present author is indebted to useful suggestions given
by Professor Adam Roberts in Warsaw.
13 Similar hypotheses can be observed in e.g. Wade S. Hooker, Jr. and David H. Savasten, "The
Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the Vietnamese Conflict", 5 Virginia JIL 243, 256-257
(1965).
14 See id., at 257; Frits Kalshoven, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 267, at 272 (Antonio
Cassese ed., 1975); Esbjtirn Rosenblad, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, at 102
(1979).
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should be applicable equally. Even though Article 2 of Protocol II limits the personal
field of application to situations provided by Article 1, the equal treatment enshrined
in Article 2 sounds futile when there is discrimination in treatment among victims
suffered from-international war, those from internal conflict provided by Protocol II,
and those from civil war defined by Common Article 3.
Hence in the long run the revision of international humanitarian law should be
achieved, and in the process of revision, the distinction between international and
civil conflicts should be abolished. Among authorities on the laws of war who
mention the problem of division between international and non-international wars,
Schwarzenberger wrote in 1968 that "the distinction between international and
internal armed conflicts becomes increasingly relative". 15 Pictet implicitly desired for
a unified law, hoping that "one day the Powers will accord at all times and to all men
the benefits they have already agreed to grant to their enemies in time of war".16
During the Diplomatic Conference, States such as Norway 17 and New Zealand18 were
in favour of establishing a unified international humanitarian law applicable to all
armed conflict, but such a view was regarded as unrealistic. 19 Such a high ideal
seems to have withered, but it may be time to at least consider the possibility of
introducing the unified laws of war. It is, as a matter of course, desirable that
15 Georg Schwarzenberger, "From the Laws of War to the Law of Armed Conflict", 21 Current Leagal
Problems 239, 255 (1968).
16 Jean S. Pictet, Red Cross Principles, at 29 n.1 (1956).
17 Norway, 5 OR, CDDH/SR.10, paras 1-6, at 91, noted and construed in Hans-Peter Gasser,
"Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan, Kampuchea, and
Lebanon", 33 American University Law Journal 145, at 146 and n.2 (1983).
18 New Zealand, 8 OR, CDDH/I/SR.4, para. 8, at 26.
19 See Georges Abi-Saab, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International
Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 217, 225-226 (1988). Gasser regarded the Norwegian proposal as
"an extreme solution". Gasser, supra. note 17, at 146.
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Protocol II is applied to all parties to a civil conflict, 20 but it would be almost
impossible because of proliferation of fighting groups in such struggles.
There are, however, difficulties in establishing a unified humanitarian treaty. For
instance, the Rome Statute is one of the most recent humanitarian instrument,s and it
...
contains more humanitarian rules to the victims of non-international armed conflicts.
Furthermore, the Statute introduced the notion of "serious violations" in civil war,
and this can be considered one of the most important changes which it brings to the
law of armed conflict. Having said so, even the Rome Statute accords with the
tradition that different rules apply to international and non-international armed
conflicts, and it seems most unlikely, at least in the foreseeable future, that States
would agree another humanitarian instrument which would abolish the traditional
distinction. In addition, endeavours to produce a single convention applicable to all
war would appear to States to be highly political because they would equate such
efforts with the legitimisation of rebel forces which they would fear. 21 Besides, the
convention could create a gap between international and domestic laws. States
usually prohibit offences against their own existence in their penal laws, and they
would have to change their own laws to conform with the unified humanitarian rules.
Such changes would make the legitimate government feel vulnerable, because they
could contribute to threatening its own existence in the future.
Having mentioned the difficulties of adopting a unified humanitarian convention,
such a treaty would, nontheless, have certain advantages for States. First, the treaty
would introduce more protection for hors de combat of governmental armed forces.
20 See Rodney G. Allen et al, "Refining War: Civil Wars and Humanitarian Controls", 18 Human
Rights Quarterly 747, 764 (1996).
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Needless to say, the protection would also extend to those of the rebel forces, but
better protection of their own soldiers would be an advantage to the government.
Second, the government could appeal to the public by stating that it treats captured
fighters of the rebel group humanely in accordance with a humanitarian treaty, even
though the actual "implementation" of the treaty would need to follow such a claim.
Third, unlike the internationalisation of national liberation movements which only
singles out struggles for self-determination, a unified treaty would not choose a
particular category of conflict, which would reduce the difficulty in categorising the
conflict.
Furthermore, the myth that there has always been a division between international and
non-international wars should be openly challenged. The historical analyses in this
thesis indicate the applicability of the general principles of the laws of war to civil
war, and governmental insistence upon fears of legalisation of a rebel group does not
necessarily stand in a historical perspective.
Today's scholarly works as well as judicial judgments may not be ready for a move
toward a unified treaty, as it is rare, among them, to support such proposal, if they
ever consider it. At a glance, the jurisprudence of the ICTY appears to be one of
them, but one could sense a sign of the proposal in it. One instance of it is the Tadic
case, in which the Appeals Chamber in its decision stressed the importance of the
Security Council's position not to classify the armed conflicts in the former
Yugoslavia. 22 The Appeals Chamber further stated that, had the Security Council
21 The politicisation of the laws of war in a future revisioning conference is predicted by Borrowdale.
See Andrew Borrowdale, "The law of war in Southern Africa: the growing debate", 15 CILSA 41, 56
(1982).
22 The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic,a/k/a "Dule", Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, 2 Oct. 1995, paras 72-78, reprinted in 35 ILM 32
(1996) [hereinafter Tadic case].
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decided to empower the Court to consider only international armed conflict, on the
one hand, the Court could not have taken into considerations atrocities committed by
the Bosnia-Herzegovina's government army against Bosnian Serb civilians since
those civilians were nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina and therefore not protected
under Geneva Convention IV; on the other hand, the Court could have dealt with
crimes committed by Bosnian Serbs against civilians of nationality of Bosnia-
Herzegovina because Bosnian Serbs acted "as organs or agents of' the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia and therefore those civilians were regarded as protected
persons under Geneva Convention IV. 23 The Appeals Chamber simply regarded such
outcome as "absurd" since "it would place the Bosnian Serbs at a substantial legal
disadvantage vis-à-vis the central authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina". 24 The ICTY
did not state that, because of such "absurdity", the difference between international
and non-international armed conflicts should be abolished, but it at least found a
defect in today's international humanitarian law, which would be in essence similar to
this author's contention.
In the same case, moreover, the Appeals Chamber further found Article 3 of the
Tribunal's Statute, which provides the prosecution of violations of the laws or
customs of war, to be applicable to non-international armed conflict. 25 The article is
mainly concerned with the "Hague law", which Common Article 3 and Protocol II
rarely mention, and therefore the finding went beyond the scope of the treaty
provisions. On the one hand, this author is in the opinion that the Court should have
examined more State practice and opinio juris before reaching the conclusion 26 , but
23 Id., para. 76.
24 Id.
23 Id., paras. 87-93, particularly 89-91.
26 .
a 
,1 para. 88 (the Court only refered to the statements made by the American, British, French and
Hungarian delegates made at the Security Council.)
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on the other hand the finding confirms the validity of the idea that the move toward a
unified international humanitarian law is in progress.27
Should there be a unified humanitarian law, Article 1 of a future convention should
be:
This Convention shall be applicable to armed conflict.
The important point is that such a treaty does not internationalise civil conflict, but it
sets rules applicable to all armed conflict irrespective of nature. The phrase such as
"irrespective of whether it is international or non-international" should not be inserted
because such qualification itself would cause the problem of interpretation. Having
said so, it would be useful to consider which situation is not armed conflict and
therefore to introduce the lowest threshold so that all the situations above the
threshold would be governed by the unified humanitarian law. In this respect, Article
1(2) of Protocol II, which this author found customary in Chapter 5, would be of
assistance. The provision states that Protocol II is not applicable to "situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence
and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts". The problem of
interpretation of each situation would still remain, but this provision at least clearly
indicates that Protocol II is not applicable to situation not amounting to armed
conflicts. Therefore, if a similar provision would be introduced in the unified
humanitarian law, it would become a useful tool to distinguish armed conflict from
mere internal disturbances and tensions. Finally, it needs to be stressed that Article
27 See Colin Warbrick and Peter Rowe, The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: the
Decision of the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case, 45
ICLQ 691, 701 (1996) (Rowe states that "[the Appeals Chamber's] interpretation of Article 3 of the
Statute sends a coach and four through the traditional distinctions between an international and non-
international conflict")
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8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute is similarly worded, and this indicates the well-established,
customary nature of this provision.
The unified humanitarian law should be as simple as possible. 28 It is a fact that the
law of armed conflict has become more and more detailed and technical, and one
pertinent example is the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The willingness of a government
and a rebel group to comply with the full Geneva Conventions is often emphasised,29
but the practical value of such willingness is doubtful. For instance, the FMLN
declared the -application of the full Geneva Conventions and Protocols, 3 ° but it is
questionable that the dissident group could abide by more than five hundred
provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Thus, it may be desirable that technicalities
are left to domestic legislation and military manuals.31
Rosemary Abi-Saab describes the fear held by international lawyers:
... not all experts agree on the desirability of encouraging a search for "general
principles" of humanitarian law, lest the Geneva Conventions be reduced to a
few rules deemed essential, at the expense of others of equal importance,
especially the rules of implementation; for fear, in other words, of reducing the
whole body of international humanitarian law applicable to international
conflicts to this minimum of principles, to the detriment of the numerous more
specific rules of humanitarian law applying to conflicts of this type.32
28 As to the problem of specification of the laws of war, see Delbert D. Smith, "The Geneva Prisoner
of War Convention: An Appraisal", 42 New York University Law Review 880, 910-912 (1967)
29 See Tadic case, para. 105-107.
30 See supra. Ch. 5.
31 However, technicalities are unavoidable in conventions on certain weapons.
32 Rosemary Abi-Saab, 'The "General Principles" of humanitarian law according to the International
Court of Justice', IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 357, 371.
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Having examined the importance of the general principles of the laws of war in
Chapter 2, this author refutes the above concern for two reasons. First, it would not
be scholarly to dissuade the study of the general principles of the laws of war, which,
without legal- obligations, have been invoked theoretically and practically in both
intemationaL and civil conflict for centuries. Second, the 1949 Geneva Conventions
and their Protocols exist not for their own sake, but for the sake of the victims of
armed conflict. In other words, if the reduction of these instruments would be more
helpful than their preservation as they are, let them be reduced to fewer provisions!
Besides, if a State, which ratifies a new humanitarian law comprising of less detailed
provisions, is confidently able to "implement" the law, the States would introduce
domestic law and a military manual which provides more detailed provisions.
A unified and simplified law should be ratified only by those States that are willing to
comply with it. As the present author has already written, the world-wide ratification
would not necessarily result in the better "implementation" of humanitarian
instruments, which would be dangerous to the legitimacy of international
humanitarian law. A State must consider if she can "implement" a humanitarian
treaty, and she should ratify it only when she is certain that the treaty will be
"implemented". For instance, it might be tempting to accuse the US Government of
not having ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is almost
universally ratified. However, according to the information of the UNICEF, the US
Government has not ratified the treaty because she "undertakes an extensive
examination and scrutiny of treaties before proceeding to ratify". 33 Such attitude of
33 UNICEF, "Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently asked questions" at http:// www.
uniceforg/crc/faq.htm.
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the US Government should not be condemned; rather it should be followed by other
States.
10.2.4. APPROACH BASED ON MORALITY, TRADITION AND CULTURE34
In the last part of this thesis, the present author considers the problem of the universal
character of today's international humanitarian law. Recent humanitarian treaties,
including the 1977 Protocols, have been adopted in international conferences where
representatives from all over the world gathered. Abi-Saab prefers to regard such
humanitarian conventions of universal character as "general international law",
towards which many States have "a generalized feeling that [they are] legally bound
or not". 35 The examination of State practice, however, indicates that Protocol II,
comprising of provisions that, Abi-Saab claims, "were produced through a complex
process of careful drafting and lengthy negotiations", has not been adequately applied,
when the instrument is applicable. Common Article 3, part of the 1949 Geneva
Conventions that are almost universally ratified, is often subject to gross violations.
There are a number of possible answers for violations of treaties concerning
international humanitarian law, but the present writer considers that one important,
yet unnoticed, reason may be the universal character of humanitarian conventions.
International conferences may offer good opportunity for all States, whether small
States or Great Powers, to express their views on particular issues. However, the
examination of the Official Records of the Diplomatic Conference indicates that this
is not always the case; some provisions of Protocol II were not adequately discussed,
34 Regarding international humanitarian law and cultural relativism, see Marco SassOli and Antoine A.
Bouvier, How Does Law Protect in War, at 70-71 (1999).
35 Georges Abi-Saab, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some
Preliminary Reflexions", in Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja (eds.), Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven 115, 121-2 (1991).
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and many articles were the result of compromise reached at the last stage of the
Diplomatic Conference. "Something was done" by adopting Protocol II on the whole
by consensus, but the study of the Official Records shows that many States were not
convinced by approved articles.
_
A unified and simplified humanitarian convention might provide a clue to this
problem, if not a solution. States would more easily accept the treaty for its
simplicity, as the detailed "implementation" should be left to the States. Civil wars
are atrocious, because they are often concerned with differences, such as culture,
ethnicity, religion and ideology, and the legal instrument which was provided by an
international conference may not appeal to the parties to the conflict. Rather, good
domestic measures, which reflect the morality, tradition and culture of the people
living in the State facing such conflict, would be more useful to prevent cruelties.36
For instance, during the Japanese Civil War, it was not an international treaty but
Bush ido, ethics of the samurai, which contributed to ameliorating the conditions of
victims. The same is true to the American Civil War, as it was Lieber's Code, not an
international instrument, which humanised the war.
The present author is not so optimistic as to suppose that States parties to a unified
and simplified law would always "implement" the treaty, but as he has just written,
the treaty should only be ratified by the State which is willing to "implement" it so
that the treaty will become an effective tool when an armed conflict occurs. In
addition, the better dissemination of the law of armed conflict, particularly in a way to
appeal to the morality, tradition and culture of people would result in better
36 SassOli and Bouvier, supra. note 34, at 71 (stating that "These international dimensions of 1HL
should never be underestimated or forgotten: very often the respect and implementation of the rules
will in fact depend on the establishment of a clear correspondence between the applicable treaties and
local traditions or customs").
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"implementation". 37 The laws of war can be construed in different ways, depending
on each culture. 38 International humanitarian law may not function when hatred
spreads, as recent conflict shows, but good domestic measures based on morality,
tradition and culture would be easily understood and would prevent some atrocities, if
not al1.39
For the time being, however, the possibility that such a unified and simplified treaty is
adopted is remote, and therefore customary law can play a role in ameliorating the
conditions of victims in non-international armed conflict. Study on customary law in
this area needs to be much encouraged. Needless to say, an objective view is
necessary for ascertainment of custom. It is therefore appropriate that the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda found in its judgment that "Additional
Protocol II as a whole was not deemed by the Secretary-General to have been
universally recognized as part of customary international law". 4° The ICRC, the only
organisation which has maintained its presence in almost all conflicts for more than a
century, is conducting research into customary rules in international humanitarian law,
and the publication of the work is much awaited. 41 Of course, such study on custom
would be futile without "implementation" of the custom, and this author concludes
this thesis by emphasising the importance of "implementation".
" Id.
38 Id.
39 1d.
40 The Prosecutor v. Jean-Paul Akayem, Judgement, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 2 Sept., 1998, para. 609,
at http:// www. ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Akayesu/judgement/akay001.htm.
41 See the relevant argument in Ch. 1.
282
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
Acufla, Tathiana Flores, The United Nations Mission in El Salvador: A Humanitarian Law Perspective,
The Hague/London/Boston, Kluwer Law International, 1995.
Aizu Boshin Sen.- shi Hensankai [Association to Compile Documents on the War in Aizu], Aizu Boshin
Senshi [The War in Aizu], Tokyo, Aizu Boshin Senshi 1-lensankai, 1933.
Arango, E. Ratiu5n, Spain: democracy regained, 2nd. ed., Boulder/Oxford, Westview Press, 1995.
Beck, Robert J., Arend, Anthony Clark and Vander Lugt, Robert D., International Rules: Approaches
from International Law and International Relations, New York/ Oxford, Oxford UP, 1996.
Bedjaoui, Mohammed, Law and the Algerian Revolution, Brussels, The International Association of
Democratic Lawyers, 1961.
Bellamy, Christopher, Knights in White Armour: The New Art of War and Peace, London, Hutchinson,
1996.
Berry, Nicholas 0., War and the Red Cross: The Unspoken Mission, New York, St. Martin's Press,
1997.
Best, Geoffrey, War and Law Since 1945, Oxford, Oxford UP, 1994.
Blishchenko, Igor, International Humanitarian Law, Translated from Russian by Ivan Chulaki, Moscow,
Progress Publishers, 1989.
Bond, James E., The Rules of Riot: Internal Conflict and the Law of War, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1974.
Bothe, Michael, Partsch, Karl Josef and Solf, Waldemar A., New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts:
Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, The
Hague/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
Bothe, Michael, Kurzidem, Thomas, and Macalister-Smith, Peter, eds., National Implementation of
International Humanitarian Law: Proceedings of an International Collequium held at Bad
Homburg, June 17-19, 1988, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1990.
Boyle, Kevin and Hadden, Tom, Northern Ireland: The Choice, London, Penguin Books, 1994.
Brierly, J.L., The Law of Nations: An Introduction to the International Law of Peace, 6th ed., Sir
Humphrey Waldock ed., Oxford, Oxford UP, 1963.
Brogan, Patrick, World Conflicts, 3d ed., London, Bloomsbury, 1998.
Brownlie, Ian, Principles of Public International Law, 5th ed., Oxford, Oxford UP, 1998.
Cassese, Antonio, ed., Current Problems of International Law: Essays on UN. Law and on the Law of
Armed Conflict, Milano, Dott. A. Giuffre Editore, 1975.
Cassese, Antonio, ed., The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica
s.r.1., 1979.
Casten, Erik, Civil War, Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1966.
Checkland, Olive, Humanitarianism and the Emperor's Japan, 1877-1977, New York, St. Martin's
Press, 1994.
Ciment, James, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, New York, Facts On File, Inc., 1997.
Clapham, Christopher, ed., African Guerrillas, Oxford/ Kampala / Bloomington & Indianapolis, James
Currey/ Fountain Publishers/ Indiana UP, 1998.
Cohn, Ilene and Goodwin-Gill, Guy S., Child Soldiers: The Role of Children in Armed Conflict, Oxford,
Oxford UP, 1994.
Coogan, Tim Pat, The IRA, rev, new ed., London, Harper Collins Publishers, 1995.
Cordesman, Anthony H., Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE: Challenges of Security, Boulder,
Colorado/ Oxford, Westview Press, 1997.
Cortazzi, Hugh, Dr. Willis in Japan, 1862-1877: British medical pioneer, London/ Dover, New
Hampshire/ Athlone Press, 1985.
Danilenko, Gennady M., Law-Making in the International Community, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff,
1993.
283
Delissen, Astrid J.M. and Tanja, Gerard J., eds., Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges
Ahead: Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven, Dordrecht/Boston/ London, Martinus Nijhoff,
1991.
Destexhe, Alain, Rwanda and Genocide in the Twentieth Century, Translated into English from French
by Alison Marschner, London/East Haven, CT, Pluto Press, 1995.
Dinstein, Yoram ed., International Law at a Time of Perplexity: Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne,
Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1989.
Draper,	 The Red Cross Conventions, London, Stevens & Sons, 1958.
European Commission, Law in humanitarian crises, Vol. I, How can international humanitarian law be
made 'effective in armed conflicts?, Luxembourgh, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1995.
European Commission, Law in humanitarian crises, Vol. II, Access to victims: Right to intervene or
right to receive humanitarian assistance? Luxembourgh, Office for Official Publications of the
European Communities, 1995.
Evans, Malcolm D., Blackstone 's International Law Documents, London, Blackstone Press Limited,
1991.
Falk, Richard A., ed., The International Law of Civil War, Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins Press,
1971
Fleck, Dieter ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, Oxford, Oxford UP, 1995.
Fox, Hazel and Meyer, Michael A. eds., Armed Conflict and the New Law, Vol. II, Effecting Compliance,
London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989.
Freedman, Lawrence ed., War, Oxford/ New York, Oxford UP, 1994.
Frente Farabundo Marti Para la Liberation Nacional & Frente Democratico Revolucionario, The
Situation of Human Rights in the Salvadoran Armed Conflict January-September 1985, El
Salvador, Political-Diplomatic Commission of the FMLN-FDR, 1985.
Gasser, Hans-Peter, International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction, separate print from Hans Haug,
Humanity for All, The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, HDI, Haupt, 1993.
Green, L.C., The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict, Manchester, Manchester UP, 1993.
Griffis, William Elliot, The Mikado: Institution and Person: A Study of the Internal Political Forces of
Japan, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1915.
Hall, Williams Edward, A Treatise of International Law, 8th ed., Higgins ed., Oxford, Oxford UP, 1924.
Hargreaves, John D., Decolonization in Africa, New York/ London, Longman, 1988.
Harris, D.J., Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., London, Sweet & Maxwell, 1998.
Haug, Hans, Humanity for all: The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement,
Berne/Stuttgart/Vienna, Paul Haupt Publishers, 1993.
Hellmann-Rajanayagam, Dagmar, The Tamil Tigers: armed struggle for identity, Stuttgart, Franz Steiner
Verlag, 1994.
Higgins, Rosalyn, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It, Oxford, Oxford UP,
1994.
Horne, Alistair, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, rev. ed., London, Papermac, 1987.
Hoshi, Ryoichi, Ouetsu Reppan Domei [The Alliance of Northern Han], Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha, 1995.
Hoshi, Ryoichi, Haisha no Ishinshi [The Meiji Restoration for the Defeated], 3rd ed., Tokyo, Chuo
Koronsha, 1994.
Howard, Michael, ed., Restraints on War: Studies in the Limitation of Armed Conflict, Oxford, Oxford
UP, 1979.
Howard, Michael, Andreopoulos, George J., and Shulman, Mark R., eds., The Laws of War: Constraints
on Warfare in the Western World, New Haven/ London, Yale UP, 1994.
Huband, Mark, The Liberian Civil War, London/Portland, OR, Frank Cass, 1998.
Hunter, Janet, Concise Dictionary of Modern Japanese History, Tokyo, Kodansha International Ltd.,
1984.
Hutchinson, John F., Champions of Charity: War and the Rise of the Red Cross, Boulder, Colorado/
Oxford, Westview Press, 1996.
284
Ikei, Masaru, Zoho Nihon Gaikoshi Gaisetsu [The History of Japanese Diplomacy, revised and
enlarged] , Tokyo, Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989.
Independent Commission on International Issues, Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge: A
Report for the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, London/ New
Jersey, Zed Books, 1986.
Ishii, Takashi, Boshin Senso Ron, [The Japanese Civil War], Tokyo, Yoshikawa Kobunkan, 1986.
Ishii, Takashi, Meiji Ishin to Gaiatsu [Meiji Restoration and Foreign Pressure], Tokyo, Yoshikawa
Kobunkan, 1993.
Ishimitsu, Mahito, Aru Meiji Jin no Kiroku [Record of a Man of Meiji ] , Tokyo, Chuo Koronsha, 1971.
Ishin Shiryo Hensankai [Association to Compile Documents on the Meiji Restoration] ed., Fukkoku
Kazoku Fuyo [Genealogy of Noble Family, Reissued], Tokyo, Ohara Shinseisha, 1982.
ICRC, The ICRC and the Algerian Conflict, Geneva, ICRC, 1962.
ICRC, The International Committee of the Red Cross and internal disturbances and tensions, Geneva,
ICRC, 1986.
International Committee of the Red Cross and International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent
Societies, Handbook of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, 13th ed.,
Geneva, ICRC/ International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1994.
Jackson, Gabriel, A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War, London, Thames and Hudson, 1974.
Jackson, Henry F., The FLN in Algeria, Westport, Greenwood Press, 1977.
Janis, Mark W. and Evans, Carolyn, eds., Religion and International Law, The Hague/Boston/London,
Martinus Nijhoff, 1999.
Junod, Marcel, Warrior Without Weapons, Translated by Edward Fitzgerald, first published by Jonathan
Cape Limited, London, 1951; reprinted by International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva,
1982.
Kajima, Morinosuke, Nihon Gaikoshi, Dai 1 kan, Bakumatsu Gaiko [The History of Japanese
Diplomacy, Vol. 1, Diplomacy at the end of the Edo Period], Kajima Heiwa Kenkyujo [Kajima
Peace Institute] ed., Tokyo, Kajima Kenkyujo Shuppankai, 1970.
Kalshoven, F., Constraints on the Waging of War, 2nd ed., Geneva, ICRC, 1991.
Keegan, John, A History of Warfare, London, Pimlico, 1994.
Koike, Iichi, Zusetsu Nihon no "I" no Rekishi, Jyo, Tsushi Hen [Illustrated History of Medicine in
Japan, Vol. 1: Comprehensive History], Tokyo, Ozorasha, 1992.
Koshaku Shimazuke Hensanjo [Institute of the Family of Prince Shimazu] ed., Sappan Kaigunshi
[History of the Navy of the Satsuma Han], Vol. 1, Tokyo, Harashobo, 1968.
Kwakwa, Edward, The International Law of Armed Conflict: Personal and Material Fields of
Application, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992.
Lauterpacht, Hersh, Recognition in International Law, Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1947.
Levie, Howard S. ed., The Law of Non-International Armed Conflict, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
Livingston, Marius H., ed., International Terrorism in the Contemporary World, Westport, Greenwood
Press, 1978.
Macdonald, R.St.J. and Johnston, Douglas M., The Structure and Process of International Law: Essays
in Legal Philosophy Doctrine and Theory, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1986.
McCoubrey, Hilaire, International Humanitarian Law, 2nd ed., Aldershot/ Brookfield USA/ Singapore/
Sydney, Dartmouth, 1998.
McCoubrey, Hilaire, and White, Nigel D., International Law and Armed Conflict, Aldershot/ Brookfield
USA/ Hong Kong/ Singapore/ Sydney, Dartmouth, 1992.
McCoubrey, Hilaire, and White, Nigel D., International Organizations and Civil Wars,
Aldershot/Brookfield, USA/Singapore/Sydney, Dartmouth, 1995.
McCoubrey, Hilaire, and White, Nigel D., The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation of United Nations
Military Operations, Aldershot/Brookfield USA/ Singapore/ Sydney, Dartmouth, 1996.
Malanezuk, Peter, Akehurst's Modern Introduction to International Law, 7th rev. ed., London/New
York, Routeledge, 1997.
285
Meron, Theodor, Human Rights in Internal Strife: Their International Protection, Cambridge, Grotius,
1987.
Meron, Theodor, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law, Oxford, Oxford UP, 1989.
Messenger, Charles, The Century of Warfare: Worldwide Conflict from 1900 to the Present Day,
London, Harper Collins, 1995.
Meyer, Michael A., ed., Armed Conflict and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and
the 1981 Weapons Convention, London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law,
1989.
Minter, William, Portuguese Africa and the West, New York/ London, Monthly Review Press, 1972.
Misra, S.S., Ethnic Conflict and Security Crisis in Sri Lanka, Delhi, Kalinga Publications, 1995.
Moore, J.N., ed., Law and Civil War in the Modern World, Baltimore/ London, Johns Hopkins Press,
1974
Moorehead, Caroline, War, Switzerland and the History of the Red Cross, London, Harper Collins, 1998.
Nitobe, Inazo, Bushido: The Soul of Japan, rev, and enlarged ed., Rutland/ Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle
Company, 1969. Originally published by G.P. Putman's Sons, New York in 1905.
Newitt, Malyn, Portugal in Africa: The Last Hundred Years, London, C. Hurst & Co., 1981.
Nogueira, Franco, The United Nations and Portugal: a study of Anti-Colonialism, London, Sidgwick
and Jackson, 1963.
Oppenheim, L., International Law: A Treatiese, Vol. II: Disputes, War and Neutrality, 5th ed., H.
Lauterpacht ed., London/New York/Toronto, Longmans, Green and Co., 1935.
Osatake, Takeshi, Kokusaihoyori Mitaru Bakumatsu Gaikoshi [Diplomacy of the later Period of the
Shogunate, in the light of International Law], Tokyo, Hokodo, 1930.
Otsuka Takematsu ed., Meiji Boshin Kyokugai Churitsu Tenmatsu [Neutrality in the Japanese Civil
War], Tokyo, Nihon Shiseki Kyokai, 1932.
Oyama, Kashiwa, Boshin Sensoshi, Joge [History of the Japanese Civil War, Vols. 1&2] , Tokyo, Jiji
Tsushinsha, 1968.
Padelford, Norman J., International Law and Diplomacy in the Spanish Civil Strife, New York, The
Macmillan Co., 1939.
Parker, Geoffrey, ed., The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare: The Triumph of the West,
Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1995.
Parsons, Anthony, From Cold War to Hot Peace: UN Interventions 1947-1995, London, Penguin Books,
1995.
Pictet, Jean S. ed., Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field: Commentary, Geneva, ICRC, 1952.
Pictet, Jean S., Red Cross Principles, Geneva, ICRC, 1956.
Polomka, Peter, ed., Bougainville: Perspectives on Crisis, Canberra, Strategic and Defence Studies
Centre, Research School of Pacific Studies, The Australian National University, 1990.
Roberts, Adam and Guelff, Richard, eds, Documents on the Laws of War, 3rd ed., Oxford, Oxford UP,
2000.
Rogers, A.P.V., Law on the Battlefield, Manchester/ New York, Manchester UP, 1996.
B.V.A. and Cassese, Antonio, The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a Peacemonger,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1994.
Ronzitti, N., ed., The Law of Naval Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with
Commentaries, Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
Rosas, Allan, The Legal Status of Prisoners of War: A Study in International Humanitarian Law
Applicable in Armed Conflicts, Helsinki, Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia, 1976.
Rosenblad, Esbjtim, International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict: Some Aspects of the Principle
of Distinction and Related Problems, Geneva, Henry Dunant Institute, 1979.
Rupesinghe, Kumar and Verstappen, Berth, Ethnic Conflict and Human Rights in Sri Lanka: An
Annotated Bibliography, London/Munich/New York, Hans Zell Publishers, 1989.
286
Sandoz, Yves, Swinarski, Christophe and Zimmermann, Bruno eds., Commentary on the Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, Geneva,
ICRC/Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
SassOli, Marco and Bouvier, Antoine A., How Does Law Protect in War: Cases, Documents and
Teaching Materials on Contemporary Practice in International Law, Geneva, ICRC, 1999.
Satow, Sir Ernest, A Diplomat in Japan: an inner history of the critical years in the evolution of Japan,
Rutland, Vermont/ Tokyo, Charles E. Tuttle, 1983. Originally published by Seeley, Services,
London In 1921.
Schindler, Dietrich and Toman, Jiri, eds, The Laws of Armed Conflicts: A Collection of Conventions,
Resolutions and Other Documents, 3rd rev, and completed ed., Dordrecht/ Geneva, Martinus
Nijhoff / Henry Dunant Institute, 1988.
Schwarzenberger, Georg, International Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Vol. II,
The Law of Armed Conflict, London, Steevens and Sons Ltd., 1968.
Scott, George, The Rise and Fall of the League of Nations, London, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1973.
Seevarathnam, N., ed., The Tamil National Question and The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, Delhi, Konark
Publishers Pvt Ltd., 1988.
Shaw, Malcolm N., International Law, 4th ed., Cambridge, Cambridge UP, 1997.
Shiba, Ryotaro, 'Meiji' to lu Kokka [The State whose Name is 'Meiji :1, Vol. 2, Tokyo, Nippon Hoso
Kyokai Shuppan, 1994.
Silber, Laura and Little, Allan, The Death of Yugoslavia, London, Penguin Books/ BBC Books, 1995.
Somalia: A Government at War With Its Own People, NY/WashingtordLondon, The Africa Watch
Committee, 1990.
Suter, Keith, An International Law of Guerrilla Warfare: The Global Politics of Law-Making, London,
Frances Pinter Publishers, 1984.
Swinarski, Christophe, ed., Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross
principles in honour of Jean Pictet, Geneva/ The Hague, ICRC/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1984.
Takahashi, Kunitaro, Oyatoi Gaikokujin 6 Gunji [Foreigners Employed by the Imperial Government,
Vol. 6, Military], Tokyo, Kajima KenIcyujo Shuppan, 1969.
Takamatsu, Ukiji, Bakusho Furuya Sakuzaemon (am) Bakui Takamatsu Ryoun (ototo) Den [Biography
of Two Brothers, Furuya Sakuzaemon and Takamatsu Ryoun] Fukuoka, 1980.
Thirlway, H.W.A., International Customary Law and Codification, Leiden, Sijthoff International
Publishing Company, 1972.
Thomas, Hugh, The Spanish Civil War, 3rd ed. rev, and enlarged, London, Penguin Books, 1990.
Toman, Jiri, The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict: Commentary on the
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and its
Protocol, signed on 14 May 1954 in The Hague, and on other instruments of international law
concerning such protection, Aldershot/Vermont/Paris, Dartmouth/UNESCO, 1996.
Twiss, Travers (later Sir), The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On
the Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War, Oxford/ London, Clarendon Press/ Longman,
Green, Longman, and Roberts, 1863.
Twiss, Sir Travers, The Law of Nations Considered as Independent Political Communities. On the
Rights and Duties of Nations in Time of War, 2nd ed. rev., Oxford/ London, Clarendon Press/
Longman, Green, and Co., 1875.
UNESCO, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law, Geneva/ Paris/ Dordrecht/ Boston/ London,
Henry Dunant Institute/ UNESCO/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1988.
Vasak, Karel, ed., The International Dimensions of Human Rights, Revised and edited for the English
edition by Philip Alston, Vol. 1, Westport/ Paris, Greenwood Press/ Unesco, 1982.
De Vattel, Emer, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law: Applied to the Conduct and to
the Affairs of Nations and of Sovereigns, Vol. III, Translation of the Edition of 1 758 By Charles
G. Fenwick With an Introduction by Albert de Lapradelle, James Brown Scott ed., The Classics
of the International Law, Washington, Carnegie Institute of Washington, 1916, reprinted by
287
Michael E. Slatkine and Jiri Toman eds., Geneva, Slatkine Reprints/ Henry Dunant Institute,
1983.
Verzijl, J.H.W. International Law in Historical Perspective, Leyden, A.W. Sijthoff, 1968.
Vidal-Naquet, Pierre, Torture: Cancer of Democracy France and Algeria 1954-62, Translated by Barry
Richard, Middlesex, Penguin Books Ltd., 1963.
Wheaton, Henry, Elements of International Law: with a Sketch of the History of the Science, 2 Vols.,
London, B. Fellowes, (Ludgate St.,) 1836.
Wheaton, Henry, -Elements of International Law, Edition of Richard Henry Dana, Jr., ed. by George
Grafton Wilson, Boston, Little, Brown, and Company, 1866, James Brown Scott ed., The
Classic§ of International Law, Washington, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1936.
White, N.D., Keeping the peace: The United Nations and the maintenance of international peace and
security, Manchester/ New York, Manchester UP, 1993.
Willis, Michael, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History, Reading, Garnet Publishing Ltd.,
1996.
Wilson, Heather A., International Law and the Use of Force by National Liberation Movements, Oxford,
Oxford UP, 1988.
Wolfke, Karol, Custom in Present International Law, 2nd rev. ed., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1993.
Woolsey, Theodore D., Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching,
and in Historical Studies, Boston/Cambridge, James Munroe and Company, 1860.
Woolsey, Theodore D., Introduction to the Study of International Law, Designed as an Aid in Teaching,
and in Historical Studies, 6th ed. rev. enlarged, London, Sampson Low, Marston, Searle, &
Rivington, Ltd., 1888.
288
ARTICLES
Abi-Saab, Georges, "The Implementation of Humanitarian Law", in The New Humanitarian Law of
Armed Conflict 310 (Antonio Cassese ed., Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica s.r.1., 1979).
Abi-Saab, G., "Wars of National Liberations in the Geneva Conventions and Protocols", 165 Recueil des
cours 353.(19794V).
Abi-Saab, Georges, "Non-International Armed Conflicts", in UNESCO, International Dimensions of
Humanitarian Law 217 (Geneva/ Paris/ Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Henry Dunant Institute/
UNESCO/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
Abi-Saab, Georges, "The 1977 Additional Protocols and General International Law: Some Preliminary
Reflexions" in Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict Challenges Ahead: Essays in Honour of
Frits Kalshoven 115 (Astrid J.M. Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., Dordrecht/ Boston/
London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
Abi-Saab, Rosemary, 'The "General Principles" of humanitarian law according to the International
Court of Justice', IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 367.
Adachi, Sumio, "The Asian Concept", in UNESCO, International Dimensions of Humanitarian Law 13
(Geneva/ Paris/ Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Henry Dunant Institute/ UNESCO/ Martinus
Nijhoff, 1988).
Akehurst, Michael, "Custom as a Source of International Law", 47 BYIL 1(1974-75).
Akehurst, Michael, "The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law", 47 BYIL 273 (1974-75)
Akhavan, Payam, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and Pragmatics of
Punishment", 90 AJIL 501 (1996).
Aldrich, George H., "Compliance with the Law: Problems and Prospects" in Armed Conflict and the
New Law, Vol. II, Effecting Compliance 3 (Hazel Fox and Michael A. Meyer eds., London,
British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1993).
Allen, Rodney G., Cherniack, Martin and Andreopoulos, George J., "Refining War: Civil Wars and
Humanitarian Controls", 18 Human Rights Quarterly 747 (1996).
Aubert, Maurice, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Problem of excessively
injurious or indiscriminate weapons", IRRC, Nov. -Dec. 1990, at 477.
Baloro, John, "International Humanitarian Law and Situations of Internal Armed Conflicts in Africa", 4
RADIC 449 (1992).
Baty, Thomas, "Can an Anarchy be a State?", 28 AJIL 444 (1934).
Baxter, Major Richard R., "So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs", 28
BYIL 323 (1951).
Baxter, R. R., "Multilateral Treaties as Evidence of Customary International Law", 41 BYIL 275 (1965-
66).
Baxter, R. R., "Treaties and Custom", 129 Recueil des cours 25 (1970-I).
Berman, Paul, "The ICRC's Advisory Service on International Humanitarian Law: the challenge of
national implementation", IRRC, May-Jun. 1996, at 338.
Blischenko, Igor P., "Judicial Decisions as a Source of International Humanitarian Law", in The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 41 (Antonio Cassese ed., Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica
s.r.1., 1979).
Blishchenko, Igor P., Humanitarian Norms and Human Rights, in Independent Commission on
International Humanitarian Issues, Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge: A Report for
the Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues 142-157 (London/ New
Jersey, Zed Books, 1986).
Blondel, Jean-Luc, "The Fundamental Principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent: Their origin and
development", IRRC, Jul.-Aug. 1991, at 349.
Boals, Kathryn, "The Relevance of International Law to the Internal War in Yemen", in The
International Law of Civil Wars 303 (Richard A. Falk ed., Baltimore/ London, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971).
Borchard, Edwin, 'Neutrality" and Civil War', 31 AJIL 304 (1937).
289
Borrowdale, Andrew, "The future of the law of war: the place of the Additional Protocols of 1977 in
customary international law", 14 Comparative and International Lcrw Journal of Southern
Africa 79 (1981).
Borrowdale, Andrew, "The law of war in Southern Africa: the growing debate", 15 Comparative and
International Law Journal of Southern Africa 41 (1982).
"Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC's solemn appeal to all parties to the conflict", IRRC, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at
492
Bothe, Michael, "Article 3 and Protocol II: Case Studies of Nigeria and El Salvador", 31 AULR 899
(1982).
Bothe, Michael, "The role of national law in the implementation of international humanitarian law", in
Studies and essays on international humanitarian law and Red Cross principles in honour of
Jean Pictet 301 (Christophe Swinarski ed., Geneva/ The Hague, ICRC/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1984).
Bothe, Michael, "War Crimes in Non-International Armed Conflicts", 24 Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights 241 (1994).
Bothe, Michael, "Correspondence", 90 AJIL 76 (1996).
Bouvier, Antoine, "Recent studies on the protection of the environment in time of armed conflict", IRRC,
Nov. — Dec. 1992, at 554.
Bovay, Nicholas M. L., "The Russian Armed Intervention in Chechnya and its Human Rights
Implications", No. 54, International Commission of Jurists: The Review 29 (1995).
Boyle, Francis A., "The Decolonization of Northern Ireland", 4 Asian Yearbook of International Law
25 (1994).
Brownlie, Ian, "Volunteers and the Law of War and Neutrality", 5 ICLQ 570 (1956).
Brownlie, Ian, "Recognition in Theory and Practice", 53 BYIL 197 (1982).
Bruderlein, Claude, "Custom in international humanitarian law", IRRC, Nov.- Dec. 1991, at 579.
Bundu, A.C., "Recognition of Revolutionary Authorities: Law and Practice of States", 27 ICLQ 18
(1978).
Cable, James, "Naval Humanitarianism", 11 International Relations 335 (1993).
Caratsch, Claudio, "Humanitarian Design and Political Interference: Red Cross Work in the Post-Cold
War Period", 11 International Relations 301 (1993).
Carnahan, Burrus M. and Robertson, Marjorie, 'The Protocol on "Blinding Laser Weapons": A New
Direction for International Humanitarian Law', 90 AJIL 484 (1996).
Cassese, Antonio, "The Spanish Civil War and the Development of Customary Law Concerning Internal
Armed Conflicts", in Current Problems of International Law 287 (Antonio Cassese ed., Milano,
Dort. A. Giuffre Editore, 1975).
Cassese, Antonio, "Means of Warfare: The Traditional and the New Law", in The New Humanitarian
Law of Armed Conflict 161 (Antonio Cassese ed., Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica s.r.1., 1979).
Cassese, Antonio, "A Tentative Appraisal of the Old and the New Humanitarian Law of Armed
Conflict", in The New Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, 461 (Antonio Cassese ed., Napoli,
Editoriale Scientifica s.r.1., 1979).
Cassese, Antonio, "The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International Armed
Conflicts", 30 ICLQ 416 (1981).
Cassese, Antonio, "The Geneva Protocols of 1977 on the Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict and
Customary International Law", 3 UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 55 (1984).
Cassese, Antonio, "Respect of Humanitarian Norms in Non-International Armed Conflict", in
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Modern Wars: The
Humanitarian Challenge: A Report for the Independent Commission on International
Humanitarian Issues 86 (London/ New Jersey, Zed Books, 1986).
Charney, Jonathan I., "The Persistent Objector Rule and the Development of Customary International
Law", 56 BYIL 1(1985).
Charney, Jonathan I., "Customary International Law in the Nicaragua Case Judgment on the Merits", 1
Hague Yearbook of International Law 16 (1988).
Charney, Jonathan I., "Universal International Law", 87 AJIL 529 (1993).
290
Cheng, Bin, 'United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: "Instant" International Customary Law?', 5
Indian Journal of International Law 23 (1965).
Cheng, Bin, "Custom: The Future of General State Practice In a Divided World" in The Structure and
Process of International Law: Essays in Legal Philosophy, Doctrine and Theory 513 (R. St. J.
Macdonald and Douglas M. Johnston eds., Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff, 1983).
Cheng, Bin, "How Should We Study International Law", 13 Chinese Yearbook of International Law and
Affairs 214 (1994-1995).
Chimango, L.J., "The relevance of humanitarian international law to be liberation struggles in Southern
Africa - the case of Mocambique in retrospect", 8 Comparative and International Law Journal
of Southern Africa 287 (1975).
Compagnon, Daniel, "Somali Armed Movements: The Interplay of Political Entrepreneurship & Clan-
Based Factions", in African Guerrillas 73 (Christopher Clapham ed., Oxford/ Kampala /
Bloomington & Indianapolis, James Currey/ Fountain Publishers/ Indiana UP, 1998)
Conteh, A.C., "Sierra Leone and the Norm of Non-Intervention: Evolution and Practice", 7 RADIC 166
(1995).
Daniels, Gordon, "The Japanese Civil War (1868) - A British View", 1 Modern Asian Studies 241
(1967).
Danilenko, Gennady M., "The Theory of International Customary Law", 31 German Yearbook of
International Law 9 (1988).
Danilenko, Gennady M., "International Jus Cogens: Issues of Law-Making", 2 EJIL 42 (1991).
Dinstein, Yoram, "The International Law of Inter-State Wars and Human Rights", 7 Israel Yearbook on
Human Rights 139 (1977).
Domb, Fania, "Treatment of War Crimes in Peace Settlements - Prosecution or Amnesty", 24 Israel
Yearbook on Human Rights 253 (1994).
Doswald-Beck, Louise, "International Humanitarian Law: A Means of Protecting Human Rights in
Time of Armed Conflict", 1 RADIC 595 (1989).
Doswald-Beck, Louise, "The San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at
Sea", 89 AJIL 192 (1995).
Doswald-Beck, Louise and Cauderay, Gerald C, "The development of new anti-personnel weapons",
IRRC, Nov.- Dec. 1990, at 565.
Doswald-Beck, Louise and Vite, Sylvain, "International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law",
IRRC, Mar.- Apr. 1993, at 94.
Draper, G.I.A.D.,"Wars of National Liberation and War Criminality", in Restraint on War 135 (Howard
ed., Oxford, Oxford UP, 1979).
Draper, G.I.A.D., "The implementation and enforcement of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and of the
two Protocols of 1978", 164 Recueil des cours 1(1979-111).
Draper, G.I.A.D., "Humanitarianism in the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts" in Armed Conflict and the
New Law 3 (Michael A. Meyer ed., London, British Institute of International and Comparative
Law, 1989)
Dugard, John, "Soldiers or Terrorists? The ANC and the SADF Compared", 4 South African Journal on
Human Rights 221(1988).
Durand, Andre, "The role of Gustave Moynier in the founding of the Institute of International Law
(1873) - The War in the Balkans (1857-1878); The Manual of the Law of War (1880)", IRRC,
Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 542.
Eagleton, Clyde, "Self-Determination in the United Nations", 47 AJIL 88 (1953).
Eide, Asbjorn, "The New Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflict", in The New
Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict 277 (Antonio Cassese ed., Napoli, Editoriale Scientifica
s.r.1., 1979).
Eide, Asbjtirn, "Internal Disturbances and Tensions", in UNESCO, International Dimensions of
Humanitarian Law 241 (Geneva/ Paris/ Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Henry Dunant Institute/
UNESCO/ Martinus Nijhoff, 1988).
Eide, Asbjorn, Rosas, Allan and Meron, Theodor, "Combating Lawlessness in Gray Zone Conflicts
through Minimum Humanitarian Standards", 89 AJIL 215 (1995).
291
Ellis, Stephen, "Liberia's Warlord Insurgency", in African Guerrillas 155 (Christopher Clapham ed.
Oxford/ Kampala / Bloomington & Indianapolis, James Currey/ Fountain Publishers/ Indiana
UP, 1998).
Everett, Robinson 0., "Possible Use of American Military Tribunals to Punish Offenses Against the
Law of Nations", 34 Virginia JIL 289 (1994).
Fair, Karen V., "The Rules of Engagement in Somalia - A Judge Advocate's Primer", 8 Small Wars and
Insurgencies 107 (Spring 1997).
Falk, Richard A., "Nuclear Weapons, International Law and the World Court: A Historic Encounter", 91
AJIL 64 (J997)
Farer, Tom, "Humanitarian Law and Armed Conflicts: Toward the Definition of "International Armed
Conflict", 71 Columbia Law Review 37.
Faundez, Julio, "International Law and Wars of National Liberation: Use of Force and Intervention", 1
RADIC 85 (1989).
Fenwick, C.G., "Can Civil Wars Be Brought under the Control of International Law?", 32 AJIL 538
(1938).
Finch, George A., "The United States and the Spanish Civil War", 31 AJIL 74 (1937).
Fleck, Dieter, "The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions and Customary International Law",
29 Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 495 (1990).
Fleck, Dieter, "Implementing International Humanitarian Law: Problems and Priorities", IRRC, Mar.-
Apr. 1991, at 140.
Fleiner-Gerster, Thomas and Meyer, Michael A., "New Developments in Humanitarian Law: A
Challenge to the Concept of Sovereignty", 34 ICLQ 267 (1985).
Forsythe, David P., "Legal Management of Internal War: the 1977 Protocol on Non-International Armed
Conflicts", 72 AJIL 272 (1978).
Forsythe, David P., "The International Committee of the Red Cross", in Armed Conflict and the New
Law, Vol. II, Effecting Compliance 83 (Hazel Fox and Michael A. Meyer eds., London, British
Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1993).
Fox, Gregory H., "International Law and Civil Wars", 26 International Law and Politics 633 (1994).
Fox, Hazel, "The Objections to Transfer of Criminal Jurisdiction to the UN Tribunal", 46 ICLQ 434
(1997).
Fraleigh, Arnold, "The Algerian Revolution as a Case Study in International Law", in The International
Law of Civil War (Richard A. Falk ed., Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
Gaeta, Paola, "The Armed Conflict in Chechnya before the Russian Constitutional Court", 7 EJIL 563
(1996).
Garner, James W., "Questions of International Law in the Spanish Civil War", 31 AJIL 66 (1937).
Garner, James W., "Spanish Civil War - Neutrality Policy of the United States", 18 BYIL 197 (1937).
Garner, James W., "Recognition of Belligerency", 32 AJIL 106 (1938).
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "International Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, and Lebanon", 31 AULR 911 (1982).
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "Internationalized Non-International Armed Conflicts: Case Studies of Afghanistan,
Kampuchea, and Lebanon", 33 American University Law Journal 145 (1983).
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "A Brief Analysis of the 1977 Geneva Protocols", 19 Akron Law Review 525 (1986).
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "Prohibition of terrorist acts in international humanitarian law", /RRC, Jul.-Aug.
1986, at 200.
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "A measure of humanity in internal disturbances and tensions: proposal for a Code
of Conduct", IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 38.
Gasser, Hans-Peter, "Correspondence", 90 AJIL 76 (1996).
Green, L.C., "Derogation of Human Rights in Emergency Situations", 16 Canadian Yearbook of
International Law 92 (1978).
Green L.C., "Terrorism and Armed Conflict: The Plea and the Verdict", 19 Israel Yearbook on Human
Rights 131 (1989).
Green L.C., "International Crimes and the Legal Process", 29 ICLQ 567 (1980).
292
Green, L.C., "What Is - Why Is There - The Law of War?", 5 Finnish Yearbook of International Law 99
(1994).
Greenberg, Eldon van Cleff, "Law and the Conduct of the Algerian Revolution", 11 Harvard ILJ 37
(1970).
Greenwood, Christopher, "The Concept of War in Modern International Law", 36 ICLQ 283 (1987).
Greenwood, Christopher, "Terrorism and Humanitarian Law - The Debate over Additional Protocol I",
19 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 187 (1989).
Greenwood, Christopher, "Customary Law Status of the 1977 Geneva Protocols", in Humanitarian Law
of Armed Conflict: Challenges Ahead, Essays in Honour of Frits Kalshoven 93 (Astrid J.M.
Delissen and Gerard J. Tanja eds., Dordrecht/ Boston/ London, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991).
Greenwood, Christopher, "The International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia", 4 International Affairs
641 (1993).
Hampson, Francoise J., "Belligerent Reprisals and the 1977 Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of
1949", 37 ICLQ 818 (1988).
Hampson, Francoise, "Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", in Armed Conflict
and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention 55
(Michael A. Meyer ed., London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989).
Hampson, F.J., "Mercenaries: Diagnosis Before Prosecution", 22 NYIL 3 (1991).
Harroff-Tavel, Marion, "Action Taken by the International Committee of the Red Cross in Situations of
Internal Violence", IRRC, May-Jun. 1993, at 195.
Harvey, Richard J., "The Right of the People of the Whole of Ireland to Self-Determination, Unity,
Sovereignty and Independence", 11 New York Law School Journal of International and
Comparative Law 167 (1990).
Henckaerts, Jean-Marie, "Study on customary rules of international humanitarian law: Purpose,
coverage and methodology", /RRC, Sept. 1999, at 660.
Hoffman, Michael Harris, "The customary law of non-international armed conflict: evidence from the
United States Civil War", IRRC, Jul.-Aug. 1990, at 322.
Hooker, Jr., Wade S., and Savasten, David H., "The Geneva Convention of 1949: Application in the
Vietnamese Conflict", 5 Virginia JIL 243 (1965).
ICRC, "Action by the International Committee of the Red Cross in the event of breaches of international
humanitarian law", /RRC Mar.-Apr. 1981, at 76.
ICRC, "Statues and Rules of Procedure of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement",
IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1987, at 25.
ICRC, "ICRC Statutes brought into line with the revised Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement", IRRC, Mar.-Apr. 1988, at 153.
ICRC, "Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards", IRRC, May-Jun. 1991, at 330.
ICRC, "The ICRC and the conflict in the former Yugoslavia", IRRC, Sept.-Oct. 1992, at 488.
ICRC, "The ICRC and internally displaced persons", IRRC, Mar.-Apr. 1995, at 180.
John, 0. Peter St., "Algeria: A Case Study of Insurgency in the New World Order", 7 Small Wars and
Insurgencies 196 (Autumn 1996).
Jones, Tim, "The British Army, and Counter-Guerrilla Warfare in Greece, 1945-49", 8 Small Wars and
Insurgencies 88 (Spring 1997).
Joyner, Christopher C., "U.N. General Assembly Resolutions and International Law: Rethinking the
Contemporary Dynamics of Norm-Creation", 11 California Western International Law Journal
445 (1981).
Kalshoven, Frits, "Applicability of Customary International Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts",
in Current Problems of International Law 267 (Antonio Cassese ed., Milano, Dott. A. Giuffre
Editore, 1975).
Kalshoven, Frits, "Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts: The Diplomatic Conference, Geneva, 1974-1977 Part I: Combatants and
Civilians", 8 NYIL 107 (1977).
293
Kalshoven, Frits, "State Responsibility for Warlike Acts of the Armed Forces: From Article 3 of Hague
Convention IV of 1907 to Article 91 of Additional Protocol I of 1977 and Beyond", 40 ICLQ
827 (1991).
Kelsen, Hans, "Recognition in International Law: Theoretical Observations", 35 AJIL 605 (1941).
Kirgis, Frederich L. Jr., "Custom on a Sliding Scale", 81 AJIL 146 (1987).
Kirpichnikov, Aleksei, "The Decisions on Sending Troops into Chechnya Are Declared Constitutional",
Sevodnya, tug. 1, 1995, at 1, reprinted in 47 The Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, No.
31, at 4 (1995).
Krill, Francoise, "The Protection of Women in International Humanitarian Law", MRC, Nov.-Dec. 1985,
at 337.
Krill, Francoise, "ICRC action in aid of refugees", /RRC, Jul.-Aug. 1988, at 328.
Kufuor, Kofi Oteng, "The Legality of the Intervention in the Liberian Civil War by the Economic
Community of West African States", 5 RADIC 525 (1993).
Kufuor, Kofi Oteng, "Starvation as a means of Warfare in the Liberian Conflict", 41 NILR 313 (1994).
Kunz, Joseph L., "The Laws of War", 50 AJIL 313 (1956).
Kwakwa, Edwards "The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements and the 1977 Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions", 2 Proceedings of the African Society of International
and Comparative Law 21 (1990).
Lauterpacht, H., "The Problem of the Revision of the Law of War", 29 BYIL 360 (1952).
Lavochkin, Vladislav, "Military Justice System in Russia. Today: Organization and Functions", 33
Revue de Droit Militaire et de Droit de la Guerre 9 (1994).
Leurdijk, J.H., "Civil War and Intervention in International Law", 24 NILR 143 (1977).
Mann, Howard, "International Law and the Child Soldier", 36 ICLQ 32 (1987).
Marks, Stephen P., "Principles and Norms of Human Rights Applicable in Emergency Situations:
Underdevelopment, Catastrophes and Armed Conflicts", in The International Dimensions of
Human Rights, Revised and edited for the English edition by Philip Alston, at 175 (Karel
Vasak ed., Vol. 1, Westport/ Paris, Greenwood Press/ Unesco, 1982).
Marley, Anthony D., "Too Many Cooks in the Kitchen: International Intervention in Liberia", 8 Small
Wars and Insurgencies 109 (Autumn 1997).
Martin, David A., "Reluctance to Prosecute War Crimes: Of Causes and Cures", 34 Virginia JIL 255
(1994).
Matheson, Michael J., "The Opinions of the International Court of Justice on the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons", 91 AJIL 417 (1997).
Maurice, Fdderic and Corten, de Jean, "ICRC Activities for Refugees and Displaced Civilians", IRRC,
Jan.-Feb. 1991, at 9.
McCoubrey, H., "Jurisprudential Aspects of the Modern Law of Armed Conflicts", in Armed Conflict
and the New Law: Aspects of the 1977 Geneva Protocols and the 1981 Weapons Convention 23
(Michael A. Meyer, ed., London, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 1989).
McCoubrey, H., "The Armed Conflict in Bosnia and Proposed War Crimes Trials", 11 International
Relations 411(1993).
McCoubrey, Hilaire, Natural Law, "Religion and the Development of International Law" in Religion
and International Law 177 (Mark W. Janis and Carolyn Evans eds., The Hague/Boston/London,
1999).
McDougal, Myres S., "Law and Minimum World Public Order: Armed Conflict in Larger Context", 3
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 21 (1984).
Meindersma, Christa, "Applicability of Humanitarian Law in International and Internal Armed Conflict",
7 Hague Yearbook of International Law 113 (1995).
Mendelson, Maurice, "The Subjective Element in Customary International Law", 66 BYIL 177 (1995).
Menkes, Jerzy, "Public International Law in/and Polish Military Forces", 33 Revue de Droit Militaire et
de Droit de la Guerre 93 (1994).
Meron, Theodor, "Towards a Humanitarian Declaration on Internal Strife", 78 AJIL 859 (1984).
Meron, Theodor, "The Geneva Conventions as Customary Law", 81 AJIL 348 (1987).
Meron, Theodor, "International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities", 89 AJIL 554 (1995).
294
Meron, Theodor, "The Continuing Role of Custom in the Formation of International Humanitarian Law"
90 AJIL 238 (1996).
Metzl, Jamie Frederic, Rwandan Genocide and the International Law of Radio Jamming, 91 AJIL 628
(1997).
Moir, Lindsay, "The Historical Development of the Application of Humanitarian Law in Non-
International Armed Conflicts to 1949", 47 ICLQ 337 (1998).
Moreillon, Jacques, "The fundamental principles of the Red Cross, peace and human rights", IRRC, Jul.-
Aug. 1980, at 171.
Mtillerson, Rein, !International Humanitarian Law in Internal Conflicts", 2 Journal of Armed Conflict
Law 109 (1997).
Murray, Christina, "The 1977 Geneva Protocols and Conflict in Southern Africa", 33 ICLQ 462 (1984).
Myren, Robin S., "Applying International Laws of War to Non-International Armed Conflicts: Past
Attempts, Future Strategies", 37 NILR 347 (1990).
Nipmgeko, Gerard, "The implementation of international humanitarian law and the principle of State
sovereignty", /RRC, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 105.
Noble, Lala Garner, "The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines", 49 Pacific Affairs 405
(1976).
Obradovic, Konstantin, "Enquiry Mechanisms and Violations of Humanitarian Law: Some suggestions
on how to improve their effectiveness", in Independent Commissions on International
Humanitarian Issues, Modern Wars: The Humanitarian Challenge: A Report for the
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues 121 (London/ New Jersey, Zed
Books, 1986).
O'Brien, William V., "The Jus in Bello in Revolutionary War and Counterinsurgency", 18 Virginia JIL
193 (1978).
O'Rourke, Vernon A., "Recognition of Belligerency and the Spanish War", 31 AJIL 398 (1937).
Padelford, Norman J., "International Law and the Spanish Civil War", 31 AJIL 226 (1937).
Palwankar, Umesh, "Applicability of international humanitarian law to United Nations peace-keeping
forces", IRRC, May-Jun. 1993, at 227.
Palwankar, Umesh, "Measures available to States for fulfilling their obligation to ensure respect for
international humanitarian law", IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 9.
Pion-Berlin, David, "To Prosecute or to Pardon? Human Rights Decisions in the Latin American
Southern Cone", 15 Human Rights Quarterly 105 (1993).
Plattner, Denise, "The penal repression of violations of international humanitarian law applicable in
non-international armed conflicts", IRRC, Sep.-Oct. 1990, at 409.
Plattner, Denise, "The 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons and the applicability of rules
governing means of combat in a non-international armed conflict", IRRC, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at
551.
Posner, Theodore R., "International Decisions Kadic v. Karadzic", 90 AJIL 658 (1996).
Post, H.H.G., "Some Curiosities in the Sources of the Law of Armed Conflict Conceived in a General
International Legal Perspective", 25 NYIL 83 (1994).
Prunier, Gerard, "The Rwandan Patriotic Front", in African Guerrillas, 119 (Christopher Clapham ed.,
Oxford/ Kampala / Bloomington & Indianapolis, James Currey/ Fountain Publishers/ Indiana
UP, 1998).
Rao, R. Jaganmohan, "When Does War Begin", 12 Indian Journal of International Law 368 (1972).
Reed, Wm Cyrus, "Guerrillas in the Midst", in African Guerrillas 134 (Christopher Clapham, ed.,
Oxford/ Kampala / Bloomington & Indianapolis, James Currey/ Fountain Publishers/ Indiana
UP, 1998).
Roberts, Adam, "The Laws of War: Problems of Implementation in Contemporary Conflicts", in
European Commission, Law in humanitarian crises, Vol. I: How can international
humanitarian law be made effective in armed conflicts? 14 (Luxembourg, Office for Official
Publications of the European Communities, 1995).
Ming, B.V.A., "The law of war and the national jurisdiction since 1945", 100 Recueil des cours 323
(1960-11).
295
Rowe, Peter, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: The Decision of the Appeals
Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic Case", 45 ICLQ 691 (1996).
Rowe, Peter and Meyer, Michael A., "Ratification by the United Kingdom of the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949: Selected Problems of Implementation", 45
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 343 (1994).
Rowe, Peter, and Meyer, Michael A., "The Geneva Conventions (Amendments) Act 1995: A Generally
Minimalist_Approach", 45 ICLQ 476 (1996).
Rubin, Alfred P., "The Status of Rebels under the Geneva Conventions of 1949", 21 ICLQ 472 (1972).
Rubin, Benjamin,_"PLO Violence and Legitimate Combatancy: A Response to Professor Green", 19
Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 167 (1989).
"Rules of international humanitarian law governing the conduct of hostilities in non-international armed
conflicts", IRRC, Sept.-Oct 1990, at 383.
Sandoz, Yves, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and the Law of Armed Conflict Today",
Vol. 4, International Peacekeeping 86 (Winter 1997).
Saxena, J.N., "Guerrilla Warfare and International Law", 25 Indian Journal of International Law 621
(1985).
Schachter, Oscar, "The Right of States to Use Armed Forces", 82 Michigan Law Review 1620 (1984).
Schachter, Oscar, "Entangled Treaty and Custom", in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 717
(Yoram Dinstein ed., Dordrecht/Boston/London, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1989).
Schindler, Dietrich, "The International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights", IRRC, Jan.-Feb.
1979, at 3.
Schindler, D., "The Different Types of Armed Conflicts According to the Geneva Conventions and
Protocols", 163 Recueil des cours 117 (1979-II).
Schwarzenberger, Georg, "From the Laws of War to the Law of Armed Conflict", 21 Current Legal
Problems 239 (1968).
Schwelb, Egon, "Northern Ireland and the United Nations", 19 ICLQ 483 (1970).
Shraga, Daphna, "The United Nations as an Actor Bound by International Humanitarian Law", 5
International Peacekeeping 64 (Summer 1998).
Siekmann, Robert, "The Development of the United Nations Law Concerning Peace-Keeping
Operations", 5 Leiden Journal of International Law 273 (1992).
Smith, Delbert D., "The Geneva Prisoner of War Convention: An Appraisal", 42 New York University
Law Review 880 (1967).
Solf, Waldemar A., (No title), 31 AULR 927 (1982).
Solf, Waldemar A., "Protection of Civilians against the Effects of Hostilities under Customary
International Law and under Protocol I", 1 American University Journal of International Law
and Policy 117 (1986).
Sommaruga, Cornelio, "Respect for international humanitarian law: ICRC review of five years of
activity (1987-1991)", IRRC, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 74.
Sommaruga, Cornelio, "Unity and plurality of the emblems", IRRC, Jul.-Aug. 1992, at 3.
Sommaruga, Cornelio, "Humanitarian action and peace-keeping operations", IRRC, Mar.-Apr. 1997, at
178.
Spencer, Claire, "Algeria in Crisis", 36 Survival 149 (Summer 1994).
Tachi, Sakutaro, "Book Reviews. Osatake: Diplomacy of the later Period of the Shogunate, in the light
of International Law", 26 The Journal of International Law and Diplomacy 189 (1927)
Tanja, Gerard J., "Recent Developments Concerning the Law for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict", 7 Leiden Journal of International Law 115 (1994).
Taubenfeld, Howard J., "The Applicability of the Laws of War in Civil War", in Law and Civil War in
the Modern World 499 (J.N. Moore ed., Baltimore/ London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1974).
Tauxe, Jean-Daniel, "Liberia: humanitarian logistics in question", IRRC, May-Jun. 1996, at 351.
"The Red Cross in Civil Wars", 5 AJIL 438 (1911).
Thomas, Ann Van Wynen and Thomas, A.J., International Legal Aspects of the Civil War, in The
International Law of Civil War 110 (Richard A. Falk ed., Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins
Press, 1971).
296
Turns, David, "War Crimes without War? - The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to
Atrocities in Non-International Armed Conflict", 7 RADIC 804 (1995).
Van Deventer, Henry W., "Mercenaries at Geneva", 70 AJIL 811 (1976).
Van Dyke, Jon, "The Riddle of Establishing Clear and Workable Rules to Govern Armed Conflicts", 3
UCLA Pacific Basin Law Journal 34 (1984).
Veuthey, Michael, "Implementation and Enforcement of Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in
Non-Internajional Armed Conflicts: The Role of the International Committee of the Red Cross",
33 AULR 83 (1983).
Villa, Hernando Valencia, "The law of armed conflict and its application in Colombia", IRRC, Jan.-Feb.
1990, at 5.
Vinson, Nigel, "The Demise of the Anti-Personnel Mine: A Military Perspective", 143 No. 1, RUSI
Journal 18 (February 1998).
Waldock, C.H.M., "The regulation of the use of force by individual States in international law", 81
Recueil des cours 451 (1952-11).
Walker, C.P., "Irish Republican Prisoners - Political Detainees, Prisoners of War or Common
Criminals?", 19 The Irish Jurist, 189 (1984).
Warbrick, Colin, "The European Convention on Human Rights and the Prevention of Terrorism", 32
ICLQ 82 (1983).
Warbrick, Colin, "The Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 and the European
Convention on Human Rights: The McVeigh Case", 32 ICLQ 757 (1983).
Warbrick, Colin, "Co-operation with the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia", 45 ICLQ 947
(1996).
Warbrick, Colin and Rowe, Peter, "The International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia: the Decision of
the Appeals Chamber on the Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction in the Tadic case", 45 ICLQ
691 (1996).
Wedgwood, Ruth, "War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia: Comments on the International War Crimes
Tribunal", 34 Virginia JIL 267-275 (1994).
Weil, Prosper, "Towards Relative Normativity in International Law", 77 AJIL 413 (1983).
Wortley, B.A., "Observations on the Revision of the 1949 Geneva 'Red Cross' Conventions", 54 BY IL
143 (1983).
Wright, Quincy, "The Outlawry of War and the Law of War", 47 AJIL 365 (1953).
Wright, Quincy, "Is Discussion Intervention?", 50 AJIL 102 (1956).
Wright, Quincy, "The American Civil War (1861-65)", in The International Law of Civil War 30
(Richard A. Falk ed., Baltimore/London, Johns Hopkins Press, 1971).
Yingling, Raymund T. and Ginnane, Robert W., "The Geneva Conventions of 1949", 46 AJIL 393
(1952).
Zayas, Alfred M. de, "International Law and Mass Population Transfers", 16 Harvard ILJ 207 (1975).
297
ELECTRONIC INFORMATION
"Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949 and Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977: ratifications,
accessions and successions" (29 August 2000), which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at
http:// www. icrc.org/.
Hans-Peter Gasser, The United Nations and International Humanitarian Law: The International
Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations' involvement in the implementation of
international humanitarian law", paper presented in the International Symposium on the
occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations, Geneva, 19-21 October (19 Oct.
1995), which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at http:// www. icrc.org/.
Press Release, L/ROM/22, "UN Diplomatic Conference Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish
Permanent International Criminal Court", 17 Jul. 1998, at http:// www. Un.org/icc/pressrel/
Irom22.htm.
Press Release 95/18, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: ICRC strongly condemns shelling of civilians in Tuzla",
(26 May 1995) which can be found in the ICRC's homepage at http:// www. icrc.org/.
"Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Ratification Status as of 30 April 2001" at http://
www. un.org/law/icc/ statute/status.htm.
UNESCO, "Convention and Protocol for the Prohibition of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed
Conflict (The Hague, 14 May 1954)" at http:// www.
unesco.org/culture/laws/hague/html_eng/page9.shtml.
UNESCO, "Status by Treaty: Convention on the Rights of the Child" which can be found in the
UNICEF homepage at http:// www. unhcr.ch/.
UNICEF, "Convention on the Rights of the Child: Frequently asked questions" at http:// www.
unicef.org/crc/faq.htm.
298
CONFERENCES
1966	 "The International Regulation of Internal Violence in the Developing Countries", 60 Proceedings of
ASIL 58 (1966).
1967	 "Panel: International Law and Civil Wars - I", 61 Proceedings of ASIL 1(1967).
"Panel: International Law and Civil Wars - II", 61 Proceedings of ASIL 50 (1967).
1973	 "Terrorism and Practical Crimes in International Law", 67 Proceedings of ASIL 87 (1973).
1973	 "Human Rights and Armed Conflict: Conflicting Views", 67 Proceedings of ASIL 141 (1973).
1975	 "Japan's Assimilation of Western International Law", 69 Proceedings of ASIL 63 (1975).
1978	 "Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949", 72 Proceedings of ASIL 142 (1978).
1982	 Conference: The American Red Cross - Washington College of Law
"Conference: International Humanitarian Law: Non-International Armed Conflicts"
31 AULR 897 (1982).
1985	 "Should the Laws of War Apply to Terrorists?", 79 Proceedings of ASIL 109 (1985).
1987 "Customary Law and Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions for Protection of War
Victims: Future Directions in Light of the U.S. Decision Not to Ratify", 81 Proceedings of ASIL 26
(1987).
1987 "Humanitarian Law Conference: Determining Customary International Law Relative to the
Conduct of Hostilities in Non-International Armed Conflicts", 2 American University Journal of
International Law and Policy 471 (1987).
1988	 "A Discussion of Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions of 1949", 82 Proceedings of ASIL 613
(1988).
299
